



RADICAL RIGHT NARRATIVES AND NORWEGIAN COUNTER-NARRATIVES

IN THE DECADE OF UTØYA AND BÆRUM
SOLO-ACTOR ATTACKS



The *CARR-Hedayah Radical Right Counter Narratives Project* is a year-long project between CARR and Hedayah that is funded by the EU STRIVE programme. It is designed to create one of the first comprehensive online toolkits for practitioners and civil society engaged in radical right extremist counter-narrative campaigns. It uses online research to map narratives in nine countries and regions (Australia, Canada, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States), proposes counter-narratives for these countries and regions, and advises on how to conduct such campaigns in an effective manner. This country report is one of such outputs.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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The views expressed in this practical report are the opinions of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Hedayah, the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right or the European Union.

INTRODUCTION

01

On 22 July 2011 at 15.25 a massive explosion was heard in Oslo. A car bomb went off in the Norwegian government headquarters, killing 8 and injuring scores more. The perpetrator, Anders Behring Breivik, had already left the scene and was on his way to Utøya, where less than 2 hours later he shot dead 69 young people, mostly teenagers, and injured another 66 at the Labour Party-linked youth wing's annual summer camp. The massacre was the worst terrorist attack in Norway's history, which shocked the small country of 5 million to the core.

Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg of the Labour Party received international acclaim and wrath in equal measure for the way he responded to the attacks. He called for calm and support in his attempts at keeping Norway as open, democratic and tolerant as before. He responded much as Jacinda Ardern did years later, after the 15 March 2019 Christchurch Attacks on a local mosque, though Ardern went further in her support of the Muslim community.¹ At the time, Stoltenberg failed to see the impact Breivik's acts were going to have on Norway's Muslim communities. Before photos of Breivik started to flood the media in late July 2011, Norwegians believed the perpetrator had to be Muslim. Many Muslims were verbally assaulted and women reported being physically attacked in Oslo as Breivik's extremist views became normalised.² In the years since, much has been done by politicians, academics, activists, police, and other practitioners to heal the national trauma caused by Breivik's acts of terrorism, and to try to avoid a similar attack in the future. Yet, too little effort was put into understanding the impact it had on the country's diverse mi-

nority communities and individuals. Muslims were naturally scared after the attack on the government headquarters in Oslo and the massacre at Utøya, where Muslim members of the Labour party's youth wing were also victims of Breivik's terrorist act.³

An investigation into the attacks and the events of 22 July 2011 was carried out by a committee led by Alexandra Bech Gjørv. The aim was to understand what had happened, and how to prevent similar attacks in future. The committee found major missteps on behalf of the Norwegian police—especially in their response on 22 July—and issued a damning criticism of police culture and leadership.⁴ The main criticisms were how long it had taken the police to arrive at Utøya, as well as their logistics and communication abilities, as key phone calls and messages had failed to be communicated. Since its release, the investigation itself has been the subject of criticism for allegedly being based on hindsight and not the facts available at the time of the attack.⁵

After 2011, terror laws in Norway were tightened and effort was put into understanding radical right extremism⁶ and terrorism and how to prevent it. The Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) was established at the University of Oslo in February 2016 as a result of the terror attacks. C-REX's funding and focus is based around radical right extremist terror, violence, and extreme radical right-wing political parties. The Center has a broad international scope, with a goal to better understand these forces and how to deal with them.⁷

¹ Wiggen, M., 'Rethinking Anti-Immigration Rhetoric after the Oslo and Utøya Attacks' *New Political Science*, 34/4, 2012.

² Tollesrud, E., 'Vondt at muslimer fikk skylden', 26 July 2011, online at: <https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/e8LRa/vondt-at-muslimer-fikk-skylden>.

³ Therkelsen, H., 'Vi følte den samme sorgen', 20 July 2020, online at: <https://www.dagsavisen.no/nyheter/innenriks/vi-folte-den-samme-sorgen-1.463879>.

⁴ NOU Norges offentlige utredninger 2012:14, 'Rapport fra 22 juli kommisjonen', 13 August 2013, online at: <https://www.regjeringen.no/no/dokumenter/nou-2012-14/id697260/.csrud,E.>, 'Vondt at muslimer fikk skylden', 26 July 2011, online at: <https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/>.

⁵ Bakke Foss, A., '22 juli rapporten filleristet politi Norge, nå kommer kritikken av konklusjonene', 23 May 2016, online at: <https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/nAW9o/22juli-rapporten-filleristet-politi-norge-naa-kommer-kritikken-av-ko>.

⁶ Here 'radical right extremism' is used as an umbrella term to describe a variety of protest movements, cell-based groups ('groupuscules') and lone-actor terrorists that harbour violent nativist, authoritarian and (sometimes) populist policy ideas. This includes individuals and groups who actively advocate violence or attempt the revolutionary overthrow of liberal democracy. The former category is also sometimes historically referred to as the 'extreme right', and range from lone-actor terrorists to a range of formally constituted neo-fascist and neo-Nazi political parties that inspire political violence.

⁷ See the C-REX home page, online at: www.svuo.no/c-rex/english/.

Despite these extensive efforts, it was only chance that prevented a similar anti-Muslim terror attack from being carried out in August 2019. On 10 August 2019 the 21-year-old white, Norwegian national, Philip Manshaus, murdered his stepsister Johanna Ihle-Hansen, later claiming that he murdered Johanna because she was not of the “Nordic race.”⁸ He then went to Al-Noor mosque in Bærum, a municipality in the Greater Oslo Region, dressed in a uniform and armed with several guns. Manshaus broke into the mosque and started shooting, but was stopped and restrained by two men until police arrived. The attack happened the day before Eid when the mosque was full. As was the case in the Breivik attack years earlier, the police again responded slowly and appeared hesitant to enter the mosque. The police’s insufficient response led to another external investigation, as it was clear that lessons learned from 2011 were not applied.⁹

Despite the post-Breivik counterterrorism efforts, 2019–2020 saw progress for Norway’s radical right. Albeit very small compared to Sweden, these groups have gained traction in their ideological appeal, networking abilities, and potential alternatives to terror.¹⁰ Norwegian radical right activists have long relied on help from Sweden to organise or send activists to participate in demonstrations and meetings in Norway (as is the case with the Nordic Resistance Movement, NRM). The previous leader of the Norwegian branch of the NRM, Haakon Forwald, even lived in Sweden with his Swedish neo-Nazi wife for several years. Forwald was labelled ‘the most dangerous man

in the Nordic region’ by the tabloid newspaper Verdens Gang, but he does not have a criminal record and is not seen to be an effective, charismatic leader.¹¹

This country report chronicles how violent radical right groups that were active in the 1990s and 2000s have largely disappeared. Despite the massacre carried out by Breivik and the near-attack by Manshaus, Norway does not have a strong radical right-wing scene. There are several groups with very small membership and street presence, though online activity has become more popular. While the groups that are active today officially denounce violence, their members’ rhetoric on social media paints a very different picture. As was the case with Breivik and Manshaus, terrorist attacks are more likely to come from individual actors radicalised online.

The first part of this report provides an overview of the violent movements that laid the groundwork to the Nordic Resistance Movement that is particularly active in Sweden and has branches in Norway, Denmark, and Finland. The report also looks at the violent movements of the 1990s and 2000s in the context of current de-radicalisation and counter-narrative efforts. Such approaches are fundamental to designing a more holistic, multi-agency approach to helping individuals leave violent radical right extremist movements. Much can be learned from examining the ‘Exit-Norway’ programme of the 1990s, which played a central role in breaking up these groups (with particular success noted in the second half of the decade).

⁸ The Nordic page, ‘Messages from the killed step sister about the mosque shooter in Norway. ‘He is racist and hateful and I don’t feel safe’, 14 May 2020, is online at: www.tnp.no/norway/panorama/messages-from-the-killed-step-sister-about-the-mosque-shooter-in-norway-he-is-racist-and-hateful-i-dont-feel-safe.

⁹ Since then other incidents have highlighted how the Bærum police has a problem with racial profiling, see: Herbjørnsrud, D., ‘Spesialenheten bør granske Bærums – politiets handlinger overfor muslimer’, *Utop*, 16 June 2020, online at: <https://www.utrop.no/plenum/ytringer/216129/>.

¹⁰ Klungtveit, H.S. (2020) *Nynazister blant oss*, Kagge Forlag, Oslo.

¹¹ Forwald was described as the most dangerous man in the Nordic region by undercover journalists in *V/G*; see Berg, R., and Rasmussen, E. ‘Det hvite raseriet: kapittel 9. Nordens farligste’, 2017, online at: <https://www.vg.no/spesial/2017/det-hvite-raseriet/>.

PART ONE RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS AND NARRATIVES IN NORWAY

ANTI-IMMIGRANT, ANTI-ISLAM, ANTI-SEMITIC, & ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT SENTIMENTS

Few radical right groups in Norway today have a presence outside of online activity. The Norwegian Defence League (NDL) was previously active but since their last street demonstration in 2011, the group has only existed on Facebook. The Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) used to be active until the organisation split in August 2019.¹² They appeared again recently outside a synagogue in Oslo, where they handed out anti-semitic hate propaganda around Yom Kippur 2020.¹³ Over the last year, Stop Islamisation of Norway (SIAN) has become increasingly active on the streets, demonstrating in city centres and residential areas. They have targeted neighbourhoods with high immigrant populations, a strategy the English Defence League applied in the United Kingdom a decade ago. SIAN's demonstrations were met with violent counter-demonstrations and the movement gained media coverage they did not have before. Most radical right groups

today, however, have shifted their operations online, increasing government concern about violence from lone wolf actors. According to the Norwegian police security service, radical right individuals inspired by anti-Muslim rhetoric have a higher propensity to violence than at any time in more than a decade.

The groups do not officially promote violence but instead encourage activists who take part in street demonstrations to provoke counter-demonstrators to attack first and then 'fight back.' The boundaries between the radical right and the mainstream have become increasingly blurred. For example, the Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) has a programme resembling a political party with commonly-held policies, like environmental and sustainability policies, but are presented through an extremist lens of 'this planet being too small for all of us.'

¹² Online at <https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/nynazistene-fikk-ga-i-fred-ole-ble-pasatt-handjern-og-bortvist-da-han-sto-foran-dem/68549547>.

¹³ Norge i dag, 30 September 2020. 'Nynasister delte ut propaganda i Oslo – svært ubehagelig', online at: <https://idag.no/svart-ubehagelig/19.34356>.




FIGURE 1 A matrix of radical right groups based on the level of violence and extremity in their narratives.

(Horizontal Axis: Mainstreamness of Narratives¹⁴, Vertical Axis: Incidence of Violence¹⁵)

¹⁴ Here, ‘mainstreamness’ can be measured by the adoption of moderate narratives (usually involving a broad issue agenda, anti-establishment populism and electoralism) compared to more extreme, esoteric positions and modus operandi (e.g. street activism and terrorism) taken by fringe groups (De Lange, Akkerman and Rooduijn 2016).
¹⁵ Here, ‘violence’ is measured as part of the narrative within a group and its mode of activism. Whilst the dominant trend within these groups has been toward non-violent forms of rhetoric and activism, neo-Nazi groups (such as the Nordic Resistance Movement and Nordisk Styrke) have historically shown more overt instances of violent activism, often perpetrated against perceived ‘outsiders’ such as ethnic and religious minorities.

TABLE 1: Overview of Radical Right Extremist Narratives in Norway

EXTREMIST NARRATIVE	DEFINITION	EXAMPLE
Anti-Establishment Sentiment	Here, ‘Anti-Establishment Sentiment’ is defined as a sustained critique of political, media and business elites, often dressed up in conspiratorial language.	“the elites’ globalisation project meets a lot of resistance in the population; if a new party is able to get 15% of the votes then we have to look for the big words to describe that.”(Selvstendighetspartiet, Norway)
Anti-Globalist Sentiment	Here, ‘Anti-Globalist Sentiment’ is defined as a sustained critique of globalisation and others forms of internationalism, based on anti-elitist sentiments.	“I’m against the European Economic Area Agreement and globalisation.” (Alliansen, Norway)
Anti-Immigration Sentiment	Here, ‘Anti-Immigration Sentiments’ are defined as particularly strident views against open immigration policies. In particular, they might involve the cessation of immigration or the compulsory and voluntary repatriation of non-indigenous citizens to the country in question.	“We want to say that ‘we are the people,’ and we demand to be part of the debate (about) Muslim immigration and the influence of the totalitarian ideology of Islam.” (PEGIDA, Norway)
Anti-Muslim Populism	Here, ‘Anti-Muslim Populism’ is defined as a fusion of anti-Muslim hatred and populist forms of nationalism, including tropes around Islamisation and negative depictions of Islam.	“Muslims are notorious sexual predators [and] rape in epidemic proportions.” (SIAN, Norway)
Anti-semitism	Here, ‘Anti-semitism’ is defined as expressions of anti-Jewish prejudice, including some anti-Zionist positions and anti-Jewish conspiracy theories.	“If we don’t deal with the globalist Jews now, in Norway led by the Jew Ervin Kohn, the Jew lackeys in Høyre and the Jew lackeys in Fremskrittspartiet will accept the UN Migration Pact, and then it’s over.” (Alliansen, Norway)
Alt-Right	Here, the ‘Alt-Right’ is defined as “a [radical] right-wing, primarily online political movement or grouping ... whose members reject mainstream conservative politics and espouse extremist beliefs and policies typically centred on ideas of white nationalism.” ¹⁶	“Today we see the start of an escalation of terror from the left, a communist revolution they have worked towards for decades.” (For Generasjon Identitet, Norway)

¹⁶ Merriam-Webster, *Alt-Right*, 2017, online at: <https://time.com/4946240/merriam-webster-alt-right-meaning/>.

Aryanism	Here, ‘Aryanism’ is defined as the belief in an ethnically pure northern European race, based on biological characteristics.	“The most important part for us is that you don’t mix races. The Nordic race is behind a lot of inventions and much of the culture that have been created.” (Nordic Resistance Movement, Norway)
Christianism	Here, ‘Christianism’ is defined as a civilizational and traditionalist interpretation of Christianity that sees the Christian religion as the defining feature of the ‘nation’ and/or Western Civilisation.	“Norway needs more Christianity and less Islam.” (Demokratene i Norge) ¹⁷
Cultural Nationalism	Here, ‘Cultural Nationalism’ is defined as radical right populist parties or movements presenting views against immigration and Islam. These movements are usually not preoccupied with racial differences but focus on cultural differences, claiming that Islam is incompatible with Western culture and society. ¹⁸	“Our criticism is primarily aimed at the media, politicians, researchers and intellectuals in the West who systematically glorify reality and avoid sharing information openly and honestly about the consequences of immigration policies that are in the process of losing control.” (Norwegian Defence League)
Ethno-Nationalism	Here, ‘Ethno-Nationalism’ is defined as the unanimity of the nation and a (usually native white) ethnic in-group, with immigration by non-white groups seen as endangering this monist ideal.	“We have nothing against immigrants as individuals. On the other hand, we are completely against today’s mass immigration which threatens to make ethnic Norwegians a minority in their own country within a couple of decades.” (Maalmannen.no)
Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory	Here, the ‘Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory’ refers to the writings of Renaud Camus and the belief in a demographic replacement of native Europeans by non-European migrants, deemed to be facilitated by ruling elites.	“We wish to preserve the people of Europe and promote their cultures and to stop Islamisation and mass immigration.” (For Generasjon Identitet, Norway)
Identitarianism	According to José Pedro Zúquete, Identitarians are a “quickly growing ethno-cultural transnational movement [aimed at ‘preserving’ a European form of ethno-cultural heritage] that, in diverse forms, originated in France and Italy and has spread into southern, central, and northern Europe.” ¹⁹	“We imagine a world where separate peoples can rule for themselves and live in peace with each other.” (For Generasjon Identitet, Norway)

¹⁷ The Democrats in Norway (or *Demokratene i Norge*), formerly and commonly known as the Democrats, is a right-wing populist party in Norway without parliamentary representation. It has particularly authoritarian stances regarding immigration and Islam’s role within Norwegian public life.

¹⁸ Bjorgo & Ravndal, 2019, *Extreme-Right Violence and Terrorism: Concepts, Patterns, and Responses*, pp.3-4, online at: <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Extreme-Right-Violence-and-Terrorism-Concepts-Patterns-and-Responses.pdf>.

¹⁹ José Pedro Zúquete, “*The Identitarians: The Movement against Globalism and Islam in Europe*,” 2018, <https://undpress.nd.edu/9780268104214/the-identitarians/>.

Islamophobia	Here, ‘Islamophobia’ is defined as “anti-Muslim hatred...motivated by hostility or bias towards people perceived to be Muslim.” ²⁰	“Islam is a threat to peace and freedom in Norway.” (SIAN, Norway)
Neo-Nazism	Here, ‘Neo-Nazism’ is defined as adherence to the ideology of National Socialism after 1945, including Aryanism, veneration of Adolf Hitler, and advocacy of the Third Reich.	“We aim to create a new generation of strong conscious Nordic people, our ambition is to <i>create a strong ideology, culture and organisation</i> .” (Nordisk Styrke, Norway)
Welfare Chauvinism	Here, ‘Welfare Chauvinism’ is defined as support for a welfare state where immigrants have fewer entitlements to a variety of welfare programmes than natives. ²¹	“Ever since the first Pakistanis arrived, the Muslims as a group has been a burden on the welfare state. Muslims come from non-functioning garbage states. They have an ideology that prevents women from working and ties them to the bed and the kitchen. The breed irresponsibly big litters of children.” (SIAN, Norway)
White Supremacism	Here, ‘White Supremacism’ is defined as a belief in white dominance over people of other racial backgrounds. It is often connected to concerns about ‘white replacement’ or belief in ‘White Genocide’ conspiracy theories.	“To create a new generation of strong conscious, Nordic people and our ambition to create a strong ideology to fight and strengthen our culture and organisation.” (Nordisk Styrke, Norway)
Violence	Here, ‘Violence’ is defined as the threat of, or actual, physical attack against an individual or group based on racial or religious characteristics.	“We are firmly rooted in our national socialist worldview and are prepared to die to defend our beliefs...we are a total antithesis to the established parties and politicians. We are fanatic and will fight to the last drop of blood to defend our people, and these are the ingredients that will lead us to victory.” (Nordic Resistance Movement, Norway)

²⁰ Feldman & Allchorn, *Working Definition of Anti-Muslim Hatred*, online at: <https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2019/05/15/a-working-definition-of-anti-muslim-hatred-summary/>.

²¹ Bonal & Zollinger, 2018, *Immigration, Welfare Chauvinism and the Support for Radical Right Parties in Europe*, online at: <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2018/03/19/immigration-welfare-chauvinism-and-the-support-for-radical-right-parties-in-europe/>.

CONTEXT: HISTORY OF RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS AND CVE INTERVENTIONS IN NORWAY

From the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, several loosely connected extreme radical right groups were active in Norway. The most notorious groups were the skinhead neo-Nazi ‘Boot Boys’ and ‘Vigrid,’ the latter an anti-semitic and racist group that was steeped in old Norse mythology, with its own pagan rituals, priests, and ceremonies. They embraced low-level violence and consisted of a mainly informal network of nationalists, National Socialists, and skinheads who were content fighting anti-racists in the street. Their strategy was to physically attack ethnic minorities on public transport, in the workplace, and their businesses, noting the event where members of Vigrid entered a Turkish-owned pizzeria in Ørlandet and attacked its ethnic-minority workers.²²

In response to Vigrid’s terror campaign, parents and children, the church, mentoring projects, and social workers working in outreach were mobilised. The police became increasingly vigilant in stopping and searching young people for weapons, a strategy which later became problematic but was deemed successful at the time as weapons disappeared from the streets and less gang activity was reported.²³

The ‘Exit’ programme’s most important outcome was that it successfully encouraged youth to disengage from extremist groups and activities. The method was then shared with other countries as an example of a workable Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategy. It therefore came as a shock when 15-year-old Benjamin Hermansen was brutally stabbed to death in Holmlia, Oslo on 26 January 2001

by two young, white self-declared racists. The murder even affected young people who had been connected to the neo-Nazi community. The killing was considered the first racist murder in Norway. The murderers Joe Erling Jahr (20) and Ole Nicolai Kvisler (22), were imprisoned for 16 and 15 years respectively. Both had belonged to the notorious Boot Boys.

Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik from the Christian Democratic Party called for a dramatic review of how the country dealt with racism. At the same time, thousands of anti-racists demonstrated in the streets, neo-Nazis were hounded, and it became impossible to host a gathering or a party for racists or neo-Nazis. As a result, the Boot Boys became invisible overnight, recruitment stopped, and the group ceased to exist around 2003.

There are several reasons such organisations collapsed, and not all are due entirely to the ‘Exit-Norway’ programme. For some individuals, it was a natural progression of growing up, moving, or disinterest. The mood in the general public and the counter-demonstrations also sent a signal to the members that they were not likely to get support by continuing the same violent methodology. In addition, many members had joined not because of ideology, but because they were looking for a community and belonging. When they started to understand how much damage the groups could do, and how violent the leaders were, many became frightened into leaving. They were young and wanted to be liked.²⁴

EXTREME RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS IN NORWAY

FOLKEBEVEGELSEN MOT INNVANDRING (FMI)	NORDIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (NORWAY)
FOUNDER Leif B. Økland	FOUNDER Not known
LEADER Haakon Forwald	LEADER Haakon Forwald
MEMBERSHIP N/A	MEMBERSHIP 40 (est.)
FOLLOWERS 15,333 (<i>Facebook</i>)	
IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY
Cultural Nationalism	Anti-Semitism
Anti-Muslim Populism	Aryanism
Anti-Immigration Sentiments	Neo-Nazism
	Violence

²² Blindheim, A.M., ‘Filmet sitt eget gjengangrep – hoyreekstremister angrep tyrkisk restaurant på Ørlandet’, 15 December 2005, online at: <https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/filmet-sitt-eget-gjengangrep/66164597>.

²³ Tore Bjørgo who heads C-REX, started the Exit project; see his edited book, *Leaving Terrorism Behind* (2008). London: Routledge.

²⁴ Daugherty, C. E., ‘Deradicalization and disengagement: exit Norway and Sweden and addressing neo- Nazi extremism’, *Journal for Deradicalisation* No. 21 2019, online at: <https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/287>.



NORDISK STYRKE (NS)

FOUNDERS
Klas Lund, Anders Rydberg, Haakon Forwald, Emil Hagberg, Niklas Yngwe

LEADER
Klas Lund


MEMBERSHIP
Unknown

FOLLOWERS
23 (*Twitter*)

IDEOLOGY

Neo-Nazism

White Supremacism



SOLDIERS OF ODIN (NORWAY)

FOUNDER
Not known

LEADER
Steffen Larsen

MEMBERSHIP
50 (est.)


FOLLOWERS
13 (*Twitter*), *banned by Facebook*

IDEOLOGY

Anti-Muslim Populism

Anti-Immigration Sentiments

Violence



STOP ISLAMISATION OF NORWAY (SIAN)

FOUNDER
Arne Tumyr

LEADER
Lars Thoresen

FOLLOWERS
10,500 (*Facebook*)

MEMBERSHIP
Unknown


IDEOLOGY

Cultural Nationalism

Anti-Immigration Sentiments

Anti-Muslim Populism

Welfare Chauvinism



NORWEGIAN DEFENCE LEAGUE

FOUNDER
Unknown

LEADER
Unknown

FOLLOWERS
28,396 (*Facebook*)


MEMBERSHIP
Unknown

IDEOLOGY

Cultural Nationalism

Anti-Immigration Sentiments

Anti-Muslim Populism



SLÅ RING OM NORGE

LEADER

Unknown

FOLLOWERS

N/A

MEMBERSHIP

Unknown

IDEOLOGY

Anti-Muslim Populism

Cultural Nationalism



PEGIDA (NORWAY)

LEADER

Max Hermansen


FOLLOWERS

18,522 (*Facebook*)

IDEOLOGY

Anti-Immigration Sentiments

Anti-Muslim Populism



MAALMANNEN.NO

FOUNDER

Lars Bjarne Marøy

LEADER

Olav Torheim


FOLLOWERS

1,134 (*Facebook*)

IDEOLOGY

Ethno-Nationalism

Anti-Globalist Sentiments



WARGUS CHRISTI

FOUNDER

Olav Torheim

LEADER

Frodi Midjord

FOLLOWERS

1,051 (*Facebook*)

IDEOLOGY

Ethno-Nationalism

DESCRIPTION	
	<p>Founded in 1987, FMI was the first explicitly anti-immigrant Norwegian organisation.²⁶ The group's leader, Arne Myrdal, was violent and in 1990 was charged with planning to bomb a reception centre for asylum seekers. He was ultimately forced out of FMI in April 1991 and left the organisation to start a new one and pursue a more violent path. Currently, FMI is mainly a Facebook group, with occasional street protests and demonstrations. Their political aim is to provide information about immigration and its negative effects.</p>
NARRATIVE EXAMPLES	
<p>FOUNDER Leif B. Økland</p> <p>FOLLOWERS 15,333 (Facebook)²⁵</p> <p>MEMBERSHIP N/A</p> <p>IDEOLOGY</p> <p>Cultural Nationalism</p> <p>Anti-Muslim Populism</p> <p>Anti-Immigration Sentiments</p>	<p>Cultural Nationalism: “we work...to ensure that Norway remains a nation based in our Norwegian and Christian heritage and the people's community.” <i>- An excerpt from FMI's homepage.²⁷</i></p> <p>Anti-Muslim Populism: “Norway and Denmark are the first targets for an Islamic revolution in Europe.” <i>- A flyer quoting Sheikh Issam Amira.²⁸</i></p> <p>Anti-Immigration Sentiments: “No, black people can stop being black, we can paint them in the colours of the rainbow. Don't they know it's racist to say black.” <i>- An excerpt from a FMI Facebook post.²⁹</i></p>

²⁵ This figure was noted at the time of writing in July 2020.

²⁶ Bjørge, T., ‘Høyreekstremisme er ikke lenger et ungdomsproblem, miljøene består nesten utelukkende av voksne’, 22 October 2018, online at: <https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/aktuelt/aktuelle-saker/2018/hoyreekstremisme-er-ikke-lenger-et-ungdomsproblem.html>.

²⁷ My translation. FMI, homepage online at: <https://www.fmi.no>.

²⁸ My translation, FMI Flyer members and ‘friends’ were asked to distribute, online at: http://fmi.no/images/stories/demo/pdf/muslimsk_okkupasjon_kort_041409.pdf.

²⁹ My translation. FMI Facebook page, online at: <https://www.facebook.com/FolkebevegelsenMotInnvandring/>.

DESCRIPTION	
	<p>The Norwegian Resistance Movement (NRM) was an early attempt by those leaving Boot Boys and Vigrid in the early 2000s to start what is now the Nordic Resistance Movement's Norway branch. The group was inspired by the Swedish Resistance Movement but in the early years did not manage to establish an active group. The movement was dormant until 2011 when it resurfaced with a new leader and a new strategy. Haakon Forwald, the group's new leader, claimed that the old group had attracted the wrong supporters and that a new version needed to be more careful with recruitment. His modern version of the NRM was not entirely new, however, as activists had been working hard for years to establish a new organisation. The NRM became a very hierarchical organisation based in Sweden with strong discipline and with only a few committed members. The Norwegian iteration was reliant upon their Swedish colleagues, so much so that the Norwegian Resistance Movement merged into a pan-Nordic organisation in 2016 (it also claims to have strengthened pan-Nordic identity). The NRM aims to create a racially pure pan-Nordic region (or ethno-state) and to expel anyone they deem non-ethnic Nordic.³⁰ According to their programme, the NRM wants to dismantle the “global Zionist elite” and to this end, they publish articles with anti-semitic content to expose links to the “Zionist elite” and attract support. On the death of John Lewis, they wrote, “The black activist John Lewis was closely allied with Jewish power.”³¹</p> <p>While the group claims to be non-violent, there are a number of instances where members have exhibited violence. Members train in martial arts, attended training camps in Russia, and have a history of attacking immigrants. In Finland, a man died in 2016 after being kicked by a member, which led to the group's temporary ban.³² The NRM has grown steadily since 2011 but struggled to mobilise on the street. They moved their focus to social media where they have created a basis to improve their international networks and to create cells similar to Islamist terrorist organisations. Since 2015 their strategy has been to be as visible as possible with town-centre public meetings, sticker and poster campaigns, and documentation online. As of September 2020, they are active online at Frihetskamp.net and motstandsbevegelsen.org.</p> <p>In Sweden, the NRM is registered as a political party, at one point holding two local council seats in Dalarna which they lost in the 2018 elections.³³ Due to internal conflict about strategy and politics as a result of the 2018 results, activists became demoralised and the group's activities were dramatically reduced. The group split in 2019. Several of the most prominent members and those with the highest propensity to violence have left the group.³⁴ In Norway, the effect was much the same and even the leader Haakon Forwald left. The most radical individuals, including Forwald, have founded ‘Nordisk Styrke.’ Forwald sits on the board of representatives.</p>
<p>FOUNDER Not known</p> <p>LEADER Haakon Forwald</p> <p>MEMBERSHIP 40 (est.)</p>	


³⁰ Klungtvedt, H., (2020) *Nynazister blant oss*. Oslo, Kagge Forlag

³¹ My translation. Nordfront.se Editorial, ‘Den svarte aktivisten John Lewis var sterkt allierad med judisk makt’. Nordfront.se, 23 July 2020, online at: <https://www.nordfront.se/svart-aktivist-allierad-med-judisk-makt-smr>.

³² No author. *Varis*, ‘Finland: Temporarily banned neo-Nazi group Nordic Resistance Movement announces demonstration for Independence Day’, *Varis antifasistinen verkosto*, 29 October 2019, online at: <https://varisverkosto.com/2019/10/finland-temporarily-banned-neo-nazi-group-nordic-resistance-movement-announces-demonstration-for-independence-day/>.

³³ Færseth, J., ‘Mindre nynazistisk aktivitet i 2019’, *Utopi*, 4 May 2020, online at: <https://www.utrop.no/nyheter/nytt/216104/>.

³⁴ Poohl, D., ‘Nazistiske Grupper mindre aktive’, EXPO 29 April 2020, online at: <https://expo.se/2020/04/nazistiska-grupper-mindre-aktiva>.

	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES		
	Anti-Semitism: “The idea was that the Jews want to mix the races and in that way destroy the white race. They said that the Jews influenced society through their property – the banks and the media.” <i>- Hugo Edlund, ex-member of NRM, quoted in Haaretz.³⁵</i>		
	Aryanism: “The most important part for us is that you don’t mix races. The Nordic race is behind a lot of inventions and much of the culture that has been created.” <i>- Simon Lindberg (leader of NRM, Sweden) quoted in a Quartz article.³⁶</i>		
	Neo-Nazism: “Hitler was a good person surrounded by lies.” <i>- Simon Lindberg (leader of NRM, Sweden) interviewed by RT.³⁷</i>		
	Violence: “We are firmly rooted in our national socialist worldview and are prepared to die to defend our beliefs[...]we are a total antithesis to the established parties and politicians. We are fanatic and will fight to the last drop of blood to defend our people, and these are the ingredients that will lead us to victory.” <i>- An interview with NRM leader Haakon Forwald, cited by Filternyheter.no.³⁸</i>		

NORDIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT (NORWAY)		
IDEOLOGY		
Anti-Semitism		
Aryanism		
Neo-Nazism		
Violence		

	DESCRIPTION	
	<p>NS is a splinter group of the NRM and was founded in August 2019 as a result of internal conflict in the NRM.⁴⁰ NS's leader, Klas Lund, has a violent past and a long history in the Scandinavian neo-Nazi subculture. He founded the pan-Nordic NRM and was convicted of murder in 1986. He has several convictions for violence, robbery, and for illegal possession of weapons. NS's ambition is to build a strong organisation with few but committed members to fight "cultural Marxism and decadence." They offer two types of membership, 'friend' and 'activist.' They claim each type of membership is demanding as they expect members to be physically fit, to undertake a specific exercise regime, and adhere to a healthy lifestyle. The leadership understands this request is hard so they accept potential members on a trial for six months to assess commitment and suitability.⁴¹</p> <p>So far, the organisation has not been active on the street and there is also minimal internet activity.⁴² They run a radio programme and podcast called 'Radio Polaris' where they discuss current affairs and also present information about the organisation.⁴³</p>	
	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES	
	<p>Neo-Nazism:</p> <p>"In Austria, they are now trying to erase the memory of Hitler by turning his house into a police station. The mainstream is rewriting history."</p> <p>– NS founder, Haakon Forwald, commenting on NS Radio.⁴⁴</p>	
	<p>White Supremacism:</p> <p>"To create a new generation of strong, conscious, Nordic people and our ambition to create a strong ideology to fight and strengthen our culture and organisation."</p> <p>– NS founder, Haakon Forwald, cited by Filter Nybeter.⁴⁵</p>	

NORDISK STYRKE (NS)	
FOUNDERS	Klas Lund, Anders Rydberg, Haakon Forwald, Emil Hagberg, Niklas Yngwe
LEADER	Klas Lund
MEMBERSHIP	Unknown
FOLLOWERS	23 (Twitter) ³⁹
IDEOLOGY	
	Neo-Nazism
	White Supremacism

³⁵ Stavrou, D., ‘What drove this Swede to quit his cult and fight antisemitism instead?’, Haaretz, 23 March 2020, online at: <https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/.premium/MAGAZINE-what-drove-this-swede-to-quit-his-neo-nazi-cult-and-fight-anti-semitism-instead-1.8623123>.

³⁶ Cheng, S., “‘I feel betrayed by my country’: the Swedes who think their Scandinavian utopia is being ruined by refugees”, 23 June 2016, online at: <https://qz.com/711479/the-swedes-who-think-their-scandinavian-utopia-is-being-ruined-by-refugees/>.

³⁷ RT, ‘Swedish nationalist party leader says ‘Hitler is a good person surrounded by lies’ during interview. 25 August 2018, online at: <https://www.rt.com/news/436858-sweden-nationalist-party-hitler>.

³⁸ My translation. Klungtveit, H.S and Skybakmoen, J. ‘Nynazist Haakon Forwald: ‘hengeløkker er politikk’’, 1 May 2018, Online at: <https://filternyheter.no/nynazistleder-haakon-forwald-hengelokker-er-politikk/>.

³⁹ This is the figure at the time of writing in July 2020.

⁴⁰ Klungtveit, H.S., ‘Norske Haakon Forwald en av lederne i ny nazi-organisasjon – dette betyr splittelsen av «Den nordiske motstandsbevegelsen»’, 13 August 2019, Online at: <https://filternyheter.no/splittelse-i-nynazist-miljoet-norske-haakon-forwald-hevder-a-vaere-en-av-lederneutbrytergruppe/>.

⁴¹ Admin, ‘Om medlemskap in Nordisk styrke’, *Nordisk Styrke* 16 August 2019, online at: <https://nordiskstyrke.org/om-medlemskap-i-nordisk-styrke/>.

⁴² Klungtveit, H. S., ‘Norske Haakon Forwald en av lederne i ny nazi-organisasjon. Dette betyr splittelse av den Nordiske Motstandsbevegelsen’, *Filter Nyheter*, 13 August 2019, online at: <https://filternyheter.no/splittelse-i-nynazist-miljoet-norske-haakon-forwald-hevder-a-vaere-en-av-lederne-utbrytergruppe/>.

⁴³ Radio Polaris is Nordisk Styrke’s official *pod radio* where they produce podcasts on current affairs, most recently on Covid-19. The radio is run by Klas Lund and Haakon Forwald. 25 May 2020, online at: <https://nordiskstyrke.org/radio-polaris-3-covid-19-og-forberedelser/>.

⁴⁴ My translation from Norwegian, NS Radio, online at: <https://nordiskstyrke.org/ns-radio-7-historie-fanatisme-og-kampmoral/>.

⁴⁵ Forwald, H., ‘Propaganda og kampmetoder,’ *Nordisk Styrke*, 23 September 2019, online at: <https://nordiskstyrke.org/propaganda-og-kampmetoder/>.

	DESCRIPTION
	<p>An international network of anti-immigrant vigilantes founded by Miko Ranta in Kemi, Finland. They were founded in 2015 as a response to an increase in asylum seekers who they saw as a threat, particularly to ‘their women.’ Miko Ranta was convicted for racially motivated assault in 2005. Soldiers of Odin (SoO) have groups in 20 Finnish cities and some of their activities have been supported by the True Finns Party. They have had branches in Sweden, Estonia, Norway, Denmark, UK, Republic of Ireland, USA, Portugal, Spain, and Canada. It is not clear who founded the Norwegian branch that has existed between 2016-2017.⁴⁶ Ronny Alte, also known from Norwegian Defence League and Pegida, claims he founded SoO Norway but Alte has a habit of proclaiming himself the leader of new radical right movements. Alte was the previous spokesperson for the Norwegian Defence League, and left SoO in March 2016.⁴⁷ The group is largely a media-based collective.⁴⁸ SoO have been banned by Facebook and, according to the local leader in Kristiansand Jan Tellef Aanonsen, the Norway branch folded whilst the previous leader Steffen Andre Larsen insists the group is still active.⁴⁹ The decision to close the Norway branch seems to have been taken centrally.</p>
SOLDIERS OF ODIN (NORWAY)	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
	<p>Anti-Muslim Populism: “Muslims themselves aren’t the problem. The problem is how they treat others based on their religious beliefs.”</p> <p>– <i>Leading member of SoO Norway, Ronny Alte, cited in Nettavisen Nyheter.</i>⁵⁰</p> <p>Anti-Immigration Sentiments: “...a patriotic organisation fighting for white Finland.”</p> <p>– <i>Vigilante patrol member on why he supports Soldiers of Odin.</i>⁵¹</p> <p>Violence: “We just want it to be safe in the city [...] in the face of uncontrolled immigration.”</p> <p>– <i>Founder of SoO Norway, Ronny Alte, cited in the Local.</i>⁵²</p>
FOUNDER Not known	
LEADER Steffen Larsen	
FOLLOWERS 13 (<i>Twitter</i>), <i>banned by Facebook</i>	
MEMBERSHIP 50 (est.)	
IDEOLOGY	
Anti-Muslim Populism	
Anti-Immigration Sentiments	
Violence	

⁴⁶ Vestrum Olsson, S. & Midtskog, E.R., ‘Ekstremismeforsker: Sterke personligheter splitter slike miljøer’, 26 February 2016, online at: <https://www.nrk.no/norge/ekstremismeforsker--sterke-personligheter-splitter-slike-miljoer-1.12823089>.

⁴⁷ Hope not Hate, ‘Soldiers of Odin network’, no date, online at: <https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/research/islamophobia-hub/profiles/anti-muslim-street-protest-movements/soldiers-odin-network/>.

⁴⁸ Castle, T. and Parsons, T., ‘Vigilante or Viking? Contesting the mediated constructions of Soldiers of Odin Norge’ *Sage*, 22 September 2017.

⁴⁹ No author, ‘Odins soldater er lagt ned’, NRK, 6 January 2017, online at: www.nrk.no/sorlandet/-odins-soldater-er-lagt-ned-1.1330927.

⁵⁰ My translation. Semb Aasmundsen, J. & Bekkevold, B.K., ‘Islamkritiker sliter med å få jobb’, 15 July 2015, online at: <https://www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/islamkritiker-sliter-med-a-fa-jobb/3422809423.html>.

⁵¹ Teivainen, A., ‘Finnish police commissioner: vigilante patrols have no additional rights’, 06 January 2016, Online at: <https://www.helsinki.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/13691-finnish-police-commissioner-vigilante-patrols-have-no-additional-rights.html>.

⁵² Alte on Soldiers of Odin on patrolling the streets in Tønsberg, Norway. *The Local*, ‘Patriot’group of soldiers’of Odin debut in Norway’, 15 February 2016, online at: <https://www.thelocal.no/20160215/patriot-group-soldiers-of-odin-debut-in-norway>.

	DESCRIPTION
	<p>Stop Islamisation of Norway (SIAN) is part of an international network of radical right counter-Jihadists, formed in 2008. The group grew out of an action group that was established in 2000 called ‘Stop calls to prayer.’ Another name before they settled on SIAN was ‘Forum against Islamisation.’ They compare Islam to Nazism and occupation. The leader, Lars Thoresen, was imprisoned for hate speech.⁵⁴ Their main concerns are normalisation of Islamophobia and garnering media attention. SIAN was also part of the European organisation against Islamisation of Europe but broke company with the European group in 2011. Their constitution is liberal and does not promote violence but the leader’s and activists’ rhetoric and behaviour show a different picture.</p> <p>SIAN has attracted members and activist from a broad spectrum of backgrounds and different political parties and organisations such as the local politician from the Socialist left party Morten Schau. They are active on the street and their demonstrations in the last few years have gained significant attention.⁵⁵ Normally, counter-demonstrations attract larger crowds as in Trondheim where anti-racists were the first to attack and have been accused of violence against the police and SIAN. SIAN activists had to be escorted away by police as counter-demonstrators attacked them and the police. At a demonstration in Oslo a few weeks earlier SIAN leader, Lars Thoresen, was attacked by eggs and tomatoes and held the Qur’an up to protect himself while he shouted, “pelt, pelt, barbarians.”⁵⁶</p>
STOP ISLAMISATION OF NORWAY (SIAN)	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
	<p>Cultural Nationalism: “Islam is uniquely barbaric [...] Muslims get more and more violent the more religious they get.”</p> <p>– <i>SIAN leader, Lars Thoresen, cited in Bok og Bibliotek.</i>⁵⁷</p> <p>Anti-Immigration Sentiments: “What when we have enough immigrants from the Middle East and Africa [...] their culture and they take over [...] they come and they will take our houses.”</p> <p>– <i>SIAN activist, Anna Bråten, cited in Filter Nyheter.</i>⁵⁸</p> <p>Anti-Muslim Populism: “Muslims are notorious sexual predators [and] rape in epidemic proportions.”</p> <p>– <i>SIAN leader, Lars Thoresen, cited in Norway Today.</i>⁵⁹</p> <p>Welfare Chauvinism: “Ever since the first Pakistanis arrived, the Muslims as a group has been a burden on the welfare state. Muslims come from non-functioning garbage states. They have an ideology that prevents women from working and ties them to the bed and the kitchen. They breed irresponsibly big litters of children.”</p> <p>– <i>SIAN leader, Lars Thoresen, as cited on SIAN’s website.</i>⁶⁰</p>
FOUNDER Arne Tumyr	
LEADER Lars Thoresen	
FOLLOWERS 10,500 (<i>Facebook</i>)	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown ⁵³	
IDEOLOGY	
Cultural Nationalism	
Anti-Immigration Sentiments	
Anti-Muslim Populism	
Welfare Chauvinism	

⁵³ SIAN does not disclose membership figures but the leader Lars Thoresen claims that SIAN obtained approximately 400 new members the summer of 2020 in connection the ‘adidas knights’ barbarism’. Private email exchange 21 September 2020. SIAN’s leader was attacked by anti racists several times during demonstrations during the summer 2020.

⁵⁴ Garza, V., ‘Muslim Leaders report SIAN after the Quran burning in Kristiansand’, *Norway Today*, 19 November 2019, online at: <https://norwaytoday.info/news/muslim-leaders-report-sian-after-the-koran-burning-in-kristiansand/>.

⁵⁵ No author, ‘SIAN demonstrasjon på Mortensruds torg i Oslo’ NTB, 20 June 2020, online at: www.dagsavisen.no/nyheter/innenriks/sian-demonstrasjon-pa-mortensruds-torg-i-oslo-1.1732865.

⁵⁶ Nordhagen Walnum, A., ‘Politiet raser etter demonstrasjon: Livsfarlig’, 30 June 2020, online at: www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/politiet-raser-etter-demonstrasjon--livsfarlig/72619911.

⁵⁷ Pihl, J., ‘Folkebiblioteket- en møteplass for hatefulle ytringer’, 25 May 2020, online at: <https://www.bokogbibliotek.no/news-page/news-bibliotek/folkebiblioteket-en-moteplass-for-hatefulle-ytringer>.

⁵⁸ Klungtveit, H.S., ‘SIAN-profiler tiltalt for flere tilfeller av muslimhets: «Morderzombier» og «seksualpredatorene»’, *Filter Nyheter*, 2 February 2019, online at: <https://filternyheter.no/sian-ledere-tiltalt-for-muslimhets-i-oslo-morderzombier-og-seksualpredatorene/>.

⁵⁹ Garza, V., Op Cit.

⁶⁰ My translation. Thoresen, L., ‘Islam defineres av Allah og Muhammed. Ikke av Bushra Ishak’, 07 November 2017, online at: <https://www.sian.no/artikkel/hvem-snakker-bushra-ishaq-for>.

	DESCRIPTION
	<p>Founded in 2010, inspired by the English Defence League, and with several members from SIAN. The Norwegian Defence League's (NDL) purported aims are to fight extreme Muslims, not Islam. Anders Behring Breivik was a member of the organisation briefly in 2010 but was kicked out.⁶² The group also had little potential to mobilise in the real world. Their biggest demonstration was in Bergen in 2012 where they mobilised 35 members including people who were also active in SIAN. The police, counter-demonstrators, and journalists outnumbered NDL activists by far. The NDL were, however, badly organised, with leaders as well as members coming and going. The group began to falter in 2012. The leader at the time, Ronny Alte, who was a witness in the case against Breivik, left because of internal conflicts linked to the terrorist attacks by Breivik who was said to have been a member under a false name. Alte wanted to publicly condemn the acts of terrorism but a stronger faction disagreed, which led to his being sacked from the leadership role. Alte tried to start a new radical right party, the Norges Frihetsparti (Norwegian Freedom party) but without success.</p> <p>Nowadays, the organisation continues online with two branches. It is not clear who is in charge and most of the posts with most followers are in English. They take aim at the media, intellectuals, and politicians, but Islam is their main enemy. NDL claim not to be racist and say they want to gather all ethnicities to fight for “our democracy and freedom of speech, now threatened by Islamist ideology.”⁶³ Its current concerns include gaining followers on Facebook and normalisation of Islamophobia.</p>
NORWEGIAN DEFENCE LEAGUE	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
	<p>Cultural Nationalism: “If immigrants make societies great, why don´t they make their own societies great?” <i>– NDL status on Facebook 18 May 2019.⁶⁴</i></p> <p>Anti-Immigration Sentiments: “The list is far from complete, and a longer list can be prepared with multiple keywords or keyword changes we have used. We have only included entries under the keywords ‘Islam, Kurdish, Turkish, Muslim, Iranian, Iraqi, Somali, Pakistani, Arabic, Mohammed, Ali, and Hussein’.” <i>– EDL deputy leader cited in the Nordic Page.⁶⁵</i></p> <p>Anti-Muslim Populism: “Norwegian Defence League [sic] aims to gather all ethnicities to fight for our democracy and freedom of speech now threatened by Islamist ideology.” <i>– An excerpt from the NDL’s home page.⁶⁶</i></p>
FOUNDER Unknown	
LEADER Unknown	
FOLLOWERS 28,396 (Facebook) ⁶¹	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	
IDEOLOGY	
Cultural Nationalism	
Anti-Immigration Sentiments	
Anti-Muslim Populism	

	DESCRIPTION
	<p>Slå Ring om Norge (‘Embrace Norway’) was a culturally nationalist Norwegian Facebook group, it started in 2017 and had more than 36,000 followers before the group was closed in 2018. It promoted direct democracy and used populist anti-elite rhetoric and published posts that called for the prime minister Erna Solberg and the main opposition leader Jonas Gahr Store as well as the leader of the liberal party Trine Skei Grande to be hanged publicly. Other posts demanded deportation of a million inhabitants with immigrant backgrounds, forcing asylum seekers to use GPS tracking devices and to incarcerate them in labour camps.⁶⁷ Slå Ring om Norge supported the then Minister of Justice Sylvi Listhaug from the radical right Fremskrittspartiet (Frp) when she was forced to step down from government. Listhaug had compared the labour party to ‘jihadists’. Supporters blamed the left for uncontrolled immigration, claimed the group was a victim of false accusations of racism by the left and saw themselves as fighting a just culture war. Listhaug’s office was flooded with flowers by Slå Ring om Norge supporters but the Facebook group closed down when she publicly disapproved of their rhetoric and activities.⁶⁸</p>
SLÅ RING OM NORGE	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
	<p>Anti-Muslim Populism: “The closet Muslim Erna Solberg is...traitor and a notorious liar...” <i>–An excerpt from a Twitter post on Slå ring om Norge.⁶⁹</i></p> <p>Cultural Nationalism: ‘Stop racism against ethnic Norwegians. Ethnic Norwegians are systematically discriminated against and treated like 2nd class citizens in their own country.’ <i>– A citation from Slå ring om Norge’s Facebook poster campaign.⁷⁰</i></p>
LEADER Unknown	
FOLLOWERS N/A	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	
IDEOLOGY	
Anti-Muslim Populism	
Cultural Nationalism	

⁶¹ This figure was noted at the time of writing in July 2020.

⁶² Hanshuus, B.P., ‘Fra gata til data’ in Bjørge, T., ed., *Høyreekstremisme i Norge. Utviklingstrekk, konspirasjonsteorier og forebyggingsstrategier*. Politi hogskolen, Oslo, 2018.

⁶³ Norwegian Defence League Facebook, online at: www.facebook.com/pg/norwegiandl/about/?ref=page_internal.

⁶⁴ Norwegian Defence League Facebook, online at: <https://www.facebook.com/norwegiandl/>.

⁶⁵ EDL Deputy leader Lars Johnny Aardal defending on compiling a list of Muslims in Norway. *The Nordic Page*, ‘Norwegian Defence League Filing Muslim Organisations and Companies’, 2 March 2013, online at: <https://www.tnp.no/norway/panorama/3575-norwegian-defence-league-fing-muslim-organizations-and-companies>.


⁶⁶ <https://www.facebook.com/norwegiandl/>.


⁶⁷ Rognan Gravklev, B., ‘Men jeg er jo ikke rasist!’, 20 March 2018, online at <https://www.dagsavisen.no/debatt/men-jeg-er-jo-ikke-rasist-1.1117317>

⁶⁸ Lofstad, R., ‘Slå ring om Norge» ble tatt ned’, 17 March 2018, online at: <https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/sla-ring-om-norge-ble-tatt-ned/69623479>.

⁶⁹ Morten Myksvoll, Tweet about *Slå Ring om Norge*, 15 zarch 2018, online at: <https://twitter.com/mortenmyksvoll/status/974322583033319424>.

⁷⁰ Michalsen, G.L., ‘Denne høyrevridde Facebook-siden forfalsker lenker fra en rekke medier. Nå har Nettavisen anmeldt slik svindel til politiet’, 27 April 2017, online at: <https://www.medier24.no/artikler/denne-hoyrevridde-facebook-siden-forfalsker-lenker-fra-en-rekke-medier-na-har-nettavisen-anmeldt-slik-svindel-til-politiet/382170>.

DESCRIPTION	
	<p>Max Hermansen organised the first PEGIDA march in Oslo on 12 January 2015, in which 190 demonstrators participated. They tried to attract members by spreading conspiracy theories about the refugee situation in Europe and marches also took place in a handful of small towns in Tønsberg, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Ålesund, and Stjørdal og Hamar. The movement was not successful in mobilising in Norway, counter demonstrations attracted larger crowds than PEGIDA supporters and the group ceased to exist as a street movement the same year.⁷¹ Hermansen lost his job as a part-time sixth-form lecturer and his shop was tagged with “Nazi swine.” He was later banned from Facebook. Ronny Alte, known from NDL, tried to found another branch of PEGIDA with little success as the two groups merged. When they wilted it is believed that PEGIDA’s Norway branch was swallowed up by SIAN.⁷²</p>
PEGIDA (NORWAY)	
LEADER Max Hermansen	
FOLLOWERS 18,522 (<i>Facebook</i>)	
IDEOLOGY	
Anti-Immigration Sentiments	<p>Anti-Immigration Sentiments: “Norway doesn’t have a climate crisis, but Norway has a serious immigration crisis, which is a big danger for the youth and the future of Norway. Repatriation fast, the future is for patriots who love Norway.”</p> <p>– <i>An excerpt from PEGIDA Facebook homepage.</i>⁷³</p>
Anti-Muslim Populism	<p>Anti-Muslim Populism: “We want to say that ‘we are the people,’ and we demand to be part of the debate (about) Muslim immigration and the influence of the totalitarian ideology of Islam.”</p> <p>– <i>Anti-Muslim demonstrator’s comments cited in ‘News in English.no.’</i>⁷⁴</p>

DESCRIPTION	
	<p>Maalmannen.no is an online magazine with blogs focusing on globalisation, multiculturalism, and cultural identity.⁷⁶ The magazine grew out of a movement to preserve old, Norwegian dialects and to fight anti-globalisation. The magazine’s ideology has moved far to the right and concerns have arisen regarding how the magazine has started to embrace anti-immigrant conspiracy theories. Articles on the website started to appear around 2017 covering participation at Nazi festivals where white power bands had performed.⁷⁷ The editor, Olav Torheim, reported from neo-Nazi marches and demonstrations he had participated in, among others the Salem March in Sweden, demonstrations in Dresden and Magdeburg and the ‘independence’ march in Warsaw.⁷⁸ Torheim, who has a PhD in physics, is also linked to the Identitarian movement and went on to set up Scandza Forum in April 2017. He has worked as a researcher in France and Germany.⁷⁹</p>
MAALMANNEN.NO	
FOUNDER Lars Bjarne Marøy	
LEADER Olav Torheim	
FOLLOWERS 1,134 (<i>Facebook</i>) ⁷⁵	
IDEOLOGY	
Ethno-Nationalism	<p>Ethno-Nationalism: “We have nothing against immigrants as individuals. On the other hand, we are completely against today’s mass immigration which threatens to make ethnic Norwegians a minority in their own country within a couple of decades.”</p> <p>–<i>An excerpt from Maalmannen.no Facebook post.</i>⁸⁰</p>
Anti-Globalist Sentiments	<p>Anti-Globalist Sentiments: “We are forced to destroy Norwegian nature to save the global climate.”</p> <p>–<i>Maalmannen.no Online Editor, Olav Torheim, writing in Nordbordaland.</i>⁸¹</p>

⁷¹ Berntzen, L.E., Weisskircher, M., ‘Remaining on the Streets:Anti-Islamic PEGIDA Mobilisation and its Relationship to Far-Right Party Politics’, 2019. In Calani, M., Cisar, O., eds. Radical Right ‘Movement Parties’ in Europe, Abingdon, Routledge.

⁷² Arneberg, H., ‘Pegida leder (54) mister deltidsjobben sin’, 23 January 2015, Online at: <https://www.aftenposten.no/osloby/i/RxER5/pegida-leder-54-mister-deltidsjobben-sin>.

⁷³ PEGIDA Facebook page, online at: <https://www.facebook.com/pegidanorge/>.

⁷⁴ News in English.no , ‘150 turned up for march against Muslim immigration’, 13 January 2015, online at: <https://www.newsinenglish.no/2015/01/13/few-turned-up-for-march-against-muslim-immigration/>.

⁷⁵ This figure was noted at the time of writing in July 2020.

⁷⁶ Adminmaalmannen, ‘Torheim med doktoravhandling um fysikkeksperiment’, 3 June 2014, online at: <https://www.maalmannen.no>.

⁷⁷ Radikal Portal, ‘Målmannen – fascisme under høgorsk dekke’, 27 February 2014, online at: <https://radikalportal.no/2014/02/27/mal mannen-fascisme-under-hognorsk-dekke/>.

⁷⁸ Taylor, M., ‘White Europe’ 60,000 nationalists march on Poland’s independence day’, *The Guardian*, 12 November 2017, online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/12/white-europe-60000-nationalists-march-on-polands-independence-day>.

⁷⁹ Adminmaalmannen, ‘Torheim med doktoravhandling um fysikkeksperiment’, *Maalmannen.no*, 3 June 2014, online at: <https://www.maalmannen.no/2014/06/torheim-med-doktoravhandling-um-fysikkeksperiment/>.

⁸⁰ *Maalmannen.no* Facebook post, 20 May 2016, online at: <https://www.facebook.com/maalmannen/posts/1370341826315627/>.

⁸¹ On the ‘global wind power industry’. Torheim, O. , ‘Lokal, nasjonal kamp mot vindkraftindustrien’, 2 July 2020, online at: <https://www.nordhordland.no/meiningar/lokal-og-nasjonal-kamp-mot-vindkraftindustrien/o/5-33-365860?fbclid=IwAR2S-JYcQBjvpBgNZxiMh5APF290je4xVR0wr5AhE-q7WxEQtFq7QV0fM>.

	DESCRIPTION
SCANDZA FORUM	<p>Scandza Forum is a Scandinavian organisation that organises meetings and conferences in Scandinavian capitals. It is linked to Maalmannen.no and has invited key speakers from the alt-right movement in the USA, Greg Johnson and Kevin MacDonald, and Guillaume Duroucher from France, to Oslo and Stockholm in 2017.⁸³ Johnson, who had praised Breivik and expressed respect for him in previous writings, was arrested and prevented from speaking at the Scandza Forum’s conference in Oslo on 02 November 2019. The authorities had been made aware of the extremist and deported him on national security grounds.⁸⁴</p> <p>Scandza Forum’s main modes of activism are these conferences as well as online collaborations, acting as a forum for members from a broad spectrum of radical right organisations, from the NRM and Alliansen, to meet and network. Scandza are skilled communicators and seem to have the potential to become a more efficient platform for individuals. Members and activists are also connected with international extremists and organisation like the European Identitarian movement and white supremacists elsewhere.⁸⁵</p>
FOUNDER Olav Torheim	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
LEADER Frodi Midjord	
FOLLOWERS 1,051 (Facebook) ⁸²	
IDEOLOGY	
Ethno-Nationalism	<p>Ethno-Nationalism: “It isn’t enough to stop non Western immigration, we need to stop the stream of immigrants. This is the message from Greg Johnson at the first Scandza Forum meeting in Norway.”</p> <p>– Description of Scandza Forum, as cited on Maalmannen Homepage.⁸⁶</p>

⁸² This is the figure at the time of writing in July 2020.

⁸³ Bjørge, T. and Gjelsvik, I., ‘Utvikling og utbredelse av høyreekstremisme i Norge’, *Høyreekstremisme i Norge*. Politi hogskolen, Oslo, 2018.

⁸⁴ Kallelid, M. & Riaz, K. W. ‘Høyreekstremistisk amerikaner pågrepet, 25 demonstranter anholdt på Torshov’ 2 November 2019 , online at <https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/i/2Ggqk4/hoeyreekstremistisk-amerikaner-paagrep-25-demonstranter-anholdt-paa-to>.

⁸⁵ Aasland Ravndal, J., ‘Transnational militancy in the making’, C-REX Working Paper Series, Oslo: C-REX, 2019, online at: <https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/publications/c-rex-working-paper-series/transnational-militancy-in-the-making.pdf>.

⁸⁶ My translation. Adminmaalmannen.no reporting on the first Scandza forum conference in Oslo. 4 July 2017, ‘Hundretals frammotte på Scandza Forum i Oslo’, online at: <https://www.maalmannen.no/2017/07/hundretals-frammotte-pa-scandza-forum-i-oslo-2/>.

MAINSTREAM RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS IN NORWAY

	
DEMOKRATENE I NORGE	SELVSTENDIGHETSPARTIET
FOUNDER Vidar Kleppe	FOUNDER Ellen Due Brynjulfsen
LEADER Mashvan Kasheikal	LEADER Oliver Stian Seivaag Hugaas
FOLLOWERS 17,629 (Facebook)	FOLLOWERS 1,833 (Facebook)
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	MEMBERSHIP Unknown
IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY
Cultural Nationalism	Ethno-Nationalism
Anti-Globalist Sentiments	Anti-Immigration
Anti-Muslim Populism	Anti-Globalist Sentiments

MAINSTREAM RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS IN NORWAY

		
FOR GENERASJON IDENTITET	ALLIANSEN (ALTERNATIV FOR NORGE)	EKTENYHETER.NO
FOUNDER Unknown	FOUNDER Hans Jørgen Lysglimt Johansen	FOUNDER Onar Åm
	LEADER Hans Jørgen Lysglimt Johansen	
FOLLOWERS 18 (Facebook)	FOLLOWERS 7,622 (Facebook), 3,008 (Twitter)	FOLLOWERS 559 (Facebook) 104 (Twitter)
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	MEMBERSHIP Unknown	MEMBERSHIP Unknown
IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY
Ethno-Nationalism	Ethno-Nationalism	Identitarianism
Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory	Anti-Semitism	Anti-Immigration Sentiments
Identitarianism	Anti-Globalist Sentiment	
Alt-Right	Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory	

	DESCRIPTION
DEMOKRATENE I NORGE	<p>Demokratene i Norge is a radical right, anti-establishment protest party with strong support in Kristiansand (where it was the third biggest party and got 13.5% in the local elections in 2019).⁸⁸ Fitting with its protest-based and anti-globalisation identity, Demokratene i Norge claims that Norwegian culture is under threat. Demokratene i Norge's main concerns are normalisation and mainstreaming of radical right ideology and influence through political power. The party was founded as a national conservative political party as 'Demokratene' in 2002 by Vidar Kleppe. Kleppe was previously an MP for the radical right parliamentary party Fremskrittspartiet but was expelled in 2001 for leading a rebellious faction that threatened the leadership of Carl I. Hagen. Kleppe was very outspoken and had extreme views especially on immigration that contradicted the party line. He was also accused of sexual misconduct and a year after the suspension he left the party. In Demokratene Kleppe joined a handful of colleagues who had also left their old parties both on right and left. The party has since moved from being a national conservative party to becoming more radical and in 2010 the party changed its name to 'Demokratene i Norge.'</p>
FOUNDER Vidar Kleppe ⁸⁷	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
LEADER Mashvan Kasheikal	
FOLLOWERS 17,629 (Facebook)	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	
IDEOLOGY	<p>Cultural Nationalism: “Norwegians need to protect Norwegian culture and protect Norwegian values.” <i>– An excerpt from Demokratene i Norge's Facebook page.⁸⁹</i></p> <p>Anti-Globalist Sentiments: “We are the only party that is against liberal globalisation that is destroying our Norwegian culture and values, our freedom and our democracy. We will take the fight at home and abroad.” <i>– An excerpt from Demokratene i Norge's party programme.⁹⁰</i></p> <p>Anti-Muslim Populism: “Europe is full of Islamist extremists, members of one of the most barbaric terror groups the world has ever seen who drive into crowds, stab people with knives and shoot at people.” <i>– A quote from Demokratene i Norge's founder, Vidar Kleppe, on the party's website.⁹¹</i></p>
Cultural Nationalism	
Anti-Globalist Sentiments	
Anti-Muslim Populism	

⁸⁷ Kleppe was previously an MP and deputy leader of the Fremskrittspartiet, FrP but was suspended and left the party in 2001. The leader at the time, Carl I. Hagen accused Kleppe of being a “populist” and for undermining the party. Kleppe left the party in 2001. See *VG nett*: ‘Raser mot Kleppe’, 25 February 2003, online at: <https://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/i/KVQjy/raser-mot-kleppe>.

⁸⁸ Lindblad, K. E., ‘» Nasjonalistisk» parti med brakvalg’, 10 September 2019, online at: www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/nasjonalistisk-parti-med-brakvalg/71582491.

⁸⁹ My translation of Kleppe's comment on Facebook, 14 November 2019, online at <https://www.facebook.com/Demokratene/>.

⁹⁰ Schei Lilleås, H. ‘Thriller i sør: «jeg vil bli varaorfører»’ *Nettavisen News*, 26 September 2019, online at: <https://www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/thriller-i-sor--jeg-vil-bli-varaorfører/3423851920.html>.

⁹¹ Vidar Kleppe said he was right in warning against Muslim immigrants. Demokratene ‘Vidar Kleppe om sine advarsler mot muslimsk innvandring: jeg fikk rett’ (translated from Norwegian), 8 December 2017, online at: <https://www.demokratene.no/2017/vidar-kleppe-om-sine-advarsler-mot-muslimsk-innvandring-jeg-fikk-rett/>.

DESCRIPTION	
	<p>Selvstendighetspartiet (ShP) (or ‘Independence Party’) was founded in 2015 by Ellen Due Brynjulfsen, an activist from SIAN. Inspired by Alternative für Deutschland and borrowing most of its programme from the radical right populist party, ShP also aligns with more mainstream parties in the Scandinavian party systems, including the Norwegian Green Party. In 2019, ShP gained 0.2% (573 votes) in the local regional elections in Oslo and Akershus. Its main concerns are demographic ‘replacement’ and stopping immigration. Brynjulfsen has also spoken at Norwegian-based demonstrations against the UN Migration pact and defended the European Identitarian movement in the online newspaper, Resett.⁹³</p>
SELVSTENDIGHETSPARTIET	
FOUNDER Ellen Due Brynjulfsen	
LEADER Oliver Stian Seivaag Hugaas	
FOLLOWERS 1,833 (<i>Facebook</i>) ⁹²	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	
IDEOLOGY	
Ethno-Nationalism	
Anti-Immigration	
Anti-Globalist Sentiments	
NARRATIVE EXAMPLES	
	<p>Ethno-Nationalism: “This doesn’t look good if you are trying to sell the lie about successful multiculturalism and contact between Norwegian and Islamic (sic) culture.”</p> <p>– <i>Selvstendighetspartiet founder, Ellen Due Brynjulfsen, quoted in a SIAN pamphlet.</i>⁹⁴</p> <p>Anti-Immigration: “It is strange that as soon as you want to stop immigration to Europe and are against the EU you are labelled a right-wing extremist.”</p> <p>– <i>Selvstendighetspartiet founder, EllenDue Brynjulfsen, writing on ShP’s webpage.</i>⁹⁵</p> <p>Anti-Globalist Sentiments: “The elites’ globalisation project meets a lot of resistance in the population; if a new party is able to get 15% of the votes then we have to look for the big words to describe that.”</p> <p>– <i>Selvstendighetspartiet founder, Ellen Due Brynjulfsen, writing on Selvstendighetspartiet’s homepage.</i>⁹⁶</p>

DESCRIPTION	
	<p>For Generasjon Identitet, the Norwegian branch of the international Identitarian Movement was very shortlived as a national group and only lasted for five years 2013-2018. A Facebook page was created in January 2019. The international movement is still a key source of ‘alternative’ news among radical right groups in Norway who look for a counterweight to mainstream media, which they say is dominated by the ‘leftist propaganda.’ For Generasjon Identitet aligned themselves with the Identitarian movement in Europe (hence the Lambda in its logo), it reported mainly on immigration, Islam, and asylum seekers, linking the latter to criminal activity in Norway. The ideas have been taken up by others, for example, Hans Jørgen Lysglimt Johansen, who set up the Alliansen party in late 2016. Inspired by Donald Trump’s 2016 victory in the USA, Johansen uses a strategy of provocation and confrontation.⁹⁸ More extreme than other parties within the Norwegian political system, they are prepared to use violence in a potential civil war. Key concerns are the group’s links to Scandza and involvement with the European Identitarian movement, and its deletionist rhetoric on immigration.⁹⁹</p>
FOR GENERASJON IDENTITET ⁹⁷	
FOUNDER Unknown	
FOLLOWERS 18 (<i>Facebook</i>)	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	
IDEOLOGY	
Ethno-Nationalism	
Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory	
Identitarianism	
Alt-Right	
NARRATIVE EXAMPLES	
	<p>Ethno-Nationalism: “We believe in ethnic diversity and that’s why we think multiculturalism is a particularly bad idea. We imagine a world where different people can live separately, in peace.”</p> <p>– <i>Identitarbevegelsen cited in Utrop.</i>¹⁰⁰</p> <p>Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory: “We wish to preserve the people of Europe and promote their cultures and to stop Islamisation and mass immigration.”</p> <p>– <i>An excerpt from Identitarbevegelsen’s Facebook page.</i>¹⁰¹</p> <p>Identitarianism: “We imagine a world where separate peoples can rule for themselves and live in peace with each other.”</p> <p>– <i>Identitarbevegelsen cited in Filter X.</i>¹⁰²</p> <p>Alt-Right: “Today we see the start of an escalation of terror from the left, a communist revolution they have worked towards for decades.”</p> <p>– <i>Identitarbevegelsen article in Resett.no.</i>¹⁰³</p>

⁹² These figures were correct at the time of writing in July 2020.

⁹³ Due Brynjulfsen, E., ‘Er kritikk av EU og innvandringspolitikk høyreekstremt?’, Selvstendighetspartiet website, 11 May 2019, online at: <https://selvstendighetspartiet.no/artikler/2019/5/11/er-kritikk-av-eu-og-innvandringspolitikk-hoyreekstremit>.

⁹⁴ Translated from Norwegian. Thorsen, L., ‘Shariapoliti i Ullahsaker’, Stop Islamisation of Norway website, 26 August 2019, online at: <https://www.sian.no/artikkel/shariapoliti-i-ullahsaker>.

⁹⁵ Due Brynjulfsen, E., Op Cit., 11 May 2019.

⁹⁶ Author’s translation from Norwegian. Due Brynjulfsen is referring to ‘Forum voor Democratie’. ‘Er kritikk av EU og innvandringspolitikk høyreekstremt?’, Selvstendighetspartiet website, 11 May 2019, online at: <https://selvstendighetspartiet.no/artikler/2019/5/11/er-kritikk-av-eu-og-innvandringspolitikk-hoyreekstremit>

⁹⁷ Frie Ord was an internet based group that aimed to work to promote “freedom of speech” but folded after only a couple of years due to lack of capacity. ‘Frieord kaster inn håndkleet- arbeidsbyrden ble for stor’, *Frieord*, 20 October 2018, online at: www.frietskamp.net/frieord-kaster-inn-handkleet-arbeidsbyrden-ble-for-stor/.

⁹⁸ Ravndal, J., ‘Ekstremismeforsker: De vil endre hvordan folk tenker. Identitarbevegelsen kombinerer en intellektuell appell med «stiligg» gateaktivisme, sier forsker’, 21 January 2019, online at: www.vl.no/nyhet/ekstremismeforsker-de-vil-endre-hvordan-folk-tenker-1.1264734.

⁹⁹ Vestheim, T.M. F., ‘Ytre høyres nye, hippe ansikt’, 10 August 2017, online at: www.dagsavisen.no/nyheter/verden/ytre-hoyres-nye-hippe-ansikt-1.1007493.

¹⁰⁰ Alnes Holte, E., ‘Ny bevegelse mot “blanding” av folkeslag’, 13 March 2013, online at: <https://www.utrop.no/nyheter/nytt/26708/>.

¹⁰¹ Skybakmoen, J., ‘Dette er «identitar»-lederen som fikk hjemmet sitt ransaket etter terroren i Christchurch’, 27 March 2019, online at: filterx.no/dette-er-identitar-lederen-som-fikk-hjemmet-sitt-ransaket-etter-terroren-i-christchurch/.

¹⁰² Rasmussen, T., ‘Dette er antifa’, 1 July 2020, online at: https://resett.no/2020/07/01/dette-er-antifa/?fbclid=IwAR39PB_VwVaEpgP917T3sEF85-6kL-A2Mw8XnP4bsscSzXUKgyP_jmzpv1.

¹⁰³ See Identitarbevegelsen’s Facebook page, 27 July 2019, online at: www.facebook.com/ForGenerasjonIdentitet/photos/a.344351249835891/344351189835897/?type=3&theater.

DESCRIPTION	
	<p>Alliansen was founded in 2016 by Lysglimt Johansen and is seen as a micro party. Inspired by the Identitarian movement, the ‘great replacement’ theory and concern about immigration and mixing of people and cultures, anti-semitism is central to the party’s programme. Despite being very radical and fervent in its reviews, it is, however, a small party with little support (for example, it got 0.1% in the 2017 Norwegian national elections). As noted above in the profile on Scandza Forum, Lysglimt Johansen participated at Scandza’s conference in Oslo in November 2019. Key concerns among policymakers and practitioners in Norway should be the party’s normalisation and mainstreaming of their exclusionist ideas through the mainstream media (especially during election campaigns when tiny fringe parties get a disproportionate amount of attention) and their potential to collaborate with other antisemitic groups on Norway and abroad.</p>
NARRATIVE EXAMPLES	
<p>FOUNDER Hans Jørgen Lysglimt Johansen</p> <p>LEADER Hans Jørgen Lysglimt Johansen</p> <p>FOLLOWERS 7,622 (<i>Facebook</i>), 3,008 (<i>Twitter</i>)¹⁰⁴</p> <p>MEMBERSHIP Unknown</p> <p>IDEOLOGY</p> <p>Ethno-Nationalism</p> <p>Anti-Globalist Sentiment</p> <p>Anti-Semitism</p> <p>Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory</p>	<p>Ethno-Nationalism: ‘The traitors. Those responsible for the coup, those responsible for the dissemination of the nation and the people’s interests. Those responsible for globalisation as mass immigration without the people’s control. It’s treason and the treasonous shall hang.’ - <i>Alliansen leader, Lysglimt Johansen arguing for liberal politicians and journalists to be hanged. Cited on Antirasistisk senter’s homepage.</i>¹⁰⁵</p> <p>Anti-Globalist Sentiment: ‘I’m against the European Economic Area Agreement and globalisation.’ -<i>Alliansen leader, Lysglimt Johansen, cited in Dagbladet.</i>¹⁰⁶</p> <p>Anti-Semitism: ‘If we don’t deal with the globalist Jews now, in Norway led by the Jew Ervin Kohn, the Jew lackeys in Høyre and the Jew lackeys in Fremskrittspartiet will accept the UN Migration Pact, and then it’s over.’ -<i>Alliansen leader, Lysglimt Johansen’s tweet, cited in Utrop.</i>¹⁰⁷</p> <p>Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory: ‘The Norwegian people are being replaced with people of African and Asian heritage. How do we stop the madness?’ -<i>Alliansen leader, Lysglimt Johansen, talking in an Alliansen Facebook video.</i>¹⁰⁸</p>


¹⁰⁴ These figures were correct at the time of writing in July 2020.

¹⁰⁵ My translation. Lysglimt Johansen suggested hanging the ‘traitors’ who were responsible for globalisation that had led to ‘mass’ immigration. Antirasistisk senter, 7 August 2018, for Online at: <https://antirasistisk.no/alliansen-henrette-landssvikere/>.

¹⁰⁶ Bogacz. N., ‘Alliansen lederen om det «falske Holocaust-narrativet», 03 January 2019, Utrop, online at: <https://www.utrop.no/nyheter/nytt/34417/>.

¹⁰⁷ Andersen, J.E.& Solås Svutn, S., ‘Leverte liste til lokalvalg en time før fristen gikk ut- her blir Alliansen lederen bortvist fra Oslo skole’, Dagbladet, 3 April 2019, online at: <https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/her-blir-alliansen-lederen-bortvist-fra-oslo-skole/70936001>.

¹⁰⁸ My translation. See video on Alliansen’s Facebook page online at: <https://www.facebook.com/lysglimt/videos/vb.594261571/10154719713031572/?type=2&theater>.

DESCRIPTION	
	<p>Stop Islamisation of Norway (SIAN) is part of an international network of radical right counter-Jihadists, Founded in 2010 as an alternative news source to the mainstream in Norway, based on views that the news media seen as ‘fake’ or a form of left-wing propaganda, ektenyheter.no is an anti-immigration platform linked to the Identitarian movement in Europe. The articles on their website are anonymous, signed without surnames or by the editor Onar Åm. The website provides links to the alt-right activist Tara McCarthy’s podcasts, Russia Today, Ruptly and far-right podcast ‘This is Europe’ as well as more mainstream news outlets.</p>
NARRATIVE EXAMPLES	
<p>FOUNDER Onar Åm</p> <p>FOLLOWERS 559 (<i>Facebook</i>) 104 (<i>Twitter</i>)¹⁰⁹</p> <p>MEMBERSHIP Unknown</p> <p>IDEOLOGY</p> <p>Identitarianism</p> <p>Anti-Immigration Sentiments</p>	<p>Identitarianism: ‘We would like to see a long, open debate on the question of Norwegians’ and Europeans’ identity in the twenty-first century.’ - <i>An excerpt from Ekte Nyheter’s programme.</i>¹¹⁰</p> <p>Anti-Immigration Sentiments: ‘One of these facts is that the reason behind an increase in inequality in Norway is immigration.’ - <i>An excerpt from Onar Åm on ektenyheter.no.</i>¹¹¹</p>

¹⁰⁹ These figures were noted at the time of writing in July 2020.

¹¹⁰ My translation. Ektenyheter home page, online at: <https://ektenyheter.no/index.php/2017/09/programerklaring/>.

¹¹¹ Åm, O., ‘Uærlig press gir Siv Jensen skylden’, 31 March 2017, Online at: <https://ektenyheter.no/index.php/2017/03/uærlig-presse-gir-siv-jensen-skylden/>.

SUMMARY

The above report has summarised Norway-based raical right groups. Many of the organisations described here do not exist any more, but individual actors from groups that have ceased to exist, are often still active online and on the streets in the existing groups. The overview has shown that there are diverse radical right groups, many of which are only active online but they are nevertheless influential organisations.¹¹² The narratives the various groups propagate generally centre upon ethno-nationalism, identitarianism, cultural nationalism, anti-immigration, anti-Muslim prejudice, and, at the fringes, neo-Nazism. Many of the online groups listed here overlap with the same activists moving between online and offline modes of engagement, demonstrating a largely closed social network of activists.

The groups’ narratives have also become more extreme and at the same time normalised. Radical right violence is low compared to the 1990s and 2000s, but the potential for violence is higher and (due to the fragmented nature of the scene) it is more likely to come from solo actors, as was the case with Breivik and Manshaus.

In a country report on racism in Norway, the UN (CERD) stressed their concerns over radical extremist and neo-Nazi organisations that had obtained a stronger and more visible presence in Norwegian media, as well as noting more street demonstrations than in other countries. The

UN also evinced concern about Norway failing to ban organisations that promote and incite hatred. Other reports suggest it is the NRM that occupies public space more so than before, but also SIAN, Hans Jørgen Lysglimt Johansen, and other influence-type individuals and networks with links to the Identitarian movement internationally.¹¹³

The following are the most important narratives in Norway, exhibited to a certain extent by all the groups listed above:

- 1. Anti-Immigrant Narrative:** The majority ethnicity, the ‘Nordic race,’ is threatened by non-white immigration that could lead to a ‘white genocide’ planned by liberal proponents via multiculturalism.
- 2. Anti-Islam Narrative:** Norway and the rest of Europe face an invasion by Muslims who will damage the native culture and introduce Sharia law.
- 3. Anti-Establishment Narrative:** The government is handing too much power to global companies, and organisations and are out of touch with the ‘people.’
- 4. Welfare Chauvinist Narrative:** The Norwegian welfare state cannot afford to look after immigrants, there are not enough resources for overbreeding immigrant families.

¹¹² Prangeruud, Haanshuus, B. and Juskås, A.R., ‘An analysis of the far right in Norway on social media’. *Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning* 58 (February 2017), online at: www.idunn.no/tfs/2017/02/hoeyreklikk-en-analyse-av-ytre-hoeyre-paa-sosiale-medier-i-no.

¹¹³ Editorial,FN krever at Norge forbyr rasistiske organisasjoner- forbud vil bare føre til at nazistene går under jorda’, *Dagbladet*, 4 January 2019, online at: www.dagbladet.no/kultur/forbud-vil-bare-fore-til-at-nazistene-gar-under-jorda/70620446. For example, Fjordman, who partly inspired Breivik, is still blogging. He has become a prominent public commentator. Fjordman had more influence on Breivik than the title of the manifesto as many of the chapters in the manifesto were taken more or less directly from the blog. In the case against Breivik, his lawyers were paid for by the Middle East Forum, which is a right-wing American ‘think-tank’ that also sponsored Tommy Robinson in Britain. See Brown, A. ‘The myth of Eurabia, how a far right conspiracy theory went mainstream’ 16 August 2019, online at: www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/16/the-myth-of-eurabia-how-a-far-right-conspiracy-theory-went-mainstream.

PART TWO

RADICAL RIGHT COUNTER-NARRATIVES IN NORWAY

03

TAPPING INTO ANTI-IMMIGRATION, ANTI-ISLAM, ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT, AND WELFARE CHAUVINIST NARRATIVES

The communities in the 1990s to 2000s focused on attacking immigrants and black and brown people, they organised Nazi social events and gatherings, and distributed leaflets and stickers encouraging violence. They became increasingly violent and menacing throughout the 1990s by harassing and attacking people on public transport and in the streets. It became clear that they were not going to go away through the policing and community interventions that existed at the time.

This broader situation, alongside threats to himself and to a young girl¹¹⁴ who asked for help, prompted the then PhD researcher Tore Bjørgo to set up 'Exit-Norway,' a programme to help young adults leave neo-Nazi networks. The programme was a holistic, multiagency initiative where parents played an important role, and it has since inspired several similar programmes globally.¹¹⁵ The programme was soon adopted by Sweden, Denmark, and Germany. Many countries and practitioners continue to use the strategy to develop programmes to fit local purposes and to help deradicalise people from Islamic extremism as well as from the radical right.

Constructing counter-narratives to disrupt, delegitimise, and devalue the radical right is something Norwegian governments have done through the universal welfare state, soft policing, and an integrated, holistic approach to dealing with extremists since the 1990s. The message from government coalitions from the left, centre, and the right has been similar in focusing on awareness raising and an appreciation of a multicultural, equal society and the intention to protect it. The current PM wrote on her blog that "a human being is not a representative for a whole culture [...] racism and xenophobia should not take place in our society."¹¹⁶ Political parties from the whole spectrum, NGOs, and social movements have since the 1990s organised campaigns and demonstrations to counter radical right narratives. The main focus has been on countering the anti-immigration narratives and with the biggest political parties, the Conservatives Høyre and Labour Arbeiderpartiet much in agreement regarding 'controlling immigration.' In 2016, the Norwegian government published a new strategy on hate speech and commissioned the Holocaust Centre in Oslo to conduct a project gathering new knowledge of, and efforts to prevent, hate speech in order to guide the government's work in this area.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ The young girl, Karen Winter went on to become a film director. She wrote and directed the film 'Exit', DOK Leipzig, 2018, online at: <http://cinematheque-leipzig.de/index.php?seite=Start&film=6195>.

¹¹⁵ Bjørgo, T., 'Exit neo-Nazism. Reducing recruitment and promoting disengagement from racist groups', (627) paper, 2002, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, online at: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/27380/627.pdf>.

¹¹⁶ Solberg, E., 'Nei til rasisme og fremmedfrykt', *Min Blogg*, 30 August 2007, online at: <https://erna.no/2007/08/30/nei-til-rasisme-og-fremmedfrykt/>.

¹¹⁷ Lenz, C., Lid, S., Lorentzen, G., Nustand, P., Rise, E., 'Tiltak mot hatefulle ytringer: kunnskaps og tiltaksversikt', Senter for studier av Holocaust og livssynsminoriteter, January 2018, online at: https://kriminalitetsforebygging.no/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Tiltak_mot_hatefulle_ytringer_Kunnskaps_og_tiltaksversikt.pdf.

Moreover, in 2019, the Norwegian government published a new plan of action on racism and discrimination. As a result of the terror attack on 10 August 2019 in Bærum, the government announced on 22 August 2019 that they were starting work on a new plan to prevent racism and discrimination against Muslims.¹¹⁸

Practitioners should continue to respond to radical right extremist messages above by following these guidelines:

- 1. Anti-Immigration Narrative:** i.e. Stressing the positive contribution of immigrants and people of different faiths have played in current politics and on the labour market. Immigrants in Norway have one of the highest labour market participation rates in Europe.
- 2. Anti-Islam Narrative:** i.e. Stressing the fact that Muslims or other people of faith are not extremists or trying to convert the whole of Norway to Islam. Referring to the work of imams and mosques that contribute positively to community cohesion and welfare.
- 3. Anti-Establishment Narrative:** i.e. Stressing the high level of trust in politicians in general, the democratic legitimacy of domestic institutions and the importance of political participation in influencing the system. Joining interest organisations or parties to gain agency.
- 4. Welfare Chauvinist Narrative:** i.e. Stressing the positive contribution immigrants make to Norwegian society and link that to taxation and the positive impact of high levels of education especially among second-generation immigrants. Stressing human dignity, cultural enrichment, and universal human rights.

In Norway, the radical right extremist threat has been present since the 1990s, when the holistic 'Exit-Norway' programmes were developed. There is broad support for the universal welfare state that has been at the core of programmes tackling radical right groups. The Norwegian Police Security Service had not kept a close enough eye on radicalisation post-2005, which let Breivik slip through the net. On 22 July 2011, Norwegians were reminded of that threat and the radical right was firmly put back on the agenda by the Prime Minister. His reaction to the attacks is a good example of counter-narratives and strategic com-

munication. Stoltenberg focused on the families who lost children at Utøya and reiterated that Norway was not going to give in to radical right terror and narratives. The country was going to continue being an open, inclusive, diverse, and multicultural society. Stoltenberg is still talking to victims on a regular basis, he calls them around 22 July and gets in touch at special holidays.¹¹⁹

The governmental information centre (*22. juli senteret*) was opened 22 July 2015 (see Figure 2). It hosts exhibitions and works on mediation and memory.¹²⁰ By the end of September 2015, the centre had been visited by more than 35,000 individuals and it had an overwhelming emotional impact on many, so much so that a telephone helpline was set up for visitors.¹²¹

Linked to this, the '22 July commission' was set up by the government to examine what had happened, and how to learn lessons from the attacks.¹²² Despite Stoltenberg's promises, government reports and recommendations, another attack of a similar scale could too easily have happened on 10 August 2019 when Manshaus broke into the Al-Noor mosque in Bærum and started shooting before he was stopped by two men in the mosque.¹²³

The attack in Bærum was a shock as Norwegian society had done a lot to prevent radical right terror. Counter-narrative collaboration between NGOs and the state were in place even before 2011. Because of the experience with violent gangs in the 1990s, counter-narratives aimed to disrupt, delegitimise, and devalue radical right narratives. Radicalization to violent extremism as a complex phenomenon has evolved and new strategies are being created to respond to current threats like individual online radicalisation, normalisation of microaggression and racism, and violent groups and individuals who mainly communicate using the internet and social media. For most of the counter-narrative campaigns, the main focus has been on awareness raising and anti-immigration narratives. Coinciding with the death of George Floyd and the Black Lives Matter movement in America, a big poster campaign was launched by *Antirasistisk Senter* in collaboration with advertising companies in June 2020 to highlight and combat everyday racism.

The Conservative party has increasingly criticised the left side of the political spectrum for trying to monopolise and



FIGURE 2 A Visitor at the '22. juli senteret' in Oslo, Norway¹²⁴

take ownership of anti-racism issues as they have also for many years organised campaigns against racism and xenophobia and see themselves as firmly anti-racist.¹²⁵ There is broad agreement on racism and anti-immigration counter-narratives between the two biggest parties, but many smaller parties and NGOs do not think the mainstream goes far enough to tackle everyday racism and racism in the public sector.¹²⁶

In an initiative led by the department for children & families, a 'stop hate speech campaign' was launched in February 2014. It is a network of young people with more than 50 member organisations and individuals that promote human rights and counter hate speech. It is part of the European Council's youth departments 'No to Hate Speech Movement'.¹²⁷ There is a broad spectrum of groups involved from anti-racist organisations, interest organisations for gay rights, youth with disabilities, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, European youth, and youth against the EU.¹²⁸ The focus is on countering hate speech and raising awareness of international human rights online.¹²⁹ The members counter racist narratives and comments online with 'bombing' campaigns where they counter racism online and add positive comments and share when people write something that promotes inclusion and human rights. The network organises courses on dialogue and changing attitudes, tailor-made workshops for local communities, trains advisors on everyday racism and

strives to create inclusive communities where everyone feels welcome and safe to participate.¹³⁰

The Wergeland Centre is an international centre with headquarters in Oslo and is also focusing on education. It is funded by the European Council and works on building and sustaining a culture of human rights and democracy in education in five areas built on the United Nations sustainable development goals. The centre works to implement the Council of Europe's policies in Europe and beyond and to reach the UN development goals of strengthening democratic competence, promoting inclusive and democratic learning environments, providing teaching and learning resources, building partnerships, and contribution to policy. The Wergeland Centre works with 1,300 schools across Europe.¹³¹

The Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities (HL Centre) is a national centre that focuses on research, documentation, and education. The centre houses a permanent exhibition, provides teacher training, welcomes school visits, and organises and offers meeting space for events and seminars open to the public. It was founded in 2001 and works in collaboration with the University of Oslo. Their remit is to protect religious minorities and the centre was funded as part of the post-war reparation package the Norwegian government paid to the Jewish community. The

¹¹⁸ Regjeringen.no, 'Regjeringens Handlingsplan mot rasisme og diskriminering på grunn av etnisitet og religion 2020-2023' 11 December 2019, online at: www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/589aa9f4c14540b5a5a6144aaca7b518/handlingsplan-mot-rasisme-uu-des-2019.pdf.

¹¹⁹ Jens Stoltenberg, *Desert Island Disks*, BBC Radio 4, 17 June, online at: www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m000ktrt.

¹²⁰ The 22 July Centre is open for all from 11 am to 4 pm, Thursday – Sunday, online at: <https://22julisenteret.no/information-in-english/>.

¹²¹ Henriksen, A., '35 000 har besøkt 22.juli senteret', *Aftenposten*, 2 October 2015, online at: <https://www.aftenposten.no/kultur/i/qjXE/35000-har-besokt-22-juli-senteret>.

¹²² Kolås, A., 'How critical is the event? Multicultural Norway after 22 July 2011', *Journal for the study of Race, Nation and Culture* 25/5, pp. 518-532, London, Routledge, 2017, online at: www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13504630.2016.1271740.

¹²³ Dearden, L., 'Worshipper, 65, takes down heavily armed mosque gunman before he can kill anyone', *The Independent*, 11 August 2019, online at: www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/norway-mosque-shooting-attack-latest-gunman-worshipper-man-hero-far-right-terror-a9051986.html.

¹²⁴ The photo is from 22. Julisenteret, online at: https://22julisenteret.no/om-utstillingen/_p8a0330/.

¹²⁵ Schou, I., 'Rødt og MdG har ikke monopol på antirasisme', *Viken*, 17 June 2020, online at: <https://hoyre.no/viken/aktuelt/rodt-og-mdg-har-ikke-monopol-pa-antirasisme/>.

¹²⁶ Falch Urbye, F. 'Pasienter krever etnisk norske sykepleiere. Sykepleier 'Maria' har fått nok', *FriFagbevegelse*, 20 April 2019, online at: <https://frifagbevegelse.no/forside/pasienter-krever-etnisk-norske-pleiere-sykepleier-maria-har-fatt-nok-6.158.612966.845e8c6e24>.

¹²⁷ Council of Europe, 'What is the No Hate Speech Movement', online at: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/no-hate-campaign>.

¹²⁸ See Ungdomsnettverk mot hatprat, online at: <http://www.stopphatprat.no/ungdomsnettverk-mot-hatprat/>.

¹²⁹ Stopp Hat, 'Hva er Stopp Hatprat kampanjen?', online at: <https://www.stopphatprat.no>.

¹³⁰ During the COVID-19 crisis, an open Zoom meeting on how to collaborate to combat hate speech in Norway was organised by the *Stopp Hatprat* campaign, online at: www.stopphatprat.no/apent-nettmote-9-juni-hvordan-kan-vi-bekjempe-hatprat-sammen/.

¹³¹ The European Wergeland Centre, online: <https://theewc.org>.

HL Centre has a strong voice in public debates in Norway and plays an important role in creating counter-narratives and in defending the rights of religious minorities.¹³²

The Khalifa Ihler Foundation is also a very important initiative set up by an Utøya survivor and expert in countering radicalisation into violence, Bjørn Ihler, and the award-winning Libyan peace activist and researcher, Asma Khalifa. The Foundation is a global network that works to counter radicalisation to violent extremism that can lead to terror attacks. The Khalifa Ihler Foundation is also one of the world-leading international organisations shaping policy and conversations promoting peace and human rights through projects, workshops, and events. Moreover, the foundation has developed a Hate Map where they can map radical right incidents globally.¹³³

The Directorate of Children, Youth, and Family Affairs run by the Ministry for Children and Family Affairs have advisors available on bullying, racism, honour issues, radicalisation, how to argue and stay calm, and concrete examples as to what to do to counter racism and hatred. They produce brochures and information for their networks to use. In 2002, the Directorate initiated a prize in memory of Benjamin Hermansen who was killed by neo-Nazis in 2001. The prize goes to one school that has worked particularly well to counter racism.¹³⁴

There are many grassroots organisations and campaigns that are increasingly using hashtag (“#”) internet campaigns for issues of racism and anti-Muslim prejudice, such as #muslimjævel, which came about after the journalist Kadhafi Zaman was called a “f***ing Muslim” live on TV as he reported from a demonstration organised by PEGIDA in Oslo in 2015. Another relevant grassroots campaign focusing especially on the radical right in Norway is ‘en av oss’ (one of us) inspired by the Swedish campaign #jagärhär that was less political and did not focus on countering the radical right as is the case with ‘en av oss.’ ‘En av oss’ aims to create a community and capture hatred online where they use ‘gentle activism’ and mobilise activists to provide counter-narratives to hatred online. They have had some problems with radical right activists trying to use their platform to spread hatred and encourage violence.

Two very important organisations that have worked on counter-narrative messaging and campaigns were founded by immigrants. *Antirasistisk senter* (‘the centre against racism’) and OMOD (‘the organisation against racism at work’) are high profile and have for decades demanded more proactive counter-narratives and strategies to counter racist attacks and they have a long tradition of highlighting and working to eradicate institutionalised racism and discrimination. OMOD works for social justice and plays an important role in lobbying employers, trade unions, and politicians regarding the important resource immigrants provide and on how the Norwegian economy depends on immigrant labour. By documenting immigrants’ skills and social contributions, these and other groups highlight the further role immigrants could play if politicians implement their recommendations and systematically tackle institutional discrimination and racism.¹³⁵ Deputy leader Anita Rathore and OMOD’s leader Oddvar deLeon are recognised figures in Norway’s public debates on migration policy and wider politics.¹³⁶ Most recently OMOD has complained that organisations for immigrants do not get enough funding for campaigns to inform immigrants about the Coronavirus.¹³⁷

The *Antirasistisk senter* have run several campaigns since it started as a radio station run by immigrants in 1982. They have since become an important voice in Norwegian public debates about immigration and racism, and in offering a counter-narrative in responses to the radical right. The organisation was actively challenging neo-Nazi groups in the 1990s. They have always been creative in their campaigns and to mark their 30th anniversary (in their current form) in 2008 they launched ‘I’m also Norwegian,’ which was a campaign aimed at young people and offered material and visits to schools. It used, among other things, posters with a picture of the Norwegian duo Karpe Diem wearing T-shirts saying: “one Hindu + one Muslim = Norwegian rap group? Yes ffs! Karpe Diem.”¹³⁸

Antirasistisk senter has a long history of creative and fresh campaigns like the ‘tea and tolerance’ campaign in 2010, where Muslims invited their neighbours to a cup of tea to break down barriers and encourage dialogue.¹³⁹ *Antirasistisk senter* members are active in the media and have a



FIGURE 3 A photo from ‘Ja, ja, ja – a Nordic Music Affair (2015).¹⁴⁰

voice that is heard and respected in the public debate. They launched a big counter-narrative campaign aimed at hatred and racism on 30 June 2020. The campaign is supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Culture and several advertising firms.¹⁴¹ The campaign is called #aktivmotrasimse (active against racism).¹⁴² It is a collaborative effort lead by *Antirasistisk senter* but with many other organisations from the world of media and business taking part.¹⁴³ The focus is on awareness raising of everyday racism and uses posters (see Figure 4) and tagging with the #aktivmotrasimse hashtag to spread awareness, with the posters seen around city and town centres in Norway. They use portraits of people with a quote of what has been said to them, for example, a photo of a young woman with a headscarf: “A woman on the tube told me: “The only shame we have in Norway is you.””¹⁴⁴

Despite all the work that is being done to combat racism, Lara Rashid and Irfan Mushtaq ask for more action against radical right extremism and anti-Muslim populism. They want more discussion and action against structural racism and everyday racism. Irfan Mushtaq survived the Bærum attack and Lara Rashid is a Labour party activist and a Utøya survivor, who lost her sister at Utøya. Rashid says the shooter in Bærum, Philip Manshaus, was inspired by someone who was inspired by the Utøya terrorist and asks “who will be the next, inspired by Manshaus?” She is concerned



FIGURE 4 A poster fom Antirasistisk Senter’s (2020) #aktivmotrasimse (active against racism) counter-narrative campaign¹⁴⁵

¹³² See HL Centre homepage online at: <https://www.hlsenteret.no/om/>.
¹³³ See the Khalifa Ihler homepage online at: <https://www.khalifaehler.org/about-1>.
¹³⁴ Budfir.no, ‘16 år med Benjaminpris. Forebyggende arbeid mot diskriminering og rasisme i skolen’, Nettbiblioteket, 2019, online at: <https://budfir.no/Bibliotek/Dokumenter/?docId=BUF00004818>.
¹³⁵ See OMOD’s homepage, online at: <https://www.omod.no>.
¹³⁶ Borgersrud, A., ‘Koronafast antirasist’, *Dagsavisen*, 7 June 2020, online at: www.dagsavisen.no/nyheter/navn-i-nyhetene/koronafast-antirasist-1.1725359.
¹³⁷ Johansen, J.M., ‘Innvandrerorganisasjoner får ikke penger til spredning av korona informasjon’, 7 April 2020, online at: <https://resett.no/2020/04/07/innvandrerorganisasjoner-far-ikke-penger-til-spredning-av-korona-informasjon/>.
¹³⁸ See information about the campaign ‘Jeg er også norsk’, online at: http://www.jegernorsk.no/om_kampanjen.htm.
¹³⁹ See the annual report ‘Antirasistisk senter, årsrapport 2011’, online at: https://antirasistisk.no/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/antirasistisk_senter_arsrapport_2011.pdf.

¹⁴⁰ See ‘Ja Ja ja a Nordic Music Affair’, online , see: <https://jaajamusic.com/2016/09/karpe-diem-gunerijs-trenda-nordic-chart-norway/>.
¹⁴¹ Andersen J., ‘Kulturministeren med i kampanje mot rasisme’, Kampanje, 30 June 2020, online at: <https://kampanje.com/reklame/2020/06/reklamedugnad-mot-rasisme/>.
¹⁴² See ‘Reklamedugnad mot rasisme’, Kreativt Forum, 1 July 2020, online at: <https://www.kreativtforum.no/arbeider/reklamedugnad-mot-rasisme>.
¹⁴³ See information about the launch of the campaign at the Antirasistisk Senter, *Kampanjelansering*, Antirasistisk dugnad, 30 June 2020, online at: <https://antirasistisk.no/kampanjelansering-antirasistisk-dugnad/>.
¹⁴⁴ See more information about the campaign on twitter #aktivmotrasimse.
¹⁴⁵ Photo from the #aktivmotrasimse campaign. See twitter Online at: <https://twitter.com/hashtag/aktivmotrasimse?lang=en>.

about what passes in the public debate in the name of freedom of speech and the normalisation of anti-immigrant rhetoric and the racist language in comments on the internet, and that intelligent people are defending it. After the Bærum attack, she grew fearful, admitting that said she used to be frightened of dark men with beards on the bus, now she is scared of white men hanging around mosques. Mushtaq, who is a board member at the al-Noor mosque in Bærum suggests more work and focus on inclusion is needed in order to prevent people from seeking the company of the radical right extremists and to stem increasing polarisation and hatred. Mushtaq also regrets that the government did not consult Muslim organisations in their action plan of 2019.

Away from the radar of the police and the security service, Facebook groups and individuals had become increasingly active and radical. In 2020 the security service upgraded their emergency response in relation to extreme radical right violence and said: “the risk of radical right violence is seen to be as high a risk of terror attacks as from extreme Islamists. The last year the extreme rad-

ical right has become more transboundary in terms of ideology and networking. Radical right extremist activists are increasingly prepared to use violence to reach their goal.”¹⁴⁶ Manshaus’s attack in Bærum was a stark reminder that it is time to revisit the holistic approach to extremism and the ‘Exit-Norway’ programmes of the 1990s. The strategy was built on the existing criminal justice system and collaboration between the state and charitable projects. It aimed to provide a pathway forward for countering violent extremism approaches in Norway and Scandinavia. The Exit programme was hailed as a success in the late 1990s and early 2000s, most notably in Sweden that had a much stronger presence of grown-up radical right activists than in Norway where the activists were often very young teenagers. In Sweden, the intervention led to as many as 125 neo-Nazis leaving the organisation and only a few returning. The programme was led by a de-radicalised former Nazis who coached individuals to leave the organisations.¹⁴⁷ For the future, funding and decentralisation of the police could cause problems with police reform in 2019 leading to many local police stations closing down.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This report has tracked radical right extremist narratives and counter-narratives in Norway at a time when many radical right movements have either disappeared or moved online with the exception of a couple that are more active on the street.

There is much to learn from Norwegian approaches to crime, with its soft policing and where the welfare state and criminal-justice system focus on rehabilitation rather than punishment as a deterrent. Counter-narratives and campaigns are more likely to make an impact in countries with criminal-justice systems that focus on rehabilitation and where practitioners are willing to listen and to believe that people can change. Norway led the way early in de-radicalisation of racist youth in the 1990s. Intervention through the ‘Exit-Norway’ programme was a programmatic, holistic approach put together by the government, NGOs, and academics. Civil society and citizens’ engagement and mass demonstrations against racism have also played an important role in Norwegian society that in conjunction with the organisations discussed here have made a positive difference. Exit-Norway has had a very important function in Norway and internationally with counter violence extremism programmes. The work is carried out in collaboration with the police, social services and local municipalities.

While there is broad consensus in Norway about the holistic approach, there is also a cross-political agreement on prevention and understanding ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors that

can influence people when it comes to exiting groups.¹⁴⁸ Creating counter narratives to the radical right and prevention of radicalisation needs to have a high priority in society so local knowledge, confidence, and trust in those delivering such programmes are crucial ingredients.

In response to the growth in solo terror attacks, threats, and the challenges they bring, practitioners could revisit deradicalisation strategies and programmes dating back to the early ‘Exit’ programmes in Norway and Sweden. The programmes pioneered rehabilitation and resocialisation of extremists in the 1990s and can be adapted to local conditions.¹⁴⁹ Small police units need central roles in ‘Exit programmes’ and counter-narrative strategies. Building relationships and facilitating dialogues between practitioners, the police, and extremists or people at risk of radicalisation are to be recommended.

The government, schools, and international organisations like the Khalifa Ihler Foundation, The Wergeland Centre, and The Holocaust Centre have an international scope and contribute with counter-narratives to the radical right. National organisations that focus on education, the grassroots, human rights, democracy promotion, and integration like *Antirasistiske Senter* and OMOD, have also played important roles in influencing opinion. They have also contributed to positive narratives about immigrants and immigration regarding rights to work and the right not to be exposed to everyday racism.

¹⁴⁶ Klungtveit, H.S., *Nynazister blant oss- på innsiden av den nye høyreekstremismen*. Kagge, Oslo, 2020, p. 8.

¹⁴⁷ Daugherty, E. C., ‘Deradicalisation and Disengagement: Exit Programmes in Norway and Sweden and Addressing Neo-Nazi Extremism’, *Journal For Deradicalisation* 21 (Winter 2019/2020).

¹⁴⁸ Bjørge, T. *Root causes of terrorism. Myths, reality and ways forward*. London: Routledge, 2005.

¹⁴⁹ Daugherty, C. E., ‘Deradicalization and disengagement: exit Norway and Sweden and addressing neo- Nazi extremism’, *Journal for Deradicalisation* No. 21 2019, online at: <https://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/287>.

Initiatives like these from credible voices need to be encouraged. Focus on analysing and targeting people directly who engage with extremist content is also an important strategy to prevent distribution of radical right extremist messages in the first place. Organisations that analyse and target individuals should be proactive in engaging with grassroots and in preventing those who promote radical right extremism online and distribute extremist propaganda. Such an approach could prevent radical right narratives becoming normalised and impacting on public conversations on- and offline.

A strong civil society and governments that allow counter-demonstrations build a good foundation and prevents recruitment to the radical right. For practitioners and anti racist movements it is important that they try and influence counter demonstrations and counter narrative campaigns to be peaceful to prevent sympathy for the radical right. This could prevent counter attacks and legitimisation of radical right violence as the radical right claims to be fighting enemies on the political left as well as an international struggle to stop a Muslim 'invasion.' Counter-narratives work best when they can delegitimise the simple and conspiratorial

elements of radical right extremist narratives. In the summer of 2020 SIAN's leader was attacked and injured and received much sympathy and support in the media and allegedly hundreds of new members. Similar confrontations can become trigger events that can escalate the violence in radical right groups. The groups listed in this report do not encourage violence unless they are provoked and attacked first. Non argumentative approaches and campaigns that provide alternative narratives to grievances and information about individuals and immigrants' positive contribution to society can divert individuals away from propaganda spread by extremists .

On the whole, counter-narrative campaigns and collaboration between the political system, education, and civil society organisations in Norway has had a positive effect. Partly as a result, it should be stressed in closing that Norway is comparatively tolerant when it comes to ethnic minorities. The programmes discussed here in connection with other initiatives and research make a difference, but there is still room for improvement in terms of collaboration across all the existing initiatives and agreement on how to produce counter-narratives.

