

# Project “Countering radicalization among women in Jalal- Abad and Chui Provinces”

## Report on the sociological survey "Determining the level of knowledge about radicalization and violent extremism among women and youth"



**Hedayah**  
countering violent extremism



PIL Research  
Company

“Mutakallim” Progressive  
Public Association of Women

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## Abbreviations

a/a	Aiyl Aimak (Village Governments)
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DEC	District Electoral Commissions
DIAO	District Internal Affairs Office
IcSP	Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace
LSG	Local Self-Government
NGO	Non-Government Organization
RUSI	Royal United Institute of Defense Studies
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## INTRODUCTION

This report presents the findings of a sociological survey "Determining the level of knowledge about radicalization and violent extremism among women and youth" for the Progressive Public Association of Women "Mutakallim", conducted from May to July 2018 within the framework of the project "Countering radicalization among women in Jalal-Abad and Chui Province". This project is part of STRIVE Global Program, implemented by Hedayah, through the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) of the European Union. The main goal of the survey, as the name implies, is to determine the level of knowledge of women and youth about radicalization and violent extremism, in particular about the risks, ways and measures to identify and prevent them in the target communities of Jalal-Abad and Chui provinces.

## DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY

To ensure the completeness and reliability of the collected data the study has used both qualitative and quantitative methods of collecting and analyzing information. In particular, the following methods were applied:

1. Desk study (study and analysis of regulatory legal acts, and other documents relevant to the objectives of the study);
2. Survey of population. This survey was conducted among 1000 women.

This questionnaire consists mostly of quantitative survey questions, but there are also open questions, where participants could provide their own definition of extremism-radicalism phenomena or give another response.

The questionnaire for the population consists of two sections: demographic data (questions D1-D11) and the second section (questions B1-B25) helps to collect and analyze information about the respondents' judgments on the level of radicalization and violent extremism in the local community, perception of its nature, factors and risks of radicalization. In development of this tool and evaluation of violent extremism, the survey team have used the "Methodology for the Diagnosis of Dispositions of Violent Extremism" developed by D. Davydov and K. Khlomov (2017)<sup>1</sup>.

- **Research participants**

When selecting respondents, the criteria for their representativeness of the common population in the studied areas were met by such parameters as age, place of residence (see Annex 1 and Annex 2). The communities and sites for survey were selected by random (probabilistic) sampling using Research Randomizer ([www.random.org](http://www.random.org)) - a free resource for rapid generation of random numbers (Annex 3). The generation has used a list of election polling stations in Jalal-Abad and Chui provinces, as well as in Bishkek and Jalal-Abad cities. The age quotas were calculated on the basis of the Demographic Data of

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<sup>1</sup>Reference to the given source is available here:

<https://www.researchgate.net/search.Search.html?type=publication&query=Методика%20диагностики%20диспозиций%20насильственного%20экстремизма>. The methodology is reflected in a set of questions B15.

the National Statistics Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2018. The selected three age groups were: 18-28 - youth, 29-58 - able-bodied, and 59+.

Since there has been no access to the data on the breakdown of the population by age at the level of aiyl aimak (a/ a), the calculation was carried out according to the age-breakdown by regions, and by rural and urban settlements (see demographic compilation, sections 1.11 by regions, www.stat.kg). The calculation was carried out in three options. Since the population of cities is in several times higher than the population of aiyl aimaks, option No. 3 was more appropriate (Appendix No. 2).

Progressive Public Association of Women “Mutakallim” identified 10 communities (target communities), and two control ayamaks (a/a) in both areas were selected in consultation with the company's research team (Table 1).

<b>Table 1. Selected communities for the study</b>	
<b>Jalal-Abad province</b>	<b>Chui province</b>
<b>Target communities</b>	
Jalal-Abad city	<b>Jany-Jer a/a</b> , Sokuluk district
<b>Tash-Bulak a/a</b> , Suzak district	<b>Mayevka a/a</b> , Alamudun district
<b>Atabekov a/a</b> , Suzak district	<b>Aleksandrovka a/a</b> , Moskovski district
<b>Kurmanbek a/a</b> , Suzak district	<b>Logvinenko a/a</b> , Yssyk-Ata district
<b>Kenesh a/a</b> , Bazar-Korgon district	Orok a/a, Sokuluk district
<b>Control communities</b>	
<b>Yrys a/a</b> , Suzak district	<b>Vasilievskaa a/a</b> , Alamudun district
	Bishkek

Having studied the data on the lists of district electoral commissions (DEC) (lists of the DEC by the number of voters), the largest villages of Chui and Jalal-Abad provinces were selected (the list of villages and quotas can be studied in detail in Annex 1): 11 villages were selected in Chui province and 15 villages in Jalal-Abad province.

Also having studied the number of inhabitants, Orok a/a in the Sokuluk district was excluded from the list of selected communities due to the small number of residents in the villages living in this community. This decision also allowed to balance the number of communities across provinces, as well as to include control communities. 20 sites (according to the DEC lists of two cities) in urban areas (10 sites in Bishkek and Jalal-Abad) were selected by random sampling. After the survey, 20% of the sample was checked through the quality control of the conducted field work (by calling to respondents and checking routing sheets, conducting control visits).

### **3. An expert survey of stakeholders.**

100 structured interviews were conducted with representatives of local self-governance bodies, law enforcement agencies, schools, medical institutions, as well as with local informal leaders, including

imams and representatives of the State Commission for Religious Affairs. Surveys were conducted in Bishkek, Jalal-Abad cities and in the villages of Chui and Jalal-Abad provinces. The survey allows to study the respondents' opinion about ongoing processes of radicalization and violent extremism in these communities, the role of women in this process, as well as their opinions about effective measures against radicalization. The questionnaire for expert interviews like the first one consists of two sections: the demographic (questions D1-D4 and B1-B2) and the main part of the study is aimed to investigate attitudes and understanding of respondents regarding the problem of extremism and radicalization in their area of residence (B3-B23 questions). This questionnaire has more open questions than quantitative ones.

Questionnaires for the population and experts include both closed and open questions<sup>2</sup>. The questionnaires were developed in Russian language and translated into Kyrgyz and Uzbek. However, only Russian and Kyrgyz versions have been used during the survey depending on the respondent's language preferences. According to information received from the Coordinator in the Jalal-Abad province, the population mostly preferred to use questionnaires in Kyrgyz language.

Before we started the study, we tested tools in Kyrgyz and Russian languages on 16-17 May in both areas. A total of 20 surveys for testing purposes were conducted in Bishkek (10 questionnaires: 6 with population, 4 with experts) and in Jalal-Abad city (10 questionnaires: 6 with population, 4 with experts). In their reports, interviewers provided their feedback both regarding questions and sections of questionnaires, and translation of the questionnaire. All recommendations were taken into account when finalizing the instruments; a report on the results of the testing was submitted for consideration of the Mutakallim. Also, prior to conducting field work, the research company represented by its coordinators held trainings during which they informed the interviewers about the aims and tasks of the study, instructed them about the basic rules for interviewing and clarified all questions of the questionnaire, as well as explained the recruiting methods of the respondents. The interviewers received prepared and printed out guide with general comments/instructions and sampling procedures. Thus, according to the guide for selecting residential units/households in the private sector, the interviewers had to move according to the rule - 3 steps. For example, after the first successful interview from the starting point, the interviewer selects the next house by passing by two houses to the right of the house where there has been a successful interview, and selects the third house. When going door-to-door around apartments in residential building, another step rule and another procedure has been used depending on the number of apartments in the building (Annex 4).

To conduct two types of surveys, both with the population and experts, the interviewers had two supporting letters in hand – one from the research company and on behalf of the customer - “Mutakallim”, as well as a cover letter from the State Commission on Religious Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic. Participation in the survey was voluntary, and each respondent had the right to withdraw from participation in the study at any time without providing any arguments. However, there was an exception

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<sup>2</sup> Instruments for data collection are attached to the report

when working with law enforcement officers in the Jalal-Abad province. In Jalal-Abad region, the interviewers encountered difficulties in conducting expert interviews with law enforcement officials, since respondents from this group did not accept the provided supporting letters. Only on receiving an additional supporting letter from the special Unit on Combating Extremism and Illegal Migration under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic stating the need for supporting the study and allowing to give an access to six officers of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Jalal-Abad province. It took more than a month for the Ministry of Internal Affairs to consider the application of Mutakallim and to receive this permission from them.

Another challenge in conducting the survey was posed by an unscrupulous work of the interviewers at a site in Bishkek. The control checks revealed that at one of the sites the interviewers conducted the survey in bad faith (20 questionnaires). In this connection, the work on this site was urgently redone with a change in the starting point. These challenges delayed the overall data collection process.

**THE STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT**

The report includes two main sections: A. The results of the survey of population (1000 questionnaires) and B. The results of the survey of experts (100 questionnaires). Each of the sections also has corresponding subsections.

The results of the survey of population (participants) are presented in two sections: the demographic and the main results of the population survey. The second section (questions B1-B25) is divided into four sections. Questions of the questionnaire, which are presented in this section, help to collect and analyze information about the respondents' evaluative judgments on the level of radicalization and violent extremism, perception of its nature, factors and risks of radicalization in local communities. The following four sections will help identify the baseline project indicators in a more detail:

1. Section 1- describes the results obtained to questions B1-B14, this comprises the background information on social problems, as well as introductory questions on the attitude to religion and self-identification and attitude towards surrounding people;
2. Section 2 – describes the results of battery questions B15 – disposition of violent extremism;
3. Section 3 – describes the results on questions B16- B17 and B18-B24, which allow analyzing value judgments, understanding by respondents of the level of radicalization and violent extremism in the area of residence.
4. Section 4 – presents the results on question B25, where respondents define who is the “conscience of nation” for them, a moral reference point.

It is important to note that data obtained by this questionnaire will be used for identification of baseline of the project by the following indicators:

Impact level	The number of people, who increased their level of understanding of the risks of violent extremism
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	The number of women, who improved their situation (and have become less vulnerable to radicalization propaganda)
Result 1	1.1. The number of women and young people well-informed about the radicalization and violent extremism.

The outcomes of expert interview with stakeholders are also presented in two chapters, like the results of population survey: demographic data and main results. The second chapter will present the results on questions B3-B23, which help to analyze judgments, understanding of experts on the level of radicalization and violent extremism in the area of their residence. In the final part of the report the key conclusions will be given briefly.

## A. RESULTS OF POPULATION SURVEY

### • Demographic data – Chapter I

A total of 1000 surveys were conducted among women aged 18 and older in two provinces, Jalal-Abad (500 questionnaires) and Chui (500 questionnaires) (Table 2. Demographic data – questions D1-D11).

#### ▪ *Age groups*

Among those aged 18-28 (young people), 282 (28.2%) people were interviewed, among 29-58 year-old group (working age population) - 569 (56.9%) people were interviewed, and among those aged 59 and older - 149 (14.9%) respondents were interviewed. The urban population constitutes 40% and the rural population - 60%.

#### ▪ *Ethnic groups*

In terms of ethnicity, the majority identified themselves as Kyrgyz (60.8%), followed by those who identified themselves as Uzbeks (18.4%) and Russians (11.3%), the remaining 9.5% identified themselves as members of 19 different ethnic groups. Chui province was represented by a larger number of ethnic groups than Jalal -Abad province.

#### ▪ *Education, employment, financial status*

Regarding education, the majority of respondents indicated that they have a general secondary education - 34.6%, specialized technical education - 18.6%, and higher education – 21.8%.

Regarding questions about employment, 42.8% are housewives, on maternity leave, 18.4% of respondents noted that they work by hire, 14.7% are non-working pensioners. In terms of employment, there were smaller differences between the provinces, for example, number of respondents in Chui province answered that they work for hire was higher (23.8% - Chui province, 13% - Jalal-Abad), it is also interesting that in Chui province there were none who answered that they are engaged in agriculture and/or animal husbandry.

Regarding the financial situation of respondents, the majority noted that "money is enough only for food, clothing and small appliances, but it would be difficult to buy a refrigerator or a washing machine" for them - 52.7%.

Fewer than a quarter of the respondents (22.2%) answered that "they have enough money for buying large household appliances, but it's hard to buy real estate (cottages or apartments)." Less than 20% of respondents consider themselves very few poor and poor, 12.6% indicated that "there is enough money for food, but it is difficult to buy clothes", 6.9% indicated that they "do not have enough money even for food," most of them were representatives of Chui province. These were non-working pensioners (22), housewives, in maternity leave (24), and employees (10). 36 of them were from rural areas in Chui province.

In the minority were also those who indicated that they lived in prosperity - 4.9% "we can afford to buy anything", these were mainly residents of Jalal-Abad province (about 10% of respondents in Jalal-Abad province) for the most part those living in urban area (Jalal-Abad). They were represented by such groups as housewives, on maternity leave (18), and employed (10).

- *Marital status*

The majority of respondents noted that they were married - 76.9%, and 11.1% said they were widows. The marriage of 68.9% respondents was officially registered, while 8.6% answered they had a religious registration.

**Table 2. Demographic data**

#	Demographic data		Province (number)		Total	Province (%) n=500		Total % N=1000
			Jalal-Abad	Chui		Jalal-Abad	Chui	
D2	Age groups	18-28	142	140	<b>282</b>	28.4	28	28.2
		29-58	298	271	<b>569</b>	59.6	54.2	56.9
		59+	60	89	<b>149</b>	12	17.8	14.9
		<b>Total</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>500</b>	<b>1000</b>			
D3	Ethnic origin/nationality	Kyrgyz	309	299	<b>608</b>	61.8	59.8	60.8
		Uzbek	177	7	<b>184</b>	35.4	1.4	18.4
		Russian	4	109	<b>113</b>	0.8	21.8	11.3
		Dungan		26	<b>26</b>	0	5.2	2.6
		Uighur	4	8	<b>12</b>	0.8	1.6	1.2
		Tatar	2	7	<b>9</b>	0.4	1.4	0.9
		Lezgin		8	<b>8</b>		1.6	0.8
		Tajik	1	5	<b>6</b>	0.2	1	0.6
Turk	3	3	<b>6</b>	0.6	0.6	0.6		

#	Demographic data	Province (number)		Total	Province (%) n=500		Total % N=1000	
		Jalal-Abad	Chui		Jalal-Abad	Chui		
		Other <sup>3</sup>		28	<b>28</b>		5.6	2.8
D4	Rural population	Number of surveyed respondents	300	300	<b>600</b>			60
		Number of villages	15	11	<b>26</b>			
	Rural population (districts)	Alamedin		120	120			12
		Issyk-Ata		60	60			6
		Moskovskiy		60	60			6
		Sokuluk		60	60			6
		Suzak	240		240			24
		Bazar-Korgon	60		60			6
		<b>Total</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>600</b>			60
Urban population	Number of surveyed respondents	200	200	<b>400</b>			40	
	Number of sites	10	10	<b>20</b>				
D5	Education	No formal education	1	2	<b>3</b>	0.2	0.4	0.3
		Elementary education (4 grades or less)	4	9	<b>13</b>	0.8	1.8	1.3
		Incomplete secondary (5-9 grades)	77	37	<b>114</b>	15.4	7.4	11.4
		General secondary (10-11 grades)	180	166	<b>346</b>	36	33.2	34.6
		Secondary technical (vocational school)	26	57	<b>83</b>	5.2	11.4	8.3
		Specialized technical (technical college)	109	77	<b>186</b>	21.8	15.4	18.6
		Incomplete higher	12	24	<b>36</b>	2.4	4.8	3.6
		Higher	90	128	<b>218</b>	18	25.6	21.8
		Academic degree	1	0	<b>1</b>	0.2	0	0.1
D6	What is your occupation?	Work for hire	65	119	<b>184</b>	13	23.8	18.4
		I work from time to time on short-term contract, work temporarily, work on seasonal work	13	3	<b>16</b>	2.6	0.6	1.6

<sup>3</sup>Other participants named the following 13 nationalities in Chui oblast: Azerbaijan (3), Armenian (1), Balkar (2), Georgian (1), Kazakh (2), Kalmyk (2), Korean (4), Kurd (3), Latvian (1), German (3), Tabasar (3), Ukranian (5), Chechen (1). Also one respondent named her mixed origin - "Asian and European".

#	Demographic data	Province (number)		Total	Province (%) n=500		Total % N=1000	
		Jalal-Abad	Chui		Jalal-Abad	Chui		
	I am a private entrepreneur, I do business	18	18	<b>36</b>	3.6	3.6	3.6	
	I am engaged in agriculture and/or animal husbandry	54	0	<b>54</b>	10.8	0	5.4	
	I am self-employed	5	3	<b>8</b>	1	0.6	0.8	
	Unemployed pensioner	61	86	<b>147</b>	12.2	17.2	14.7	
	Unemployed student	16	21	<b>37</b>	3.2	4.2	3.7	
	Housewife, on maternity leave	223	205	<b>428</b>	44.6	41	42.8	
	Unemployed	43	43	<b>86</b>	8.6	8.6	8.6	
	Other	2	1	<b>3</b>	0.4	0.2	0.3	
	No answer		1	<b>1</b>	0	0.2	0.1	
D7	Financial situation	We do not have enough money even for food	19	50	<b>69</b>	3.8	10	6.9
		There is enough money for food, but it is difficult to buy clothes	72	54	<b>126</b>	14.4	10.8	12.6
		Money is enough for food, clothes and small appliances, but it would be difficult to buy a refrigerator or a washing machine	238	289	<b>527</b>	47.6	57.8	52.7
		Money is enough for large household appliances, but it's difficult to buy real estate (a country house or an apartment)	121	99	<b>220</b>	24.2	19.8	22
		We can afford to buy anything	47	2	<b>49</b>	9.4	0.4	4.9
		No answer	3	6	<b>9</b>	0.6	1.2	0.9
D8	Marital status	Single	18	57	<b>75</b>	3.6	11.4	7.5
		Married	406	363	<b>769</b>	81.2	72.6	76.9
		Divorced	22	21	<b>43</b>	4.4	4.2	4.3
		Widow	53	58	<b>111</b>	10.6	11.6	11.1
		Other	1	0	<b>1</b>	0.2	0	0.1
		No answer	0	1	<b>1</b>	0	0.2	0.1

#	Demographic data		Province (number)		Total	Province (%) n=500		Total % N=1000
			Jalal- Abad	Chui		Jalal- Abad	Chui	
D9	Type of marriage registration?	State registration (Registry office)	363	326	<b>689</b>	72.6	65.2	68.9
		Religious registration	43	43	<b>86</b>	8.6	8.6	8.6
		No registration	21	10	<b>31</b>	4.2	2	3.1
		No answer	1	3	<b>4</b>	0.2	0.6	0.4
D10	How many years have you been living in this settlement?	Have been living here since birth	21	99	<b>120</b>	4.2	19.8	12
		Less than 1 year	22	23	<b>45</b>	4.4	4.6	4.5
		1-5 years	90	66	<b>156</b>	18	13.2	15.6
		6-10 years	70	61	<b>131</b>	14	12.2	13.1
		More than 10 years	297	248	<b>545</b>	59.4	49.6	54.5
		No answer	0	3	<b>3</b>	0	0.6	0.3

- *Living in the area*

Half of the respondents (54.5%) answered that they had lived in the area where the survey was being conducted for more than 10 years. The percentage of respondents who had lived in the village from the birth (12% - 120 respondents) is very low. However, among the "indigenous" residents, the majority of those surveyed (99) live in Chui province (question D10). At the same time, based on responses received to question D11, "Where did you live before you moved to this town?", 159 (87%) out of 182 respondents in Jalal-Abad province responded they were from Jalal-Abad province, 10 from Osh province, 7 from the northern regions of Kyrgyzstan and 6 respondents had previously lived in other countries - Russia (5) and Uzbekistan (1). On Chui province, 105 (70%) out of 148 respondents answered D11 question they had come from other regions of Chui province, while about 30% came from other regions and countries: 20 respondents arrived from the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan, 13 respondents arrived in Chui province from other northern regions, 10 previously lived in Uzbekistan (2), Tajikistan (7) and Kazakhstan (1). These findings show that women of Jalal-Abad and Chui provinces are mobile within their regions. At the same time, residents of Chui province have a more diverse background (experience of moving from other regions and countries, as well as ethnically more diverse).

- **Results of population survey – Chapter II**

- Section 1- general information on social problems, attitudes to religion and self-identification (questions B1-B14)

- Question B1 – the three most serious problems in your area?*

The respondents were offered to choose the three most serious problems in their area. The list contained 16 options of problems. One of the main problems in all three cases (Problem 1, Problem 2, Problem 3)

were unemployment, corruption and rising prices (Table 3). The most serious problem according to respondents was unemployment - 55%, (Table 4). To a greater extent this problem was expressed in Jalal-Abad province (44% of respondents in rural areas). Next by the importance from the list were chosen corruption (22.4%) and rising prices (26%). More than a quarter of respondents interviewed from Jalal-Abad province (30%) believe that corruption is one of the most serious problems, while in Chui only 14% consider this phenomenon as a serious problem. Thus, about 30% of respondents in Chui province, mostly among the respondents from rural areas - 1/3, believe that rising prices are a big and serious problem in their area. It should be mentioned that two other problems from the suggested list have also been noted in Jalal-Abad province: unavailability of many types of medical services (32%) and inaccessibility of housing (15%). These problems were more often highlighted by residents of rural areas.

<b>Table 3. The three most serious problems.</b>	<b>Province (number)</b>		<b>Total number</b>	<b>Province (%)</b>		<b>Total %</b>
	Jalal-Abad (n=500)	Chui (n=500)		Jalal-Abad (n=500)	Chui (n=500)	
Unemployment (Problem 1)	174	73	<b>247</b>	34.8	14.6	24.7
Unemployment (Problem 2)	91	75	<b>166</b>	18.2	15	16.6
Unemployment (Problem 3)	72	65	<b>137</b>	14.4	13	13.7
Corruption, bribery (Problem 2)	77	16	<b>93</b>	15.4	3.2	9.3
Corruption, bribery (Problem 3)	52	44	<b>96</b>	10.4	8.8	9.6
Rising prices (Problem 2)	1	69	<b>70</b>	0.2	13.8	7
Rising prices (Problem 3)	70	56	<b>126</b>	14	11.2	12.6
Inaccessibility of many kinds of medical services (Problem 1)	60	20	<b>80</b>	12	4	8
Inaccessibility of many kinds of medical services (Problem 2)	54	11	<b>65</b>	10.8	2.2	6.5
Inaccessibility of housing (Problem 1)	64	23	<b>87</b>	12.8	4.6	8.7
Other (Problem 1)	47	283	<b>330</b>	9.4	56.6	33
Other (Problem 2)	14	169	<b>183</b>	2.8	33.8	18.3
Other (Problem 3)	20	77	<b>97</b>	4	15.4	9.7

<b>Table 4. General summary table disaggregated by urban and rural areas in two provinces</b>					
<b>Problem</b>	<b>Provinces</b>	<b>Place of residence</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Total in province</b>	<b>Total amount and %</b>
	Jalal-Abad	City	117 (23.4%)		

<b>Problem</b>	<b>Provinces</b>	<b>Place of residence</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Total in province</b>	<b>Total amount and %</b>
Unemployment	(n=500)	Village	220 (44%)	337 (67.4%)	550 (55%)
	Chui (n=500)	City	71 (14.2%)	213 (42.6%)	
		Village	142 (28.4%)		
Rising prices	Jalal-Abad (n=500)	City	44	111 (22%)	260 (26%)
		Village	67		
	Chui (n=500)	City	52	149 (29.8%)	
		Village	97		
Corruption, bribery	Jalal-Abad (n=500)	City	80	154 (30%)	224 (22.4%)
		Village	74		
	Chui (n=500)	City	49	70 (14%)	
		Village	21		
Inaccessibility of housing	Jalal-Abad (n=500)	City	63 (13%)	154 (15%)	
		Village	91 (18%)		
Inaccessibility of many kinds of medical services	Jalal-Abad (n=500)	City	58 (12%)	160 (32%)	
		Village	102 (20%)		

*From the data obtained, we can conclude that in most cases respondents identify the socio-economic problems (unemployment, rising prices, inaccessibility of housing, medical services, and corruption).*

It is interesting that respondents, in most cases, indicated their/other versions of responses, especially the respondents from Chui province (Table 3). For example, out of 283 (59%) of the proposed options for Chui province, women from rural areas (41%) in these cases indicated other problems.

#### *Other problems 1*

Among the problems identified and described by respondents from Jalal-Abad province were the lack/absence of kindergartens (emphasis was done on public/state ones), problems with access to clean drinking water. More than half of respondents in Chui province noted that they were facing problems with the infrastructure, in particular the three most frequently encountered problems were: 1. safety-related (bad roads, lack of traffic lights, lack of street lighting) - 94 respondents; 2. problems related to the education and leisure of children (lack of kindergartens, schools, playgrounds, places for leisure) - 56 respondents; 3. Problems with water (unclean drinking water, no sewerage, problems with irrigation water) - 34 respondents.

#### *Other problems 2*

In the second case, among other problems mentioned by respondents from Jalal-Abad province were the lack/absence of kindergartens and sports grounds, absence of asphalt roads and sidewalks, lighting and

water. In Chui province, respondents were also unhappy with the safety and the quality of roads, the absence of traffic lights (40 respondents), problems related to the education and leisure of children (lack of kindergartens, schools, playgrounds, leisure) were noted by 32 respondents, 31 respondents noted problems with electricity, 13 respondents - water problems, and 9 respondents - garbage.

### *Other problems 3*


Among other problems in the third case indicated by respondents from Jalal-Abas province were the lack / absence of kindergartens and sports grounds, water and electricity problems, as well as problems with external labor migration, including border crossings. On Chui province, the problems also concerned the lack/absence of kindergartens and sports grounds (9), electricity problems (10), problems with bad roads and transport (15), water problems - 8 and garbage-5.

*In general, we can conclude that the main problems described by the respondents are the problems of the infrastructure complex.*

### *B2. In recent years, the number of Muslim believers has increased. How do you feel about this? And the questions B3 and B4 – linked to question B2.*

More than 75.8% (758 respondents) of the respondents believe that an increase in the number of believers is a positive change (22.3% is very good, 53.5% is normal) (Table 5). To this question 17% respondents in Jalal-Abad and 27.6% in Chui province responded that this was a very good trend. Most respondents believe that an increase in the number of Muslim adherents is a normal phenomenon (56.6% in Jalal-Abad and 50.4% in Chui province) (Diagram B2).

Surveyed in rural areas of Jalal-Abad province (9.6% - this is very good, 37% is normal) believe these changes are positive. To a lesser extent this is



considered so by the respondents of Jalal-Abad city (7.4% - this is very good, 19.6% is normal). The same trend is observed in Chui province (it should be noted that according to the demographic data 21.8% identified themselves as Russians - respondents with non-Muslim origin), the rural population in Chui oblast participating in the survey are more positive to the increase in the number of believers compared to the urban one (18.6% and 9% - this is very good, respectively) (Table 5).

These details were further confirmed in answers to clarifying question B3 (Table 6), where respondents indicated that they believe this phenomenon had positive influence, particularly, strengthening families and upbringing of children, this opinion was expressed by 59.3% of the respondents. In the context of the regions, respondents in Chui province 62.8% agree with this statement, in Jalal-Abad province these indicators are also high 56%.

30.9% of respondents believe that an increase in the number of Muslim adherents is a positive change, as it contributes to development and maintenance of order in the society: 38.2% respondents in Chui province, 24% in Jalal-Abad province. 10% of respondents believe that this is a positive trend as it strengthens national values (Table 6). It should be noted that among those who in this continuum (positive and negative attitude) there is a small number of those who fear and consider these changes as threatening for the society (11.2% - fear, 13.8% - threat perceptions in Jalal-Abad province and 14.6% - fear, 3.4% - threat perceptions in Chui province). Interestingly, such judgments as fear are observed equally in both areas, whereas the threat level is several times higher in the Jalal-Abad province, in rural areas - 8.8% (by community, 20% of respondents in Bazar-Korgon district and 13% in the Suzak district). When broken down by ayyl aimaks, in three out of five of them, the population feels a threat to their society (18% - Tash-Bulak a/a, 20% - Kenesh a/a and 23% - Kurmanbek a/a). Also, 20% of those surveyed in Kurmanbek a/a community have some concerns about this. In Chui province, 45% of the respondents in the Logvinenko a/a perceive an increase in the number of Muslim as a threat, namely respondents from Novopokrovka village noted that they had some concerns about this.

<b>Province</b>	<b>Place of residence</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Very good</b>	<b>Normal</b>	<b>Have some concern</b>	<b>It's a threat to our society</b>
Jalal-Abad	Rural	number	48	185	21	44
		%	9.6%	37.0%	4.2%	8.8%
	Urban	number	37	98	35	25
		%	7.4%	19.6%	7.0%	5.0%
	Total	number	85	283	56	69
		%	17.0%	56.6%	11.2%	13.8%
Chui	Rural	number	93	142	40	12
		%	18.6%	28.4%	8.0%	2.4%
	Urban	number	45	110	33	5
		%	9.0%	22.0%	6.6%	1.0%
	Sub-total	number	138	252	73	17
		%	27.6%	50.4%	14.6%	3.4%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>number</b>	223	535	127	86
<b>%</b>		22.3%	53.5%	12.7%	8.6%	

Table 6 Question Q3. Why do you think so? (positive response)	Province (number)		Total	Province (%)		Total
	Jalal-Abad	Chui		Jalal-Abad n=500	Chui n=500	
	Because it strengthens our national values	25		75	<b>100</b>	
Because it helps to conduct fair and honest business	5	14	<b>19</b>	1	2.8	1.9
This helps to strengthen the family and proper upbringing of children	279	314	<b>593</b>	56	62.8	59.3
This makes the authorities more responsible	19	17	<b>36</b>	4	3.4	3.6
This develops and maintains the order in society	118	191	<b>309</b>	24	38.2	30.9

A small number of respondents indicated in the clarifying question B4 the reasons why they believe that this trend is negative (dangerous or threatening) (Table 7). About 10% of respondents believe that this leads to intolerance and conflicts in society. It is notable that in Kurmanbek a/a 23% of the interviewed respondents believe that this trend leads to growth of intolerance and conflicts in society. Less than 6% believe that this can lead to an increase in extremism. It should be noted that in Jalal-Abad province, about 10% of respondents shared concerns that this could lead growth to intolerance and conflict in society, and also adversely affecting lives of women, their roles and position within society (Table 7).

Table 7 B4. Why do you think so? (negative response)	Province (number)		Total	Province (%)		Total %
	Jalal-Abad	Chui		Jalal-Abad	Chui	
This leads to intolerance and conflicts in society	56	41	<b>97</b>	11	8.2	9.7
This negatively affects situation with women	56	19	<b>75</b>	11	3.8	7.5
This narrows the perspective of women	13	14	<b>27</b>	3	2.8	2.7
This is a threat to a freedom of person and human rights	45	17	<b>62</b>	9	3.4	6.2
This leads to an increase of religious extremism	27	31	<b>58</b>	5	6.2	5.8

*B5. Do you practice masturat dawat<sup>4</sup>? and questions B6-B9*

Only 22 respondents answered questions B5 to B9, these respondents practice masturat-dawat. The majority of respondents in this group are from Chui province, rural areas. Interesting data were received in this group of respondents, most women in this group last time went for masturat-dawat for 3 days, accompanied mostly by their husbands and other family members. All 22 women answered that they do not attend mosque. Moreover, 17 of them consider that women should not go to the mosque (Table 8 and Table 9).

<b>Table 8</b> <b>Question B5. Do you practice mastura-dawat?</b>	<b>Rural</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Jalal-Abad</b>	<b>Chui</b>	<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>Total %</b>
	Number		Number			
Yes	13	9	7	15	22	2.2%
No	568	403	490	481	971	97.1%

<b>Table 9</b> <b>Question B6. How long was your last masturat dawat?</b>	<b>Number</b>
1 day	2
3 days	19
2 weeks	1
Total	22

<b>Question B7. Who did you go with for masturat dawat last time?</b>	<b>Number</b>
With husband	12
With son	3
With sisters	2
With neighbors	1
With mother	2
With grandchildren and daughter-in-laws	1
With family	1
<b>Question B8. How often do you attend mosque?</b>	<b>Number</b>
Women do not go to mosque	2
Never went <sup>5</sup>	20

<sup>4</sup> Masturat dawat – “from the Arabic term da’wa, which means “invitation,” and in the Tablighi context can be translated as “proselytizing tour,” the spiritual effect is foremost on the dawatchis themselves instead of the villagers and townspeople they encounter and invite to follow the same path ... Occasionally special dawats are organized for married couples (called masturat dawat)” (Pelkmans, 2017, pp.104- 107). Pelkmans, M. (2017). *Fragile conviction: changing ideological landscapes in urban Kyrgyzstan*. Cornell University Press.


<sup>5</sup> One of the assumptions why women do not visit mosques can be the fact that the mosques do not provide separate space for women. Some clues also were provided by Pelkmans (2017) where he states that masturat dawat is practiced rarely because: “[F]irst, as an organization the Tablighi Jamaat is less accessible to women, and most involved women are so through their husbands. Second, Tablighi ideas of proper gender behavior do not translate easily to the post-Soviet Kyrgyz context. ... negative opinion about Tablighis” (p.107). In addition to that the muftiate of Kyrgyzstan has to issue special permission for dawatchis to go to their tour, these permission “need to be shown to the imams of receiving

Question B9. What do you think should women have an opportunity to go to mosques like men?	Number
Yes	4
No	17
Difficult to answer	1
Total	22



*B10. How religious do you think you are?*

On question B10, respondents were suggested to indicate how religious they were on a scale from 1 - "Not religious at all" to 10 - "Very religious". The most popular answers of respondents were moderately religious - according to the scale they chose options 4 (11.8%), and 5 (38.5%). There were also respondents who self-identified as "Very religious" - 12.6%. When broken down by regions, in Chui province in the continuum from "Not at all religious" to "Very religious," respondents defined themselves as "Very religious" closer to 7 and higher on a scale, while the population of Jalal-Abad province in most of the cases answered "moderately religious" options from 1 including 5 on a scale (Diagram B10). Here, you can look more closely at the communities, broken down by urban and rural ones. It is interesting that in all five communities in rural areas of Chui province, respondents noted that they were more religious (answers on a scale from 6 and higher). They defined themselves as religious on a scale from 7 or higher, respondents from the communities of Alexandrovka a/a and Maevka a/a (Diagram B10a, n = 60 when calculating results within communities - a/a). While communities in rural areas in Jalal-Abad region have defined themselves as moderately religious (Diagram B10b, n = 60 in the calculation results within communities - a / a). Less than 20% of the respondents in the given locality have chosen answers on a scale above 7 points.



Diagram B10. Breakdown of data by oblasts



mosques and to the police when requested to do so" (p. 108). Pelkmans, M. (2017). *Fragile conviction: changing ideological landscapes in urban Kyrgyzstan*. Cornell University Press.



There were also differences between the rural and urban population (Diagram B10c) on this question. Respondents in rural areas noted to a greater extent that they consider themselves as moderately and more religious in a greater degree than respondents from the urban areas. In urban areas, one can observe diversity of selected options on a scale from "not religious at all" to "very religious", there are no trends (Diagram B10c). When broken down by cities, Bishkek and Jalal-Abad, there are small differences (Diagram B10d). In the city of Bishkek one can observe a wide range of religious self-identification as was presented in general in Chui province, while in Jalal-Abad, there are almost no answers on a scale above 7. It can be summed up that this is one of the interesting features of Jalal-Abad province - one can assume that respondents are afraid to identify themselves as "very religious."



We can make a hypothesis that this question is very sensitive among the respondents from Jalal-Abad province because of the existing stigmatization and state control of certain ethnic groups, thus for example about 38% of the respondents in this province belong to other ethnic minority groups. Thus, minority ethnic groups might be afraid and avoid to identify themselves as extremist/radical by stating that they belong to "very religious" group. Moreover, it should be emphasized that religious practices within ethnic minorities is also regulated/controlled by the local government (ayil okmotu). This regulation of religious life in the southern regions can be compared with the contrasting situation in the



northern regions where religious practices in most of the cases are not regulated and local government bodies do not strengthen anti-extremist measures.

The second existing stigmatization is related to regional stigmatization, as it is illustrated in the results of the survey of the experts there are bias towards citizens of the southern regions, particularly, when southerners are believed to be more religious and thus in practice are under the strengthened control of the law enforcement bodies and central government. Taking into account these assumptions we can assume that respondents from Jalal-Abad province are more aware about dangers to be perceived as radical/extremist and thus cautious to be identified so.

*B11. How often do you believe that our government does everything right?*



On this question, the opinions of respondents were divided, half of the respondents said that not always (sometimes - 51.7%) the government is doing everything right. Whereas, 45.6% answered to this question positively (always - 11.4% and 34.2% - almost always). Here we can emphasize that overall level of the trust in the government in Kyrgyzstan is low. This fact is being reported in a number of international research reports, and it could be considered as one of the drivers of radicalization, as lack of trust in the government is usually believed to be used by the extremists in their attempts to fill the vacuum left by the government.

Only 3 respondents answered that they do not believe in the correctness of the government's actions, indicating the "never" answer (Diagram B11). By region and by place of residence (urban and rural population), the communities in Jalal-Abad province were more positive in this issue than in Chui province. By place of residence, the rural population was more positive in this issue than the urban population.



*B12. In general, do you think that most people can be trusted, or, conversely, you need to be cautious when dealing with people?*

On this question respondents were more inclined to choose the second statement - 65.3% believed that one should be cautious with people. According to the findings of one of the recent works on social cohesion reported by Kemel Toktomushev<sup>6</sup> (2017) there is an alarming situation related to the very low level of trust and decreasing social cohesion. Thus, special measures must be taken on increasing the level of trust towards others as well as social cohesion in the targeted communities in order to refer to the alarming results illustrated in the questions B11, B12 and B14.




To a greater extent, the rural population did not trust others. These results illustrate the negative trend where rural population seem to be more atomized and have lower level of social cohesion in comparison with urban areas. By regions, the respondents in Chui province were more cautious than respondents in Jalal-Abad province (Diagram B12). When broken down by rural communities (ayil aimaks), one can see that respondents in three communities of Chui province (Vasilievsky a/a, Zhany Jer, and Logvinenko a/a), are more cautious (Diagram B12a, n = 60 when calculating results within communities - a/a).

<sup>6</sup> Toktomushev, K. (2017). Promoting Social Cohesion and Conflict Mitigation: Understanding Conflict in the Cross-Border Areas of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Available at: <https://www.ucentralasia.org/Content/Downloads/UCA-IPPA-WP40-Promoting%20Social%20Cohesion%20and%20Conflict%20Mitigation-Eng.pdf>


*B13. Speaking generally, do you think that people try to help to each other, or they think only of themselves?*

To the question B13 “Do you think that people try to help to each other, or they think only of themselves?” respondents split almost equally in two polarized groups (Diagram B13).



*B14. Do you think your neighbors will intervene if your rights for freedom to choose religion and beliefs are to be violated?*

To the question B14 “Do you think your neighbors will intervene if your rights for freedom to choose religion and beliefs are to be violated?” – most respondents in rural areas answered positively, whereas the urban population were not sure that neighbors will come for assistance (43.3% and 22.4% respectively). Positive answers by provinces were distributed evenly by Jalal-Abad (33.9%) and Chui provinces (31.8%). 10.5% respondents in Chui province did not believe that neighbors would come for help. Almost the same number of respondents found it difficult to answer to this question in rural area and Jalal-Abad province.



➤ **Section 2 – results on battery of questions B15 – dispositions of violent extremism**

Violent extremism is a multi-factor and extremely diverse phenomenon that cannot be considered only with the help of one variable. Thus, three main factors are distinguished that can be considered at three levels: situational factors (macro - at the level of the country or society), socio-cultural (meso – that affects the level of communities, sub-groups-social identification) and individual factors (micro-level) (Royal United Services Institute, 2015, p. 2)<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> Allan H., Glazzard E., Esperson S., Reddy-Tumu S., Winterwotem, E., (2015). "Drivers of violent extremism: a review of hypotheses and literature." Royal United Services Institute (www.rusi.org)

There is strong evidence suggesting that radicalization is a social process and that identity is a key factor in identifying the reasons why people become involved in violent movements. Psychologists from different countries study the prerequisites that contribute to development of an identity that can become "non-adaptive" and have "propensities" to violence, and also determine what cognitive processes and attitudes can contribute to a "way of thinking" that is a particular risk indicator for radicalization (Royal United Services Institute, 2015, p. 2)<sup>8</sup>.

To study the phenomenon of violent extremism within the baseline study we used a methodology to diagnose dispositions of violent extremism developed by Russian psychologists and colleagues Davydov D. and Khlomov K. (2017)<sup>9</sup>. This methodology is considered to be relevant to the studied topic – violent extremism, attitudes/dispositions. First of all, it was developed and tested in the similar community (Russia) that shares common historical and cultural background. The second reason why this instrument is used is due to how it is easy to operate to the enumerators and the statements are formulated in precise and in easily understood language to the respondents. Thus, the adaptation of this instrument was very easy in Kyrgyz and Uzbek languages.

This tool consists of 11 dispositions that help to cluster and evaluate violent extremism. Respondents should determine to what extent they agree with 66 statements related to violent and extremist nature on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means that you strongly disagree, and 5 - completely agree with the statement.

One of the difficulties in using this tool is that the developers are still in the process of standardizing the verification of this methodology, with the involvement of the corresponding sample. Consequently, there are no scaling norms. Also, the analysis itself takes a lot of time. In this connection, the research team decided that the average arithmetic indicators (mean) with breakdown by regions (Table 10) will be calculated.

As part of the testing, some changes were made to the wording (clarification) of some questions, for example, question number 36 sounded like "People's fate depends on the symbols they use". But since comments were received during the testing of the questionnaire, the question was updated as follows: "People's fate often depends on symbols (pins from the evil eye, spiritual "protection" pendants, stones, red thread on the wrists, etc.) they use." Or the question number 32 "There are signs in which special knowledge is hidden" was rephrased as "There are divine signs in which a special message is hidden".

When calculating the average arithmetic data (mean) on dispositions, it was revealed that in general, the population's beliefs are in less extend violent or extremist (in a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is "totally disagree", 2 "disagree", 3 "cannot define my position", 4 "agree", 5 "totally agree"). Thus, in other words,

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<sup>8</sup>ibid

<sup>9</sup> A link to this source can be obtained from this e-mail address:

<https://www.researchgate.net/search/Search.html?type=publication&query=Методика%20диагностики%20диспозиций%20насильственного%20экстремизма>. This methodology is reflected in the list of questions for B15.

if the sum of mean values within the disposition “Cult of power” is lower than 3.0 than the respondents do not have violent disposition within this cluster. So we can conclude that respondents as a whole do not have dispositions of violent and extremist nature, as the sum of their mean values do not reach 4.0 and higher.

However, out of this general picture, we can define the highest level that was revealed in Chui province in three dispositions - "Conventional coercion" – 3.94, "Anti-intrapeption" – 3.59 and "Protest activity" – 3.70. And in Jalal-Abad province the highest level was illustrated in the "Conventional coercion" disposition – 3.47 (Table 10). Relying of the definitions that were provided by the developers of the instrument here we can present the operationalization of these three dispositions that caught our attention:

- "Conventional coercion" is the belief that there are people who deserve punishment, an individual finds an outlet to his/her grievances/frustration and direct his/her aggressive impulses towards the ‘enemy’ and considers himself/herself quite the right person to do this punishment. For people who have this believes it is important to "know the enemy." People who have high level of this disposition can be easily manipulated by extremist groups who can help them to identify the enemy and address to him the aggressive impulses.

- "Protest activity" is a willingness to take risks, a willingness to sacrifice oneself for the sake of an idea.

- "Anti-Intrapeption" is a demonstrative disdainful attitude towards the humanities and psychology disciplines, as well as to certain areas in fiction and visual art. At the core of such disposition lies the fear of the manifestation of genuine feelings, the avoidance of personal freedom (the responsibility to be a subject) as they are afraid of uncertainty and afraid to experiences threats to their self-image.

#	Dispositions	Jalal-Abad	Chui
		Mean arithmetic	
1	<b>Cult of power</b>	2.82	2.57
2	<b>Acceptability of aggression</b>	2.97	2.76
3	<b>Intolerance</b>	3.04	2.67
4	<b>Conventional coercion</b>	3.47	3.94
5	<b>Social pessimism</b>	2.63	2.71
6	<b>Mysticism</b>	2.80	2.80
7	<b>Destructiveness and cynicism</b>	2.76	2.94
8	<b>Protest activity</b>	3.34	3.59
9	<b>Normative nihilism</b>	2.71	2.50
10	<b>Anti-intrapeption</b>	3.20	3.70
11	<b>Conformism</b>	3.32	3.45

➤ Section 3 – results by value judgments and understanding of such phenomena as radicalization and violent extremism (questions B16- B17 and B18-B24)

In 2005, Kyrgyzstan passed a law on combating extremism - "On Countering Extremist Activity"<sup>10</sup>. According to this law, "extremism" or "extremist activity" is defined in four points:

- "the activities of public associations or religious organizations or other enterprises, organizations and institutions, as well as mass media, regardless of the form of ownership, or individuals in planning, organizing, preparing and carrying out actions", which are defined in 9 sub-paragraphs, starting from the description of the action of violent nature directed against the state: changing the "foundations of the constitutional system and violating the integrity of the Kyrgyz Republic", "undermining the security of the Kyrgyz Republic" "seizure or appropriation of power", "terrorist activity", "creation of illegal armed formations" and ending with actions directed against certain groups and communities: "the incitement of racial, national (interethnic) or religious hatred", "humiliation of national dignity", for "mass riots and propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of citizens based on ideological, political, racial, national (ethnic) or religious hatred or hostility, as well as on the grounds of hatred or hostility towards any social group".
- "Propaganda and public demonstration of Nazi attributes or symbols similar to Nazi attributes and symbols with a degree of fusion";
- "public calls for implementation of certain activity or the commission of specified actions"
- "funding of certain activity or providing other assistance in its implementation or performing of specified actions"

This rather wide range of understanding of extremism is not a unique issue and does not pose difficulty in determining this phenomenon. Researchers Glazard E. and Zeusen M. (2016)<sup>11</sup> from the National Security and Resilience Studies Center at the Royal United Institute of Defense Studies (RUSI) in their work on "violent extremism" also noted that very rarely this phenomenon is clearly defined and this is not just a question/issue for academics. Thus, they specify that "neither the United Nations nor the European Union has an official definition. USAID defines it as "propaganda, participation, training or other support of ideologically motivated or justified violence for achieving social, economic or political goals"<sup>12</sup>. This broad and all-embracing definition can be described as a "simple and obvious statement", and it gives rise to many contradictions and uncertainties. There are more questions for clarification, than answers. For example, should violent extremism always be ideological, or can it be criminal or even aimless? Is this something that is carried out by non-state actors? Is "violent extremism" simply a synonym for "terrorism"? It should be emphasized that these terms, like "extremism" and "violent extremism" mean different things for different people and institutions.

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<sup>10</sup> The Law "On Counteracting to Extremist Activity" of the Kyrgyz Republic. More detailed information on the law is available here: <http://cdb.minjust.gov.kg/act/view/ru-ru/1748?cl=ru-ru>

<sup>11</sup> Glazard E. and Zeusen M. (2016). "Violent extremism." You can find more details on the link [http://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Violent-extremism\\_RP.pdf](http://gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Violent-extremism_RP.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> Ibid

*B16. Please tell us, what, in your opinion, does the word “extremism” mean?*

In order to understand how the phenomenon of "extremism" is understood by the target groups of the project, the respondents were asked an open question - the interviewers asked to tell what they thought the word "extremism" was. As one would expect, this issue was one of the most difficult (as well as the next open question on definition of "radicalism"). Not all respondents could clearly articulate their understanding. Often, respondents used one or more words to describe "extremism", and not everyone could formulate their definition in long and full sentences. 33% - 328 female respondents found it difficult to answer this question (152 respondents in Chui and 176 in Jalal-Abad province).

561 respondents (345 in Chui oblast and 216 Jalal-Abad) identified different level of danger/threats when defining extremism: terrorism/terrorist/terror, explosions, war, aggression, evil/bad, suicide-bombers, killing, and danger. All these definitions do not have a clear subject. Interesting, that subjects and objects were identified 21 times in Jalal-Abad and 7 times in Chui province. Subjects were described in gender terms in Jalal-Abad oblast: 12 times referred to women, out of them three were described as covered/veiled and were characterized as subjects with bad intentions/actions; eight women were described as objects whose freedom and opportunities were limited, or they were deceived, and were covered/veiled by someone; and 3 men, described as having beard, calling for dawat, or leaving to another country, abandoning their wives. Other types of subjects were defined as Wahhabis, Dawatists, recruiters, and ISIS members. These patterns can be evaluated as lack of clear understanding about this phenomenon and lack of clear boundaries between secure and dangerous ideologies/ideas and behaviors.

Calculation of the most frequently used words revealed that such words as "terrorism", "terrorists", "terrorist act", "terror" were often used. So, in Chui province these words were used to describe extremism - 241 times, in Jalal-Abad - 57 times. In general, it is observed that there are differences in discourses and definitions, which can be assumed to occur due to the fact that greater number of questionnaires were filled in Russian language in Chui province. The word religion (or “din” in the Kyrgyz language) was used 97 times in Jalal-Abad province and 63 times in Chui province. The words Islam and Muslims were used 26 times in Chui province and 27 times in Jalal-Abad province.

In general, when describing extremism, respondents used negative connotations. For the most part, abstract definitions were used. For example, such words and phrases as "terrorism, terrorists", "war", "terrorist attacks and explosions", "wrong pathway or flow", "danger", lawlessness and chaos", “another religion or flow”, “propaganda or agitation”, “different/other’s ideology or worldview”. It should be noted that the danger here was seen more as "actions directed against society" and "means of intimidating people", rather than considered as actions directed against the state (Table 11 and Table 12). It is also interesting that the respondents imagined this phenomenon as something far away pointing at abstract forces from other countries and different religious movement (Syria, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, Uzbekistan, ISIS, Wahhabis). It is important to note that among the respondents there were those who did not believe in the existence of this phenomenon in the Kyrgyz Republic (several respondents).

The detailed descriptions were laid down for analysis in the following groups: 1. subjects, 2. groups/ organizations, 3. objectless. Most of the responses were in cluster groups 2 and 3 (Table 11-14).

How are the subjects of extremism described? Respondents from Jalal-Abad province, describing the subjects involved in extremist activities, characterized them as vulnerable and as victims (deceived, moved from the right path, those who turned out of the way, lost, people who do not understand, people without a family), as well as those who sold themselves "for the sake of money", as fanatics (people corrupted by religion, those who hit religion) and "those who lost faith" were "incorrectly educated" and also defined the sub-group as "bearded men". In Chui province, respondents did not characterize subjects as victims and vulnerable groups, they were described as those who "fell into religion" and "lost in religion" and those who "left faith" questioning the mental health of extremists (people with mental abnormalities/disorders), their legal literacy (those who do not know laws and rights) were also called into question.

Interestingly, at the group/organizational level, extremists were described as violent and dangerous groups/movements. It is notable that the respondents think of extremist groups/organizations as those who campaign, deceive, manipulate/recruit in their own interests, hiding behind religion/Islam/God (including those described as those who are against Muslims and Islam) destroy/kill and prepare suicide bombers and terrorists. Three groups of certain groups were indicated: Wahhabis, those who are calling / leaving for Dawat, ISISists. Several respondents in this rhetoric emphasized that this phenomenon is connected with the diversity of religious trends and worldviews, and the violent nature in their opinion was associated with the discontent in society and their actions were regarded as "those who establish social justice through conflict." The risk groups were identified as young people, as well as women (Table 11 and Table 12).

<b>Table 11. Definition of extremism (Jalal-Abad province)</b>	
<b>Subjects</b>	
People	Those who are deceived, who have lost their way, those who turned from the way, lost their way, for the sake of money, people who do not understand, are spoiled by religion, people who lost faith, people without a family, incorrectly brought up, bearded men, those who threw themselves into religion.
<b>Groups/organizations:</b>	
Enemies inside	enemies of the people, enemies among the people, traitors
Abstract forces	The enemies of Muslims who have left religion, dangerous branches/groups/organizations, a group with untrustworthy intentions, recruiters who cover women, those who go/call for Dawah, those who think they are real Muslims, suicide bombers, Wahhabis, terrorists (both individuals and groups), murderers, bloodsuckers, destroyers, instigators, provocateurs who left their families and their homeland, those who leave for war in Syria, those who start wars, agitators of war, they suppress, manipulate in their own interests, change their

	<p>outlook, spoil religion, those who converted to another religion, from another country.</p> <p>Separate and untrustworthy groups with an aim, bad people, Arabs, other countries, people from outside, impose their ideas and ideology, deceive people, direct/set people against each other, divide people, those who establish social justice through conflict, violent changes</p>
Society	Discontent in society, diversity of trends and religions
Youth	Risk group – youth
Women	limit the freedom and opportunities of women, those women who covered themselves and those who are covered by others
<b>Non-subjective:</b>	
1. Negative judgments	<p>- Against Islam, denigration of Islam/Muslims, show Islam from a bad side, against religion, hide behind Islam, God, religion</p> <p>- wrong/incorrect interpretation/understanding of religion, manipulation in their own interests and goals,</p> <p>Heavy, cruel crime, murder, suicide,</p> <p>Terrorist acts, explosions, dangerous, brutal phenomena, actions directed against society, means of intimidating people, illegal activities (violation of state laws and also Islamic laws), against the state discontent with power, violence on TV.</p>
2. Absolute / abstract negative statements	<p>Terrorism, evil, an extreme, extreme methods and views, ideology/religious outlook, wrong branch, agitation, conflict, enmity, violence, war (between peoples, groups, states), fear, wrong path, pogroms, riots, bad word, bad and a dangerous phenomenon, political wars and terrorist attacks, politics.</p> <p>A different religion, another brand, a doubt of the existence of extremism in the Kyrgyz Republic (we do not have that, I heard they have it in Uzbekistan, distribution of incorrect information through the media)</p> <p>violation of human rights</p>

<b>Table 12. Definitions of extremism (Chui)</b>	
<b>Subjects</b>	
People	Those who threw themselves into religion, people with mental disabilities/disorders, those who do not know the laws and rights, departed from the faith, lost in religion
<b>Groups/organizations:</b>	
Enemies inside	Traitors

Abstract forces	Suicide bombers, terrorists, Wahhabists, militants, Dawatchi, those who recruit for war and prepare suicide bombers, instigators, dangerous and hostile groups/gangs, those who start wars, foment disagreements, religious fanatics, religious groups and branches, Islamic terrorism, ISIS, sects, those who go to war in Syria, from the outside, coming from abroad, hide behind the name of God, the influence of Saudi Arabia.
Society	The diversity of religions, the oppression of religions, the threat to society, the world
Youth	Risk group – youth
<b>Non-subjective:</b>	
1. Negative judgments	Actions against society, struggle, difficulties, terrorist attacks, explosions, mass casualties, violence, war/wars, losses, tears, grief, dangerous, bad, death, murders, suicides, crime, victims, outlaws, actions directed against a certain group, against society, anti-human phenomenon, division of people, outside of Islam, not Muslims, although they ascribe themselves to the nickname, hide behind religion to achieve their goals and interests, wrong/incorrect branch, sects, wrong way, lawlessness, stirring up interethnic interreligious discord and a negative phenomenon, against humanity, against the civilian population, against the Constitution and against the secular state, against the social rules, extreme methods and views,
2. Absolute / abstract negative statements	Aggression against the world and people, religious problem, terrorism, religion and worldview, faith, militancy, propaganda, agitation of terrorism, religious fanaticism, a branch of Islam, ideology, way of solving problems, not a religion, violation of human rights, against peace, global problem, evil, doubt in the existence of extremism in the KR (extremism is a contrived word, and cannot be used against infidels), a different religion, envy, jealousy, not a religion, life after death (give their lives for the sake of heavenly life in the after life).

*B17. Tell us, please what, in your opinion, does the word “radicalism” mean?*

Sedgwick, M. (2012)<sup>13</sup> also emphasizes that there are difficulties in defining "radicalism" by saying "there is absolutely no consensus as to what radicalization is", and there is also no unambiguous answer to what "radical" is. Also, as with the understanding of the phenomenon of "extremism", the understanding of radicalism varies greatly in different countries and communities. And this, according to Sedgwick, M.

<sup>13</sup> Sedgwick, M. (2012). «Radicalism is not a problem: it is a movement towards violence which should be resisted». More details on the source is available here: [http://faithdebates.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/1329816534\\_Mark-Sedgwick-radicalization-final.pdf](http://faithdebates.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/1329816534_Mark-Sedgwick-radicalization-final.pdf)

(2012) is a problem, since if we do not even know what exactly we are trying to resist/prevent, we are unlikely to be very successful in countering radicalism. So, he believes that you can even worsen the situation by trying to counter what is vague and unclear.

In studying policies/strategies to counteract the radicalization of different countries, Sedgwick M. (2012) came to the conclusion that in some countries radicalism and extremism are often and commonly used interchangeably. This phenomenon is considered very narrowly, and is understood as a point of view that supports the use of violence. Other countries define it much broader, including such terms as extremism, intolerance, lack of mutual respect in radicalism, as in the case of the British Prevent Strategy. According to this strategy, extremism/radicalism is defined as "vocal or active opposition to ... mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs".<sup>14</sup>

When working with respondents, we wanted to clarify what understanding they had on the issue of radicalization. It turned out that with the definition of this phenomenon they had more difficulties than with the previous question (B16). When asked the question about radicalism in general 692 women (71%) could not give their definition. When broken down by provinces - 399 respondents from Jalal-Abad found it difficult to define by themselves, 293 in Chui province faced the same problem. Plus, in Chui province 30 respondents said that the definition of radicalism is extremism (indicating that they have the same answer as in question B16). There are also four clusters of the definitions:

1. the largest it "do not know" – 71%;
2. "subjects" of radicalism are characterized as Wahhabist, suicide-bombers and terrorists. Important to mention that radicalism was linked to subjects from outside, who had aims to divide the nation/people into two fighting sides.
3. "rejection link to Islam", using such justification as "another religion/movement/sect" or "non-religion". It is important to note that only 2 times Islam was articulated in relation to radicalism, and only in Chui province.
4. "Object of illegal actions conducted by radical subjects" – in Chui oblast respondents identified that actions are targeting society, and in Jalal-Abad the target was a state. No gendered subjects/objects were identified.

It is interesting that the respondents in Chui province described the subjects of radicalism as those who are involved in these actions as: "atheists", "illiterate people", "Muslim fanatics", "those who live by religion (believe too much)" and as "victims of radicalism", "Victims of terrorist acts", "murdered and innocent people. While in Jalal-Abad province a number of respondents indicated them as subjects who are "vulnerable due to their political and religious status."

There were also respondents who defined radicalism as "extremes", "fighting for ideas and changes", "against and contradiction", "separation and warring parties, polarity", "destroying others, each other",

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid

"one-sided/narrow worldview/way of thinking", "treason" and "betrayal" (Table 13 and Table 14). In general, radicalism was described in negative terms like in case of extremism. So, when describing the phenomenon in Chui province respondents -in 105 cases negative convictions were used - wrong, not good, terrorism, war, explosions and so on. According to the use of words, the most frequently used words were religion - 28, Islam - 8, religious movement - 16, sects - 10, out of which, in 5 cases respondents did not associate radicalism with religion/Islam/Muslims. Next come terrorism - 18 times, terrorists - 15 times, dangerously - 12, fanatics / fanaticism - 11, terrorist attacks - 9, war - 8, Wahhabists - 5 times (according to Chui province).

In Jalal-Abad province, 77 negative and condemning descriptions of this phenomenon were used. They used such words as: against/contradiction - 27 times, 15 cases of them were indicated, actions organized / directed against the state, and targeting people against each other - 8 times, division - 11, the diversity of movements / religions - 9, the war - 6, the movement / Islam - 5 times. To a lesser extent, respondents in Jalal-Abad province estimated radicalization in connection with religion than respondents in Chui province. So, in Jalal-Abad province, this phenomenon is to a large extent was understood as a political phenomenon and division of the parties.

<b>Table 13. Definition of radicalism (Jalal-Abad):</b>	
<b>Subjects</b>	
People	Vulnerable by political and religious status
<b>Groups/organizations:</b>	
Enemies inside	traitors
Abstract forces	Wahhabism, terrorists, groups from other countries, those who destroy, divides people into warring parties, those who incite, groups/forces opposed to the state, secretive groups, terrorists, those who oppose, those who start wars, interethnic discord, weak and do not have intelligence and fall into such groups
Society	Variety of religious trends, polarity, social discontent, vulnerable groups (political and religious status)
<b>Non-subjective:</b>	
1. Negative judgements	They confuse religion with different concepts, diversity - deceive people, women cover themselves, wear black robes, call for Dawat, suppression and discrimination, bad word/phenomenon, danger, destruction/division of the state/people, violence, warring parties, civil war, destruction of each other, extermination of one of the two, contradictions, against each other, those who divide, against freedom and human rights, including freedom of religion, crime, murderers, deception of people, people with limited understanding, imposition of their ideas, treason, betrayal

2. Absolute/abstract statements	Reforms, terrorism, wrong way, diversity, violation of law, disaster, policy against, solving social problems, inhumanity, fighting for ideas, changes
<b>Table 14. Definition of radicalism (Chui):</b>	
<b>Subjects</b>	
People	Atheists, victims of terrorist attacks, innocent people who are killed, illiterate people, Muslim fanatics, those who live with religion (believe too much)
<b>Groups/organizations:</b>	
Enemies inside	
Abstract forces	Wahhabis, dangerous sects, zombified terrorists, suicide bombers, ISIS-members, terrorist organizations, groups, criminals, hiding behind religion, the branch is hostile to a peaceful society, with the goal of seizing lands and domination over countries,
Society	The diversity of religions
<b>Non-subjective:</b>	
1. Negative judgments	Aggression, dangerous, religious conflicts, religious wars, murders, explosions, terrorist attacks, death, wrong religious branch/brand, one-dimensional/one-sided worldview/views/thinking, not Islam/Muslims, misinterpretation of Islam, not religion, terrorism propaganda, extreme manifestation/measure of hostility, set against each other, Islamic/religious fanaticism, in contradiction, undermines faith (against Islam), disorder, protests, division, a dangerous branch for the fatherland, an attempt on the lives of civilians
2. Absolute/abstract statements	Terrorism, extremism, an extreme, struggle for truth (to prove one's rightness), another/new religion/branch, another Islam, faith, polarity of opinions, one-sidedness, confusion, changes, violation of order, peace, politics,

It should be noted that when analyzing these statements and judgments of respondents by definitions and understanding of these two phenomena of "extremism" and "radicalism" it is difficult to conduct a deeper analysis, since the survey was conducted in the framework of a structured interview. For a deeper analysis, it is necessary to use qualitative methods of data collection, for example, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions.

Subsequent questions will describe the results of B18-B24, which help to gather and analyze the attitude and perception of respondents of radicalism-extremism phenomena.

*B18. How serious do you consider the problem of extremism in your locality?*

The overall results indicate that the majority of the participants consider that the problem of extremism does not exist in their locality – 61.6%. 27.1% respondents believe that the problem is minor, but still exists.

Only 5.1% believe that it is the most important problem in their area that must be responded immediately. When these responses were disaggregated by communities the following numbers were revealed: a total of 29 respondents in Jalal-Abad province and 6 in Chui consider the phenomenon of extremism an urgent issue to be addressed. In Jalal-Abad province: Atabekov a/a – 6 respondents, Kenesh a/a – 9, Kurmanbek a/a – 6, Yrys a/a – 8; and in Chui province in Maevka a/a – 6 respondents believed that the problem is very serious in their locality and needs to be solved immediately.

When segregated by provinces, the majority of respondents in both areas believe that the problem of extremism does not exist in their area (Jalal-Abad - 52.6% and Chui - 70.6%). However, there is a large difference between Jalal- Abad and Chui province: in Jalal –Abad 32.2% of the respondents and 22% in Chui believe that the problem of extremism exists in their area (exists, but not that significant) (Table 15). With the breakdown of this community response, almost half of those interviewed in the Tash-Bulak and Atabekov a/a communities and to a lesser extent in the Yrys a/a (control community) believe that the problem of extremism exists in their communities, but the problem is insignificant (Diagram Q18. n = 60 when calculating indicators in communities).



<b>Table 15. Question B18. How serious do you consider the problem of extremism in your locality?</b>	<b>Jalal-Abad (n=500)</b>	<b>Chui (n=500)</b>
This is the most serious problem for us, which requires an immediate solution	7.8%	2.4%
This is a serious problem, but there are more important problems that require immediate solution	6%	3.6%
The problem of extremism is insignificant here	32.2%	22%
We do not have such a problem	52.6%	70.6%

*B19. Do you think that the extremist sentiments in your locality have intensified lately?*

Respondents answered negatively to this question, disagreeing that extremist sentiments have intensified in their locality (Jalal-Abad - 52.8% and Chui - 85.6% - disagree). About 11% of respondents in Jalal-Abad province believe that extremist sentiments in their settlement have intensified in recent times (Table 16). 18% in the community of Yrys a/a (control community) believe that extremist attitudes in their community have increased lately (Diagram B19, n = 60 when calculating indicators in communities).

It should be noted here that the results linked to violent extremism that are indicated in this question and in the questions below indicate that extremist attitudes are more violent among the control groups/communities rather than in the target/pilot communities. To explain that, it should be pointed out that while selecting control groups, there was not possibility to assess the level or link to violent

extremism in these communities due to the fact that in Kyrgyzstan there is such a map that would indicate religious communities that helps to evaluate level/links to violent extremism. Thus, one of the recommendations would be that Mutakallim should pay attention to control communities and consider working with them in future interventions.



<b>Table 16. B19. Do you think that the extremist sentiments in your locality have intensified in recent times?</b>	<b>Jalal-Abad (n=500)</b>	<b>Chui (n=500)</b>
Yes	10.8%	5.6%
No	52.8%	85.6%
Difficult to answer	35.6%	7.2%
No answer	0.8%	1.6%

*B20. What, in your opinion, are the causes of radicalism and extremism?*

In identifying the reasons for radicalism and extremism (Table 17) respondents pointed out 6 out of 10 priorities:

1. Low level of religious education
2. Low level of education
3. Propaganda and violence in the media (including the Internet)
4. High level of labor migration
5. Inaction of authorities
6. Social injustice in society

When broken down by regions, it is interesting to observe the differences in perception of radicalism and extremism. For instance, respondents in Chui province believe that radicalization and extremism are primarily caused by the low levels of education, both religious (60.2%) and the general (43.4%), followed


by social injustice (24.4%), whereas in the opinion of respondents in Jalal-Abad province the causes of radicalization and extremism are increasingly linked to propaganda and violence in the media (40.4%), low level of religious (39%) and general (28.4%) education, high level of labor migration (36%). Respondents from both provinces equally consider that the inaction of the authorities also affects radicalization and extremism (22.4%). 10% of respondents from Jalal-Abad province indicated that social injustice in society is the cause of radicalization and extremism, and 11% of respondents in Chui province believe that the reason lies in the economic inequality in society (Table 17).

<b>Table 17. B20. What, in your opinion, are the causes of radicalism, extremism?</b>	<b>Jalal-Abad (n=500)</b>	<b>Chui (n=500)</b>
Low level of religious education	39%	60.2%
Low level of education	28.4%	43.4%
Propaganda and violence in the media (including the Internet)	40.4%	4.2%
High level of labor migration	36%	20%
Inaction of authorities	22.4%	22.4%
Social injustice in society	10%	24.4%
Low legal culture of the population and insufficient tolerance of people	19%	4%
Economic inequality in society	8.6%	11%
Activation of non-traditional religious movements	2%	4.8%
Repression by the authorities	0.4	0.4

To this question the respondents also gave their own answers (i.e. another answer). Out of 146 such responses in Chui province, about 100 respondents state that they believe that economic inequalities in society is the main reason of radicalization and extremism, and by this they explain the material/ financial interest (Table 18). This finding corresponds to the data presented in a number of research and reports that focused on the investigation of reasons of radicalization and extremism. When broken down by places of residence (urban and rural population) - there were no strong differences between groups (Table 18 and Diagram B20).

<b>Table 18. B20 (open-ended questions)</b>	
<b>In your opinion, what are the causes of radicalism, extremism?</b>	
<b>Chui province</b>	<b>Quantity</b>
Economic inequality in society (lack of money, unemployment, low income)	38
Money, material/financial interest	56
Suggestibility, credulity of people, manipulation	9
Unattended, poor parenting	3
Lack of their own opinion	2
The distorted concept of religion	2

Absence of ideology	2
They threaten families	1
Fanaticism	1
Want to dominate the world	1
<b>Jalal-Abad province</b>	<b>Quantity</b>
Difficult to answer	1
Do not understand, do not know	1
There are very many Dawatists [those who go on Dawat]	1
No such phenomenon	1
No answer	1




*B21. Is the government taking enough measures to solve the problem of extremism?*

In general, the respondents expressed their dissatisfaction with the work of the government to address the problem of extremism - 43.8% said that measures were taken by the government are insufficient. When broken down by regions, 22.6% in Chui province were satisfied with government measures, in Jalal-Abad province - 28.4%. The majority of dissatisfied respondents were in Chui province - 56.2%. 40.2% of the respondents in Jalal-Abad province found it difficult to answer to this question (Table 19).

	Jalal-Abad (n=500)	Chui (n=500)
<b>Table 19. B21. Is the state taking enough measures to solve the problem of extremism?</b>		
Yes, enough	28.4%	22.6%
No, not enough	31.4%	56.2%
Difficult to answer	40.2%	20%

*B22. Who, in your opinion, bears the main responsibility for solving the problems of extremism?*

According to respondents, the main responsibility for solving the problem of extremism lies with the Parliament and the government (53.8% in Chui province and 32.4% in Jalal-Abad province), as well as with the Militia (16.2% in Chui



province and 34% in Jalal-Abad province). However, the respondents from Chui province largely believe that the Parliament and the government bear more responsibility than law enforcement officers. At the same time, the respondents of Jalal-Abad province believe that both the first and the second bear equal responsibility (Diagram B22). Interesting that civil society representatives are not associated as main actors in this process.

*B23. What can people do for their organization, group that is important to them?*

Interesting results were obtained from the answers to question B23 (Table 20). In general, the majority of respondents expressed their disagreement that organizations and groups can use violence and violate the law in order to achieve their goals. Respondents from Chui province expressed more disagreement. However, it should be noted that more than 30% of respondents in Jalal-Abad province agreed that they can understand those who continue to support the organization, a group that fights for the political and legal rights of their group, even if the organization sometimes violates the law. 23.2% found it difficult to answer this question. Also, more than 30% of respondents in Jalal-Abad Province were able to confidently answer the last two questions in this section, regarding the use of violent actions, including attacks on the police. Among those who agreed, broken down by community, according to the statement "I can understand someone who continues to support the organization, the group ... even if the organization sometimes breaks the law" the following results were obtained: Vasilyevka a/a (control community) - 68.3% Yrys a / a (control community) - 53%, Atabekov a / a - 40%, Kurmanbek a / a - 35%, Kenesh a / a - 30%, Tash Bulak a / a - 28% (n = 60 for the calculation indicators by community). 53.3% of respondents in the community of Vasilyevka a/a (control community) answered that they can understand someone who participates in acts of protest against pressure on members of their group, even if the protests can be violent.

I can understand someone who continues to support the organization, a group that fights for the political and legal rights of their group, even if the organization sometimes violates the law.	Jalal-Abad (%) (n=500)	Chui (%) (n=500)
Do not agree	42.2	80.6

Agree	34.6	12.6
Difficult to answer	23.2	6.0
I can understand someone who continues to support the organization, a group that is fighting for the political and legal rights of their group, even if the organization sometimes resorts to violence.	Jalal- Abad (n=500)	Chui (n=500)
Do not agree	65.4	90
Agree	11.6	3.4
Difficult to answer	22.8	5.8
I can understand someone who is involved in acts of protest against pressure on members of their group, even if the protests can be violent	Jalal- Abad	Chui
Do not agree	53.6	86.6
Agree	13.4	6.8
Difficult to answer	32.6	5.8
I can understand someone who attacks the police or security forces if he / she saw how they oppressed members of their group.	Jalal- Abad	Chui
Do not agree	50.4	88.4
Agree	16.6	3.6
Difficult to answer	32.8	7.2

#### *B24. Statements related to religious beliefs*

These statements can be traced to general trends, where the majority agreed/disagreed with the statements. In other words, they had one point of view. So we can say that, in general, there is no diversity in the answers, there is a majority opinion regarding religious beliefs both in Chui and Jalal-Abad provinces (Table 21). So, more than 70% of respondents did not agree with the following statements: "education in madrassas for children is more useful than schooling" (question B 24.1), and that "a true believer should refuse medical help and vaccinations if this contradicts the Muslim canons" (question B 24.2), "For the protection of Islamic values, one can sacrifice one's life" (question B 24.6) and "A Muslim must follow his/her chosen one everywhere, even in zones of armed conflict" (question B 24.10). More than 60% of respondents did not agree with the statement that "It is better to follow the advice of the mullah and the norms of the Sharia than to appeal to the judicial and law enforcement agencies" (question B 24.7) (Table №21).

Interesting results were obtained as a result of counting the answers to the question "Can you sacrifice your life for the sake of protecting Islamic values?" The majority in Jalal-Abad and fewer respondents in Chui province disagreed with this statement (92.8% and 73.2% respectively). So, about 18% of those who agreed with this statement in Chui province, about 76 respondents are from rural (Vasilievka - 13, Vinogradnoye - 14, Zhany-Jer - 17, Zapadnoe- 15, Novopavlovka - 10, Novopokrovka - 6) and 14 from urban areas.

#	<b>Table 21. B24. Statements related to religious beliefs</b>
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		Jalal- Abad (%) (n=500)	Chui (%) (n=500)
1	<b>Education in madrassas for children is more useful than studying at a school</b>		
	Do not agree	81.4	89.0
	Agree	7.2	8.0
	Difficult to answer	11.4	2.6
2	<b>A true believer should refuse medical aid and vaccinations if this contradicts the canons of religion</b>	Jalal-Abad	Chui
	Do not agree	90.8	92.6
	Agree	5.2	4.6
	Difficult to answer	4.0	2.4
6	<b>For the protection of Islamic values, one can sacrifice one's life</b>	Jalal-Abad	Chui
	Do not agree	92.8	73.2
	Agree	2.6	18.0
	Difficult to answer	3.6	8.2
10	<b>A Muslim woman must follow her chosen one everywhere, even in zones of armed conflict</b>	Jalal-Abad	Chui
	Do not agree	85.6	78.0
	Agree	6.6	16.4
	Difficult to answer	7.2	5.2
7	<b>It is better to follow the advice of the mullah and the norms of the Sharia, than to turn to the judicial and law enforcement bodies</b>	Jalal-Abad	Chui
	Do not agree	64.0	83.4
	Agree	14.8	10.6
	Difficult to answer	20.8	5.4

Of those who are out of trend of disagreeing (Table 21) to questions B24.10 in the communities in Chui province were representatives of the Vasilievsky a/a (control community) - 50%, half of the respondents in this community 30 out of 60 respondents, and 28 out of 60 in the community of Jany Jer, 12 out of 60 in the Logvinenko a/a. These respondents agreed that "A Muslim must follow his/her chosen one everywhere, even in armed conflict zones".

The majority, almost 80% or more of the respondents, unanimously agreed with the following statements: "A Muslim must comply with the state legislation of the country in which he/she lives" (question B24.5), "Sexual relations before and outside marriage are unacceptable for women and men" (question B24.9) (Table 22).

#	<b>Table 22. B24. Statements concerning religious beliefs</b>		
5	<b>A Muslim must respect the national legislation of the country in which he/she lives</b>	Jalal-Abad (%) (n=500)	Chui (%) (n=500)
	Do not agree	2.8	1.2
	Agree	95.0	97.8

	Difficult to answer	1.4	0.2
9	<b>Sexual relations before and outside marriage are unacceptable for women and men</b>	Jalal-Abad	Chui
	Do not agree	6.4	9.8
	Agree	90.8	81.4
	Difficult to answer	2.2	8.2

The three following statements in this battery of questions seem to be ambiguous for respondents (Table 23). Two of them are related to reproductive health and pregnancy planning.

On the statement about the use of contraceptives (question B24.3), 49.4% of respondents in Jalal-Abad and 76% of Chui province answered that they believed this practice did not contradict with the moral standards. Here, on this question, 30.2% of respondents in Jalal-Abad believe that the use of contraceptives contradicts to religious moral standards. When broken down by places of residence (urban and rural population), it was found that 33.3% of residents in rural areas of Jalal-Abad province and 25.3% of Chui province and 25.5% in Jalal-Abad city and 4% in Bishkek are against contraceptives for religious reasons.

The majority (more than 65%) answered that they agree that "abortion contradicts our faith" equally in both areas (question B24.4). However, 26.4% of the respondents in Chui province and 18.2% of respondents in Jalal-Abad province disagree with this belief. If broken down by places of residence (urban and rural population), it can be seen that 35% of the urban population (in Bishkek) and 21% of the rural population in Chui province do not agree with this statement on abortion, considering that there is no religious contradiction in this matter. 26.5% of respondents in the city of Jalal-Abad also believe that there is no contradiction in religion about the issue of abortion.

The last statement in this battery also received a bit scattered answers (Table 23). So, more than 65% of respondents do not agree that "Muslim women will not forbid her husband to have other wives" (question B24.8). While 25.2% of the respondents in Jalal-Abad region agree that the Muslim will not be against polygamy.

#	<b>Table 23. B24. Statements concerning religious beliefs</b>		
		Jalal-Abad (%) (n=500)	Chui (%) (n=500)
3	The use of contraceptives is contrary to moral standards		
	Do not agree	49.4	76.0
	Agree	30.2	16.8
	Difficult to answer	20.4	6.6
4	Abortion is contrary to our faith	Jalal-Abad	Chui
	Do not agree	18.2	26.4
	Agree	68.2	65.4
	Difficult to answer	13.6	7.6

8	Muslim woman will not forbid her husband to take other wives	Jalal-Abad	Chui
	Do not agree	66.0	85.6
	Agree	25.2	6.8
	Difficult to answer	8.8	7.2

➤ Section 4. Conscience of the nation – moral reference (question B25).

*B 25. Is there anyone in our country among politicians, cultural and artistic figures, scientists, public and religious authorities who you could call a “conscience of the nation”, your moral reference? Who are they?*

Two religious figures, Chubak Aji (22.6%) and Abdyshukur Aji<sup>15</sup> (20.4%) headed the list of "conscience of the nation" or moral reference in Jalal-Abad province. In Chui region, the most frequently mentioned model was famous Kyrgyz Soviet writer Chingiz Aitmatov (20.2%). By other names, we see a very wide spread among politicians, as well as cultural and art figures (Table 24). According to Chui province, almost half of the respondents did not name or hesitate to name someone as a model - 44.4%. In Jalal-Abad province, such respondents were 1/3 of those surveyed in the area.

<b>Table 24. B25.</b>		
<b>Name</b>	<b>Jalal-Abad</b>	<b>Chui</b>
Chubak Aji	113	13
Abdyshukur Aji (Narmatov)	102	6
Chingiz Aitmatov	66	101
Sooronbay Jeenbekov (President fo KR)	61	32
Japarov (Sadyr, or no name specified) (ex-parliamentarians)	33	2
Roza Otunbaeva (ex-president, female)	7	32
Madumarov (political leader)	25	7
Almazbek Atambaev (ex-president)	0	17
Isakov (name is not specified, but it could be ex-prime minister)	2	14
Askar Akaev (ex-president)	12	6
Babanov (political leader, ex-prime minister)	7	11
Kurmanjan Datka (historical figure, female)	4	10
Kurmanbek Bakiev (ex-president)	8	0
Janar Akaev (parliamentarian)	7	0
No name specified	173 (34.6%)	222 (44.4%)

<sup>15</sup> Chubak Aji Jalilov and Abdyshukur Aji Narmatov are two well-known local religious leaders in Kyrgyzstan. For example, Chubak Aji has his own Youtube channel.

Also we counted the names of other women leaders for analysis to whom the respondents referred. The names of both modern, active and non-active women politicians, names of local leaders, as well as names of contemporary and Soviet figures of cultural and entertainment areas were mentioned. There were 63 references to the names of women in Jalal-Abad province and 44 names were mentioned in Chui province. The names were identified into the following categories:

<b>Categories</b>	<b>Names in Jalal-Abad province</b>	<b>Names in Chui province</b>
Politicians	Jyldyz Zholdosheva – 11 times (ex-parliamentarian) Natalya Nikitenko (parliamentarian) Cholpon Zhakupova (ex- parliamentarian) Cholpon Baekova (lawyer, ex-head of the Constitutional Court) Aida Salyanova (ex-parliamentarian, ex-general prosecutor)	Gulipa Konduchalova (minister, Soviet times) Cholpon Baekova Talipova (ex-Parliamentarian) Altynai Seitbekovna (vice-minister)
Civil society	Zamira Akbagysheva – 2 (Congress of Women in Kyrgyzstan, activist)	Zamira Akbagysheva
Cultural and entertainment areas (singers, actors, writers and etc.)	Salamat Sadykova – 9 (singer) Gulnur Satylganova – 4 (singer) Tattybubu Tursunbaeva – 4 (actress, Soviet times) Bubusara Beishenaliyeva -2 (ballet dancer, Soviet times) Rosa Amanova – 2 (singer, dean in one of the universities) Nurkan Koychumanova – 2 (singer) Shahra Talipova (singer) Gulsun Mamasheva (singer) Gulbu Orozkul kyzy (singer) Sabira Kumushaliyeva (actress, Soviet times) Orozaliyeva-akyn Kasamaliyeva (Shair) (Kyrgyz actress) Nelya (singer) Akulova (signer) Assol Moldokmatova (celebrity in the Kyrgyz modern art culture)	Bubusara Beishenaliyeva - 9, Salamat Sadykova-2 Gulnur Satylganova-2 Sabira Kumushaliyeva-2 Assol Moldokmatova-2, Eldana Foreyes (comedian, social media celebrity) Zamira Zholdosheva (stylist, designer) Eraliyeva (singer) Zhamal Seydakmatova (actress) Dinara Akunova (singer) Aliya Shagiyeva (artist, daughter of ex-president Atambaev) Tattybubu Tursunbaeva Baima Sutenova (journalist) Baken Kadykeeva (actress, Soviet times) Darika Asylbasheva (celebrity)
Non-identified (full name is not given, or not familiar name)	Abylgaziyeva Tatymanova Sadirbekova Orakova Minavar Koichiyeva Karimova Dzhunbaeva Salahain Kabylova Aizhan Akylbekova	Sulaimanova Rakhat Samara Khakimova Kanykei Abdarazakova, Aichurok Imamatova Gulnara Satybaldiyeva Nazira Mambetova Batikaliyeva
Local leaders	4 local women leaders	5 local women leaders

### Brief overview of data on indicators

This subsection discusses indicators for one of the key scoring scales and questions used in the population survey. The review includes the following issues:

<b>Questions B2</b> <i>“In recent years, the number of Muslim adherents has increased. What is your attitude towards that?”</i> and <b>B4.</b> <i>“Why do you think so?”</i> (clarification – negative answer)	Show the level of understanding / perception of risks and threats among the population - "Over the last few years, the increase in the number of Muslim believers is having ... consequences"
<b>Question B10.</b> <i>“How religious do you think you are?”</i>	Allows to determine to what extent people are afraid of religious radicalization, and are afraid to identify themselves as "very religious." This question may allow us to measure the results of the second indicator at the level of impact - susceptibility to the propaganda of radicalization.
<b>Question B15.</b> <i>dispositions of violent extremism (Table 10)</i>	Helps to study beliefs (dispositions) and susceptibility to violent extremism (VE) and radicalization.
<b>Questions B16.</b> <i>“Please tell us, what, in your opinion, does the word “extremism” mean?”</i> and <b>B17.</b> <i>“Tell us, please what, in your opinion, does the word “radicalism” mean?”</i>	One of the key issues in determining/defining the phenomena of extremism and radicalization – helps to determine the overall level of awareness.
<b>Question 20.</b> <i>“What in your opinion, are the causes of radicalism, extremism?” (Table 17)</i>	Allows to determine which causes and groups of risks are identified by respondents.
<b>Question B23.</b> <i>“What can people do for their organization, group that is important to them?” (Table 20)</i>	"What people can do for their organization, for the sake of a group that is important to them" - this issue is one of the key in understanding the susceptibility to propaganda and radicalization.
<b>Question Q24.</b> <i>Statements related to religious beliefs (Table 21)</i>	The statements concerning religious beliefs help determine the level of acceptance of radicalization. Number of people who have high levels of disposition of conventional coercion and protest activities. Hypothetical readiness for violent acts, such as sacrifice of life for the protection of Islamic values and following husband to armed violent zone.

Below we present one more indicator in addition to the existing one in the log frame. The proposed indicator is related to dispositions related to conservative statements related to gender relations, particularly suppression of women’s rights and freedoms (reproductive freedom and rights, legal marriage rights):

<b>Question Q24.</b> <i>Statements related to religious beliefs (Table 23)</i>	Suppression of women’s freedoms and rights
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The following tables illustrate the data regarding to three indicators (data is broken down by provinces) (Tables 25-27). It should be noted that in these three tables below we are presenting the summarized

baseline results that were shown in detail in the questions described above. Here we present this summary in the form of a log frame, disaggregating the baseline results by provinces.

<b>Table 25. The impact level</b>		
<b>Indicator: Number of people who have increased the level of their understanding of the risks of violent extremism</b>		
Questions	Jalal-Abad province	Chui province
B2	11.2% - concern 13.8%- threat	14.6% - concern 3.4%- threat
B4	11% - leads to intolerance and conflicts 11% - negatively affects the situation of women 9% - threat to individual freedom and respect for human rights 5% - leads to the increase of extremism	8.2% - leads to intolerance and conflicts 3.8% - negatively affects the situation of women 3.4% - threat to individual freedom and respect for human rights 6.2% - leads to the increase of extremism
B20	Reasons of radicalization and extremism 39% - low level of religious education 40.4% propaganda and violence in mass media (including internet) 28.4% - low level of general education 36% - high level of labor migration	Reasons of radicalization and extremism 60.2% - low level of religious education, 43.4% - low level of general education 24.4%- social injustice

<b>Table 26. Impact</b>		
<b>Indicator: The number of women who have improved their situation (and have become less vulnerable to propaganda of radicalization)</b>		
Questions	Jalal-Abad province	Chui province
B10	Moderately religious (on answer scale 4-5-6) - 76.8% (384) Very religious (on scale from 8 and above) -2.2% (11)	Moderately religious (on answer scale 4-5-6) - 39.6% (198) Very religious (on scale from 8 and above) - 45.2% (226)
B15	Dispositions (on scale from 1-2 low level, 4 and 5 high level) 3.04 – intolerance 3.47- conventional coercion 3.34- protest activity	Dispositions (on scale from 1-2 low level, 4 and 5 high level) 2.67 – intolerance 3.94 – conventional coercion 3.59- protest activity
B23	- 34% in Jalal-Abad province answered <u>positively</u> to the question and they understand those who continue to support organization or group which fights for political and legal rights of their group, even if the organization violates the law. - 23.2% - difficult to answer to this question - 32.8% (grey zone) had difficulties with answering to the questions in the last 2 statements (on support of violent protests and attack on militia)	Majority (more than 80%) answered negatively to the questions regarding the support of radical groups
B24	On the example of question B24.6	On the example of question B24.6

	<p>92.8% do not agree with the statement that “one can sacrifice his/her life for protection of Islamic values</p> <p>On the example of question B24.10. 85.6% respondents do not agree with the statement “A Muslim woman must follow her chosen one everywhere, even to the armed conflict zones”</p>	<p>73.2% do not agree with the statement that “one can sacrifice his/her life for protection of Islamic values</p> <p>18% from Chui province consider that one can sacrifice his/her life for the sake of religion.</p> <p>On the example of the question B24.10. 78% respondent do not agree with the statement “A Muslim woman must follow her chosen one everywhere, even to the armed conflict zones”</p>
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<b>Table 27. Result #1</b>		
<b>1.1. Indicator:</b> The number of women and young people who are well informed of radicalization and violent extremism		
Questions	Jalal-Abad province	Chui province
B16 and B17	<p>33% - 328 women respondents found it difficult to define extremism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 176 women in Jalal-Abad province</li> <li>- A total of 692 women – 71% could not give a definition to radicalism. Broken down by provinces:</li> <li>- 399 women from Jalal-Abad province could not give a definition</li> </ul>	<p>33% - 328 women respondents found it difficult to define extremism</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 152 women in Chui province</li> <li>- A total of 692 women – 71% could not give a definition to radicalism.</li> <li>- 293 women from Chui province could not give a definition</li> </ul>

## B. RESULTS OF EXPERT INTERVIEWS WITH STAKEHOLDERS

### Demographic data – Chapter I

This survey among experts was conducted to study the opinion of different stakeholders on issues and processes of radicalization and violent extremism in their communities. The interviews were conducted in the form of structured interviews with representatives of LSGs, law enforcement bodies, schools, medical institutions, representatives of civil society (local informal leaders and NGOs), as well as with imams. A total of 100 surveys were conducted in two provinces, Jalal-Abad (50 respondents: 30 women and 20 men) and Chui (50 respondents: 28 women and 22 men) (Table 28. Demographic data - questions D1-D3 and B1-B2). The urban population is 32% (16 respondents in two cities) and rural areas 68% (32 respondents in each region).

- *Age groups*

Respondents were also divided into three age groups, from the age of 18-28 (young people) was interviewed - 7, 29-58 - (working age population) - 68, and 18 respondents were interviewed in an age group 59+. The majority - 68% were representatives of the second age group.

- *Ethnic groups*

In terms of ethnicity, most identified themselves as Kyrgyz - 74% (39 respondents in Jalal-Abad province and 25 respondents in Chui). 10% of respondents identified themselves as Uzbeks.

#	Demographic data	Province (number)		Total	
		Jalal-Abad	Chui		
D1	Sex	Women	30	28	58
		Men	20	22	42
		<b>Total</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>100</b>
D2	Age groups	18-28	4	3	7
		29-58	35	33	68
		59+	7	11	18
D3	Nationality	Kyrgyz	39	35	74
		Uzbek	10		10
		Russian	1	8	9
		Other		5	5

*B1. Job title of respondents of expert interviews and question B2 - Which organization does the respondent work for?*

As noted earlier, when recruiting respondents, difficulties arose in gaining access to law enforcement officials in Jalal-Abad province. But after receiving the cover letter, the interviewers managed to conduct the needed quantity of interviews. On average, 7 interviews were conducted with representatives in each area. Most of all, representatives of LSGs and representatives of schools were open to the interview, while fewer interviews were conducted with imams and other experts in this field (Table 29).

These questions helped us determine the occupation of respondents. In order to ensure anonymity and confidentiality, data on these issues are submitted in a generalized format.

Informal leaders in Jalal-Abad province were represented by members of the courts of aksakals (elderly), women's councils. And representatives of law enforcement agencies were officers of the District Internal Affairs Office, as well as district police inspectors. According to Chui province, representatives of law enforcement bodies were youth officers/inspectors, district youth officers/inspectors, district police officers. Representatives of local self-government bodies in Chui province were employees of the State Register Office, Tax Inspection, offices of aiyl aimaks. While in Jalal-Abad, they were represented by different institutions of local authorities in aiyl aimaks.

<b>Table 29. Respondents of expert interviews</b>	Jalal-Abad	Chui
LSG representatives	10	9
Representatives of schools	8	9
Law enforcement officers	6	7
Employees of healthcare institutions	7	8
Imams and representatives of the State Committee on Religious Affairs	5	6
Representatives of NGO, Public Foundations	7	4
Local informal leaders	7	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>

• **Results of expert survey – Chapter II**

This questionnaire is more focused on the collection and analysis of value judgments, the understanding of experts about the level of radicalization and violent extremism in their region of residence. This section describes the results on issues B3-B23.

*B3 What is extremism in your opinion? and B4. What is radicalism in your opinion?*

Questions B3 and B4 in the questionnaire for experts are similar questions, which are numbered in the questionnaire for the population as B16 and B17. One of the differences between the responses of expert interviews from a survey of population is the fact that it was easier for respondents in the experts' group

to define extremism. So only 3 experts could not answer this question from 100 respondents. Also, the answers were complete and fuller than those of the respondents from the survey of population (Table 30).

The most frequently used words and phrases used to describe extremism were:

- religion - 39 times, Islam - 22 times, Muslims - 7 times
- against - 20 times (against: religion / Islam, society / nation / people, law and state, the Constitution).
- extreme - 16 times
- terrorism - 8 times, terrorists - 7, terrorist attacks - 8 times

In general, when describing subjects, respondents in both samples, both among experts and population, gave similar answers describing people as those who misunderstand or inappropriately practice religion, those who have lost their way, and those who engage in extremist activity for the sake of money. However, one difference was that experts related this phenomenon to structural factors that are affecting the subjects who live in poverty and in an unstable situation, dissatisfied with the status.

Also, unlike the findings obtained from the survey of population it was easier to analyze/cluster the answers of expert respondents due to more complete formulations given by this group of respondents. In general, extremism has also been described in negative terms. An interesting fact is that both surveys had respondents who emphasized that extremism is an action aimed at establishing social justice and against the state as a result of discontent with the activities and policies of the authorities - "a lesson to the state". One of the respondents noted that the phenomenon takes its roots in the Soviet past (there was no specification exactly how it was related to the Soviet past).

If we conduct an analysis that is generalized between the responses of the public and experts, the responses of the former are for the most part focuses on the emotional perception of the phenomenon as something dangerous and terrible, defining actions as cruel and deadly (war, terrorist attacks / explosions, terrorism / terrorists, suicide bombers, murders), while experts to a greater extent were able to give clear characteristics and divide it into sub-groups.

<b>Table 30. Definition of extremism</b>	
<b>Subjects</b>	
People	Those who have no understanding/mispracticing, who have lost their way, poor/dissatisfied/unstable, act for the sake of money
<b>Groups/organizations:</b>	
Enemies inside	Inside enemies
Abstract external forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political forces against state/Constitution</li> <li>• Illegal organizations</li> <li>• Those acting against society</li> <li>• Those leaving for Syria</li> <li>• Those who have bad intentions/goals/manipulative/brainwashing</li> <li>• Getting off the right path/movement</li> <li>• Isolated groups</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reading much about jihad from Koran</li> <li>• Having their own laws</li> <li>• Groups of activist Muslims/terrorists</li> </ul>
Society	Religious and political diversity, polytheism
Youth	Risk groups
<b>Subjectless:</b>	
Adverse/negative judgments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Against Islam (traditional)</li> <li>• Means of frightening/dividing</li> <li>• Not a religion</li> <li>• Sects from other countries</li> <li>• Wrong policy</li> <li>• Wrong/bad pathway/direction</li> <li>• Misinterpretation of religion/Islam</li> <li>• Bad crime/conflict</li> <li>• Left in Soviet past</li> <li>• Extreme methods/views</li> <li>• Against freedoms and rights of human</li> <li>• Incorrect upbringing/propaganda</li> </ul>
Absolute/abstract negative statements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Terrorism</li> <li>• Conflict within Islam</li> <li>• Ideology/religious worldview</li> <li>• Violence/protest/fight</li> <li>• Evil/life destruction</li> <li>• War of religions in Arab countries</li> <li>• Doubt in existence of extremism in KR</li> <li>• Propaganda of one's ideas</li> <li>• Lesson to the state – social extremism</li> <li>• It is derived from the word extreme. This term was introduced by Europeans linking it with Islam<sup>16</sup>.</li> </ul>

To the question B4 on the definition of radicalism, in general, there has not been much difference for experts between the definition of extremism and radicalism (Table 31). It should be noted that for this question, to which respondents were supposed to define radicalism, 33% of them found it difficult to answer.

Radicalism was for the most part like extremism and was described as a phenomenon associated with religion. So, the words describing the religious orientation during the calculation showed that "religion" was used 23 times, Islam - 13, movement - 11 times. Unlike the data obtained from a survey of population, radicalism was less understood as an "extreme" (5 times mentioned), or confrontation

<sup>16</sup> Here is a full quotation of the definition given by the respondent to this question: "It is derived from the word extreme. This term was introduced by Europeans linking it with Islam. But there should be a golden middle concept. Thus, if there is a harm and danger to the society and the actions/ideas are extreme, are beyond the limits and boundaries of the society that is what we can call extremism. But that is not an Islamic extremism."

(against the Islam / state / people - 12 times mentioned). Here it can be said that the opinion of the respondents in the survey with the population differs from understanding of radicalism described in the expert interviews.

<b>Table 31. Definition of radicalism</b>	
<b>Subjects</b>	
People	People deceived for the sake of money with deep psychological changes
<b>Groups/organizations:</b>	
Enemies inside	In society those who are against religion
Abstract external forces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Group/forces against state</li> <li>• Hizb-ut-Tahrir</li> <li>• Wahhabist</li> <li>• Travel to other countries to earn money/for the sake of family</li> <li>• Those leaving for Syria</li> <li>• With bad intentions/goals/manipulative</li> <li>• Externally, from other countries</li> <li>• Terrorist religious groups/sects</li> <li>• Acting against society</li> </ul>
Society	Political, ideological diversity (secular and religious society)
Youth	Risk group
<b>Subjectless:</b>	
Adverse/negative judgments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Wrong understanding of religion</li> <li>• Difference/Misunderstanding of each other</li> <li>• Misinterpretation of religion</li> <li>• Isolation from society/division</li> <li>• Wrong/bad pathway/direction</li> <li>• Legal illiteracy of KR citizens</li> <li>• Against religion</li> <li>• Wrong propaganda/movement</li> <li>• Unacceptable in secular society</li> <li>• Absence of ideology</li> </ul>
Absolute/abstract negative statements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Religious understanding</li> <li>• Non-traditional Islam</li> <li>• No religion</li> <li>• Migration as a factor for development of radicalism</li> <li>• Extremism</li> <li>• Ideology/religious worldview</li> <li>• Extreme measures/opinions and uncompromising stand</li> <li>• Terrorism</li> <li>• Establishing Khalifat</li> <li>• Changing the world</li> <li>• War within religions/between nations/a global problem</li> </ul>

*B5. Did you discuss the problem of extremism with your colleagues?*

Most of the respondents noted that they discuss the problem of extremism with their colleagues – 89% of respondents (Table 32).

<b>Table 32. B5. Did you discuss the problem of extremism with your colleagues?</b>	<b>Jalal-Abad (quantity)</b>	<b>Chui (quantity)</b>	<b>Jalal-Abad (%)</b>	<b>Chui (%)</b>	<b>Total %</b>
Yes	45	44	88	90	89
No	5	6	12	5	11


*B6. Did you observe any manifestations of extremism during the last in your community?*

Most expert respondents did not encounter/observe any manifestations of extremism in their community in the last year (Table 33).

<b>Table 33. Q6. Did you observe any manifestations of extremism in your community in the last year?</b>		<b>Jalal-Abad</b>	<b>Chui</b>
No, I did not observe/encounter	yes	43	42
	no	7	8
Did you encounter propaganda: have you seen any leaflets, papers, magazines with extremist content?	yes	5	2
	no	45	48
Have you witnessed insults and humiliations of people because of their nationality or religion?	yes	2	3
	no	48	47
Have you witnessed desecration and destruction of monuments, graves?	yes	2	
	no	48	50
Have you witnessed protest actions using violence: arsons, explosions, street protests?	no	1	1
	no	49	49

*B7. What sources did you come across where you have seen the extremist materials?*


To this question, as well as the previous question, the respondents in the most cases answered that they did not encounter with extremist materials (Diagram B7). Of those who did encounter such materials, 1/4 indicated that they had come across such materials



on the Internet, 1/3 saw such material in TV shows.

*B8. How would you estimate the level of extremism threat in the Kyrgyz Republic?*

Opinions among the experts were divided into two groups - those who believe that the threat level of extremism in Kyrgyzstan is "elevated blue" - 35% and those respondents who rate it as a "low green level" - 30%. 13% believe that there is no threat of extremism in the country (Diagram B8). It should be noted that the responses of those who assess the level of threat as "elevated blue" are generally scattered across almost all communities, but it is important to mention that in Alexandrovka a/a in Chui province 4 of 6 experts and in communities Kurmanbek a/a and Kenesh a/a in Jalal-Abad province half of the respondents estimated the threat level as "elevated blue".



*B9. Where in Kyrgyzstan there is a problem of extremism?*


According to the opinion of experts three regions were identified as having problems related to extremism: 43 respondents named Jalal-Abad province, 14 respondents noted Osh province (only experts in Chui province), and 14 respondents said that there are problems of extremism in Batken province (Table 34).

	Jalal-Abad	Chui
Jalal-Abad province	28	15
Osh province	0	14
Batken province	7	7
Difficult to answer	7	8

*B10 and B11. Extremist sentiments*

Most of the interviewed experts believe that there is no tendency of increase in extremist sentiments in their communities. So, more than 80% believe that recently there has been no strengthening of such sentiments. More than 70% of experts believe that in the future extremist sentiments will not raise/increase. However, 1/4 of the experts interviewed assess the situation as disturbing/alarming, and believe that in the future such sentiments may intensify/raise (Diagram B10-11).

This result illustrates that about 30% of respondents are alerted. Here we can see that results from question B8, where 35% of the respondents believed that the extremism threat in their region is very high – “elevated blue”, and here in question B11 we can see similar results where experts share their concerns about the raise of the extremist sentiments in their community in the future.



*B12. What in your opinion is the growth factor of extremist sentiments?*

This question is similar to question number B20 in the questionnaire for the population. In the first place, the growth factor of extremism is a low level of religious education (65%) and next is a low level of general education (56%) (Table 35). These results are consistent with the results obtained during the population survey. Further by the priority of factors is social injustice (35% of experts) and a high level of labor migration - 28%. To a greater extent, these factors were stressed by experts from Chui province.

If broken down by provinces, we can see that there are differences in the perception of the factors, thus the respondents in Jalal-Abad province define other priorities, to a greater extent they believe that a low level of general education is the main factor in the growth of extremist sentiments - 64%, and low level of religious education was noted by 58%.

		Jalal-Abad (%)	Chui (%)	Total %
Low level of religious education	Yes	58.0	72.0	65.0
	No	42.0	28.0	35.0
Low level of general education	Yes	64.0	48.0	56.0
	No	36.0	52.0	44.0
Social injustice in the society	Yes	28.0	42.0	35.0
	No	72.0	56.0	64.0
High level of labor migration	Yes	20.0	36.0	28.0
	No	80.0	64.0	72.0
Inaction of state authorities	Yes	18.0	12.0	15.0
	No	82.0	88.0	85.0
	Yes	18.0	4.0	11.0

<b>Table 35. B12. What in your opinion is the factor of growth of extremist sentiments?</b>		Jalal- Abad (%)	Chui (%)	Total %
Low legal culture of population and low tolerance of people	No	82.0	96.0	89.0
Propaganda and violence in mass media (including in the Internet)	Yes	14.0	12.0	13.0
	No	86.0	88.0	87.0
Economic inequality in the society	Yes	12.0	18.0	15.0
	No	88.0	82.0	85.0
Activation of non-conventional religious movements	Yes	12.0	12.0	12.0
	No	88.0	88.0	88.0
Repression of authorities	Yes	2.0	4.0	3.0
	No	98.0	96.0	97.0

*B13. Have you personally encountered any extremist group?*

Most of the respondents did not personally encounter the extremist groups. 10% of the respondents encountered personally with any extremist organization - 8 men of the expert in Jalal-Abad province and 2 women of the experts in Chui province (Table 36).

<b>Table 36. B13. Have you personally encountered with any extremist group?</b>	Jalal- Abad	Chui
Yes	8	2
No	42	47

*B14. How? Clarifying the question Q13.*


This clarifying question on how respondents met extremist groups received answers that can be classified as a personal experience when visiting a mosque, Dawats or other religious ceremonies (for example, funerals), as part of law enforcement and security services operations or their data. For a more detailed example, see the following answers given by respondents:

- On duty, when detained persons with extremist literature,
- When a woman leads a closed way of life (do not leave the house) and do not communicate with anyone other than her husband,
- Participated in the inquiry after the detention of a group of Uzbek men by National Security Service officers, they were trained in Syria. Later there was a reportage on TV.
- Jahovists [Ўаиховцы] - a new trend, when they go to Dawat they take the whole family with them. It is not known how they make money. Discreet, segregative. The meeting with the representatives of this group took place at the funeral, one of the members of Jaho [Ўаухо] - "they did not allow to cry for the deceased"
- I saw those who go for Dawat

- In the mosque, I saw followers from the Yakyn-Inkar movement (one of the religious groups in Kyrgyzstan that are leading life in isolation from society that does not belong to their group, for example, they do not watch TV, do not let their children to school. This group was lately and frequently reported in mass media).
- From investigative information.

*B15. Do you think that state programs are effectively designed to address the problem of extremism?*

About half of the respondents believe that the state is effectively working on programs aimed at solving the problems of extremism. However, 24% of experts in Chui province and 20% in Jalal-Abad province assess the state's performance as not enough efficient. 1/4 of the respondents found it difficult to answer to this question (Diagram B15).



*B16. Why do you think so? Clarifying question to B15.*

The answers of the respondents were divided into four groups: 1) experts who believe that no measures are being taken and there are no programs to combat extremism; 2) there are programs and laws and the state is working but not effectively; and the third group 3) believes that the process of Islamization and the growth of extremism tend to increase rapidly, especially in the south of the country, and 4) there is a fourth group that gave examples of effectiveness and a systematic approach to addressing the problems of radicalization (Table 37).

<i>No measures are taken to address the problem of extremism</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- no special program</li> <li>- unaware of such programs, haven't seen/heard of such measures</li> <li>- nothing is being done, no work is felt – “unless the war breaks out, no one will act here”</li> <li>- mosques are uncontrolled (a lot of mosques)</li> <li>- no explanatory work is done (among population and youth)</li> <li>- no measures are taken to combat extremism, only men go to mosques, women do not have access for prophylactic talk with them</li> </ul>
<i>Weak state and laws, corruption</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- we have laws but they need to be tightened on these issues</li> <li>- weak state, laws need to be reinforced</li> <li>- these programs are needed just for material benefit and corruption</li> <li>- no results, ineffective as the problem could be solved long ago</li> <li>- local authorities do not pay enough attention to this problem</li> <li>- no work is done on systemic level</li> </ul>

<b>Table 37. B16, clarifying. Justification of answer for the question B15</b>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- weak control</li> <li>- internet and online social networks are not controlled</li> <li>- no ideology for youth – lectures should be introduced at schools on extremism</li> <li>- shortage of specialists, low qualification and training as a consequence lead to unemployment, and this is one of the radicalization factors</li> <li>- activities are implemented but on a regular basis</li> </ul>
<i>The level of extremism is growing, as well as islamization</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- in the south<sup>17</sup> population is being actively radicalized, recruitment to Syrian war</li> <li>- extremism is growing in our south and overall world</li> <li>- more and more people can be seen in the streets of south wearing religious clothes (black hijabs) and bearded men</li> </ul>
<i>Work underway</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- mosques started coordinating their work</li> <li>- Dawatists are under control</li> <li>- control over youth travelling abroad is in place</li> <li>- close work with mosques underway (imams work with population, training conducted in traditional Islam)</li> <li>- more information meetings are held (more workshops, round tables and discussions; talks are conducted at schools and universities, summer schools at mosques give the basic knowledge about Islam, village meetings)</li> <li>- 10 units under the district internal affair offices are monitoring the situation</li> <li>- there are the lists of prohibited organizations (Hisb-ut-Tahrir, etc.)</li> <li>- NGO and other civil activists are conducting explanatory work</li> <li>- district inspectors are controlling the districts</li> <li>- videos are produced (to increase public awareness)</li> </ul>

*B17. What effective measures against radicalization / extremism could you suggest?*

It should be noted that half of the respondents found it difficult to identify / propose effective measures against radicalization/extremism (question B17). When defining stakeholders in the fight against radicalization / extremism, the following were named: Parliament, President, law enforcement agencies, neighborhood committee leaders and district. The main target groups were identified as youth and women, with whom it is necessary to work through schools, colleges and organized events, and meetings. It was also added that it is necessary to work with imams and dangerous religious communities that need to be checked and to tighten control over them. Table 38 presents examples of measures against radicalization / extremism proposed by respondents. The proposed measures were grouped in three blocks: legal and policy measures, educational and awareness raising measures and socio-economic measures. Also, there was an additional block with the answer – “nothing needs to be done”.

<b>Table 38. B17. Effective measures against radicalization/extremism</b>	
Legal and political measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen / tighten laws aimed to fight against extremism</li> </ul>


<sup>17</sup> Important to note that experts did not refer to 2010 events (ethnic clashes in the south of Kyrgyzstan between Uzbek and Kyrgyz) – further elaboration and study is needed. However, we believe that this can be linked with the historical differences between south and north, where southerners were closer to Kokand Khanate and other more religious groups, thus are considered to be more exposed to religion.

**Table 38. B17. Effective measures against radicalization/extremism**

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Take under arrest, imprison extremists and radicals, and set precedents as examples</li> <li>• Political will is needed (the President, the Parliament) - the commitment and determination of the authorities (tough decisions and laws, programs against radicalization are needed)</li> <li>• Prohibit religious clothing in schools</li> <li>• Promote democratic and secular values</li> <li>• Control / supervision of prohibited groups</li> <li>• Control / supervision of women who are dressed in black robes and bearded men in religious clothing (Arab clothing)</li> <li>• The National Security Service, the Jogorku Kenesh, the Ministry of Internal Affairs should address this problem</li> <li>• Conduct inspections in mosques, and among the Dawatists (could distinguish traditional Islam from other movements)</li> <li>• Keep track of those who travel to Saudi Arabia</li> </ul>
Educational and awareness-raising measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct explanatory conversations / gatherings in the villages about the differences between traditional Islam and other movements, and the harm of certain movements</li> <li>• Work with target groups - young people and women at schools, universities and conduct home visits and preventive conversations</li> <li>• Hold round tables, meetings for prevention</li> <li>• In schools from grade 5, the subject "Fundamentals of Islam" should be introduced</li> <li>• Study Koran</li> <li>• Competent imams (it is better to work with imams, bring the essence of religion)</li> <li>• Improve the quality of religious education</li> <li>• Work with young people as a risk group</li> <li>• Work together as members of extremist organizations and groups</li> <li>• Short videos/clips about the fate life stories of militants in Syria</li> <li>• Conduct a TV debate to make different voices are heard</li> <li>• To increase the legal literacy of the population</li> <li>• Conduct training in conjunction with district police and work with neighborhood leaders</li> <li>• Provide more information through the media and Internet, social media networks</li> <li>• Conduct trainings, seminars among the population and activists</li> <li>• Activities should have regular and systematic character</li> </ul>
Social and economic measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Help the poor</li> <li>• Develop sports and cultural events for young people</li> <li>• Improve environment /quality of life</li> <li>• Proper professional distribution / planning and employment</li> <li>• Address unemployment</li> <li>• Involve public figures, civic activists, famous people to speak on TV, at seminars, conferences</li> </ul>
No measure is needed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is no need to take any measures</li> <li>• Not to conduct any activities, it will be regarded as propaganda</li> <li>• Do not conduct any awareness -raising work (preventive measure such as conducting meetings with different groups and explaining/educating them about radicalization/extremism), this kind of measure can be perceived negatively by people</li> </ul>

*B18. Who, in your opinion, bears the main responsibility for solving the problem of extremism?*

The opinion of experts on this issue was very diverse, in contrast to the results of the survey among the population (question B22 in the questionnaire for the population), where the Parliament, government and the police were unanimously determined as responsible. Here, for instance, experts in Jalal-Abad province indicated that the main responsibility lies with the population itself (72%), equally with local authorities and the police (42% each), and then with the Parliament and the government (38%), and civil society organizations (20%). In Chui province, we see another picture: 48% believe that the main responsibility lies with the Parliament and the government, 32% believe that local authorities and 20% - the population and 18% responsibility of the police (Diagram B18).



*B19 "What is the role of women in strengthening radicalism and extremism?"*

The answers to this question were distributed among three groups (Table 39):

- No role for women, where, in general, respondents denied the existence of such phenomena in their communities (12 respondents believed that women did not have such a role, and 2 respondents denied any existence of such developments/phenomena in their community),
- The majority of answers to this question were emphasizing the role of women, stating that it is big and significant within their families in strengthening radicalism/extremism. Respondents referred woman's role as a transmitter of culture/ideology in their families while rearing their children and 'recruiting' their family members/community, as well as those who join the religious struggle by following/supporting their husbands/brothers/fathers.

Here we can refer to the work of Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (1989)<sup>18</sup> where the role of a woman is described within her group, where woman's obligation is to participate in processes and practices within their communities/collectivities - ethnic / national /religious groups. The main components of these women's roles are that a woman is perceived as: 1. "the biological reproducer" of the members of her group - the birth of children for the reproduction of members of her group 2. "cultural / ideological agent" that conveys the culture / faith of her group to her children and the community (education) 3. a woman must join a national / religious struggle (join her husband / father / brother), 4. a woman is a "symbol of the social boundary" between members of her group and a stranger 5. The "symbol of differences" for their group, here the focus is on the symbolism of the ideological discourse for construction and reproduction that distinguishes the characteristics/categories of members of their group (for example, the difference as wearing a hijab, and other attributes and symbols). In other words, women act not only as biological and social reproducers, but also as symbolic determinants of their group boundaries.

- Egalitarian. This group of respondents stressed that the role in strengthening radicalism / extremism is unambiguous both for women and for men.

No role	<input type="checkbox"/> Insignificant role – “can’t stop even their own children” <input type="checkbox"/> They play no role as they subordinate to their husbands
Denying the existence of this phenomena as radicalism and extremism	<input type="checkbox"/> “we do not have such a thing in our village. Therefore, no role is played by women. Our women are not involved in such activities”
Have role	<input type="checkbox"/> advocating through training in big groups that are uncontrolled, they meet on a regular basis <input type="checkbox"/> women as instruments <input type="checkbox"/> upbringing of children, can involve all the family <input type="checkbox"/> women leadership in a family <input type="checkbox"/> propaganda of wearing headscarf <input type="checkbox"/> women are more active than men <input type="checkbox"/> woman power <input type="checkbox"/> women are peace builders compared to men <input type="checkbox"/> women are powerless, they are easy to recruit/deceive and they help to recruit others <input type="checkbox"/> illiterate and unaware

<sup>18</sup> Anthias, F., & Yuval-Davis, N. (1989). *Woman-nation-state*. Springer. In their work, these two female scholars are illustrating how intersections between gender and nation/group works, particularly, where women are seen only as those who fulfill ‘naturalized’ roles as biological reproducers of the group, through women are seen having also roles in the cultural constructions of their community, with their duties to contribute to the formation and prosperity of their collectivities.

<b>Table 39. B19 “What is the role of women in strengthening of radicalism and extremism”</b>	
	<input type="checkbox"/> “women are taught at home, so they can mentor family in the wrong way”, i.e information and teachings that men get in mosques is different from those that women get at home <input type="checkbox"/> obedience to husband – follows her husband, son in training, will cover herself and follow the religious movement spreading extremism by this <input type="checkbox"/> clothing is an important element - "special weapon of women, they are grouped / linked through the hijab" <input type="checkbox"/> support husbands and sons to join extremist groups <input type="checkbox"/> women go on sex tours to Turkey, and from there to Syria
Egalitarian worldview – the role of men and women are equally important	<input type="checkbox"/> are equally recruited

*B20. What is the role of women in countering radicalism and extremism?*

The results were divided by those who believed that the role of women was significant and those that were skeptical about it. When answering this question respondents focused on the parental role of women, talking about the proper upbringing, controlling and monitoring of children. The role of women in conducting preventive works and conducting explanatory talks with both members of their families and in their communities was also emphasized (Table 40). 6% of respondents answered that there is no role, and 21% of respondents found it difficult to answer this question.

<b>Table 40. B20. What is the role of women in countering radicalism and extremism?</b>	
An important and big role	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- upbringing of children (controlling children) - can both positively and negatively affect, depending on the world view of mothers.</li> <li>- nurturing values against radicalism</li> <li>- resisting radicalization in the family, persuading and advising, sometimes prohibiting in the family circle to participate in extremist activities</li> <li>- monitoring and controlling family members and identifying such families</li> <li>- reporting to law enforcement bodies if there is a suspicion</li> <li>- assisting and participating actively in the life of the community</li> <li>- women can also oppose radicalism/extremism refusing to support such activities among members of their families</li> <li>- women peacekeepers, teachers, employees of healthcare institutions can hold conversations with people and guide them to take the right path</li> <li>- significant role of women in explanatory/preventive works</li> <li>- educated and intelligent women can show resilience and resist this phenomenon</li> <li>- women activists carry out preventive work, often take part in meetings and are usually more active than men</li> <li>- women can refuse to support husbands</li> <li>- there are women provocateurs and instigators</li> <li>- recruiter and extremist (participate in agitation)</li> </ul>

<b>Table 40. B20. What is the role of women in countering radicalism and extremism?</b>	
	women
There is no role or it is insignificant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- no role (6 respondents)</li> <li>- follow their husbands</li> <li>- cannot contradict their husbands</li> <li>- no one will listen to them</li> <li>- there is no gender equality in the country - women are suppressed by men, so a woman cannot influence them</li> <li>- high rate of unemployment among women, low level of representation of women in various structures in the state and in politics leads to lower engagement of women</li> </ul>

*B 21. Are there in KR women who can be religious leaders in countering radicalism and extremism?*

50% of respondents believe that there are women in the country who can be religious leaders in countering radicalism and extremism. The rest half consider that there are no such women.

Table 41. B21. Are there in KR women who can be religious leaders in countering radicalism and extremism?	Jalal-Abad	Chui
yes	50.0	54.0
no	50.0	46.0

*B22. If yes, then name them, clarifying question to B21*

Not all experts could answer this question, 47 did not answer, 15 answered that they heard, but could not recall, 10 said it was Zhamal Frontbek kyzy (head of Mutakallim), 6 named Roza Otunbaeva (female president, interim government 2010-2011), 2 named Rita Karasartova (civil activist, non-governmental sector).

There were also answers that "any woman with higher education, higher religious education can be a leader" and also called local women leaders (Rosia Mamekovna - local leader, local NGO leader, Kazima - local aksakal court representative in Aleksandrovka, NGO - Levara R. and Sushaklo K., other women and human rights activists, women deputies and public figures). The respondents also named the following women leaders: Aigul Abdurasulova - human rights activist, Zilya Apautdinova, Aizhan Akylbekova, Zamira Akbagysheva, Zhenishbek kyzy, Klara Azhibekova, T. Umetalieva, Nahlalldia, Rosa Aitmatova, Dinara Oshurakhunova.

*B23. If not, how to prepare them, clarifying question to B21*

58% of respondents did not answer this question, 7% answered that they could not answer. The most common responses were preparation of leaders through training - 14% (workshops, training in state

madrassa, religious education), dissemination of information, including through the media - 7%, explanatory work on religion - 6%, special training programs for activists - 5 (state, NGOs), fighting patriarchal values, that suppress and discriminate against women - 2%. Other answers were that women leaders "prepare themselves", "this is the work of the Muftiate in setting the right direction and improving understanding of population about such concepts as religious groups and sects." Also, several respondents did not believe that it would be advisable to work with women, as "women are weak, vulnerable to propaganda", "there will be no impact - since women are not allowed to enter mosques".

## KEY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Here we present the key conclusions and recommendations that are based on the analysis of findings of the baseline assessment “Determining the level of knowledge about radicalization and extremism among women and youth” within the framework of the project "Countering radicalization among women in Jalal-Abad and Chui Province”. The main research questions and objectives that were addressed in this analytical paper were:

- What is the original situation at the start of the project (baseline) in regard to the level of knowledge/understanding of radicalization and violent extremism among women and youth?
- Are there regional differences and peculiarities that must be addressed during the implementation process?
- What kind of differences exist in perceptions and understanding of the studied phenomena among experts and population?

It should be noted that baseline research allows to define and summarize results at the start of the project (baseline) in relation to the three indicators at the impact and results level, disaggregated by provinces.

Impact level	The number of people, who increased their level of understanding of the risks of violent extremism
	The number of women, who improved their situation (and have become less vulnerable to radicalization propaganda)
Result 1	1.1. The number of women and young people well-informed about the radicalization and violent extremism.

The detailed data regarding to these three indicators presented earlier in the text (Tables 25-27). The summary was presented in the form of a log frame. These findings that measure the impact and result level indicators of the project in the target communities, would be useful for Mutakallim to evaluate the difference between the baseline situation and the final situation.

This concluding part is divided into two parts: key conclusions and recommendations. The first part, divided into sub-sections, reflects the main findings, whereas the second focuses on what can be done on the basis of these findings.

### Key conclusions:

#### *Understanding violent extremism and radicalism*

- It must be noted that participants of the population survey had difficulties in giving definitions to violent extremism and radicalism. In contrast, the participants in the expert’s survey, in general, gave clear definitions to these phenomena.

- In defining extremism and radicalism the majority of the respondents are describing the terms having negative connotations, perceiving these as negative phenomena:
  - Respondents often make analogies or describe the phenomena in connection with such concepts as religion, religious movement, Islam, Muslims, sects, as well as dangerous activities/actors (terrorism and terrorists, suicide bombers, terrorist attacks, explosions, war, murders, lawlessness, Wahhabis, Hizb ut-Tahrir, Dawatists), extremity.
  - Other less frequently used references were legality, state, Constitution, and Koran.
  - Extremism and radicalism are understood as the actions of groups directed against society/people and the state.
  - Respondents when describing subjects of extremism used such public discourse narratives where defined them as victims who do not have opportunities, either were deceived, misunderstood and lost, as well as those who sell themselves for money or subjects were described as fanatics.

- Semantic analysis of the definitions on extremism given by the population were identified into four key clusters:

<p>“Do not know” – 1/3 of the responses</p>	
<p>“Danger” cluster – 589 times mentioned</p>	<p>Thus, the “danger” narratives included definitions using such negative connotations as terror/terrorism, killing, aggression, evil/bad, war, suicide-bombers, and explosion. Danger was also connected with those who went to Syria and Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>“Religion” cluster – 259 times mentioned</p>	<p>“Religion” cluster also included subjects and the spectrum of the definitions was starting from “other religious/Muslim movements” to definition of extremism as “non-religion”. Subjects of the extremism in the “religion” cluster were defined as fanatics, invaders from outside, those who bring destruction (consciously and unconsciously), those who lost the right path, were deceived, those who are sold (hired) or those who pay money (recruiters).</p>
<p>“Gendered subjects/objects” cluster– 16 times mentioned.</p>	<p>In the cluster “gendered subjects/objects” of extremism defined asymmetrically, men are only referred 3 times, they are subjects of extremism – those who call for dawat, leaving their wives behind, those who have particular facial features – beard. Whereas women are indicated 13 times – they are primarily identified as objects, whose freedom and opportunities are limited, those who are being deceived and those who are forced to be covered/veiled by other.</p>

- It is important to note that respondents revealed negative attitudes towards veiled women (wearing hijab) and men with beards. They are seen as those who cannot be trusted, as those who conduct illegal and outrageous actions. We assume that such negative attitudes may reflect images that are most likely are constructed by Mass Media.

- The respondents from the population survey believed that radicalization and extremism are primarily caused by the following six reasons:
  1. Low level of religious education
  2. Low level of education (general/secular)
  3. Propaganda and violence in the media (including the Internet)
  4. High level of labor migration
  5. Inaction of authorities
  6. Social injustice in society

Here we observe regional differences, particularly when respondents in Chui province prioritized low level of education (religious and secular), whereas in Jalal-Abad province respondents emphasized on “propaganda and violence in the media and Internet”, “low level of religious education”, and “high level of labor migration” as one of the main causes of violent extremism and radicalism. Overall, experts’ responses coincided with the responses of the population, particularly, they also named low level of education (religious and secular), and highlighted social injustice and labor migration.

- The responses of the participants in the survey had more difficulties with defining radicalism, that demonstrates lower level of understanding of this phenomenon. Thus, there were higher number of respondents who were not able to give definition to radicalism, and those who responded used more limited spectrum of definitions. Here we defined three clusters based on the semantic analysis:
  - “subjects of radicalism”,
  - “object of illegal actions conducted by radical subjects” and
  - “rejection of the link to Islam”.

These responses are correlated with the same three dispositions identified for violent extremism. In general, we can confirm based on the findings that respondents in the population survey had no clear understanding of the differences between the two phenomena as "extremism" and "radicalism".

- Even though the majority of the respondents (population survey) believe that extremism is not a serious problem in their areas, still there are respondents (in both, population and expert surveys) who are concerned about the risks of violent extremism and radicalism. Especially the respondents in Jalal-Abad province have greater awareness of them, among them experts are more alerted about the risks and threats related to extremism. For example, overall, about 35% of the respondents (expert survey) believe that the threat level of extremism in Kyrgyzstan is "elevated blue".
- The findings revealed that there is a higher level of anxiety among experts than among population. Moreover, experts tend to give negative prognosis for the future developments in their communities, stating that in the future extremist sentiments may intensify.
- The findings also revealed that there is a high level of contradictions in value system among population. From the one hand, there are external narratives of danger of violent extremism that is linked to Islam/religion, and on the other hand, there are internal religious values that normalize

islamization processes in the country. These contradictions cause internal conflict, that is more visible in the case of Jalal-Abad when respondents are more cautious to respond to sensitive questions on self-identification.

- Respondents in most cases did not encounter extremism in the last years in their communities and did not encounter extremist materials. However, among the experts, we can see that there were those who encountered personally with an extremist organization/group (8 experts in Jalal-Abad province and 2 experts in Chui province). And moreover, 15% of experts observed manifestations of violent extremism in their communities.
- Overall, there is a positive attitude towards the increase of islamization among the population, about 75% assessed the increase of number of Muslims as a normal process. However, there are about ¼ of the respondents who believe that such changes are negative and dangerous: may lead to conflicts and raise of intolerance in the society, influence negatively to the status of women, limiting people's opportunities, freedoms and rights.

#### Trust and perceptions of risks related to current processes in regard to the studied phenomena

- Overall, it can be stated that there is a very high tension within communities (different ideologies, diverse interests of ethnic, religious groups).
  - For example, more than the half of the respondents (population survey) believed that one should be cautious with people.
  - These findings correlated with the recent works on social cohesion (Toktomushev, 2017). In his report Toktomushev (2017) on the example of analysis of border conflicts in the south of Kyrgyzstan (border with Tajikistan) notes that the factors threatening to enhance social cohesion of communities and enhance conflict tensions and radicalization in the region can be summed up as: projected fears on each other, unresolved questions on the rational use of common natural resources, the use of isolation and securitization strategies when interacting with out-group members. As a result in the end we have aggravation and widening of the gaps between the groups (in-group and out-group) and the escalation of conflicts.
  - We highlight that there is an alarming situation related to the very low level of trust to the government and officials as well as decreasing social cohesion in Chui province, in greater extend in rural than urban areas. There were very high levels of mistrust (82-85%) among respondents in Vasilievka a/a (community divided along the ethnic lines, Kairylmans – ethnic Kyrgyz returnees, local Kyrgyz and other ethnic groups), in Zhany Zher a/a, and Logvinenko a/a. In Jalal-Abad the lowest level of trust in their community was revealed in Kurmanbek a/a.
- Findings suggest that there is a higher level of trust to state and its actions in greater extend in the south than in the north, however, it is important also to pay attention to the contradiction with the answers to question B21 in Jalal-Abad province, where respondents avoid giving negative answers and rather indicate that it is difficult to respond to sensitive questions.

- Interesting that there were regional differences, as well as among experts and population regarding the distribution of the responsibility among institutions for solving the problems of extremism.
  - Respondents from Chui province (population survey) indicated that Parliament and government had the responsibility in a greater extend to solve the problems of extremism than local self-government (LSG) and militia.
  - Whereas, respondents in Jalal-Abad province (population survey) believed that the main actors are Parliament and government, militia, and LSG with population.
  - Answers among experts were more dispersed: in Jalal-Abad province experts believed that the largest share of responsibility lies on population, then on LSG, then on militia, Parliament and government, and the last was CSO; in Chui province we observe another picture, the main actors in countering extremism in their opinion were Parliament and government, then LSG, and equally population and militia.
  - CSO were not perceived as responsible actors, among population and experts in Chui province, however, were indicated by expert in Jalal-Abad oblast (20%).
  
- The results of the surveys revealed that there is a difference in assessments of expert and population in relation to the perceptions of danger and extremism. The findings revealed that there are negative biases and prejudices among experts that can be misleading. For example, experts assessed the south of the country to be more vulnerable to the inflow and spread of extremism in Kyrgyzstan. And in contrast with the overall perceptions of the majority of respondents (population survey) where they state that they believe that the extremism is not a serious problem, experts tend to be more alerted.
  - The results of the survey revealed that experts are perceiving danger in a line of a regional stigma (experts' prejudice/bias towards the southern regions) and suggestions to introduce counter-radicalization measures that must be repressive and intolerant and must be promoted by the state and law enforcement bodies who are seen as a machine that must regulate and control extremists and radicals using hard approach. It is important to note that such attitudes and position are in reality counter-productive measures that contradict to the nature/ideas of mediation and conflict management (mediation, negotiation, reconciliation, and conflict resolution).
  - This might be due to the general perception of the region as more religious than the north. This is based on the false assumption that being more religious means being extremist. It must be noted that there were no references to certain religious/ethnic groups or 2010 ethnic clashes.
  - There was also no reference to any certain and particular ethnic group, however, this perception could be linked with the historical differences between south and north, as well as the biases of the law enforcement and central government officials who consider that the south of the country to be more religious and to be more exposed to religion than the northern parts.

### Self-identification

- The findings revealed that there are regional differences in the religious self-identification of population (population survey). The respondents from Jalal-Abad province when indicating their self-identification in the continuum "Not religious at all" -1 to "Very religious" – 10, identified themselves as “moderately religious”, whereas in Chui province we observe another picture, respondents defined themselves closer to "Very religious", indicating answers from 5 and higher.

- We can make a hypothesis that respondents from Jalal-Abad province gave such responses due to the existing stigmatization of the south of the country, as well as the increased state control of certain ethnic minority groups. Thus, this could be one of the avoidance strategies to identify themselves as moderate Muslims and being afraid to be punished/controlled/monitored.
- At the same time the sensitivity issue related to religious self-identifications contradicts to the general trend of the normalization of religiosity (islamization). Here it is important to note, that from the one hand in the responses of population in Jalal-Abad province we observe self-monitoring and avoidance in identifying themselves as “Very religious”, but on the other hand when they respond to certain questions we also observe higher number of responses where participants in Jalal-Abad province demonstrate their willingness and readiness to support extremist organizations if their community/group is suppressed (for example, 34% in Jalal-Abad province answered positively to the question and they understand those who continue to support organization or group which fights for political and legal rights of their group even if the organization violates the law; 23.2% found difficult to answer to this question; 32.8% (grey zone) found it difficult to answer to the questions related to statements regarding the support of violent protests or being ready to attack militia).
- Another indirect hypothesis to support the first one can be the findings from the Chui province. In multi-ethnic communities in Chui, in Maevka a/a and Aleksandrovka a/a respondents indicated that they are “Very religious”. They represent diverse mostly Muslim ethnic groups who “have right to be very religious” as their religious belonging coincides with their ethnic background (for example, Kyrgyz and Dungans in Alexandrovka a/a and other). Thus, these groups do not feel that they will be suspected, on the contrary, their religiosity is not stigmatized, but “legitimated”.
- Interestingly, geography plays crucial role in danger narratives. Thus, respondents referred to the violent extremism/radicalism, as well as to diversity of religious ideologies (Islamic movements) a different/new religion that comes from other countries/abroad. When giving their definitions, respondents in the population survey had several references to abstract forces or certain location and states that were associated as outsiders (non-us) when making connections with extremism/radicalism concepts:
  - War in Syria
  - War of religions in Arab countries
  - Reference to the US and Arab countries that make a profit on the war industry
  - The belief that the concept was introduced by Europeans linking extremism with Islam
  - Some were even doubting the existence of extremism in Kyrgyzstan
  - Reference to Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, ISIS, Wahhabis
- Another regional difference was related to identification with religious leaders and moral reference point. Particularly this could be observed in Jalal-Abad province. For example, when respondents (population survey) in Jalal Abad referred to the authority of mullah and following norms of the Sharia, rather than to the judicial and law enforcement bodies. Or when respondents in Jalal-Abad

named two religious male leaders stating that they are their "conscience of the nation" or moral reference point/guide. Whereas, in Chui oblast the most popular answer among the population to the same question was a Kyrgyz famous writer – Chingiz Aitmatov.

#### Dispositions:

- The methodology that allows classify the spectrum of violent extremism offers 11 dispositions<sup>19</sup>. The findings revealed that respondents in the population survey had higher values in three of them: intolerance, conventional coercion and protect activities. When we conducted semantical analysis and used the same spectrum for classification of violent extremism, we identified that responses in both surveys, among population and experts, revealed the following three dispositions: intolerance, social pessimism, and conventional coercion.
  - Disposition of intolerance is linked to the attempt of the respondents to define extremism as something that is alien to their religious practices and understanding (ideology), as well as to their culture. In most of the cases the alien ideology was define as “different movement”, “against Islam”, “bad/wrong way”.
  - The key characteristics related to social pessimism were related to participants’ definition of extremism as a phenomenon that is unpredictable and has multiple dangers (war, killing, suicide bombers, attacks, chaos and etc.), and especially experts presented pessimistic forecasts.
  - Conventional coercion disposition was characterized by the respondents’ references to subjects of extremism as enemies that were bringing danger, these dangerous subjects were defined as Wahhabist, Dawatists, recruiters, and ISIS members, but also as covered<sup>20</sup> /veiled women and men with beards.
  
- Findings also revealed there is a higher level of acceptance of violence in certain communities:
  - For a hypothetical question, respondents in six communities (1 in Chui and 5 in Jalal-Abad province) indicated that they “can understand someone who continues to support the organization, the group that fights for the political and legal rights of their group, even if the organization sometimes violates the law”: Vasilyevka a/a (control community) - 68.3% Yrys a / a (control community) - 53%, Atabekov a / a - 40%, Kurmanbek a / a - 35%, Kenesh a / a - 30%, Tash Bulak a / a - 28%.
  - Particularly, this level of acceptance of radicalization was observed in Vasilievka a/a. For example, 53.3% of respondents in Vasilievka a/a stated that they can understand someone who participates in protests against pressure on members of their group, even if the protests are violent.
  - There were also relatively significant number of respondents in Chui province who were hypothetically ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of their faith.

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<sup>19</sup> This classification was within the violent extremism spectrum (based on the methodology used in this research, Davydov and Khlomov (2017).

<sup>20</sup> This particular description was used by respondents who participated in the survey. Researchers did not change wording to other terms\phrases\descriptions in order to preserve the authenticity and closeness to the used expressions/descriptions.

- Higher risks of violent extremism/radicalization were in communities in the control groups: Yrys a/a and Vasilievka a/a.

### Women's freedoms and rights

- Conservative sentiments that endanger women's rights and freedoms were identified and classified in the following sub-groups:
  - Limitation of the reproductive rights of women (contraception and abortion are framed as anti-Islamic practices). These statements were in most cases supported by the respondents from Jalal-Abad province.
  - Relatively significant number of respondents from Chui province supported the following statement: "must follow her husband everywhere, even in zones of armed conflict". Muslim woman is seen as non-subject.
  - Role of women were seen within their ethnic-religious groups/nations who fulfill traditional functions as mothers/wives who bear and up bring children, cultural / ideological transmitters who reproduce the culture / faith of her group to her children and within her community. She must be ready to join a national / religious struggle and follow her husband / father / brother to zones of armed conflicts; she is a signifier of "social boundary" and "symbol of differences" for her group and outsiders (e.g. symbolic religious attributes such as veiling).
  - Interesting that respondents (population survey) could not name female leaders. And when naming women as "conscience of the nation" or moral reference point they in most of the cases named celebrities (singers and actresses). Little number of respondents (population survey) named political female leaders, such as Roza Otunbaeva (ex-president).
  - In the expert interviews the majority could not answer to the question to name female religious leader (47% did not answer, 15% answered that they heard, but could not name), 10% named Zhamal Frontbek kyzy (head of Mutakallim) as a religious female leader. The rest named female leaders from politics, civil society and local female leaders.

### Methodology

- In this research we used a new methodology and we revealed that these instruments/questionnaires, especially the questionnaire for the experts can be described as a tool that may reveal the predisposition of the respondent. Thus, we believe that the instrument helps to determine the attitudes/perceptions of respondents towards several issues linked to radicalization and violent extremism, we believe that respondents expressed their views openly and were revealing their beliefs/positions.

### Recommendations:

In this regard, we are making the following recommendations that we believe should be useful for Mutakallim during the project implementation period, improving effectiveness of the measures (e.g. trainings, working with resource centers in Chui and Jalal-Abad provinces) by knowing and addressing

the knowledge gaps in capacity building and awareness raising programs aimed at countering radicalization among women in Jalal-Abad and Chui provinces:

#### *Understanding violent extremism and radicalism*

- It is recommended to conduct trainings within capacity-building program, and conduct outreach campaigns within resource centers in Mutakallim that are aimed at breaking stereotypes, bias, and false assumptions about:
  - Regional stigmatization of the south of the country. It is important to work with law enforcement bodies, central and local government officials, teachers and other stakeholders to break false assumptions that the south of the country is more religious and to be more exposed to religion and violent extremism/radicalism than the north.
  - Stigmatization of certain ethnic groups. It is important to break stereotypes, negative bias, perceptions that link certain ethnic groups (e.g. Uzbeks) to radicalization/islamization/violent extremism.
  - Link of Islam/religion and violent extremism. It is important to break stereotypes, negative bias, perceptions about strong associations between religion/Islam and extremism which are most likely are constructed/transmitted by Mass Media; to prevent dominant narratives of danger and threat of religion (Islam); deconstruct image of Islam as a dangerous religion, and to promote image of Islam as a peaceful religion and individual choice.
  - Negative image of covered/veiled women and men with beards. It is recommended to break stereotypes related to negative perceptions to certain images, such as veil and beard that are associated and constructed as symbols of violent extremism/radicalization. It is also important to work on association regarding the concept of “gender” that is mostly was linked to women, thus it is important to explain in the training that gender refers to both women and men. In the training it is important to break also this stereotype. The work of women empowering activities carried out by Mutakallim’s resource centers can be very relevant in this context.
  
- It is recommended to consider working in the control communities and include some of the suggested activities in the future (e.g. Vasilievka a/a). This recommendation is done based on the findings, thus it is suggested to work in control communities against some false perceptions, stereotypes that can lead to the discrimination/stigmatization of some religious/ethnic groups.
  
- It is important to conduct educational and awareness raising activities within the capacity-building program of the resource centers in Mutakallim, in addition to the production and dissemination of mass booklets/video products to promote tolerance and cultural/religious plurality and diversity issues. Through following these suggestions, it is strongly believed that such targeted activities would allow to remove internal conflict of self-identification and decrease social tensions in the selected communities.

- There is a need to implement counter violent extremism interventions in communities where the answers of respondents suggest that violence is more accepted than elsewhere and where religious identity is very strong.

#### Trust and perceptions of risks related to current processes in regard to the studied phenomena

- It is important to involve national and local authorities in all the interventions implemented by civil society organization to build the trust. All interventions of Mutakallim and other CSO on preventions of violent extremism/radicalization are recommended to be implemented using holistic and participatory approach involving stakeholders at different levels (central and local authorities, law enforcement bodies, population, education sector and CSOs).
- It is recommended for Mutakallim and other SCOs to work in Chui province on development and introduction of special measures aimed at decreasing social tensions, especially in rural areas. It is also recommended to work on empowerment of women and youth to achieve social cohesion in their communities:
  - Work on measures aimed at increasing level of trust towards government and level of security (decrease level of risk perceptions) between ethnic, religious and other groups (for example, Kayrylmans<sup>21</sup> -returnee population in Vasilievka a/a).
  - Work with the communities in deconstructing regional/religious stigmatized prejudice and bias, as well as advised to work jointly with LSG on development and promotion of non-violent methods and measures to counter radicalization.
  - Develop and implement a plan of measures to increase the participation/responsivities of the population and local governments in addressing issues of radicalization, conflicts resolution within communities.
  - It is necessary to develop measures that promote trust in state/government authorities, including law enforcement structures that ensure protection of their rights and provision of state services.

#### Self-identification

- Support initiatives of CSOs and human rights organizations to conduct monitoring of the law enforcement bodies (militia, national security services/intelligence) on prevention of radicalization and violent extremisms. This kind of monitoring would make law enforcement services accountable for the legitimacy of the arrests/interrogations/detentions related to ethnic/religious prejudices. It is

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<sup>21</sup> Kayrylman (returnee) is an ethnic Kyrgyz person, who is a foreign citizen or a person without citizenship, voluntarily returning to its historic motherland.

recommended to use international successful practices of Northern Ireland and Spain on the introduction of the reform on anti-radicalization program within police<sup>22</sup>.

- It is important to promote secular leaders (persons) on a national scale working with state channels and the social media, taking into account gender, ethnic, regional background of individuals. In this way it will be possible to narrow the gap between south and north.

### Dispositions

- It is important to develop informational and educational measures that promote non-violence culture, peace-building and positioning Islam as diverse and peaceful religion.

### Women's freedoms and rights

- Within the activities that are implemented at Mutakallim's resource centers it is confirmed the need to promote initiatives that support women's leadership among religious communities.
- It is necessary for Mutakallim to promote through mass media and social media images of women as contributors in social, economic and political spheres.
- A particular recommendation for the Ministry of Education and Science is to introduce courses/subjects on reproductive rights of women and men into educational system.

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<sup>22</sup> Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach. OSCE 2014

## Annex 1. Sites selected for conducting survey

	Sampling Jalal-Abad province	18-28	29-58	59+	Total
1	<b>Jalal-Abad, 10 sites</b> 1. Center – Railway station (20 questionnaires) 2. Building of school No5 (20 questionnaires) 3. Building of school No 14 (20 анкет) 4. Building of State Register (20 questionnaires) 5. Building of school No9 <sup>23</sup> (20 questionnaires) 6. Building of school No 11 (20 questionnaires) 7. Building of school No 19 (20 questionnaires) 8. Building of school No17 (20 questionnaires) 9. Building of Jalal-Abad State University (20 questionnaires) 10. Building of school No 8 (20 questionnaires)	66	110	24	200
2	<b>Tash-Bulak a/a, Suzak district, Jalal-Abad province.</b>  Village: Doskana, Tash-Bulak, Gulistan 20 questionnaires in each village	20	33	7	60
3	<b>Atabekov a/a, Suzak district, Jalal-Abad province.</b>  Villages: Beck-Abad, Jiyde, Check 20 questionnaires for each village	20	33	7	60
4	<b>Kurmanbek a/a, Suzak district, Jalal-Abad province.</b>  Village: Joon - Kungoy and Taran - Bazaar, Saty 20 questionnaires for each village	20	33	7	60
5	<b>Kenesh a/a, Bazar-Korgon district, Jalal-Abad province.</b>  Villages: Babash-Ata, 1st May, Kyzyl-Oktyabr 20 questionnaires for each village	20	33	7	60
6	Control group 1 Suzak district, Jalal-Abad province, Yrys a/a	20	33	7	60

<sup>23</sup>Due to the mudflows in the area of site #5, the school #12 was replaced with school #9. Here also the random sampling method was used.

Villages: Yrys, Totiya, Kumush-Aziz 20 questionnaires for each village				
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Total 500 questionnaires

Sampling – Chui province		18-28	29-58	59+	Total
1	<b>Bishkek– 20 questionnaire for each site</b>				
1.	1-May district, building of “Sanjar” consumer service saloon, Volkov Str., 101 a				
2.	Sverdlov district, secondary school #1, microdistrict Alamedin 1				
3.	Sverdlov district Gymnazium 23 after I.V Goethe				
4.	Lenin district – 30 Kainazarov Str., Veterinary Department of Alamedin district				
5.	Lenin district, kindergarten 323, Ala-Too new settlement				
6.	Oktyabrski district, School-Gymnazium #23, 27 Matrosov Str.				
7.	Oktyabrski district, kindergarten #173, 12 nd microdistrict				
8.	Leninski district, secondary school #2, 125 Pushkin Str.				
9.	Oktyabrski district, school-gymnazium #63, 11 th microdistrict				
10.	Sverdlovski district – DOO #151, 29b Velikoluksky Str.				
		53	116	31	200
2	Control group 2, Chui province <b>Vasilyevskoe a/a, Alamudun district</b>				
1.	Building of rural council in Vinogradnoe village	16	33	11	60
2.	Secondary school # 1 of Vasilievka village				
	<b>30 questionnaires for each village</b>				
3	<b>Maevka a/a, Alamudun district, Chui province, Maevka village</b>				
1.	114 Shkolnaya Str., Culture House (20 questionnaires)				
2.	1 Naberezhnaya Str., building of JSC “FPMK” (20 questionnaires)	16	33	11	60
3.	Office of rural council of Maevka village (20 questionnaires)				
4	<b>Aleksandrovka a/a, Moskovski district, Chui province</b>				
1.	Aleksandrovka village, school named after Y. Shivaza				
2.	Besh-Oruk village, secondary school	16	33	11	60
3.	Krupskaya village, secondary school				
	<b>20 questionnaires per one village</b>				
5	<b>Logvinenko a/a, Yssyk-Ata district, Chui province</b>				
1.	Novopokrovka village, club, Lenina Str.				
2.	Logvinenko village, rural council building, 80 Lenina Str.	16	33	11	60
3.	Chon-Daly village, club, Mars Str.				
	<b>20 questionnaires per one village</b>				

6	<b>Jany-Jer a/a</b> , Sokuluk district, Chui province 1. Jany-Jer village, Profliceum #43 2. Novopavlovka village, Stroitel'naya Str. 3. Zapadnoe village, elementary school <b>20 questionnaires per one village</b>				
		16	33	11	60


Total 500 questionnaires

## Annex 2. Age quota

Sampling	1 version				2 version				3 version			
	18-28	29-58	59+	Total	18-28	29-58	59+	Total	18-28	29-58	59+	Total
DJalal-Abad city	25	42	10	77	33	55	12	100	66	110	24	200
Tash-Bulak a/a, Suzak district, Jalal- Abad province	26	41	9	76				0	20	33	7	60
Atabekov a/a, Suzak district, Jalal-Abad province	26	42	9	77	34	54	12	100	20	33	7	60
Курманбек a/a, Suzak district, Jalal- Abad province	26	42	9	77	34	54	12	100	20	33	7	60
Кенешский a/a, Bazar-Korgon district, Jalal-Abad province	26	42	9	77	34	54	12	100	20	33	7	60
Maevka a/a, Alamudun district, Chui province	20	43	14	77	27	55	18	100	16	33	11	60
Aleksandrovka a/a, Moskovsky district Chui province	20	43	14	77	27	55	18	100	16	33	11	60
Logvinenko a/a, Yssyk-Ata district, Chui province	20	43	14	77	16	33	11	100	16	33	11	60
Jany-Jer a/a, Sokuluk district, Chui province	20	43	14	77				0	16	33	11	60
Control group 1 Jalal-Abad province	26	42	9	77	34	54	12	100	20	33	7	60
Control group 2 Chui province	20	43	14	77	27	55	18	100	16	33	11	60
Bishkek	20	45	12	77	26	59	15	100	53	116	31	200
				923				1000				1000

### Annex 3. Screenshots – sampling of sites with the help of Random.org

Screenshot #1 – selection of 10 sites in Bishkek from the list of election polling centers (EPC).



Screenshot 2 – A new site EPC 2105 was chosen in Jalal-Abad, School #9. Replacement of site school #12 which is located in the mountainous area. This replacement was necessary due to the landslide and evacuation of residents of this settlement to the nearest village.



## Annex 4. Guide for conducting survey in Jalal-Abad province

Before proceeding to the survey, you need to study all the provisions of this guide, as well as the text of the questionnaire itself.

Compliance with the requirements of the guide is an indispensable condition for your participation in the research.

### GUIDE FOR THE INTERVIEWER

Dear interviewer! You are a participant of a sociological study aimed at studying knowledge and attitude of the population towards modern problems of society within the framework of the project "Empowerment of women to achieve social cohesion". A total of 500 participants from 18 years of age and older will be interviewed (18-28 young people, 29-58 able-bodied, and 59+), in the city of Jalal-Abad and in the villages of Jalal-Abad province. During the interview, the interviewer is the main performer of the work and ensures the quality of the final results of the survey. Your integrity and responsibility will be important in ensuring completeness and accuracy of the opinions provided by different groups of population (see the table below, broken down by age).

	Sampling	18-28	29-58	59+	Итого
1	<b>Jalal-Abad city, 10 sites</b> 1. Center – Railway station (20 questionnaires) 2. Building of school No5 (20 questionnaires) 3. Building of school No 14 (20 анкет) 4. Building of State Register (20 questionnaires) 5. Building of school No9 <sup>24</sup> (20 questionnaires) 6. Building of school No 11 (20 questionnaires) 7. Building of school No 19 (20 questionnaires) 8. Building of school No17 (20 questionnaires) 9. Building of Jalal-Abad State University (20 questionnaires) 10. Building of school No 8 (20 questionnaires)	66	110	24	200
2	<b>Tash-Bulak a/a, Suzak district, Jalal-Abad province.</b>  Village: Doskana, Tash-Bulak, Gulistan 20 questionnaires in each village	20	33	7	60
3	<b>Atabekov a/a, Suzak district, Jalal-Abad province.</b>  Villages: Beck-Abad, Jiyde, Check 20 questionnaires for each village	20	33	7	60

<sup>24</sup>Due to the mudflows in the area of site #5, the school #12 was replaced with school #9. Here also the random sampling method was used.

4	<b>Kurmanbek a/a, Suzak district, Jalal-Abad province.</b> Village: Joon - Kungoy and Taran - Bazaar, Saty 20 questionnaires for each village	20	33	7	60
5	<b>Kenesh a/a, Bazar-Korgon district, Jalal-Abad province.</b> Villages: Babash-Ata, 1st May, Kyzyl-Oktyabr 20 questionnaires for each village	20	33	7	60
6	Control group 1 Suzak district, Jalal-Abad province, Yrys a/a Villages: Yrys, Totiya, Kumush-Aziz 20 questionnaires for each village	20	33	7	60

**Total 500 questionnaires  
with women**

It will also be necessary to gather 50 expert interviews with representatives of local self-governance bodies, law enforcement agencies, schools, medical institutions, as well as local informal leaders, representatives of civil society, imams and representatives of the State Commission for Religious Affairs, 7-8 interviews in each of the five field zones, in rural areas, the remaining 10-15 expert interviews should be held in the city of Jalal-Abad.

### Section 1. General observations

1. The study is carried out using the method of formalized interview, in which the interviewer, strictly adhering to the text of the questionnaire and the requirements of this instruction, verbally asks questions the interviewee and records his/her answers by his/her own hands - either by circling the numbers of the corresponding positions, or by writing down the answers in words specially allocated for this place . All entries in the questionnaire are made only with a pen and must be clear and legible. In doing so, you should use a dark pen and carefully trace the numbers of the selected answer. In the case of an error, the correction is done as follows: the error circle is crossed out, the figure of the correct answer is circled around.

2. When working on the described method, the main task of the interviewer is to record the genuine, undistorted, and in no way provoked and unspoken position of the respondent. This means that during the interview, the interviewer should eliminate or minimize the impact of negative factors. Based on these requirements, the interviewer must adhere to the following rules:

- It is necessary to exclude the contact of respondent with outsiders (family members, acquaintances, etc.) during the interview, and discussion the content of questions and responses with them. Only the personal opinion of the respondent should be recorded in the questionnaire.

- Questions should be asked clearly, exactly as they are written in the questionnaire. You can not explain the questions in your own words.
- If a respondent does not understand the question, then the interviewer is obliged to read the question again **WITHOUT UPDATES** and own comments.
- Assistance to the respondent, "guidance" to the response from the interviewer - **NOT AVAILABLE!** The interviewer should not prompt the respondent's answer.
- Clearly follow all directions in the questionnaire, which are printed in italics.
- **IMPORTANT!** In the questionnaire there are instructions - **FILTERS** that indicate that the question or block of questions to which they relate is given to those and only those respondents whose answers satisfy the **FILTER** criteria. In the questionnaire, instructions for filter criteria are listed opposite the question categories.
- Write down the answers in the words that the respondent uses. If the respondent has not clearly stated his opinion, you should ask him to clarify the statement.
- It is necessary to write clearly with a pen. All entries in the questionnaires must be made by the hand of one person (the interviewer).
- If a respondent says that he/she does not understand well and advises you to contact someone else, say that you are interested in his/her opinion, no matter how much he/she understands these issues.
- If a respondent begins to talk about something unauthorized, interrupt and try to direct it to the desired topic. Say: "Sorry, I did not really understand (a) ....." and clearly repeat the question.
- You can not talk about your views.
- You can not assess what the respondent is saying, to show your attitude to what was said (except for attention, respect and goodwill towards the respondent).
- If they say to you: "This is the same as the previous question", you still have to ask to answer again, even if you repeat what has already been said.
- We recommend paying special attention to the transitions from one question to another. They are indicated in the questionnaire in this way >> "Transition to Question 34" and are done if the next question of the questionnaire is not logical to ask the same respondent.
- The questionnaire includes different types of questions. You should carefully read the notes (the number of possible answers) to each question that contain the relevant explanations.
- For an answer that falls under the "Other" option, the answer must be written in the line for the respondents' free responses.
- The interviewer read out the questions and notes the respondent's answers in the questionnaire. To pass the questionnaire to the respondent is **FORBIDDEN!**

- The order of reading out the questions is NOT CHANGED!
- The survey is conducted ONLY in apartments, houses provided for by the traffic along the route! Survey in the streets, in shops, etc. PROHIBITED!
- Asking relatives, friends, friends, etc. DO NOT DO IT!
- In each apartment, you can ask only ONE person. The presence of other residents during the survey is EXTREMELY UNDESIRE!
- Options of answers "No answer", "Difficult to answer", "I do not know" are NEVER BE READ!

## Section 2. Introductory part of the survey

The interviewer should, first of all, introduce himself/herself and inform about the purposes of his/her visit. An approximate text of the introductory part is proposed in the questionnaire. The content of the introductory conversation can be changed by the interviewer depending on the specific situation.

The task of the interviewer when meeting with the respondent and his/her family is to create a friendly, quiet atmosphere for the upcoming conversation, to convince the importance and necessity of participation in the survey of this particular person. Perhaps, the respondent should be explained to that the survey is carried out according to a special scientific method, thanks to which the survey includes women aged 18 and older living in Bishkek, Jalal-Abad and Chui and Jalal-Abad provinces.

In the case of a categorical refusal of the respondent to participate in the interview, the interviewer should express regret, apologize for the disturbance caused and say goodbye. However, such cases should be minimized.

In his/her work, the interviewer is guided by the principle that sociologists must find out and take into account the true opinions, moods, and wishes of people. Therefore, request the respondent to take seriously the issues that will be asked of him, and ask him to be frank. Also it is necessary to inform that the collected information will be used in a generalized form after computer processing.

After that, go ahead with the survey.

## Section 3. Explanation to the structure of the questionnaire and individual questions

1. In the questionnaire, all explanations to the interviewer are indicated in italics. The text given in italics to the respondent is not read.

2. The questionnaire consists of 9/12 pages depending on the language.

If there are difficulties in understanding, you need to contact the project researcher Asel Myrzabekova by phone: +550 892024.

## Section 4. Sampling procedure

*1. Following the route and selection of respondents*

Before starting a survey in the village you get a source address from the supervisor, which can be:

- a) the exact address (for example, Kievskaya str., 100) or
- b) by street (for example, Kievskaya street) or
- c) a map indicating the starting point (the intersection of Kievskaya and Bokonbayev) or
- d) building (school, hospital, bus stop, etc.)

Step One: Identify your starting point, the right side of the street and the direction of traffic

if the exact address is given (Kievskaya str., 100)

In this case, you just need to find out which way to go. Stand on the street at your original address, face to the end of the street (Kievskaya 1 - at the beginning and Kiev number 200 - at the end). Then you choose the side of the street that is to your right and go towards the end of the street. Now you have determined your starting point, the right direction and the right side of the street.

OR

if given street (Bokonbaeva)

In this case, you go and find House #1 in Bokonbaev street, this will be your starting point. Stand on the street in this starting point, facing the end of the street (No. 1 Bokonbaev-the beginning, and No. 200 Bokonbaev-the end). Then you choose the side of the street that is to your right and go to the end of the street. Now you have determined the starting point, the right direction and the right side of the street.

OR

if given a point on the map, indicating the intersection (the intersection of Kievskaya and Bokonbaeva)

Thus

In this case, always choose the street that is further in alphabetical order, that is: you choose Kiev, not Bokonbaev. Then, stand at the crossroads, facing the end of the street. Kievskaya (Kievskaya 1 - in the beginning, and Kievskaya 200 - in the end). Then you choose the side of the street that is to your right and go to the end of the street. Now you have determined the starting point, the right direction and the right side of the street.

OR

if given a building (school, hospital, bus station, etc.)

In this case, you first need to know the address of the building. If it is not possible to determine the address for a number of reasons, you must find the main entrance, which will be your starting point. Then, stand at the main entrance, facing the end of the street. Then you choose the right side of the street, and go to the end of the street. Now you have determined the starting point, the right direction and the right side of the street.

In this way.

from the starting point you should always move from the beginning of the street to the end (by increasing the numbering of houses), on the right side of the street.

Step two: Selection of residential units / households.

By residential unit we mean dwelling premises for a single household, whether it's a separate house, half a house, a basement or an apartment on the attic floor in a multi-apartment family home, an apartment above a garage or a shop, or an apartment in a high-rise building. To fit this definition, the unit must have a separate kitchen. Institutions or

neighborhoods of other groups are NOT considered residential units, because their residents do not have their own kitchen.

So, now you know the starting point and direction of movement in the area. The following are instructions for the selection of residential units / households in the private sector and apartment buildings.

Case a) *rural district/private sector*

After an effective interview, you move to the right and select the next house with the step indicated to you by the supervisor.

If in the selected house you did not manage to conduct an interview, you fix this address in the route sheet. That is, in the case of REFUSAL FROM THE INTERVIEW, NO ONE of the living houses DOES NOT FIT THE SELECTION fix it in the route sheet and go to the next house on the right. In case there is NO HOME, then skip the house in accordance with your step and return to this house 2 more times. All visits must be recorded on the route sheet.

If you have walked the whole street, but did not complete the task in full, you turn to the next, adjacent street to the right without interrupting the selection step.

Specifics of work in the village. In the village you may encounter the following:

- Streets that do not have names: make sure that the description of this street (street) is attached in the contact list, and it is desirable to attach a scheme of its location in the village so that it can be found later.
- Houses that do not have numbering or only part of the houses are numbered, then draw a plan for the location of houses, assign them serial numbers, then follow the already described scheme for selecting houses. The plan for placing houses must be attached to the contact list.

**Your step - 3:**

17	19	21	23	25	27	29	31	33	35
20	22	24	26	28	30	32	34	36	38

For example: you started with the house number 20

If you had a successful interview, you go to house number 26 (letting two houses to the right of the house where there was a successful interview and knocking / ringing on the third)

In case of unsuccessful interview you go to house number 22 and so on (the next house on the right)

Case b) residential multi-storey house (block houses, apartment houses, large residential complexes, etc.)

Each apartment should be considered as one household or residential unit.

You need to start a survey from the last floor of the first entrance of the house from the apartment with the largest apartment number.

If it is not possible to interview this apartment, you need to visit each apartment in a row until you can interview;

In case of a successful interview, the next apartment is calculated by simply adding the sampling step to the apartment number (household) where the last interview was taken;

Thus, the sampling step is effective only after a successful interview, otherwise the interviewer enters each apartment (visits each household).

In the odd number entrances, the selection of respondents should be conducted from the top floor, moving in descending order of the apartment numbers; and with an odd number - from the first floor, moving in increasing numbers of apartments.

**Table 3. The sampling step, depending on the number of apartments in the apartment building**

Number of apartments	Sampling step
1-10	2
11-25	5
26 and more	7

If you already walked around the multi-apartment building, then it is recommended to choose the number of apartment in the next house to continue interviewing based on the previous step of the sample (i.e. if the step was 5 and in the previous house we had 2 apartments, then in the next house we go not to apartment # 1, but to apartment #3).

Please interview only one person in the selected apartment. (household).

**For example:**

Entrance 1 Odd		Entrance 2 Even		Entrance 3 Odd		Entrance 4 Even	
13	14 15	28	29 30	43	44 37	50	51 52
10	11 12	25	26 27	40	41 36	47	48 49
7	8 9	22	23 24	37	38 35	44	45 45

4	5	6	19	20	21	34	35	34	41	42	43
1	2	3	16	17	18	31	32	33	38	39	40

Assume that you have to interview residents of a five-storey house with four entrances.

In this apartment house there are 40 apartments (more than 26 apartments). Hence, the sampling step is 7 apartments.

You go to the first entrance, you have to go up to the 5th floor and call to apartment number 15 (apartment with the largest number).



If you conducted a successful interview, mark it in the Route Sheet. After that, you must skip 6 apartments and go to the 7th, that is, apartment number 8. When you successfully interview in apartment number 8, the next apartment will be apartment number 1. If you managed to conduct a successful interview in apartment number 1, the next apartment will be apartment number 22 (that is, you need to skip 6 apartments: 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21).

In case of REFUSAL FROM THE INTERVIEW, NO ONE OF THE LIVING HOUSE IS NOT SUITABLE BY SAMPLE, go to the next apartment. All this must be recorded on the route sheet. In case there is NO HOUSE, then skip 6 apartments and go to the 7th. We need to return to this apartment 2 more times. All this must be recorded on the

route sheet.

### Step Three: How to continue the movement

So, from the starting point you moved from the beginning of the street to the end (by increasing numbering of houses), on the right side of the street, and knocked on every third residential unit.

In the classical case, you proceed as follows, after you determine your source address:

A selected point is your starting point, from which you start your movement. Then you find the third door in your right direction, in which the bold arrow points. Then you go to the right side of the sidewalk and try to address every third residential unit that you come across. If you reach the intersection, turn right, stay on the right side and continue the search. Perhaps in the neighborhood to which you were originally assigned, there are very few residential units. In that case - as the dotted arrows show - you go further on MoonStreet after you return back to your starting point. And so on.

It is unlikely, but it may happen that you have gone in any possible direction from the starting point and have not yet fulfilled your quota. In this case, once again go through your original route, but this time first select the FIRST residential unit, and then every third one. If this does not help, contact your supervisor to choose another starting point.

Never turn left and choose the left side of the street. Even if there are no houses on your side, and there are many of them on the other - YOU SHOULD NOT GO TO ANOTHER SIDE OF THE STREET.


AN EXCEPTION!!!

These are dead ends and lanes turning to the left (under blind alleys we also mean streets leading out of the city / village). If there is a dead-end street in a designated block or a lane that turns left, you start at the designated starting point and go to the dead-end street or alley on the right side of the street in the direction of the arrow.

Then go to the end of the dead-end street on the right side, cross the street, and go back along the opposite side of the dead-end street and interview the houses on the right side. Then turn right and continue along the right side of the street on which you stood from the very beginning.

In the lane turning left, reach the turn to the left, turn, and interrogate the houses on the right side. So until the turn to the right comes up.

**Remember that you should not leave the borders of the sample site where you work. The borders of the site are provided by the supervisor.**



#### Step Four: Selecting specific respondent

The person you are interviewing:

- It must be a woman aged 18 and over
- Permanently living in the household in where you turned (she should only reside there, it does not matter for us whether she is registered administratively, as living elsewhere)
- Should be the only member of the household with whom the survey is conducted

When you come to the household you need to find out which of the people living in the household, aged 18 and over, celebrated their birthday last.

#### ATTENTION!!!

You need to address each separate inhabited apartment three times to find tenants in the house. If someone is not at home, you return up to two times to find a suitable respondent at home (selected according to the "Last Birthday" system). One of the repeated visits can be made later on the same day. But keep in mind that if you scheduled a repeat visit on the same day, plan it at least an hour after the first visit. Please try to change the time of your visits if you have to return to the same address.

If the respondent whom you have identified in accordance with the instructions is currently absent, you can not replace the respondent with another !!!

You can not interview

- ⇒ Citizens not in the place of their permanent residence (for example, a guest)
- ⇒ In hospitals, sanatoria, hostels, etc.

#### **Section 5. Shutdown**

After completing the survey in the household, you should review all the completed Questionnaires for correctness of filling in the questions and observing the rules of logical transitions. All numerical data must be recorded clearly and legibly.

When preparing survey materials for delivery, pay special attention to compliance with the transitions in the Questionnaires. If there is no transition - the question should be asked, and the answer - written! In case of missing questions or when there are other inaccuracies, the interviewer needs to meet again with the respondent and get the missing information.

After completing the whole task, the interviewer must personally hand over the work to the regional supervisor. The set of delivered materials includes:

- completed questionnaires;
- completed search forms for respondents (routing);
- unused (spare) forms of documents.

## **Section 6. Payment and quality control of work**

Payment to interviewers is carried out only if:

The quality of the interviewer's work is carried out in traditional ways and consists in controlling two main positions:

- 1) Correctness of implementing the respondents selection procedures;
- 2) Correctness of the actual interview (checking the accuracy of the rules and requirements for interviewing, possible distortion and falsification of information, for example, self-filling interviewer questionnaires without visiting the household, "improving" the results of the survey).

Control over the quality of the interviewer's work is carried out in several stages:

- visual control of the questionnaires (at the acceptance stage in the office of the regional supervisor, as well as in the control check-up of the interviewer's work in the field {approximately 1-2 interviews});
- carrying out the formal-logical control of data (verification of logical connections) during computer processing of questionnaires;
- carrying out field audits (20% of all interviews conducted).

## **CONCLUSION**

We are confident that, despite all methodological difficulties and adversities, your work experience, your knowledge of people and cities will help to successfully cope with a difficult but necessary task - the collection of sociological information.

Thank you for your work and we hope that it will be successful and of high quality!