



BRINGING BACK THE GOLDEN AGE:

HUNGARIAN RADICAL RIGHT NARRATIVES AND COUNTER-
NARRATIVES IN LIGHT OF HISTORICAL REVISIONISM



The *CARR-Hedayah Radical Right Counter Narratives Project* is a year-long project between CARR and Hedayah that is funded by the EU STRIVE programme. It is designed to create one of the first comprehensive online toolkits for practitioners and civil society engaged in radical right extremist counter-narrative campaigns. It uses online research to map narratives in nine countries and regions (Australia, Canada, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States), proposes counter-narratives for these countries and regions, and advises on how to conduct such campaigns in an effective manner. This country report is one of such outputs.

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The views expressed in this practical report are the opinions of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Hedayah, the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right or the European Union.



INTRODUCTION

01

June 4, 2020, was not an ordinary day for Hungary. Amid the ongoing Coronavirus pandemic, nationalist Hungarians mourned the hundredth anniversary of the Trianon Treaty, a day they consider a ‘national tragedy.’ The Trianon Treaty led to the dismantling of the Kingdom of Hungary, losing more than half of its pre-war territory to newly-formed Hungary, as well as Austria, Czechoslovakia, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia), and the Kingdom of Romania. This event, seared deeply into Hungarian collective memory, serves as a potent mobiliser of nationalist sentiments, stirring up feelings of injustice and victimhood at the hands of the ‘international community.’ Even though the Hungarian radical right has always championed such narratives, quite often enmeshed with anti-semitism and contempt towards various representatives of national ‘outsiders’ (e.g. oligarchs, Westerners, Roma, migrants, foreigners), the Hungarian case of historical revisionism is fast becoming the official discourse of the ruling right-wing populist¹ party, known as Fidesz.

The ideological differences between right-wing populism and radical right extremism in Hungary are nuanced and blurry. Yet these differences have, for the most part, not influenced the electoral appeal and overall popularity of the Hungarian radical right. Unlike other European countries, the Hungarian radical right has been effectively mainstreamed ever since the early 2000s (if not 1998, when *Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja* (MIÉP) entered Parliament). With an emphasis on authoritarianism, these organisations have relied upon a well-developed network of local representatives and partnerships for their successes. In the 2018 national elections, the radical right *Jobbik* party was the strongest opposition party (with almost 18% of the electoral vote), losing only to the right-wing populist Fidesz party (securing 9% of the votes). With two-thirds of the electorate voting for radical right or right-wing populist parties, it is difficult to argue that these actors exist at Hungary’s political fringe, despite their often violent activism. On the other hand, a wide array of ex-

tra-parliamentary nationalist groups in Hungary operating independently or in collaboration with these parties have failed to attract consistent support over the years. This has led to frequent transformations and changes in the movements, yet the foundational narratives of the Hungarian radical right have remained largely steady.

These narratives resemble those of the radical right in the surrounding countries – in particular, those of the Visegrád Four region (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) but also of other Eastern European countries (Serbia, Croatia, Romania, and Montenegro) – yet bear their own, distinctive contextual features. First, the Hungarian radical right predominantly rallies around historical revisionism, in particular the rejection of the aforementioned Trianon Treaty for the cessation of the (Austro-)Hungarian Kingdom. Second, there is profound exceptionalism and ‘otherness’ that has heavily informed a sense of national pride, due to some degree to linguistic dissimilarities from surrounding countries. This all ultimately distills seemingly multifarious pathologies, such as anti-Roma sentiments, anti-semitism, and xenophobia, into a single melting pot. Third, such positions underpin a discursive good/evil distinction (or Manicheanism); from opposition to socialism in the light of the experiences of Warsaw Pact communism (in particular the 1956 revolution) to recent staunch anti-EU and anti-migration positions. Finally, the narratives distort and reinterpret political history so that national conservatism appears to be the most prominent political ideology in Hungary since the 1848 revolution.

Given the outcome of the 2018 national elections and the overall popularity radical right extremist and right-wing populist actors enjoy in Hungary, the viability of counter-narratives may be questioned. In looking at the attempts in this space, however, this report identifies a range of possible developments, albeit ones continuously shadowed by current political polarisation and the illiberal authoritarianism of the Fidesz government.

¹ While the differences may be blurred in practice, there is a somewhat clear conceptual demarcation between the ‘radical right’, ‘extreme right’, and ‘right-wing populism’ ideologies. All three accentuate a Manichean binary distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, rest on the exclusionary definitions of ‘the people’, value authoritarian principles of leadership, and disparage liberal democracy. However, the role of ethno-nationalism is more prominent in the extreme and the radical right, rather than in right-wing populism. The radical right and right-wing populism are primarily anti-liberal, whereas the extreme right is staunchly anti-democratic, calling for the overturn of the democratic system. Hungary and Poland offer adequate examples of these conceptual nuances via ruling right-wing populist parties such as Fidesz (Hungary) and Law and Justice – PiS (Poland). The rightist opposition to these parties belongs to the radical and extreme-right strands (Jobbik, Our Homeland in Hungary, or Ruch Narodowy-Konfederacja in Poland).

PART ONE RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS AND NARRATIVES IN HUNGARY

HISTORICAL REVISIONIST, NATIVIST, ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT, & CHRISTIANIST ETHNO-NATIONALIST NARRATIVES

Despite their turbulent circumstances, radical right groups and narratives in Hungary are highly influential in domestic politics, but also the international radical right landscape. They are able to achieve this through the activism of individual radical right groups as well as through hijacking established narratives from the right-wing populist parties, including those currently in Hungary's ruling government. Some of these narratives are derived from profound his-

torical resentment rooted in the signature of the Trianon Treaty a century ago, as well as the ethnonationalist understanding of the nation and national identity. To understand their impact, as well as the ways in which they are voiced by particular radical right groups, this section will first outline a typology of 11 radical right groups operating in Hungary, as well as their narrative examples, before identifying a set of shared, overarching narrative themes.




FIGURE 1 A matrix of radical right groups based on the level of violence and extremity in their narratives
(Horizontal Axis: Mainstreamness of Narratives²; Vertical Axis: Logic of Violence within Narratives³)

² For the purpose of this report, ‘mainstreamness’ can be measured by the adoption of moderate narratives (usually involving a broad issue agenda, anti-establishment populism and electoralism) compared to clearly extreme, esoteric positions and modus operandi (e.g. street activism and terrorism) taken by fringe groups (De Lange, Akkerman and Rooduijn 2016).

³ For the purposes of this report, a group is classified as violent if there is evidence of documented, direct acts of violence against a specific group or target. Here, ‘violence’ is measured as part of the narrative logics within a group and/or its mode of activism. Violence includes acts of vandalism, inciting violence, and military training.

Table 1: Overview of Hungarian Radical Right Extremist Narratives

EXTREMIST NARRATIVE	DEFINITION	EXAMPLE
Anti-Immigration Activism	‘Anti-Immigration Activism’ is characterised as views against open immigration policies based on their supposed threat to domestic culture and national identity. In particular, it might involve advocacy for voluntary or even compulsory repatriation of non-native citizens.	“Jobbik was the only one to protect Hungary and reminded the media that it was Jobbik who suggested setting up the border fence, forced the government to stop the residency bond business and Jobbik was the party to call public attention to the clandestine settlement of migrants.” (Jobbik) ⁴
Anti-Muslim Populism	‘Anti-Muslim Populism’ is characterised as a fusion of anti-Muslim hostility and populist forms of nationalism, including tropes relating to ‘Islamisation’ and prejudicial depictions of Islam.	“There is a double morality in Islam, which means that different rules apply to Muslims and non-Muslims. There is no room for criticism in Islam, as it overwrites all previous religious sentiments, and in that sense is not a tolerant idea.” (Nikoletta Incze, “Islam expert” frequently providing commentary for the Hungarian (pro-Fidesz) media) ⁵
Anti-Roma Activism	‘Anti-Roma Activism’ is characterised as public expressions of hatred or xenophobia towards Roma or Sinti minority communities.	“The emerging number of ghettos because of the unattended gypsy issues is a serious problem also in Slovakia and Romania (in the latter it is beginning to paralyze the function of the state). However, the gypsy crimes are not unknown in Ukraine, Serbia, and Croatia...” (HVM) ⁶
Authoritarianism	‘Authoritarianism’ is characterised as a tendency towards a central government with an anti-democratic figure representing the government.	“HVM is the only organisation that is convincingly anti-democratic in both its internal structure and its socio-political vision. Our community is built on authoritarianism and merit.” (HVM) ⁷
Chauvinism	‘Chauvinism’ is characterised as public forms of aggressive expression of superiority and dominance of a group, often in connection with ideas of virility and racial purity.	“Women love winners, and now that cultural Marxist public education in the West has mentally castrated white men and Hollywood, controlling media who advertise Negroes as Wakanda superheroes...” (Betyársereg) ⁸

⁴ See Jobbik, ‘Viktor Orban is unable to protect Hungary, let alone Europe’, online at: www.jobbik.com/viktor_orban_is_unable_to_protect_hungary_let_alone_europe (all websites last accessed 30 October 2020).

⁵ MTI, ‘The failure of Islamic Integration’, *Demokrata.Hu*, 4 January 2018, online at: <https://demokrata.hu/vilag/az-islam-integracio-kudarca-103334/>.

⁶ Barcsa-Turner, G., ‘Thoughts of a warrior about the tragedy of Trianon: Peace can only be reached by traditionalism’, HVM, online at: www.hvim.hu/post/thoughts-of-a-warrior-about-the-tragedy-of-trianon-peace-can-only-be-reached-by-traditionalism.

⁷ HVM, ‘About the movement’, online at: www.hvim.hu/a-mozgalomrol.

⁸ István, G., ‘Betyársereg. Antidogma: Kulturális színesítés és szexuális versengés [Antidogma: cultural colouring and the sexual competition]’, Betyársereg.Hu, online at: <http://betyarsereg.hu/antidogma-kulturalis-szinesites-es-szexualis-versenges/>.

Christianism	‘Christianism’ is characterised as a civilisational and exclusive interpretation of Christianity that views the Christian religion as a defining feature of a given ‘nation’ and/ or an allegedly homogenous ‘western civilisation.’	“Hungary was the country of the southern flank protecting Christian Europe.” (Our Homeland) ⁹
Decadence	‘Decadence’ (or ‘degeneration’) is characterised as perceived cultural and spiritual deterioration of a nation or society; in Oswald Spengler’s view, it unambiguously points toward modernity as a final, “Faustian” stage of Western Civilisation. ¹⁰	“We are declaring war on the extreme-liberal ideal of the far-left French student uprisings of 1968, which have ultimately shaped political discourse in Hungary to this day, and which have led Europe and the entire Western world to economic, cultural, and demographic decline.” (Generation Identity Hungary) ¹¹
Ethno-Nationalism	‘Ethno-Nationalism’ is characterised as the identification with a particular nation and an allegedly homogenous ethnic in-group.	“The Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin, which are fragmented because of Trianon but still belonging together to this day, are a part of the same nation, and all Hungarians living anywhere in the world are our compatriots.” (Our Homeland) ¹²
Ethnopluralism	‘Ethnopluralism’ is characterised as a right-wing counter-theory to multiculturalism, stressing forms of ‘cultural differentialism,’ ¹³ such as the right to live in separate and bordered ethnic and cultural regions. It is synonymous with <i>Identitarianism</i> and owes much to the French ‘New Right,’ or <i>Nouvelle Droite</i> .	“We want Hungarian culture in Hungary and European culture in Europe. Patriotism and the love of our nation is not a sin, it should not be called by various swear words, e.g. being criminalised as racism and fascism, perceived as a sin. In our view, national cohesion is indeed a virtue. We reject hatred among the peoples of Europe, chauvinism, our conviction that we must confront together the international forces that are constantly at war with the preservation, nurturing, and living of our identity.” (Generation Identity Hungary) ¹⁴

⁹ Our Homeland, ‘Founding Declaration’, online at: <https://mihazank.hu/alapito-nyilatkozat/>.
¹⁰ Spengler, O., ‘The Decline of the West, v. 1: Form and Actuality’, 1918, online at: <https://archive.org/details/declineofwest01spenuoft/page/n6>.
¹¹ Generation Identity Hungary, Homepage, online at www.generacio.eu/.
¹² Our Homeland, ‘Founding Declaration’, online at: <https://mihazank.hu/alapito-nyilatkozat/>.
¹³ Spektorowski, A., ‘The New Right: Ethno-regionalism, ethno-pluralism and the emergence of a neo-fascist “Third Way”’, *Journal of Political Ideologies* 8/1 (2003), pp. 111-130.
¹⁴ My translation. Generation Identity Hungary Homepage, online at: <https://www.generacio.eu/>.

Historical Revisionism	‘Historical Revisionism’ is characterised as an ideological reinterpretation of the past. ¹⁵	“We want a united nation independent of the Trianon borders, therefore, we do not take part in the often purely self-serving debates political parties of the torn Hungarians, we do not want to help the division, but the cooperation. We want to create a strong, prosperous, exemplary homeland, and a united nation to be followed by other countries.” (Our Homeland Movement) ¹⁶
Hungarism	‘Hungarism’ is defined as a fascist imaginary entailing a great(er) Hungarian state. Coined by the Hungarian fascist leader Ferenc Szálasi, ‘Hungarism’ refers to the ethnic and racial purity embodied in the concept of ‘social nationalism.’	“The task of today's and real Hungarism is not to rehabilitate Ferenc Szálasi, but to create a modern framework for Hungarism. To whom it is a sacrilege, I commend the following thought of Szálasi: "If I fall in this battle, run over me and take the flag to victory." (Mihály Öry) ¹⁷
Manicheanism	‘Manicheanism’ is characterised as assigning binary moral categories of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ but taking on aspects of an eschatological battle of good against evil.	“To this end, we are organising the Hungarian national resistance, which confronts the world and at the same time the forces that are poisoning Hungary and their past and present dark activities.” (HVM) ¹⁸
Monarchism	‘Monarchism’ is characterised as advocacy for a queen or king as the head of state, albeit with many differences between types of rule (from liberal democratic to totalitarian).	“We do not accept the causes of the destructive processes that have taken place during the decline of history. We are fighting the consequences of the overthrow of the French Revolution, the proclamation of the republics, the destruction of the kingdoms.” (HVM) ¹⁹
Palingenesis	‘Palingenesis’ ²⁰ refers to the ideological conception of the rebirth, epitomised in calls for a return to an imagined ‘golden age.’	“The Sixty-Four County Youth Movement (HVM) has been struggling since 2001 with a history-shaping intent to restore the traditional, bright world order.” (HVM) ²¹

¹⁵ Cattini, G., ‘Historical revisionism: The reinterpretation of history in contemporary political debate’, *Transfer*, 2011, online at: https://iull.cat/IMAGES_175/transfer06-essa03.pdf.
¹⁶ Our Homeland, ‘Founding Declaration’, online at: <https://mihazank.hu/alapito-nyilatkozat/>.
¹⁷ Mandiner, ‘Megfontolások a Jobbik ideológiai alapvetéséhez [Considerations for the ideological base of Jobbik]’, 26 February 2012, online at: https://mandiner.hu/cikk/20120226_ory_mihaly_megfontolasok_a_jobbik_ideologiai_alapvetesehez.
¹⁸ HVM, ‘About the Movement’, online at: <https://www.hvim.hu/a-mozgalomrol>.
¹⁹ Ibid.
²⁰ Griffin, R., *The Nature of Fascism*, (Pinter, London: 1991).
²¹ HVM, ‘About the Movement’, online at: www.hvim.hu/a-mozgalomrol.

Radical Right Ecologism	‘Radical Right Ecologism’ is defined as the affinity towards the natural environment based on ‘rootedness’ in a particular geographical area. In radical right ecologism, species are perceived as ‘domestic’ or ‘foreign’ to the national ecosystem. ²²	“The ancient pre-Christian Hungarian religion and our people were close to nature. Just think about sacrifices and prayers next to fountains or high peaks... This traditional kind of life is more familiar for us, rather than the strange and over-urbanised, anti-rural life.” (HVIM) ²³
Turanism	‘Turanism’ is defined as an ethno-nationalist movement based on the alleged ethnic and racial homogeneity of Ural-Altaic peoples (Hungarians, Finns, Turks, Mongols, and others).	“Turanism can help create a powerful alternative to the decadent and weakening West.” (Gábor Vona, former head of Jobbik) ²⁴
White Supremacism	‘White Supremacism’ is characterised as a belief in white dominance over people of other ethnic backgrounds. It is often connected to concerns about ‘white replacement’ or belief in ‘White Genocide’ conspiracy theories.	“Black on white crime has always been a problem in the US, but now there is a deliberate trend that politicians and prosecutors drastically retaliate against even the most innocent self-defence attempts by whites while violent black criminals are allowed to operate, in order to reduce social tensions. According to the new norm of institutionalised anti-white racism, any black-and-white controversy or conflict, regardless of the circumstances, automatically means that blacks can expect particularly lenient treatment from the police and judiciary while the whites are facing draconian austerity.” ²⁵ István Gazdag (reposted by Betyársereg)
Vigilantism	‘Vigilantism’ is characterised as the law enforcement undertaken without legal authority, entailing threats of actual or real physical attacks against an individual or people group (in the present context, based upon their racial or religious appearance).	‘Our main goal is to resurrect the faith and pride of the Hungarian nation, which has been tormented many times throughout history, and to boost up the warrior mentality and fighting spirit of the Hungarian youth in the Carpathian Basin.’ (HVIM) ²⁶

CONTEXT AND A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE HUNGARIAN RADICAL RIGHT

The historical beginnings of the Hungarian radical right can be traced back at least to 1919 and the anti-communist and proto-fascist movement concentrated around “The Szeged Idea” (*A szegedi gondolat*). Predominantly influenced by the advent of the Trianon Treaty, nationalist radicalism in interwar Hungary peaked with the fascist Arrow Cross Party (*Nyilaskeresztes Párt*) and the ideology of ‘Hungarism,’ a Hungarian variant of National Socialism. The party was founded in 1939 by Ferenc Szálasi, who was later to become the head of the fascist puppet state after the removal of Miklós Horthy, the long-term regent and de-facto leader of Hungary (1920-1944). While Szálasi’s historical status as a fascist leader is unambiguous and given that Arrow Cross troops were responsible for the death of more than 15,000 Hungarians and Jews during his 6-month rule, Horthy’s position remains contested in wider nationalist circles. Importantly, the great majority of the Hungarian radical right are not admirers of Szálasi but are instead admirers of Horthy, who they consider to be an exceptional statesman and whose collaboration with Nazi Germany was necessary for Hungary’s survival.²⁷

In socialist Hungary following the end of World War II, Arrow Cross party members and pre-war radical right organisations were purged. After the public execution of the party leadership, including Szálasi, the remaining members and supporters fled the country. Arguably, the most important event during the history of socialist Hungary was the 1956 revolution, articulated by the radical right as yet another (failed) attempt at reviving the national spirit. The legacy of 1956, moreover, was central to the post-socialist re-emergence of the Hungarian radical right. Gergely Pongrátz, the legendary commander of Budapest’s Corvin Köz (Corvin Passage), who survived the revolution and fled to the United States, returned to Hungary in 1991 to become a member of Jobbik in 2004. After his death in the same year, his brother and a fellow fighter at the Corvin Köz,

András, remained as an honorary speaker during the commemorations of the revolution held at Corvin Köz, initially organised by Jobbik (until 2018) and since by the Our Homeland Movement.²⁸

A characteristic feature of the post-socialist Hungarian radical right has remained a presence of one relatively strong political party in the Hungarian Parliament, paired with a network of fringe movements and violent, paramilitary organisations. The most dominant radical right force in the 1990s and the early 2000s was the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (Hungarian: *Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja*, MIÉP). Founded in 1993 by the Hungarian playwright István Csúrká, MIÉP was the main node in the emerging nationalist network, comprised of communist-era dissidents, journalists, and skinhead groups. MIÉP peaked in the 1998 Parliamentary elections, winning 14 seats and 5.47% of the popular vote. The following dominant radical right party was Jobbik, founded in 2004, which capitalised on a 2006 Hungarian scandal that led to mass protests against the then-Prime Minister from the Socialist MSZP, Ferenc Gyurcsány, but also the tragic murder of a high-school teacher by a group of Roma in the Hungarian town of Olaszliszka.²⁹ Péter Krekó and Attila Juhasz claim that 2006 marked a revival of the Hungarian radical right, both given its subsequent electoral successes as well as the positions of its narratives in Hungarian society.³⁰

The position of the contemporary Hungarian radical right is greatly conditioned by the ruling Fidesz and its leader, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán. As a national conservative party at the beginning of the century (and even closer to liberalism in the early 1990s), Fidesz has gradually turned to right-wing populism, winning the elections of 2010, 2014, and 2018 on a platform dedicated to a ‘revolution’ of Hungarian economy and society, later epitomised in the anti-migration war of words against Hungarian-born

²² Lubarda, B., ‘Beyond Ecofascism? Far-Right Ecologism as a Framework for Future Inquiries,’ *Environmental Values*, 29(6):713-732.

²³ My translation. Szent Korona Rádió, ‘Environmental protection is not a left-wing issue,’ HVIM, online at: <https://www.hvim.hu/post/2019/01/13/kornyezetvedelem-nem-lehet-baloldali>.

²⁴ Ghosh, P., ‘Strange Bedfellows: Hungarian Far-Right Jobbik Party Embraces Muslim Nations, Seeks ‘Eurasian’ Ideal Of Statehood,’ *IB Times*, 12 June 2013, online at: www.ibtimes.com/strange-bedfellows-hungarian-far-right-jobbik-party-embraces-muslim-nations-seeks-eurasian-ideal.

²⁵ Betyársereg, ‘Antidogma– Elszabadult dzsángók: hajtóvadászat fehérekre,’ 18 August 2020, online at: <http://betyarsereg.hu/antidogma-elszabadult-dzsangok-hajtovadaszat-feherekre/>.

²⁶ HVIM, ‘About the Movement,’ online at: www.hvim.hu/a-mozgalomrol.

²⁷ Since 2012, Horthy statues and memorials were erected in a number of Hungarian cities, including Budapest. Some of these commemorations were organised by Jobbik and attended by various paramilitary groups; see: www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-nationalism/hungarians-hail-horthy-as-recession-fans-nationalism-idUSBRE85F00520120616.

²⁸ The commemorations also present a gathering of radical right forces in the country, with speakers coming from major radical- and extreme-right organisations such as HVIM, Betyársereg, Erő és Elszántság, and the party: Our Homeland (and previously, Jobbik); see www.magyarhirlap.hu/belfold/20191024-kegyeletserto-modon-gyalazta-a-jobbik-pongrazt-gergely-emleket.

²⁹ Lajos Szőgi, a biology teacher was beaten to death by three men after causing mild injuries to a child in a road accident on October 15, 2006. The perpetrators were sentenced in 2009 to 17, 15 and 10 years in prison and were ordered to pay 46 million forints in compensation to the family of the victim. See: <https://hungarytoday.hu/family-of-teacher-killed-in-2006-lynching-set-to-receive-compensation/>.

³⁰ Krekó, P., and A. Juhász, *The Hungarian Far Right: Social Demand, Political Supply, and International Context* (Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag, 2017).




American businessman and philanthropist, George Soros. The binary moral distinctions advanced by the ruling party were originally developed in ultra-nationalist, radical right circles, and their impact has been striking. The crackdown on non-governmental organisations and academic institutions associated with Soros by the ruling Fidesz has been widely reported, particularly after Fidesz’s landslide victory in the 2018 elections.³¹ Soros was consistently targeted in these new discursive turns, but also targeted has been the EU, especially its then-Commission president, Jean-Claude Juncker, for “pushing migration plans that threaten Hungary’s security.”³²




Given such circumstances, the radical right opposition in Hungary found itself in the unfamiliar position of virtually defending its arch-enemy, Soros, against the ongoing “witch-hunt” perpetrated by Fidesz.³³ Of course, Soros’s position of alleged ‘puppet master’ (bearing a distinctive anti-semitic undertone) within an overarching discourse of the Hungarian radical right has not changed. Yet the electoral dominance of Fidesz over the last decade, partly thanks to a monopolising radical right discourse in some policy domains, has also instigated major upheaval on the


Hungarian radical right scene. The first of these major changes saw the shift of Jobbik, the main party of the Hungarian radical right since 2006, towards the centre ground, in keeping with largely familiar positions of ‘national conservatism,’ an established strand in Hungarian politics. Nevertheless, “replacing its paramilitary gear with puppies and kittens”³⁴ has not enabled Jobbik to become the ruling party, although in winning 19.06% of the popular vote in the 2018 elections it became the strongest opposition party following Fidesz’s sweeping victory.

The second major perturbation in the Hungarian radical right over the last decade occurred in the aftermath of the 2018 elections. Jobbik’s leader, Gábor Vona, stepped down as party chair, while a number of factions within the party started voicing their discontent with Jobbik’s turn to the centre. Later in 2018, this led to the formation of the Our Homeland Movement (Hungarian: *Mi Hazánk Mozgalom*), soon to become the new leader of radical right forces in the country. This marked a new phase in the history of the Hungarian radical right, which nevertheless continues to be marginalised by the ruling party, and thus unable to obtain significant electoral successes.

³¹ Reuters, ‘Ruling Fidesz party wants Soros-funded NGOs ‘swept out’ of Hungary,’ 11 January 2011 online at: www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-fidesz-soros/ruling-fidesz-party-wants-soros-funded-ngos-swept-out-of-hungary-idUSKBN14V0P2.
³² Bayer, L., ‘Hungary launches campaign targeting Jean-Claude Juncker,’ Politico.EU, 4 September 2019, online at: www.politico.eu/article/hungary-launches-campaign-targeting-jean-claude-juncker-george-soros/.
³³ Jobbik, ‘Fidesz gets a Reminder who was Funded by Georg Soros,’ online at: www.jobbik.com/fidesz_gets_a_reminder_who_was_funded_by_george_soros.
³⁴ Csaky, Z, ‘The Far-Right Hungarian Party Jobbik Is Moderating. Is That a Good Thing?,’ *Freedom House*, 4 October 2016, online at: <https://freedomhouse.org/article/far-right-hungarian-party-jobbik-moderating-good-thing>.

EXTREME RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS IN HUNGARY		
		
THE WOLVES (FARKASOK)	THE SIXTY-FOUR COUNTIES YOUTH MOVEMENT (HATVANNÉGYZ VÁRMEGYE IFJÚSÁGI MOZGALOM, HVIM)	HUNGARIAN DEFENCE MOVEMENT (MAGYAR ÖNVÉDELMI MOZGALOM)
FOUNDER Gábor Barcsa-Turner	FOUNDERS Gábor Barcsa-Turner Botond Kónyi-Kiss	FOUNDER Tibor László Attila
FOLLOWERS Not present on social media	FOLLOWERS Suspended from social networks	FOLLOWERS 6,059 (Facebook)
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	MEMBERSHIP Unknown	MEMBERSHIP Unknown
IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY
Turanism	Authoritarianism Turanism Decadence Historical Revisionism White Supremacism Palingenesis Radical Right Ecologism Monarchism Christianism	Ethno-Nationalism Vigilantism Historical Revisionism Ethnopluralism Anti-Roma Activism

		
THE NATIONAL LEGION (NEMZETI LÉGIO)	THE NEW HUNGARIAN GUARD MOVEMENT (ÚJ MAGYAR GÁRDA MOZGALOM)	LEGION OF HUNGARY (LÉGIO HUNGÁRIA)
FOUNDERS László Toroczkai, László Földemesi	FOUNDER István Mészáros	FOUNDER Béla Incze
FOLLOWERS 1,609 (Facebook)	FOLLOWERS Not present on social media	FOLLOWERS 2,800 (Facebook), 143 (Twitter), Instagram - suspended
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	MEMBERSHIP Unknown	MEMBERSHIP c. 50
IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY
White Supremacism	Vigilantism	Palingenesis
	Historical Revisionism	Ethno-nationalism
	Ethnopluralism	Decadence
		White Supremacism

	DESCRIPTION
THE WOLVES (FARKASOK)	<p>Farkasok is a paramilitary formation founded in 2011 by HVIM's co-leader, Gábor Barcsa-Turner, aiming to “awaken the Hungarian virtues.”³⁶ Rooted in Turanian mysticism and the neo-pagan tradition, the organisation hosts outdoor workouts and training using airsoft weaponry. As the Farkasok website makes clear, these activities are “to teach the basics of national defence in both playful and more serious forms, including the simulation of a military environment.” Farkasok accepts only men over age 16, who demonstrate “patriotic character” and “accept the hierarchical structure.”³⁷ Training consists of regular combat tactics and the basics of self-defence, but also tutorials in providing first aid, navigation, survivalist training, and orientation.³⁸ Farkasok emphasise that training does not entail firearms and is in full compliance with Hungarian laws. While most of the members of The Wolves are also members of HVIM, there is no record of Farkasok participating in the activities of other organisations.</p>
FOUNDER Gábor Barcsa-Turner	
FOLLOWERS Not present on social media ³⁵	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
IDEOLOGY	<p>Turanism: “The ancient knowledge characterising Turani-nomadic people can be found among traditional people, from the North American Indians to the Vikings, to our ancestors, the Scythian-Hun tribes. Identification with different animals was found in each of these traditions...”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from a HVIM post.</i>³⁹</p>
Turanism	

³⁵ This figure was current at the time of writing in September 2020.

³⁶ Farkasok, online at: <http://farkasfalka.com/szellemiseg/>.

³⁷ HVIM, 'Farkasok alapképzés indul [Wolves start basic training]', online at: www.hvim.hu/post/2019/03/13/farkasok-alapkepzes-indul.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

	<div>DESCRIPTION</div>
<div>THE SIXTY-FOUR COUNTIES YOUTH MOVEMENT</div> <div>(HATVANNÉGY VÁRMEGYE IFJÚSÁGI MOZGALOM, HVIM)</div>	<p>HVIM was founded in 2001, at the 81st anniversary of the Trianon Treaty. The founder of the movement and leader up until 2013, László Toroczka, currently leads the Our Homeland Movement and is a former member of Jobbik. The chief aim of HVIM is uniting all ethnic Hungarians into one state, implicitly advocating a return to the pre- Trianon borders of Hungary. Even its name refers to the memory of Greater Hungary and its sixty-three counties (the actual name includes also the city of Fiume-Rijeka, which was a <i>corpus separatum</i>). The organisation is openly anti-democratic, promoting the values of ‘natural’ leadership and anti-liberal doctrine, organised around “the fraternity of comrades, organised not by current interests of power but by eternal truths.”⁴¹ The movement has a radio station, <i>Szent Korona Rádió</i> (Holy Crown radio),⁴² as well as an online blog.⁴³ HVIM also organises a range of events, such as public workouts and youth camps, where they are taught survival skills, history, but also some basics of environmental protection.⁴⁴ The movement has long been a part of the network of nationalist organisations coalescing around a major party – first Jobbik, and then Our Homeland. The leaders of the movement, Gábor Barcsa-Turner, and Botond Kónyi-Kiss, frequently appear at events organised by Betyársereg and the Our Homeland Movement. Importantly, members of HVIM have also frequently been involved in violent incidents, both domestically and outside Hungary. In 2011, 15 HVIM militants armed with clubs attacked five Serbian-speaking teenagers in the town of Temerin, Serbia.⁴⁵ Likewise, in 2015, members of the Romanian chapter of the organisation were arrested for plotting a terrorist act.⁴⁶ The regional leaders of the organisation, István Beke and Zoltán Szócs, were each sentenced to 5 years in prison in 2018.⁴⁷</p>
<div>FOUNDERS</div> <div>Gábor Barcsa-Turner</div> <div>Botond Kónyi-Kiss</div>	<div>NARRATIVE EXAMPLES</div>
<div>FOLLOWERS</div> <div>Suspended from social networks⁴⁰</div>	<div>Authoritarianism:</div> <p>“The HVIM is the only organisation that is staunchly anti-democratic in both its internal structure and its socio-political vision. Our community is built on authoritarianism and merit.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from Hungarian Free Press article.</i>⁴⁸</p> <div>Palingenesis:</div> <p>“HVIM’s leader contrasted communist, liberal, scientific conceptions of history with traditional interpretations of history. From this juxtaposition, it becomes clear why it is important to remember heroes and why it is important to highlight positive examples from our past, and why moderns do not.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from a HVIM online article.</i>⁴⁹</p>
<div>MEMBERSHIP</div> <div>Unknown</div>	
<div>IDEOLOGY</div>	
<div>Authoritarianism</div>	
<div>Palingenesis</div>	

⁴⁰ This figure was current at the time of writing in September 2020.

⁴¹ My translation. HVIM, ‘About the movement,’ online at: <https://www.hvim.hu/a-mozgalomrol>.

⁴² Szent Korona Rádió., online at: <http://szentkoronaradio.com/>.

⁴³ HVIM blog, online at: <http://pest.hvim.hu/blog>.

⁴⁴ My translation. HVIM, ‘Children camp’, online at: www.hvim.hu/ifjusagkepzes.

⁴⁵ Radio Televizija Vojvodine. ‘Pretučeni srpski mladići u Temerinu’, 2011, online at: www.rtv.rs/sr_jat/hronika/pretnuci-srpski-mladici-u-temerinu-273528.html.

⁴⁶ Stoica, I., ‘Bomb attack by Hungarian extremists foiled on Romania’s National Day’, IBNA, 2015, online at <https://balkan.eu.com/bomb-attack-hungarian-extremists-foiled-romania-national-day/>.

⁴⁷ Lázár, G., ‘Hungarian American organisation supports convicted violent neo-Nazis in Romania’, *Hungarian Free Press*, 17 April 2019, online at: <https://hungarianfreepress.com/2019/04/17/hungarian-american-organisation-supports-convicted-violent-neo-nazis-in-romania>.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ HVIM, ‘Hányan csatlakoznának ma a Rongyos Gárdához? [How many would join the Ragged Guard today?]', online at: <https://www.hvim.hu/post/hanyan-csatlakoznanak-ma-a-rongyos-gardahoz>.

	<div>NARRATIVE EXAMPLES (cont'd.)</div>
<div>THE SIXTY-FOUR COUNTIES YOUTH MOVEMENT</div> <div>(HATVANNÉGY VÁRMEGYE IFJÚSÁGI MOZGALOM, HVIM)</div>	<p>Historical Revisionism and Decadence:</p> <p>“Many have taken their first steps on the path leading to the acquisition of the traditional view of being, of normality, through the transcendence of petty bourgeois, plebeian spirituality, underpinned by public education and the mass media.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from a HVIM article.</i>⁵⁰</p> <p>Radical Right Ecologism and Turanism:</p> <p>“We love our homeland, not just the people inside, but the natural environment. The Carpathian-basin (genuine Hungary), forms a geographical unity which has been the dwelling place of Hungarians from the beginning not by chance, and has become their country later. There is no nationalism without the love and protection of the environment. This should connect all the nationalists around the globe. Love of nature should be a part of our nationalism. The ancient pre-Christian Hungarian religion and our people were close to nature.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from a HVIM article.</i>⁵¹</p> <p>White Supremacism:</p> <p>“In her latest video, the county girl talks about American riots and healthy racism. We think that it is not blacks but whites that are oppressed. Any white person who stands up for his or her own identity is a racist and a Nazi. Alternatively, those who raise their voice for the rights of blacks deserve the award. We must not hate anyone other than us, but we must not allow to become oppressed! We must take pride in being white heterosexual Christians and not be humbled!”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from a HVIM blogpost.</i>⁵²</p> <p>Monarchism and Christianity:</p> <p>“The state idea of Szentistván is the unification of two traditions, the two elements of the soul, the Hungarian and the Christian. It has developed in the land that is a natural home to the Hungarian traditions brought with us from the East and which, by its very location, is the first starting point of Christian unity in this part of Europe. This idea is national and Christian, as the marriage of two ideas, two realities, two traditions in the church of the Danube Basin, without which there is no place for you – the present, past, and future Hungarian! It is the thought that fills our world of thought and dreams. This idea means the adherence to the king who created Christian Hungary to the tradition, way of life, organisation, character, content, or, as we say in modern terms, the selfishness of their people. It is due to this idea that Hungary remained Hungarian.”</p> <p>-<i>An excerpt from Holy Crown Radio.</i>⁵³</p>
<div>IDEOLOGY (cont'd.)</div>	
<div>Decadence</div>	
<div>Historical Revisionism</div>	
<div>Radical Right Ecologism</div>	
<div>Turanism</div>	
<div>White Supremacism</div>	
<div>Monarchism</div>	
<div>Christianism</div>	

⁵⁰ HVIM, ‘A modern oktatáson túl – megváltozva mentek haza a Vármegyes Ifjúsági- és Gyerektáborból [Beyond modern education – the children from the County Youth and Children's Camp]', online at: www.hvim.hu/post/a-modern-oktatason-tul-megvaltozva-mentek-haza-a-varmegyes-ifjusagi-es-gyerektaborbol.

⁵¹ HVIM, ‘Környezetvédelem nem lehet baloldali téma – üzenik a vármegyések [Environmental Protection Should not be a left-wing issue]', Holy Crown Radio, 9 January 2019, online at: <http://szentkoronaradio.com/blog/2019/01/09/kornyeztvedelem-nem-lehet-baloldali-tema-uzenik-a-varmegyések/>.

⁵² HVIM, ‘Egy vármegyes lány véleménye az egészséges rassztudatról [Opinion of a county girl on a healthy racism]', online at: www.hvim.hu/post/egy-varmegyes-lany-velemeny-a-c3%A9gyes-rassztudatr%C3%B3l.

⁵³ Holy Crown Radio, ‘gróf Teleki Pál: A szentistváni állameszme [Count Pál Teleki: The state idea of Szentistván]', 20 August 2020, online at: <http://szentkoronaradio.com/blog/2020/08/20/grof-teleki-pal-a-szentistvani-allameszme/>.

	DESCRIPTION
HUNGARIAN DEFENCE MOVEMENT (MAGYAR ÖNVÉDELMI MOZGALOM)	<p>Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom was formed in 2014 from <i>For a Better Future Hungarian Self-Defense</i> (Szebb Jövőért Magyar Önvédelem; henceforth Better Future).⁵⁵ In turn, the latter movement originated from the New Hungarian Guard, which was disbanded in 2014.⁵⁶ Both were founded and led by Tibor László Attila. The movement is officially a non-governmental organisation (NGO), defining itself as ‘a voluntary organisation established along the lines of the fight against social injustice and the protection (self-defence) of Hungarian national values and living space.’⁵⁷ The main scope of activities of the Hungarian Defence Movement is based on vigilantism, self-defence training, and ‘policing the neighbourhoods,’ mostly those with a significant population of Roma. There are records of the group intimidating Roma citizens in Edeleny, although the cases of physical violence are much rarer, as compared to the Better Future.⁵⁸ The content on MÖM website is suffused with anti-Roma content, such as posts on “Gypsy terror” in Medgyesegyháza⁵⁹ and “self-defence community building,”⁶⁰ and is also apparent on some of the sports-related activities and ‘spiritual hikes.’⁶¹ Unlike other groups coalescing around HVIM and Betyársereg, MÖM members have not appeared at Our Homeland rallies.</p>
FOUNDERS Tibor László Attila	
FOLLOWERS 6,059 (Facebook) ⁵⁴	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
IDEOLOGY	
Ethno-Nationalism	
Vigilantism	
Anti-Roma Activism	
	<p>Ethno-Nationalism: “We must stand up for each other and for our compatriots in an era when community cohesion and practical action have almost completely disappeared from the everyday life of European societies.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from Attila László’s New Year Message.</i>⁶²</p> <p>Vigilantism: “On Thursday night, patriots, locals, and police officers raided and chased drug addicts through the housing estate. The problem is now solved.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from MÖM website post.</i>⁶³</p> <p>Anti-Roma Activism: “Another domestic ghetto-story! A Hungarian family had to flee their home due to a series of attacks by gypsies who moved from Romania.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from a MÖM website post.</i>⁶⁴</p>

⁵⁴ This figure was current at the time of writing in September 2020.

⁵⁵ However, there are also sources that claim that the ‘original’ Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom was founded in 2005 by Dr. Attila Kakuk, a veterinarian. It remains unclear what the exact connection between Kakuk and László. Source: *Hungarian Spectrum*, ‘The Right is Getting Ready for October 23-Fidesz, the Black Guard, and MÖM’, 19 October 2007, online at <https://hungarian-spectrum.org/2007/10/19/the-right-is-ge/>.

⁵⁶ Holdsworth, J., & Kondor, K., ‘Understanding violence and the Hungarian far right’, In: A. Kallis, S. Zeiger, and B. Öztürk (eds.) *Violent Radicalisation and far-right extremism in Europe*, Abu Dhabi, UAE & Ankara, Turkey: Hedayah and SETA Publication, 2018.

⁵⁷ MÖM, ‘About the Movement’, online at: www.magyaronvedelmimozgalom.com/index.php?q=content/Tavaszi_hadjarat.

⁵⁸ Refworld, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. Hungary: Information on the Hungarian Self Defence Movement (Magyar Onvedelmi Mozgalom, MOM) in the Edeleny area, including when they were founded, objective and activities, relationship with the government and police, areas of operation, including operations within and around Edeleny; prejudice of authorities in Edeleny (2014-2016), online at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/57c427184.html>.

⁵⁹ MÖM, ‘Már a foci pályán is folyamatos a „románcigány terror” Medgyesegyházán,’ online at: www.magyaronvedelmimozgalom.com/index.php?q=hircink/bejegyzes/Mar_a_foci_palyan_is_folyamatos_a_%E2%80%9Eromancigany_terror%E2%80%9D_Medgyesegyhazan.


⁶⁰ MÖM, ‘A hazafias irányultságú önvédelmi közösségépítés napjainkban nem csak törvénszerű, hanem léteérdeke is a magyar társadalomnak, [Nowadays, patriotic self-defence community building is not only legal, but also in the best interest of the Hungarian society],’ online at: www.magyaronvedelmimozgalom.com/index.php?q=hircink/bejegyzes/A_hazafias_iranyultsagu_onvedelmi_kozossegepites.

⁶¹ MÖM, ‘A Jászszági MÖM teljesítménytúrázóí a Magas-Bakonyban is helyt álltak,’ online at: www.magyaronvedelmimozgalom.com/index.php?q=hircink/bejegyzes/Porva_30_A_Jaszszagi_MOM_teljesitmenyturazoi_a_Magas-Bakonyban_is_helyt_alltak.

⁶² MÖM, ‘László Attila MÖM vezető üzenete az új évre [Attila László’s New Year Message],’ online at: www.magyaronvedelmimozgalom.com/index.php?q=hircink/bejegyzes/Laszlo_Attila_MOM_vezeto_uzenete_az_uj_evre.


⁶³ MÖM, ‘Civil lakosok, hazafias szervezetek és rendőrök együtt üzték a drogosokat a Pillangó parkban!,’ online at: www.magyaronvedelmimozgalom.com/index.php?q=hircink/bejegyzes/Civil_lakosok_hazafias_szervezetek_es_rendorok_egyutt_uztek_a_drogosokat_a_Pillango_parkban_.

⁶⁴ MÖM, ‘Újabb hazai gettó sztori!! [Another Domestic Ghetto Story],’ online at: www.magyaronvedelmimozgalom.com/index.php?q=hircink/bejegyzes/Ujabb_hazai_getto_sztori_.

	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
HUNGARIAN DEFENCE MOVEMENT (MAGYAR ÖNVÉDELMI MOZGALOM)	<p>Ethnopluralism: “Comrades! Patriots! We believe that the biggest problem in Europe at the moment is immigration, which we must put an end to. If such an influx of migrants continues to flood in uncontrollably, it will mean the end of our continent. We see that a human tsunami from Africa and Asia could sweep us all away. We believe that every country has the right to decide who it wants to live with and who it doesn’t.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from a MÖM website post.</i>⁶⁵</p> <p>Historical Revisionism: “We remembered the occasion of the entry of Vitéz Nagybányai Miklós Horthy into Budapest on November 16, 1919!”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from a MÖM website post.</i>⁶⁶</p>
IDEOLOGY (cont'd.)	
Historical Revisionism	
Ethnopluralism	

⁶⁵ MÖM, ‘Magyar hazafiak szerveznek tüntetést Brüsszelben [Hungarian patriots organised a demonstration in Brussels],’ online at: www.magyaronvedelmimozgalom.com/index.php?q=hircink/bejegyzes/Magyar_hazafiak_szerveznek_tuntetest_Brusszelben.

⁶⁶ MÖM, ‘Mert bennünk él tovább Horthy Miklós szellemisége és mi vagyunk [Because the spirit of Miklós Horthy lives in us],’ online at: www.magyaronvedelmimozgalom.com/index.php?q=hircink/bejegyzes/Mert_bennunk_el_tovabb_Horthy_Miklos_szellemisege_es_mi_vagyunk.

	DESCRIPTION	
THE NATIONAL LEGION (NEMZETI LÉGIÓ)	<p>The National Legion is still another attempt at forming a paramilitary vigilantist organisation closely affiliated with the main radical right party in the country (first Jobbik, and then the Our Homeland Movement). In this respect, the National Legion follows the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda Mozgalom) and its successor, The New Hungarian Guard Movement (<i>Új Magyar Gárda Mozgalom</i>). The National Legion aims to “carry on the spirit of the former Hungarian Guard.”⁶⁸ The organisation is allied politically to the Our Homeland Movement, although at its inaugural press conference, led by László Toroczkai (the leader of Our Homeland), National Legion uniforms were also worn by Gábor Barcsa-Turner (HVIM, The Wolves) and members of The Outlaw Army. The ‘combat’ leader of the movement is László Földemesi, who allegedly served in the French Foreign Legion.⁶⁹ The organisation takes part in annual commemorations of the interwar paramilitary “Ragged Guard,” or the signature of Trianon Treaty.</p>	
FOUNDERS László Toroczkai László Földemesi	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES	
FOLLOWERS 1,609 on Facebook ⁶⁷	<p>White Supremacism: “On the other hand, incidents against whites have multiplied recently, with Extinction Rebellion and like organisations hiding their political positions in an environmental cloak, but left-wing politicians have already adopted this new racist narrative. Most recently, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, for example, pointed out that the only race responsible for global climate change is the white race. Such a clear and rude statement has never been made by a major news portal or a better-known politician.</p> <p>- <i>A post on the National Legion’s Facebook Page.</i>⁷⁰</p>	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown		
IDEOLOGY White Supremacism		

⁶⁷ This figure was current at the time of writing in September 2020.

⁶⁸ Magyar Nemzet, ‘The National Legion begins its journey,’ 3 June 2019, online at <https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfold/utnak-indul-a-nemzeti-legio-6986684/>.

⁶⁹ 444.hu, ‘The Newest Hungarian Guard, the new leader of the National Legion, served in the French Foreign Legion,’ 14 May 2019, online at: <https://444.hu/2019/05/14/a-francia-idegen-legioban-szolgalt-a-legujabb-magyar-garda-vagyis-a-nemzeti-legio-uj-vezetoje>.

⁷⁰ Békési, M., ‘The eradication of the white race has never been so urgent,’ 888.hu (reposted by the National Legion’s Facebook Page), 18 November 2019, online at: <https://888.hu/feher-ferfi/a-feher-faj-eltorlese-sosem-volt-meg-ennyire-surgeto-4214992/?fbclid=IwAR12ukkgYntNfKVSXLCZhpiQoWNg2-t1PzTawCeT6q3cyLSdTY6EcTmCCbs>.

	DESCRIPTION	
THE NEW HUNGARIAN GUARD MOVEMENT (ÚJ MAGYAR GÁRDA MOZGALOM)	<p>The New Hungarian Guard Movement was founded in 2009, following the dissolution of The Hungarian Guard, established in 2004 by Gábor Vona, then leader of Jobbik.⁷² This paramilitary organisation was envisaged as a “self-defence alliance,” although there is no explicit distinction from established Hungarian political parties. The uniforms of the New Hungarian Guard are black with an Árpád-striped shield as a coat-of-arms, similar to that of previous paramilitary formations in Hungary. The New Hungarian Guard has participated in vigilante patrols and has organised combat training. Like other paramilitary and vigilante organisations in the country, The New Hungarian Guard has also participated in commemorations of important events such as the signing of The Trianon Treaty, Matthias Day, and the 100th anniversary of Horthy’s entering into Budapest.</p>	
FOUNDER István Mészáros	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES	
FOLLOWERS Not present on social media ⁷¹	<p>Vigilantism and Ethnopluralism: “In Ópályi, Szabolcs County, the local OPSz [<i>Országos Polgárőr Szövetség</i> – National Civil Guard Association] members asked for help from our guards, as the number of burglaries has increased in this town. Our guards, of course, said yes to the request and served with the civil guards on Wednesday night. After many failures, the joint action ended successfully. An illegal intruder into the local store was apprehended [...] the thief from a different culture quickly informed us of his comrades, who were also captured that night with the help of the Guards.”</p> <p>-<i>An excerpt from Post on New Hungarian Guard Website.</i>⁷³</p> <p>Historical Revisionism: “In the summer of 1920, the country was mourning. To this day, all our true Hungarian brothers carry this pain in their hearts. We shall not forget!”</p> <p>-<i>An excerpt from Post on New Hungarian Guard Website.</i>⁷⁴</p>	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown		
IDEOLOGY		
Vigilantism		
Historical Revisionism		
Ethnopluralism		


⁷¹ This figure was current at the time of writing in September 2020.

⁷² Holdsworth, J. & K. Kondor, 2018, Op Cit.

⁷³ The New Hungarian Guard Website, ‘Guards captured the burglary gang!’, 24 May 2012, online at: https://ujmagyargardamozgalom.com/g%C3%A1rdis%C3%A1k_fogt%C3%A1k_el_bet%C3%B6r%C5%91_band%C3%A1t.

⁷⁴ The New Hungarian Guard Website, ‘Trianon for 100 years,’ 4 June 2020, online at: https://ujmagyargardamozgalom.com/trianon_100_ve.

	DESCRIPTION	
LEGION OF HUNGARY (LÉGIÓ HUNGÁRIA)	<p>Légio Hungária was founded in summer 2018 by a group of disillusioned members of HVIM, alongside a number of Hungarian football ultras. Much like HVIM, the chief aim of Légio Hungária is the restoration of pre-Trianon borders for Hungary, and resistance to “atheistic liberalism.” The group’s breakthrough came during the commemoration of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in October 2018, when Légio Hungária organised its first public event. After the 2019 commemoration of the 1956 Revolution, Légio Hungária members vandalised a Jewish community centre in Budapest that was financially backed by George Soros’s Open Society Foundation.⁷⁶ Since then, the group has established close connections with Betyársereg and its leader, Zsolt Tyirityán, although it has failed to maintain a close relationship with the Our Homeland Movement given that its leader, László Toroczkai, founded HVIM in 2004. By contrast, Légio Hungária has a far better network outside of the country, as the representatives of the movement frequently attend marches and commemorations organised by radical right groups in Ukraine, Poland, and Italy.</p>	
FOUNDER Béla Incze	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES	
FOLLOWERS 2,800 (Facebook), 143 (Twitter), Instagram - suspended ⁷⁵	<p>Decadence: “One of the outcomes of World War II, the modern, left-liberal worldview, has finally shown its destructive effects on culture. The other source of danger, which is partly the result of the gradual intensification of illegal migration from third world countries to our continent.”</p> <p>- An <i>excerpt</i> from a Légio Hungária article.⁷⁷</p>	
MEMBERSHIP c. 50	<p>Ethno-Nationalism: “Cooperation with our neighbours or like-minded organisations and movements in Europe does not mean that we should give up the rights of Hungarians across the border. It does not mean waiving any rights. At the moment, the situation is that the Europe we want to save can dissolve into a large and grey multicultural mass, and then the concept of the Hungarians living here, not only beyond the border, will also make no sense.”</p> <p>- An <i>excerpt</i> from a Légio Hungária article.⁷⁸</p>	
IDEOLOGY	<p>Palingenesis: “We need to preserve our customs, our culture, our traditions, we need to preserve the legacy of our ancestors, that is not in dispute. At present, however, the whole framework is in imminent danger, in which our worldviews cannot be interpreted at all. Many times, people have said: there is a war between races and civilisations for a living space. Our movements must also contribute to this struggle, and if we can count on each other as allies in this, it can only increase our chances of survival.”</p> <p>-An <i>excerpt</i> from a Légio Hungária article.⁷⁹</p>	
Decadence		
Ethno-Nationalism		
Palingenesis		

	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES (<i>cont'd.</i>)	
LEGION OF HUNGARY (LÉGIÓ HUNGÁRIA)	<p>White Supremacism: “ Racial consciousness and whiteness are extremely important issues, especially in a world where not only national self-awareness but even the issue of gender identity is under brutal siege by certain deviant groups.”</p> <p>- An <i>excerpt</i> from the Béla Incze interview.⁸⁰</p>	
IDEOLOGY (<i>cont'd.</i>)		
White Supremacism		

⁷⁵ This figure was correct at the time of writing in September 2020.

⁷⁶ Wójcik, J., ‘Between Moderation and Extremism: The Strange Evolution of Hungarian Far-Right,’ *European Eye on Radicalization*, 18 November 2019, online at: <https://eeradicalisation.com/between-moderation-and-extremism-the-strange-evolution-of-hungarian-far-right/>.

⁷⁷ My translation. Légio Hungária, ‘Egységben az erő - Európa erődítményét építjük. [We are building a fortress, a strong Europe]’, online at: <https://legiohungaria.org/89-egysegeben-az-ero-pa-eroditmeny-et-epitjuk>.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ My translation. Betyársereg “Sovinizmus mentes nacionalista Európát!” – interjú Incze Bélával a Légio Hungária vezetőségi tagjával [A chauvinist-free and nationalist Europe. Interview with Béla Incze: member of Légio Hungária management.] Online at <http://betyarsereg.hu/sovinizmus-mentes-nacionalizmust-europaban-interju-incze-belaval-a-legio-hungaria-vezetosegi-tagjaval/>.

EXTREME RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS IN HUNGARY

THE OUTLAW ARMY (BETYÁRSEREG)	GENERATION IDENTITY HUNGARY (IDENTITAS GENERACIO MAGYARORSZÁG)
FOUNDER Zsolt Tyirityán	FOUNDER Ábel Bódi
FOLLOWERS Suspended from social networks	FOLLOWERS Accounts suspended (Twitter, Facebook)
MEMBERSHIP c.100 members	MEMBERSHIP Unknown
IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY
Ethno-nationalism	Ethnopluralism
Decadence	Decadence
Palingenesis	Anti-Immigration Activism
White Supremacism	
Chauvinism	

	DESCRIPTION
THE OUTLAW ARMY (BETYÁRSEREG)	Betyársereg is a neo-Nazi organisation formed in 2008, evoking the 19th-century Hungarian highwaymen who were considered social outlaws. ⁸² The slogan of the organisation is “Ne bánts a magyart (mert pórul jársz)” [Do not mess with Hungarians (or else!)]. The movement is organised into smaller clans and maintains close contact with other nationalist organisations around the country. The official blog of Betyársereg often features interviews with representatives of other extreme-right organisations such as Légió Hungária, HVIM, Our Homeland, and Erő és Elszántság. In return, Betyársereg’s leader, Zsolt Tyirityán, is a frequent guest on the Holy Crown radio station. The organisation has participated in most major national commemorations (including for the Trianon Treaty and the 1956 Revolution), but also in anti-Roma protests organised in several towns across Hungary. ⁸³ In its official blog, Betyársereg promotes sports (notably powerlifting and combat sports), nationalist music, but also racist content such as the ‘Antidogma’ series of texts by István Gazdag, a columnist at Demokrata.hu, or “a Conference of Racists” held in Budapest in 2019. ⁸⁴ The group also has its own motorcycle clan.
FOUNDER Zsolt Tyirityán	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
FOLLOWERS Suspended from social networks ⁸¹	Ethno-Nationalism: “Since the moment of its establishment, Betyársereg symbolises a community with a strong racial and national consciousness, upholding the idea of Hungarian self-defence.” - An <i>excerpt</i> from Betyársereg website. ⁸⁵
MEMBERSHIP c.100 members	Decadence and Palingenesis: “We also try to set an example in community building, because, with our so-called clan system, we emphasise the need for a fraternal, companion, and peer communities today. Due to consumer idiocy symbolising modernity, the sick egocentric way of thinking is signalling a dying society.” - An <i>excerpt</i> from Betyársereg website. ⁸⁶
IDEOLOGY	White Supremacism: “The hateful media hysteria against us was mostly triggered by our belief in the concept of racial consciousness and the love of our national heritage and the fact that we wanted to preserve it.” - An <i>excerpt</i> from Betyársereg website. ⁸⁷
Ethno-Nationalism	Chauvinism: “It is precisely the criterion of right-wingness that it is engaged in a committed and uncompromising struggle against these satanic forces. Being on the right itself is a constant struggle, a kind of knightly journey that serves the idea of human nobility.” - An <i>excerpt</i> from Betyársereg website. ⁸⁸
Decadence	
Palingenesis	
White Supremacism	
Chauvinism	

⁸¹ This figure was noted at the time of writing in September 2020.

⁸² Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Betyár’, online at: www.britannica.com/topic/betyar.

⁸³ My translation. Népszava, ‘Régi recept: újra a „cigányterror” ellen vonul a szélsőjobb [Old Recipe: The far right is marching against „Gypsy Terror” again],’ 8 May 2019, online at <https://nepszava.hu/3035191-regi-recept-ujra-a-ciganyterror-ellen-vonul-a-szelsojobb>.

⁸⁴ My translation. Betyársereg, ‘Rasszvédők Konferenciája Budapesten [Conference of Racists in Budapest],’ 18 May 2019, online at: <http://betyarsereg.hu/rasszvedok-konferenciaja-budapes-ten/>.

⁸⁵ Betyársereg, ‘A Betyársereg egyértelmű álláspontot képvisel nemzeti ügyekben – interjú Tyirityán Zsolttal [Betyársereg takes a clear position on national issues],’ 26 January 2020, online at: <http://betyarsereg.hu/a-betyarsereg-egyertelmu-allasponot-kepvisel-nemzeti-ugyekben-interju-tyirityan-zsolttal/>.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

	DESCRIPTION
	<p>The Hungarian Chapter of the transnational identitarian organisation is largely detached from other radical right organisations in Hungary. Advocating an “independent, free and strong Europe, not exposed to either Russia or the United States,”⁹⁰ Generation Identity Hungary endorses direct action and ethnopluralism, the latter inherited from the French <i>Nouvelle Droite</i>.⁹¹ The movement is explicitly non-violent, with its members mostly coming from the student population. Unlike other extreme or/and violent organisations, the activism of Generation Identity is less focused on commemorations of historical events (although there are commemorations of the Trianon Treaty or the Siege of Vienna), but rather on protests and reactions to current events (such as the Black Lives Matter movement, refugee crisis, etc.), particularly those relating to Islam or Muslims.</p>
GENERATION IDENTITY HUNGARY (IDENTITAS GENERACIO MAGYARORSZÁG)	
FOUNDER Ábel Bódi	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
FOLLOWERS Accounts suspended (Twitter, Facebook) ⁸⁹	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	
IDEOLOGY	
Ethnopluralism	
Decadence	<p>Ethnopluralism and Decadence: “We want Hungarian culture in Hungary and European culture in Europe. Patriotism and the love of our nation are not sins, and therefore these sentiments should not be smeared or frowned upon e.g. criminalised as racism and fascism. In our view, national cohesion is indeed a virtue. We reject hatred between the peoples of Europe, chauvinism. Our conviction is that we must confront together the international forces that are constantly at war with the preservation, nurturing, and survival of our identity. We reject anti-democratic laws that violate the right to freedom of expression and are unworthy of the traditions of a free, developed European society.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from Generation Identity Hungary Homepage.</i>⁹²</p> <p>Anti-Immigration Activism [during the refugee crisis]: “We are with Greece. No way: you will not make Europe your home.”⁹³</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from Generation Identity Hungary Homepage.</i>⁹⁴</p>
Anti-Immigration Activism	

⁸⁹ This figure was current at the time of writing in September 2020.




⁹⁰ Generation Identity Hungary Homepage, online at: www.generacio.eu/.

⁹¹ Bar-On, T., ‘Transnationalism and the French *Nouvelle Droite*’, *Patterns of Prejudice* 45/2 (2011), pp. 199-223.

⁹² Generation Identity Hungary, Op Cit.

⁹³ Generation Identity Hungary. Görögországgal vagyunk! [We are with Greece]. Online at <https://www.generacio.eu/2020/03/05/gorogorszaggal-vagyunk/>.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

MAINSTREAM RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS IN HUNGARY		
		
HUNGARIAN JUSTICE AND LIFE PARTY (MAGYAR IGAZSÁG ÉS ÉLET PÁRTJA, MIÉP)	JOBBIK	OUR HOMELAND MOVEMENT (MI HAZÁNK MOZGALOM)
FOUNDER Tibor Nagy	FOUNDER Péter Jakab	FOUNDERS László Toroczkais
FOLLOWERS More than 4,000 on county pages (Facebook)	FOLLOWERS 80,902 (Facebook), 923 (Twitter)	FOLLOWERS 80,902 (Facebook), 923 (Twitter)
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	MEMBERSHIP Unknown	MEMBERSHIP Unknown
IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY
Authoritarianism	Ethno-Nationalism	Chauvinism and Ethno-nationalism
Ethno-nationalism and Christianity	Radical Right Ecologism	Historical Revisionism
Chauvinism	Chauvinism	Radical Right Ecologism
Palingenesis	Christianity	Anti-Immigration Activism
Manicheanism		Anti-Roma Activism


DESCRIPTION	
	<p>Founded in 1993 after splitting from the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), MIÉP was the first major post-socialist radical right party in Hungary. The longtime leader of the party, István Csurka, had been a well-known Hungarian play writer who split from MDF after a series of anti-semitic scandals.⁹⁶ Csurka was an outspoken and charismatic figure who brought together the building blocks of radical right discourse in Hungary. The narrative generated by MIÉP was built upon anti- communism, but also an anti-Western narrative of a ‘stolen transition.’ The latter placed the blame upon globalisation and the hidden (Jewish) domestic and international elites, which have allegedly deprived Hungarians of the ‘true’ benefits of the post-socialist transition. However, only in the 1998 national elections did MIÉP enter the Hungarian Parliament, winning 14 seats with 5.5% of the vote (248,901). This marked the party’s peak, for MIÉP subsequently tried to join forces with the then-emerging Jobbik as a part of a ‘Third Way Coalition’ in 2005. Following an electoral defeat in 2006, the alliance broke up. Thereafter, in part due to Csurka’s declining health and the lack of long-term growth, especially in terms of younger voters, MIÉP soon lost its status as the leading radical right party in Hungary – first to Jobbik, and then to the Our Homeland Movement. The coalition with Our Homeland and The Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers, and Civic Party for the European Parliament Elections in 2019 also did not prove successful, and the list did not secure any European parliamentary representation.</p>
NARRATIVE EXAMPLES	
<p>FOUNDER Tibor Nagy</p> <p>FOLLOWERS More than 4,000 on county pages (Facebook)⁹⁵</p> <p>MEMBERSHIP Unknown</p> <p>IDEOLOGY</p> <p>Authoritarianism</p> <p>Ethno-nationalism</p> <p>Christianism</p>	<p>Authoritarianism: “A state that is unable to guarantee the rule of law, that tolerates those living in accordance with the established moral values, is sometimes the object of ridicule to those who live in a sinful, careless, anti-communal life, a state that respects freedom, independence and integrity cannot provide a dignified life for its citizens.”</p> <p>“We will ensure there is only authentic and all-encompassing information, which will make the values of Hungarian culture a public treasure present in the media.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from MIÉP’s program of Order.</i>⁹⁷</p> <p>Ethno-nationalism and Christianism: “The Hungarian state has a problem, but also a goal, a task, here in the Carpathian Basin: to stop the loss of Hungarians, to support by a meaningful, Christian, Hungarian family capable of passing on the historical values of the nation and raising its children in a proper manner.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from MIÉP’s program of Order.</i>⁹⁸</p>

⁹⁵ This figure was current at the time of writing in September 2020.

⁹⁶ *Hungarian Spectrum*. ‘There is nothing new under the sun: political progression of the Hungarian far right,’ 11 August 2020, online at: <https://hungarianspectrum.org/tag/istvan-csurka/>.

⁹⁷ MIÉP, ‘A rend programja a MIÉP [MIÉP’s program of Order]’, available at www.eredetimiép.hu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=46&Itemid=55.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

NARRATIVE EXAMPLES (cont’d.)	
	<p>Chauvinism: “An entirely separate issue is the ATV channel. This channel is owned by a so-called church, the Church of Faith, but actually run by the Soros Foundation, and serves only Israeli-American and domestic neoliberal interests. It is nothing but a foreign body in the life of the nation: anti-Hungarian, lying and unscrupulous. Its abolition is a prerequisite of Hungarian survival.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from MIÉP’s program of Order.</i>⁹⁹</p> <p>Palingenesis: “We shall make the Hungarian State of the 21st century an example of an independent state, much like that of St. Stephen’s Hungary, the state of order.”¹⁰⁰</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from Betyársereg website.</i>¹⁰¹</p> <p>Manicheanism: “The Hungarian economy has fallen victim to a conspiracy-like method developed and applied in America, the “hyenas” of company acquisitions and liquidations.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from MIÉP’s program of Order.</i>¹⁰²</p>
<p>HUNGARIAN JUSTICE AND LIFE PARTY (MAGYAR IGAZSÁG ÉS ÉLET PÁRTJA, MIÉP)</p> <p>IDEOLOGY (cont’d.)</p> <p>Chauvinism</p> <p>Palingenesis</p> <p>Manicheanism</p>	

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

	DESCRIPTION
	<p>It is difficult to assess whether Jobbik should still be considered a radical right party. Founded in 2003 by student radicals as The Movement for a Better Hungary (<i>Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom</i>), Jobbik presented itself as the “radical, patriotic, and conservative” political party.¹⁰⁴ The chief aim was to counter socialism, and in doing so it allied with Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz, which was then an opposition party. For nearly a decade, Jobbik was the leading mainstream radical right organisation in Hungary, alongside an extensive network of alliances both across and outside of the country. This enabled Jobbik to emerge as an internationally recognised radical right movement, successfully radicalising the younger population in particular.¹⁰⁵ Only several years back, Jobbik was also an openly anti-semitic party, with its officials making statements about the necessity of creating lists for Hungarian Jews.¹⁰⁶ Only once (in 2006) did Jobbik enter an alliance with another party (namely MIÉP), with the coalition winning only 2.2% of the vote in national elections. However, winning 16.67% of the votes in the 2010 National Elections, 20.22% in 2014, and 19.06 in 2018, Jobbik has since become one of the strongest opposition parties in Hungary, and is therefore considered as indicating the mainstreaming of the (Hungarian) radical right.¹⁰⁷ However, since the 2014 elections, the party leadership has clearly shifted away from right-radicalism and has reinvented itself as the national-conservative, centre-right political actor to the left of the ruling Fidesz party.¹⁰⁸ This move has led much of the radical and extreme electorate supporting the party to become disillusioned with the reframing of Jobbik’s ideological position. Given that it has been almost six years from the beginnings of this transition – simultaneously witnessing the rise of Our Homeland as the new radical right party – the ideological profile of Jobbik can be more attuned to centre-right than radical right politics in contemporary Hungary.</p>
	<p>JOBBIK</p>
	<p>FOUNDER Péter Jakab</p>
	<p>FOLLOWERS 80,902 (Facebook) 923 (Twitter)¹⁰³</p>
<p>MEMBERSHIP Unknown</p>	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
	<p>IDEOLOGY</p>
	<p>Ethno-Nationalism</p>
	<p>Chauvinism</p>
	<p>Ethno-Nationalism: “A state that is unable to guarantee the rule of law, that tolerates those living in “Jobbik’s political horizons are not defined by the borders of our country but by the borders of our nation. These latter borders do not coincide with the geographical boundaries of the Hungarian Republic [...] Our fundamental principles are: thinking in terms of a nation of 15 million souls, establishing ‘protective power’ status for the motherland vis-à-vis Hungarian communities beyond the border, the cultural and economic reunification of the Hungarian nation...”” - <i>An excerpt from Jobbik’s (2010) Political Programme.</i>¹⁰⁹</p>
	<p>Chauvinism: “Our goal is the reincorporation into the national body of both Western and Carpathian-basin Hungarians.” - <i>An excerpt from Jobbik’s Foreign Affairs Political Programme.</i>¹¹⁰</p>

¹⁰³ This figure was noted at the time of writing in September 2020.

¹⁰⁴ MTI, Jobbik confident of winning EP seat, party leader says. 13 May 2016, online at <https://web.archive.org/web/20110810093412/http://www.politics.hu/20090513/jobbik-confident-of-winning-ep-seat-party-leader-says/>.

¹⁰⁵ Pirro, A., & Róna, D., ‘Far-right activism in Hungary: youth participation in Jobbik and its network,’ *European Societies*, 21:4, 603-626, 2019, DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2018.1494292.


¹⁰⁶ The Economist, ‘Anti-Semitism in Hungary: Márton’s list,’ 28 November 2012, online at: <https://www.economist.com/eastern-approaches/2012/11/28/martons-list>.

¹⁰⁷ Bozók, A., ‘Mainstreaming the Far Right Cultural Politics in Hungary,’ *Revue d’Études Comparatives Est-Ouest*, 47(4): 87-116, 2016, online at: <https://www.cairn.info/revue-revue-d-etudes-com-paratives-est-ouest-1-2016-4-page-87.htm>.

¹⁰⁸ Schulteis, E., ‘How Hungary’s Far-Right Extremists Became Warm and Fuzzy,’ *Foreign Policy*, 6 April 2018, online at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/06/how-hungarys-far-right-extrem-ists-became-warm-and-fuzzy/>.

¹⁰⁹ Jobbik, ‘Jobbik 2010 Program: Radical Change,’ online at: <http://www.jobbik.com/sites/default/files/Jobbik-radicalchange2010.pdf>.

¹¹⁰ Jobbik, ‘Foreign Affairs Policy,’ online at https://www.jobbik.com/foreign_affairs_policy.

	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
	<p>Radical Right Ecologism: “Green nationalism (<i>Zöld nacionalizmus</i>).” “It is unacceptable to ignore the national issues such as depopulation, the situation of the Gypsies, the sale of national wealth, or the tragic state of our environment!” - <i>An excerpt from Jobbik’s website.</i>¹¹¹</p>
	<p>Christianism: “We are a socially sensitive Christian party: the pillars of our policies are the representation of the Hungarian people, Christian ethics, and social principles.” - <i>An excerpt from Jobbik’s Declaration of Principles.</i>¹¹²</p>
	<p>JOBBIK</p>
	<p>IDEOLOGY (cont’d.)</p>
	<p>Radical Right Ecologism</p>
	<p>Christianism</p>

¹¹¹ Jobbik, ‘Cigarette butts can already be collected nationwide,’ online at: <https://www.jobbik.hu/vilagunk/kultura/mar-orszagszerke-gyujthetok-cigarettacsikkak>.

¹¹² Jobbik, ‘Declaration of Principles,’ online at: https://www.jobbik.com/declaration_of_principles.

	DESCRIPTION
	<p>Our Homeland was founded in 2018 by a group of disenfranchised Jobbik activists led by László Toroczkai, a well-known figure on the Hungarian radical right scene (he had founded HVIM, and was Jobbik’s mayor in Ásotthalom). In its founding declaration, the party calls for a radical change in the name of building an “organic society.”¹¹⁴ As its name suggests, Our Homeland also aims to protect the European, “Northern Civilisation.”¹¹⁵ To date, the party has participated only in the 2019 European Parliament elections, winning 3.31% of the vote through a coalition with MIEP and The Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers, and Civic Party (totaling 113,529 votes). Much like Jobbik in its more radical phase, Our Homeland Movement leads a network of other violent and non-violent radical right movements, such as HVIM, The Outlaw Army, and other, smaller fractions and groupuscules.¹¹⁶ Our Homeland’s manifesto advocates compulsory military training, progressive taxation, canceling of loans in foreign currency, banning abortions, and investing in “high-budget films that would portray the glorious Hungarian history.”¹¹⁷ The party also has an ecological section called ‘Green Homeland’ (Zöld Hazánk), which advocates for “the protection of not only human beings but also the Hungarian nature and wildlife.”¹¹⁸</p>
	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
	<p>Historical Revisionism: “A state that is unable to guarantee the rule of law, that tolerates those living in “Our long-term goal and mission must be to retrieve and protect our national self-determination, extending to the millions of our compatriots torn by unjust and unnatural borders.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from Our Homeland European Parliamentary election programme.</i>¹¹⁹</p> <p>Ethno-nationalism: “We want to create a strong, prosperous homeland and a united nation to serve as an example for other countries.”</p> <p>-<i>An excerpt from Our Homeland’s Ideological Declaration.</i>¹²⁰</p> <p>Chauvinism: “This mass of people will head towards an increasingly depopulated Europe. In this situation, Europe is threatened by two major groups. One is the system of bankers represented by French president Macron, which has an interest in transforming Europe into a mass of a mixed population of faceless consumers, and the other is Islamisation; Islam, which has been aggressively expanding ever since its birth.”</p> <p>-<i>An excerpt from Hungary Today.</i>¹²¹</p>
OUR HOMELAND MOVEMENT (MI HAZÁNK MOZGALOM)	
FOUNDERS László Toroczkais	
FOLLOWERS 80,902 (Facebook), 923 (Twitter) ¹¹³	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	
IDEOLOGY	
Historical Revisionism	
Ethno-Nationalism	
Chauvinism	

¹¹³ This figure was current at the time of writing in September 2020.

¹¹⁴ Our Homeland Movement, ‘Alapító Nyilatkozat [Founding Declaration]’, online at: <https://mihazank.hu/alapito-nyilatkozat/>.

¹¹⁵ *Hungary Today*, ‘Mi Hazánk Party Aims to Protect “Northern Civilisation,”’28 January 2019, online at <https://hungarytoday.hu/mi-hazank-party-aims-to-protect-northern-civilisation/>.

¹¹⁶ Betyársereg. Szellemiség, online at <http://betyarsereg.hu/szellemiseg/>.


¹¹⁷ Our Homeland Movement, ‘Vitaindító a Mi Hazánk Mozgalom alapító nyilatkozatához és programjához [Key points from the founding declaration and the electoral program of Our Homeland],’ online at: <https://mihazank.hu/vitaindito/>.

¹¹⁸ Our Homeland Movement, ‘Megalakult a Zöld Hazánk, a Mi Hazánk Mozgalom természet-, környezet- és állatvédelmi kabinete [The environmental and animal protection cabinet of Our Homeland has been established],’ 5 June 2019, online at: <https://mihazank.hu/megalakult-a-zold-hazank/>.

¹¹⁹ Our Homeland Movement, ‘Alapító Nyilatkozat [Founding Declaration]’, online at: <https://mihazank.hu/alapito-nyilatkozat/>, *Op Cit.*

¹²⁰ *Hirado.hu*, ‘A Mi Hazánk az egyetlen párt Fülöp Erik szerint, amelyik komolyan veszi a környezetvédelmet [According to Erik Fülöp, Our Homeland is the only party that takes environmental protection seriously],’ 10 September 2020. online at: <https://hirado.hu/belfold/belpolitika/cikk/2019/10/09/a-mi-hazank-az-egyetlen-part-fulop-erik-szerint-amelyik-komolyan-veszi-a-kornyezetvedelmet>.

¹²¹ Our Homeland Movement, ‘A Mi Hazánk Európája – EP-választási program [Our European Homeland - EP election program]’, online at: <https://mihazank.hu/a-mi-hazank-europaia-ep-valasztasi-program/>.

	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
	<p>Radical Right Ecologism: “Environmental protection is usually classified as a left-wing issue and therefore various anarchist movements are trying to monopolise it internationally. In many cases, left-wing parties that call themselves ‘greens’ do not represent real environmental solutions, but their goal is to force right-wing governments into a green cloak or try to overthrow them.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from Our Homeland Post.</i>¹²²</p> <p>Anti-Immigration Activism: “We reject providing funds to support immigration of those who are unwilling to adopt the principles of our culture. The main source of the problem is that, even after decades of trying, the integration of migrants with Muslim roots fails regularly. As Christianity loses its dominance in Western Europe, radical Islamic groups who performed countless terrorist acts on the indigenous people of Europe have been increasing.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from Our Homeland European Parliamentary election programme.</i>¹²³</p> <p>Anti-Roma Activism: “Mi Hazánk is the only party ‘declaring the existence of Roma crime’.”</p> <p>- <i>An excerpt from Hungary Today.</i>¹²⁴</p>
	OUR HOMELAND MOVEMENT (MI HAZÁNK MOZGALOM)
	IDEOLOGY (<i>cont'd.</i>)
	Radical Right Ecologism
	Anti-Immigration Activism
	Anti-Roma Activism

¹²² Our Homeland Movement, ‘2019 European Parliament Election Programme’, pp. 15-16. online at: https://mihazank.hu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ep_fuzet_WEB-1.pdf.

¹²³ *Hungary Today*, ‘Mi Hazánk to Launch ‘Identity Campaign’’, 14 February 2019, online at: <https://hungarytoday.hu/mi-hazank-to-launch-identity-campaign/>.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

SUMMARY

The above survey of radical right groups has sought to demonstrate the diversity and eclecticism of the Hungarian radical right activism, both online and offline. Many of these organisations have established expansive contacts in international circles, particularly Jobbik, Our Homeland, and the Hungarian Legion. Although the overall impact of most organisations outlined in this report remains low, the number of incidents related to violent extremism – paired with the continuing historical revisionism in Hungary – signals the potential for a steep rise in support. As noted in the introduction, the position of the Hungarian radical right remains conditioned by the ruling Fidesz, which borrows some of the key narratives of the radical right outlined in this report.

These narratives are centered around the following: Anti-Immigration Activism, Anti-Muslim Populism, Anti-Roma Activism, Authoritarianism, Chauvinism, Christianity, Decadence, Ethno-Nationalism, Ethnopluralism, Historical Revisionism, Hungarism, Manicheanism, Monarchism, Palingenesis, Radical Right Ecologism, Turanism, White Supremacism, and Vigilantism. More broadly, these narratives can be summed up according to the following elements:

1. **Historical Revisionist Narrative:** i.e. calling for a return to the pre-Trianon borders of a ‘Greater Hungary’ in order to correct the injustices committed by the international elite. This is also associated with the ‘victimhood narrative’ in which the white, Hungarian majority is presented as endangered by other groups and ethnicities (see Nativist Narrative below).
2. **Nativist Narrative:** i.e. protecting an imagined ‘cultural unity’ in Hungary by rejecting the nefarious influence of outsider ethnic groups, as well as that of ‘domestic’ outsiders (Roma, Jews, Muslims, and foreign elites).
3. **Anti-Establishment Narrative:** i.e. the government hands too much power to global companies and organisations and is out of touch with the ‘people.’
4. **Ethno-Nationalist and Christianist Narrative:** i.e. Hungarian nation and Hungarians are invariably Christian. The ethnic and religious (Christian) identity of Hungary is under threat, elites are complicit in eradicating ‘Hungarianess.’

PART TWO

RADICAL RIGHT COUNTER-NARRATIVES AND COUNTER-NARRATIVE CAMPAIGNS IN HUNGARY

03

TAPPING INTO HISTORICAL REVISIONIST, NATIVIST, ANTI- ESTABLISHMENTARIAN, & CHRISTIANIST ETHNO-NATIONALIST NARRATIVES

Perhaps as in no other European country, the counter-narratives and campaigns against the radical right in Hungary are conditioned by the hegemonic position of key actors, predominantly the right-wing populist Fidesz. In 2017 the Hungarian government, led by Fidesz, opened a 'National consultation' (*Nemzeti Konzultáció*) aimed at investigating the harmful effects of George Soros on the Hungarian economy and society.¹²⁵ In keeping with previous attacks, this anti-Soros campaign bore a distinctive, albeit implicit, anti-semitic tone, which was effectively built upon by radical right groups in Hungary and elsewhere. Much as these developments do not necessarily point to right-wing extremism *per se*, they create an atmosphere that fosters and normalises such narratives. In such settings, the space for developing and disseminating counter-narratives is rather limited by the existing monopoly Fidesz has over Hungarian media (e.g. the case of Index).¹²⁶ In consequence, those attempting to counter the radical right, xenophobia, or anti-semitism often end up being labelled as 'left-liberal traitors' and exposed to not only public criticism but outright threats.

Amidst these constraints, there have been numerous attempts at developing counter-narratives tailored to the

Hungarian radical right. Existing programs focus on establishing normative standards, such as the Hungarian police's *Hate-Crime Protocol*, which rests on the use of prejudice indicators, the monitoring of the activities of hate groups, and the use of communication supporting the victim.¹²⁷ Other NGOs and think tanks have also pointed to the need for innovative approaches to radicalisation, accounting for the contextual complexities in addressing radicalisation. One research centre that deals with radical right narratives and developing counter-narratives is Political Capital, a domestic think tank. This organisation has suggested and implemented a number of practical strategies that can be applied in countering "prejudice, radicalisation, and extremism," such as the educational packages on radicalism prevention in cooperation with the UK-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue and The Tim Parry Jonathan Ball Foundation for Peace, a guideline to counter extremist argumentation and the accounts by former members of these organisations.¹²⁸ One of the initiatives is also the "Do One Brave Thing," an initiative aiming to engage youth (aged 18-26) to speak out against violent extremism and address both online propaganda and offline rhetoric in Hungary, Italy, Poland, and Romania. The organisation has also developed a count-

¹²⁵ Zalan, E., 'The 'Soros Plan': what to keep and what to scrap,' *EU Observer*, 22 November 2017, online at: <https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/139965>.

¹²⁶ *DW Freedom*, 'Viktor Orban, Fidesz allies defang Hungary's critical media,' online at: www.dw.com/en/viktor-orban-fidesz-allies-defang-hungarys-critical-media/a-54963113.

¹²⁷ Political Capital. Radicalisation and extremism. online at https://www.politicalcapital.hu/radicalism_and_extremism.php.

¹²⁸ *Political Capital*, 'Excipients against prejudice, radicalisation and extremism,' 24 July 2020, online at: www.politicalcapital.hu/konyvtar.php?article_read=1&article_id=2554.

er-narrative guide to help the youth to stand up against extremist speech, and prepared education material to raise awareness about the negative effects of radicalisation among high school students (Extreme Dialogue project). Examples of specific counter-narratives developed in these projects include the framing of “silent majority” against the “loud minority,” as well as urging social activism through letters to public officials (e.g. mayors)¹²⁹ and placing an emphasis on the individual and their grievances instead of assuming totality and homogeneity of a radicalised group.

There are also other organisations engaging more or less directly with the subject of radicalisation (not necessarily right), such as Subjective Values Foundation, Budapest Centre for Mass Atrocities Prevention, Diverse Youth Network, and CEU Center for Policy Studies. However, it is difficult to pinpoint the specific counter-narratives developed by these organisations and initiatives, as they are hardly ever framed as such. Another important element in radical right anti-Roma and anti-immigrant narratives is the idea of ‘no-go zones,’ which projects hateful misinformation upon an entire ethnic group. Efforts here should be focused on intercultural dialogue, facilitating collaboration in order to jointly develop “solutions to local phenomena that contribute to the division and possible radicalisation of the community.”¹³⁰

Greater focus on information and disinformation is also urgently needed in the Hungarian context. Attempts at countering radical right narratives must also be situated online, where a lot of radical right mobilisation occurs. Focusing on innovative communication strategies on social networks (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter), but also permeating networks particularly popular in radical right circles (e.g. Telegram) is vital to identifying the motivations of those who are becoming radicalised. Perhaps surprisingly, and except for anti-Soros myths, the Hungarian radical right does not appear particularly inclined towards conspiracy theories (unlike their Slovakian counterparts, for instance). Accordingly, it is vital to continuously revisit the normativity assumed in countering such narratives: what exactly ‘our’ countering standpoints are. The perceived standards for a ‘good debate’ are far from being monolithic, but this should not be discouraging: pluralism, after all, is an intrinsic value of democratic societies. However, assuming moral superiority in defence of pluralism is equally harmful to the prospects of countering radical right narratives. For instance, presenting aspects of human and identity rights (e.g. LGBTIQ+) as ‘normal’ or ‘natural,’ thus using

the very own frames of the radical right, may appear to be counterproductive in the increasingly far-rightward shift of Hungarian politics. What is necessary is shifting the debate through the operationalisation of different and intentionally loose narrative frames.

The transnational context is another central consideration in understanding the impact of radical right narratives in Hungary. Despite the tense relationship with radical right organisations in the region due to territorial disputes arising from the Trianon Treaty (most notably Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia), most Hungarian radical right organisations cooperate with various ultra-nationalist and even fascist organisations across Europe (most notably in Poland, Italy, and Croatia). For instance, first *Jobbik* and then *Our Homeland Movement* had an excellent relationship with the Polish *National Movement* (now a part of *Konfederacja*), attending the annual March of Independence (11th November) in Warsaw, which also presents an informal gathering of European nationalist groups.¹³¹ At the same time, *Legio Hungaria* maintains a close relationship with the Italian extreme right organisation Lotta Studentesca, as well as with the former members of The Carpathian Sich (Ukraine).¹³² Likewise, HVIM and the Italian *Casapound* also have a long relationship established through informal, personal contacts. Identifying the patterns of interaction between these groups may also prove conducive to examining the interplay of different narratives operationalised by the radical right. When there is a better grasp of processes at stake and the actors underpinning them, there is a greater chance of realising the potential of developing counter-narratives. The mere fact that even mainstream radical right parties, such as *Our Homeland*, attend international events (e.g. The Independence March in Poland) alongside representatives of neo-Nazi organisations from countries such as Poland or Germany, is important for situating some of these actors and their narratives.

Building on the wide array of radical right narrative examples and the patterns of their dissemination, below are some key counter-narratives that could be deployed to address radical right extremism in Hungary:

1. Anti-Immigration Counter-Narrative: geopolitical conceptions of a putative ‘clash of civilisations’ have fed a dangerous myth of the ‘Hungarian island’ surrounded by potential enemies. Combatting these narratives through a different approach to history and sociology is a prerequisite in tackling widespread anti-immigrant senti-

ments. An example is focusing on microhistories instead of ‘national’ histories, or learning history through (carefully selected) anecdotes and success stories rather than through the act of periodisation and historical events as revolutionary thresholds which immediately induced social change. Crucial here is identifying the positive contribution of migrants to society (including those who identify as Muslim): not only those who arrived in Hungary, but also Hungarians who became famous abroad, as ‘immigrants’ are conducive to developing a successful counter-narrative.

2. Anti-Roma (‘Gypsy crime’) Counter-Narrative: the problem of essentialising an entire ethnic community can be addressed through fostering encounters with the representatives of the Roma community through school visits and similar cultural exchanges. It is important to identify the ‘positive’ examples: the contribution of the Roma community to Hungary. Moreover, it is important to emphasise the rather blurred lines of identity and the ‘cultural’ boundaries of the Hungarian nation – as visible once taken to the level of more personal stories.

3. Historical Revisionism Counter-Narrative: while acknowledging the role of the Trianon Treaty as a dif-

ferent moment in Hungarian history, it is necessary to emphasise the problematic role of historical myths prolonging divisions, thus leading to a perpetual circle of regional disputes. The perceived injustice committed in the near or more distant past is a potent mobiliser for nationalist sentiments, and therefore it is important to situate such events in their historical contexts. This can be done through artistic forms (such as seeing how the world would look like if all countries were within its ‘Great borders’ form), but also through education and the emphasis on the role of context, both spatial and temporal in approaching these historical developments.

4. Ethno-nationalist Christian Counter-Narrative: ethno-phyletism has proven to be profoundly problematic in fuelling radical right narratives, as it monopolises the conception of the ‘people’ which is relevant to both Hungarian nationalism and religion. The role of the Catholic Church is paramount in addressing these issues, albeit through public opinion pieces and interaction with the people on the ground. Here, it is very important to bear in mind the geography of these groups: the Hungarian radical right is particularly popular in rural areas and Eastern Hungary. Therefore, developing counter-narratives is ultimately dependent on targeting these geographic, no less than contextual, settings.

¹²⁹ *Do One Brave Thing*. Counter-Narrative Campaign. online at <https://onebravething.eu/>.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Buzzfeed, ‘March Led By White Nationalist Group In Poland Draws Tens Of Thousands From Across Europe’, 13 November 2017, online at <https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/lesterfeder/march-led-by-authoritarian-group-in-poland-draws-tens-of>

¹³² *Transylvania Now*, ‘Hungarian, Ukrainian radicals march together in Uzhhorod’, 15 April 2019 online at <https://transylvanianow.com/hungarian-ukrainian-radicals-march-together-in-uzhhorod/>

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While it may be difficult to estimate the Hungarian radical right's trajectory, there can be little doubt this phenomenon is here to stay. With the right-wing populist government firmly in power, any endeavour at developing counter-narratives to extremism in Hungary can easily fall into the often-deployed trap of being 'overly ideological' or 'endangering freedom of speech.' It is impossible to escape the world of ideologies when countering the radical right – what is important, however, is that the premises from which the radical-right ideology departs are at odds with a society that upholds the values of human dignity. When adjusting and framing such a (relatively basic) argument, one needs to keep in mind also the popularity of the radical right groups amongst swathes of the younger population. The role of 'geographies' in the generation of resentment is also important in driving radicalisation. The perceived symbolic (but also very material) division between Budapest and the rest of Hungary, the neglected rural population are all contributing to the Articulations of a 'stolen transition' point to alternative interpretations of the post-socialist era as not only characterised by democratisation and liberalisation, but also by rising inequalities and the inability to account for these problems amongst opinion-leaders (such as the press and academia). Thus, to construct plausible and successful counter-narratives to radical right extremism, it will not prove sufficient to just copy strategies from other countries with notably divergent contexts.

For instance, developing protocols and establishing verifiable standards through 'measurements of political vio-

lence,' establishing thresholds of the 'acceptable' radicalism through a set of indicators that can be scored may seem a good way to address the issue of radicalisation (and the radical right in particular), but these also run the risk of falling short of sufficiently addressing the grey zones of these processes. However, what is even more important is that these standards and procedures become a part of institutional memory – the mundane practices through which organisations and institutions operate, enforced, and continuously revisited. For this to happen, Hungary will have to adhere to the rule of law within the European Union. The visibly tense relationship between the current Hungarian government and the EU may render future 'national' advancements in this field inapplicable to the EU criteria, particularly with regard to the independent judiciary and respect for human rights.

As stressed throughout this report, the political situation in Hungary renders holistic approaches to radical right extremism an enormous challenge. The role of authorities, such as the police and judiciary, remains paramount in preventing the dangers of radical right political violence. In contrast with other European countries, for example, 'lone-wolf' actors are uncommon in Hungary, as there is nearly always some affiliation with one of the main right-wing extremist groups. To counter the mainstreaming of the radical right, it is not enough to rely on the role of the repressive apparatus of the state but to be prepared to address the subtle nuances in framing which lead to normalisation of exclusionary ideas and principles, such as

that of 'cultural' racism and xenophobia. Here, the role of education becomes ever more important, as the basic idea of tolerance for other views becomes significantly affected by the need to address perceived (and some very real) injustices. The emphasis upon community programmes and greater interaction of people from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds is a prerequisite to fully embracing Hungary as a multicultural yet complex and delicate mixture of traditions, cultures, and histories.

With this in mind, combatting violent extremism from radical right actors requires a far better preliminary understanding of how these organisations operate 'on the ground.' Given the organisational networks presented in this report, we can see how radical right actors have been able to attain significant grassroots successes. As many of their extremist narratives were made palatable to a broad-

er electoral base, there is likewise a need for non-governmental organisations (political parties, educational institutions, and civil society) countering radical right extremism to be accessible to smaller communities and non-urban areas.¹³³ The troubling distinction between the realities of Budapest and the rest of Hungary continues to haunt Hungarian society concerning a potential rise in radical right violence, paralleling the anti-elitist and chauvinist sentiments that are fuelled by the emphasis on urban-rural demarcations. What seems to be missing in countering radicalisation in Hungary today are (real) alternatives for members of radical right organisations. The politics of alternative and, even more importantly, hope, need to be developed in recognition of the inevitably complex nature of identities. At the same time, such politics require careful navigation through the existing political rifts - *ex nihilo nihil fit*.

¹³³ Nagy, A., T. Boros & A. Varga, 'Right-wing Extremism in Hungary,' Bonn, Germany: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012, online at: <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/09566.pdf>, p. 14.



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