



A MOVEMENT BETWEEN PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS AND THE PATHWAY TO VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

**GERMANY'S RADICAL RIGHT NARRATIVES AND
COUNTER-NARRATIVES**



The *CARR-Hedayah Radical Right Counter Narratives Project* is a year-long project between CARR and Hedayah that is funded by the EU STRIVE programme. It is designed to create one of the first comprehensive online toolkits for practitioners and civil society engaged in radical right extremist counter-narrative campaigns. It uses online research to map narratives in nine countries and regions (Australia, Canada, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States), proposes counter-narratives for these countries and regions, and advises on how to conduct such campaigns in an effective manner. This country report is one of such outputs.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Maximilian Kreter's doctoral research focuses on the development of the role of the ideology of right-wing extremism in germanophone White Power music ("Rechtsrock") from 1977 to 2017. He employs mixed methods content analysis to study song texts of White Power bands. He aims to identify changes and continuities in the narratives, the ideology and the narrative techniques of the germanophone White Power music scene. He has published books, articles and chapters and on White Power Music in (East-)Germany; violence against asylum seekers, social media and the extreme right; right-wing hate crimes in Saxony from 2011 to 2016; and extreme right-wing voting behavior in East-Germany from 2005 to 2011.

The views expressed in this practical report are the opinions of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Hedayah, the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right or the European Union.

INTRODUCTION

The radical right¹ in Germany, like most of the radical right in general, has fundamentally transformed this century. From 1996 to 2011 the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) [National Democratic Party of Germany],² “belonging to the old, traditional, neo-fascist type”³ of radical right parties, especially in East Germany with its sizeable support from the “groupuscular right”⁴ and autonomous Kameradschaften [or ‘free comradeships’], was the dominant actor within the radical right movement. In hindsight 2013 marked a turning point with the foundation of the radical right, eurosceptic Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) [Alternative for Germany].⁵ The further ascent of the AfD was fueled by the reciprocal interaction with the anti-Islamic street movement Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (PEGIDA) [Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident] in late 2014 and early 2015. While the AfD successively made it into the federal and then all state parliaments,⁶ PEGIDA acted as a radicalisation catalyst for public discourse and the coverage by the mainstream media in Germany and

abroad. In turn, these developments greatly helped sow the seeds of hate amongst groupuscular right, violent radical right extremists, and even terrorists.⁷

Most infamously, the terrorist network of the Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (NSU) [National Socialist Underground] remained undetected from 1998 until 2011, although most of the perpetrators, as well as instigators and networks, seem to have now been uncovered by the authorities. Since 2011 the German public has become much more aware of the terrorist threat from the right, even if some parts of the government insist upon the principle of equidistance from the extremes — a view rooted in the German constitution’s framing of ‘militant democracy’⁸ — which may be one of several reasons for the underestimation of radical right violence. By contrast, the trail of radical right terrorism in Germany stretches back from Hanau, via Halle, Kassel (Wolfhagen), Berlin-Neukölln, Dresden, and Munich,⁸ through less visible decades⁹ to the very conclusion of World War II.¹⁰ Radical right extremism

¹ Here ‘radical right extremism’ is used to describe a broad plethora of protest movements, cell-based groups (‘groupuscules’) and lone-actor terrorists that harbour violent nativist, authoritarian, and (sometimes) populist policy ideas (Mudde 2007). This includes individuals and groups who actively ‘espouse violence’ and ‘seek the overthrow of liberal democracy’ entirely (Eatwell 2003: p. 14) rather than simply ‘a critique of the constitutional order without any anti-democratic behaviour or intention’ (Carter 2005: 22). The former are historically referred to as the extreme right rather than the radical right, and range from lone-actor terrorists through to a range of formally constituted neo-fascist and neo-Nazi political parties that inspire political violence.”

The report uses Daniel Koehlers (2017: p. 59-64) typology to differentiate between the radical right, radical right violence and radical right terrorism. The radical right can commit “non-ideological” and “right-wing crimes (including non-violent hate crimes).” To classify an actor as “violent” and “extreme” “right-wing violence” and “right-wing violent hate crimes” should be ascertainable. Radical right terrorism “is an escalated form of right-wing violent hate-crimes. While hate crimes cover the intent to attack and destroy a human being out of animosity against the victim’s identity or group (including to intimidate that group, right-wing terrorism adds the intent and motivation to change the political and social status quo through the act of violence. [...] Right-wing terrorism – akin to insurgent terrorism – combines the act of destruction of an enemy and the strategic aspect of advancing the group’s political agenda, which is in fact missing with hate crimes.” Daniel Koehler, *Right-Wing Terrorism in the 21st Century. The ‘National Socialist Underground’ and the History of Terror from the Far-Right in Germany* (London: Routledge, 2017), p. 63-64.

A similar, simplified typology can be found here: Jan Schedler, ‘Rechtsterrorismus und rechte Gewalt: Versuch einer Abgrenzung,’ *Wissen schafft Demokratie* 6, 2019, p. 105-117.

² See Marc Brandstetter, M., *Die NPD unter Udo Voigt. Organisation. Ideologie. Strategie* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2013).

³ Piero Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 33.

⁴ The ‘groupuscular right’ is defined: “as fully developed, highly specialized and largely autonomous grouplets that simultaneously form the constituents of an amorphous, leaderless and centreless cellular network of political ideology, organization and activism that is termed here ‘the groupuscular right;’” see Roger Griffin, ‘From Slime Mould to Rhizome: An Introduction to the Groupuscular Right,’ *Patterns of Prejudice* 37 (1), 2003, pp. 27–50, 27; or “as tiny, often neo-Nazi, bands of radical right extremists that establish a milieu with reference points that stretch out internationally as well as into the past as well.” Paul Jackson, ‘#hitlerwasright: National Action and National Socialism for the 21st Century,’ *Journal for Deradicalization* 1 (1), pp. 97–115, 101.

⁵ See Kai Arzheimer, ‘The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?’, *West European Politics* 38 (3), 2015, pp. 535-556.

⁶ See Jay J. Rosellini, *The German New Right: AfD, PEGIDA and the Re-Imagining of National Identity* (London: Hurst, 2019); and Julian Göppfarth, ‘Activating the socialist past for a nativist future: far-right intellectuals and the prefigurative power of multidirectional nostalgia in Dresden,’ *Social Movement Studies*, online at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14742837.2020.1722628>. (All websites last accessed 29/6/2020).

⁷ See Matthias Quent, *Deutschland rechts außen: Wie die Rechten nach der Macht greifen und wie wir sie stoppen können* (München: Piper, 2019), pp. 39-98, 211-230.

⁸ See Peter Hille, ‘Right-wing terror in Germany: A timeline,’ *Deutsche Welle*, 20 February 2020, online at: www.dw.com/en/right-wing-terror-in-germany-a-timeline/a-52451976; and see also Jo Goll, ‘Verdächtige Rechtsextreme hatten Liste mit 500 Namen,’ *Rundfunk Berlin-Brandenburg*, 17 February 2020, online at: www.rbb24.de/politik/beitrag/2020/02/zwischenbericht-ermittlungsgruppe-anschlaege-berlin-neukoelln.html.

⁹ See Barbara Manthe, ‘The Under-Discussed Recent History of The Radical Right Terrorism in Germany.’ In: William Allchorn (eds.), *Tracking the Rise of the Radical Right Globally. CARR Yearbook 2018/2019*, (Stuttgart: Ibidem 2019), p. 331–334; Tobias Hof, ‘Rechtsextremer Terrorismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’ In: Martin Löhnig, Mareike Preisner, & Thomas Schlemmer (eds.), *Ordnung und Protest. Eine gesamtdeutsche Protestgeschichte von 1949 bis heute*, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2015), p. 215–36.

¹⁰ For example, Hannes Heer, *Der Mordfall Oppenhoff. Wervölfe auf den Trümmern des Nazireiches* (Köln: Westdeutscher Rundfunk 1985).

has never vanished from post-war Germany, but was rarely detected and is too often neglected. The same remains true for contemporary radical right terrorists and networks, like the recently banned Combat 18 Deutschland, Revolution Chemnitz, Old School Society, or Freie Kameradschaft Dresden, to name but a few.¹¹

That said, it can be difficult to draw a clear line between radical right terrorism and radical right violence.¹² Just as radical right terrorism saw a significant rise in recent years, Germany simultaneously had a large outburst of radical right violence, — particularly the use of vigilantism as a central *modus operandi* — in the wake of the so-called ‘refugee crisis.’ The number of attacks against ethnic minorities, local politicians, refugee aid volunteers, and journalists increased dramatically between 2015 and 2016, while numbers decreased slightly between 2017 and the end of 2019. But these are still at a much higher plateau since the beginning of the ‘refugee crisis.’¹³ The necessity of preventing and countering these different forms of violent radical right extremism has now become evident, even if politicians, as well as other authorities, for the most part, downplayed the expansion, special-

isation, and continuation of corresponding CVE and democracy-promotion programmes. The latter attempts have seen an endless string of unconnected pilot projects since the early 1990s rather than a durable prevention infrastructure. Nonetheless, Germany is often considered a role model with regards to the quality, quantity, and diversity of its CVE programmes and approaches.¹⁴

This country report focuses on parties, (sub-)movements, and groupuscules. The first part of this report surveys the activities of fourteen key groups of the radical right and their (core) narratives of Anti-Muslim Populism, Ethno-Nationalism, Anti-Globalism, Victimhood, and Neo-Nazism/‘Revisionism.’ Using case studies from the five years of May 2014 to May 2019, the second part offers guidance for counter-narratives that can be counterposed against the dominant narratives of the radical right. The following section offers examples of existing counter-narrative campaigns in Germany by (close-to-the-) state and non-state actors. The report closes with recommendations on how to conceptualise and conduct campaigns to counter (violent) radical right extremism in Germany.

¹¹ See Cristina Ariza, “What do we know about the extreme right in Germany?,” *C.ARR*, 6 March 2020, online at: <https://www.radicalrightanalysis.com/2020/03/06/what-do-we-know-about-the-extreme-right-in-germany/>.

Peter Hille, ‘Right-wing terror in Germany: A timeline,’ *Deutsche Welle*, 20 February 2020, online at: <https://www.dw.com/en/right-wing-terror-in-germany-a-timeline/a-52451976>; Jo Goll, ‘Verdächtige Rechtsextreme hatten Liste mit 500 Namen,’ 17 February 2020, online at: <https://www.rbb24.de/politik/beitrag/2020/02/zwischenbericht-ermittlungsgruppe-anschlaege-berlin-neukoelln.html>.

¹² See Jan Schedler, ‘Rechtsterrorismus und rechte Gewalt: Versuch einer Abgrenzung,’ *Wissen schafft Demokratie*, 6, 2019, 105-117, online at: <https://www.idz-jena.de/schriftenreihe/band-6-rechtsterrorismus/>.

¹³ See Bundeskriminalamt, ‘Straftaten,’ July 2019, online at: https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Bilder/DE/Arbeitsbereiche/Deliktsbereiche/PMK/Straftaten1.jpg;jsessionid=28E5B99A19E115C2ECC47CE75972D7CC.live0601?_blob=normal&v=1.

¹⁴ See Daniel Koehler, ‘Violence and Terrorism from the Far-Right: Policy Options to Counter an Elusive Threat,’ ICCT Policy Brief, February 2019, online at: <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf>; Keiran Hardy, ‘Countering right-wing extremism: lessons from Germany and Norway,’ *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*, 14 (3), 2019, 262-279, here: 273-275; Cynthia Miller-Idriss, ‘How to counter far-right extremism? Germany shows the way,’ *The Guardian*, 17 May 2019, online at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/17/counter-far-right-extremism-germany-uk-teachers>.

PART ONE RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS AND NARRATIVES IN GERMANY

FROM NEO-NAZISM AND ANTI-SEMITISM TO ANTI-MUSLIM POPULISM, AND THE GREAT REPLACEMENT CONSPIRACY THEORY

Although the AfD has recently taken the lead within the radical right movement due to successes in the polls, especially between 2016 and 2019, the ties to other groups and individuals within the movement persist, even though not always with the consent of the entire party.

(Sub-)Movements like PEGIDA and groupuscules like Revolution Chemnitz gained more significance and influence in the radical right movement in Germany. It is clear that radical right extremism — ranging from parties to movements to groupuscules — mobilises around a set

of Anti-Muslim Populism, Ethno-Nationalism, Anti-Globalism, Victimhood, and Neo-Nazism/Nazi 'Revisionism' narratives, not only in Germany but worldwide. Below is a list of extremist groups and organisations which represent the radical right in Germany, with an emphasis on developments of the last five years, broken down according to ideology, the corresponding narratives, type of organization, and propensity to violence, as depicted in Figure 1. For each group, the report offers key data, a short description, and examples of key narratives. A summary of the key narratives with examples can be found in Table 1.




FIGURE 1 A matrix of radical right groups based on the level of violence and extremity in their narratives¹⁵

(Horizontal Axis: Mainstreamness of Narratives¹⁶, Vertical Axis: Incidence of Violence¹⁷)

¹⁵ This list does not encompass all actors in the corresponding period (May 2014 – May 2019) that can be assigned to the extreme radical right movement; it is a sample of actors that meet the minimal requirements of formal ascertainability. The actors were selected according to the relevance for the movement and its representativeness of current developments, more specifically: 1. Representing one of the four groups on the biaxial coordinate system, 2. Mentioned on banning lists of the interior ministries and/or in annual intelligence reports: Priority on a federal list/report -> at least one list/report; 3. Actors with legally binding verdicts were preferred instead of actors with ongoing court proceedings. The latter were omitted if there was an alternative for one of the four groups.

¹⁶ Here, 'mainstreamness' can be measured by the adoption of moderate narratives (usually involving a broad issue agenda, anti-establishment populism and electoralism) compared to more extreme, esoteric positions and modus operandi (e.g. street activism and terrorism) taken by fringe groups (De Lange, Akkerman and Rooduijn 2016).

¹⁷ For the purposes of this report, a group is classified as violent if there is evidence of documented, direct acts of violence against a specific group or target.

Table 1: Overview of Germany's Radical Right Narratives¹⁸

EXTREMIST NARRATIVE	DEFINITION	EXAMPLE
Anti-Establishment Sentiment	Extreme political skepticism of societal, economic, scientific, and political elites that shape public discourse.	“Political correctness belongs to the ash heap of history.” [“Die politische Korrektheit gehört auf den Müllhaufen der Geschichte”] (AfD)
Anti-Globalism	Extreme opposition to cultural, economic, and political globalization; any form of international multilateralism; and elitist top-down processes.	“Fortress Europe, close the borders.” [“Festung Europa, macht die Grenzen dicht.”] (IBD)
Anti-Immigration Sentiment	Views directed against open immigration policies, including demands of compulsory or voluntary repatriation of non-indigenous citizens.	“Wage war against asylum seekers and their supporters.” [“Krieg gegen Asylanten und deren Unterstützer”] (OSS)
Anti-Muslim Populism	A spectrum ranging from relatively moderate anti-Muslim sentiments to extreme opposition/hatred towards the cultural, societal, and political influence of Muslims and the religion of Islam. These sentiments are sometimes coupled with anti-immigration sentiments against those immigrating from Muslim countries.	“Tolerance has nothing to do with Islam [...] But violence, robbery, war, killing, decapitation, crucifying, all that has to do with Islam.” [“Toleranz hat nichts mit dem Islam zu tun [...] Denn Gewalt, Ausrauben, Krieg, Töten, Kopfab schneiden, Kreuzigen, alles hat mit dem Islam zu tun.”] (PEGIDA)
Anti-Semitism	Anti-Jewish prejudice, including some forms of anti-Zionism, and extending to the conspiracy theories of omnipresent ‘behind-the-curtain’ power and control exerted by Jewish people.	“After 75 years, we still have the same enemy. The enemy isn’t called Müller or Meier — No! — The enemy is called Rothschild and Goldman & Sachs.” [“Wir haben auch noch heute denselben Feind wie vor 75 Jahren. Der Feind heißt nicht Müller oder Meier — Nein! Er heißt Rothschild und Goldman und Sachs.”] (The Right)

¹⁸ Drawing on Robert Lane's definition of 'ideology' (“The common man has a set of emotionally charged political beliefs, a critique of alternative proposals, and some modest programs of reform. These beliefs embrace central values and institutions; they are rationalizations of interests (sometimes not his own); and they serve as moral justifications for daily acts and beliefs.”) combined with Jean-Francois Lyotard's understanding of 'narrative' (Imparting values and emotions in relation to a national and/or cultural entity, serving as a basis of legitimacy (and often supremacy claims) of this construct). See Robert E. Lane, *Political Ideologies. Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe 1962), p. 15-16; Jean-Francois Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne. Rapport sur le savoir* (Paris: Edition de Minuit 1979).




Chauvinism	Here defined as the belief in the supremacy of the in-group, predominantly defined according to ethnic, cultural, and gender criteria. Chauvinism is defined as naturally anticipated, given supremacy, and is often combined with Ethno-Nationalism, Anti-Immigration Sentiment, Misogyny, and Anti-Muslim Populism.	“Beware, we do not call the police. We take care of unwanted guests by ourselves. One bullet is not enough. Old-school Society.” [<i>Achtung wir rufen nicht die Polizei um ungebete Gäste kümmern wir uns selbst. Eine Kugel reicht nicht. Oldschool Society</i>] (OSS)
Ethno-Nationalism	Defined as “the technical name for this view of things in which one’s own [ethnic] group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it.” ¹⁹	“Besides the protection of our national and European borders, a large-scale remigration project will be necessary.” [<i>Neben dem Schutz unserer nationalen und europäischen Außengrenzen, wird ein großangelegtes Remigrationsprojekt notwendig sein.</i>] (AfD)
Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory	Forms of conspiracy theory advocating a master plan to replace the perceived ‘pure’ autochthon population with a multicultural society that serves the interests of elites in power.	“Storm of asylum seekers, mass immigration, birth rate deficit, senescence, that’s what we all know, it happens with the active support of the ruling class and the devoted media.” [<i>Asylansturm, Massenzuwanderung, Geburtendefizit, Vergreisung — all das kennen wir, all das läuft ab unter aktiver Teilnahme durch die herrschende Klasse und die ihr treu ergebene Medienwelt.</i>] (One Percent)
Identitarianism	The perceived right of an ethnically and culturally defined in-group to be the prevailing force on a territorial entity that they define as ‘theirs’ (‘racism without Race’).	“Democracy requires a certain degree of homogeneity of the population in order to be able to form a common will. By fighting the multicultural project we fight for conditions that make true democracy (rule by the people) possible.” [<i>Demokratie [...] erfordert eine gewisse Homogenität in der Bevölkerung, damit sie einen gemeinsamen Willen bilden kann. Indem wir gegen das multikulturelle Projekt kämpfen [...], kämpfen wir auch für die Bedingung der Möglichkeit einer echten Demokratie.</i>] (Volksherrschaft)] (IBD)

¹⁹ William G. Sumner, *Folkways. A study of the sociological importance of usages, manners, customs, mores, and morals* (Boston: Ginn and Company 1906), p. 13




Neo-Nazism	Adherence to the ideology of National Socialism after 1945, including the celebration of high-ranking Nazis (ranging from Stauffenberg to Heß) and the celebration of Nazism.	“We’re Nazis until the bitter end.” [<i>Wir sind Nazis bis zum bitteren Ende.</i>] (Group Freital) “Without any doubt Hitler was a great German statesman.” [<i>Zweifellos handelt es sich bei Hitler um einen großen deutschen Staatsmann.</i>] (NPD)
‘Revisionism’	The public revision of Nazism, including the Holocaust, in the fields of politics, culture, and economics, particularly in comparison to the ‘decadent and putrefying’ democracies of Weimar, Bonn, Berlin, and ‘the West’ in general.	“We are the streets and we are the law, the 4th Reich is what we are fighting for.” (B&H)
Ultra-Nationalism	Defined as “extreme devotion to or advocacy of the interests of a nation, esp. regardless of the effect on any other nations.” ²⁰	“Those who do not love Germany should leave Germany.” [<i>Wer Deutschland nicht liebt, soll Deutschland verlassen.</i>] (PEGIDA)
Victimhood	A permanent perception of unjustified, politically motivated victimisation by the political opposition, which is often instrumentalised to advance ‘underdog’ or ‘populist’ political agendas.	“End German collective guilt! We defend ourselves against moral self-destruction of our nation through one-sided historical recriminations to the account of Germany” [<i>Schuldskult beenden. Wir wehren uns gegen die moralische Selbstvernichtung unserer Nation durch einseitige geschichtliche Schuldzuweisungen zu Lasten Deutschlands.</i>] (NPD) “Antifa and media against freedom of speech.” [<i>Antifa und Medien: Vereint gegen Meinungsfreiheit.</i>] (One Percent)
Vigilantism	Here, ‘Vigilantism’ is defined as a set of tactics involving direct action stunts and street patrols designed to intimidate and ‘Other’ minority populations.	“With 40 men we roughed up a bunch of wogs on the banks of the River Elbe.” [<i>Mit einem 40 Mann Haufen am Elbufer Kanackengruppen weggeklatst.</i>] (FKD)


²⁰ See ‘Ultra-Nationalism’, online at: www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/ultranationalism.

EXTREME RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS IN GERMANY

		
BLOOD & HONOUR (BSH)	COMBAT 18 (GERMANY) [COMBAT 18 DEUTSCHLAND [C 18 DEUTSCHLAND]]	REVOLUTION CHEMNITZ [REVOLUTION CHEMNITZ, RC]
LEADER Unknown	LEADERS Torsten Heise Robin Schmiemann Marco Gottschalk Stanley Röske Marco Eckert Lars Bergeest	LEADER Christian K.
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	MEMBERSHIP c. 20-60 (2019)	MEMBERSHIP 8
IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY
Neo-Nazism	Neo-Nazism	Neo-Nazism
'Revisionism'	Ethno-Nationalism	Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory
Ethno-Nationalism	Vigilantism	Vigilantism

EXTREME RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS IN GERMANY

		
OLDSCHOOL SOCIETY (OSS)	GROUP FREITAL/CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS FREITAL [GRUPPE FREITAL/ BÜRGERWEHR FREITAL]	FREE COMRADESHIP DRESDEN [FREIE KAMERADSCHAFT DRESDEN (FKD)]
LEADERS Andreas H. Markus W.	LEADERS Timo Schulz Patrick Festing	LEADER Benjamin Z.
MEMBERSHIP c. 4-10	MEMBERSHIP 8	MEMBERSHIP c. 6-30
IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY
Anti-Immigration Sentiment	Neo-Nazism	Neo-Nazism
Vigilantism	Anti-Immigration Sentiment	'Revisionism'
Chauvinism	Ultra-Nationalism	Vigilantism

DESCRIPTION	
	<p>B&H was founded in 1987 in the UK to promote neo-Nazism through ‘White Power’ music by bands like ‘Skrewdriver’ and ‘No Remorse’ Due to the infamy of the former band, B&H quickly became an international organisation. National divisions and regional sections extended across much of the whole world, above all in Europe, North America, and Oceania. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, B&H had become notorious in Scandinavia (especially Sweden and Denmark) and Germany. A German division was founded in 1994 but was banned in September 2000 by the Federal Minister of the Interior, alongside its youth organisation ‘White Youth’ (founded in 1997). The German division and its members, especially Jan Werner and Thomas Starke, became well known for their long-lasting support of the NSU, f.e. with money, infrastructure, and contacts in order to survive in the underground. Furthermore, B&H collected money at concerts “for the three” which was brought to the NSU by B&H members. Key features of this movement still include the promotion of White Power music through concerts, music production, and transnational distribution.²¹ After the ban, several groups continued as ‘Brotherhood 28’ or ‘Division 28.’ These underground organisations drew upon the infrastructure and labels of foreign divisions with close ties to German activists — especially in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France, and Hungary.²² In addition to white power music, B&H is well known for its close association with its paramilitary wing, Combat 18. B&H is not as violent/militant as C18 but members did not hesitate to use violence against each other. For example, the confidant of the ‘White Power’ band ‘Landser,’ Jean-René Bauer, had the B&H member and NSU confidant Thomas Starke beaten up after discovering that he talked to the police in the course of the ‘Landser’ trial.²³ They also used violence to advance their political agenda. For example, Carsten Szczepanski — also known as informant ‘Piatto’ as a witness in the NSU trial — served four years in prison 1994-1998 for the politically motivated attempted murder of a Nigerian teacher that he committed alongside a group of other neo-Nazis. Serving as an informant and ‘valuable source’ he quickly became a day release prisoner.²⁴ Finally, they were banned due to their “active and militant stance and action against the constitutional order.”²⁵</p>
BLOOD & HONOUR (B&H)	
LEADER Unknown	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	
IDEOLOGY Neo-Nazism	
NARRATIVE EXAMPLES	
<p>Neo-Nazism: “Blood and Honour.” [Blut und Ehre]</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>-Motto inscribed on the travelling knives of the Hitler Youth from 1933 until 1938.²⁶</i></p>	

²¹ See Sebastian Gräfe, “Blood & Honour”: “Trotz Verbot nicht tot?” Bedeutung in Gegenwart und Vergangenheit” In: Uwe Backes & Steffen Kailitz (eds.), Sachsen – eine Hochburg des Rechtsextremismus? (Göttingen: V&R 2020), p. 299-314.


²² See NRW rechtsaußen, ‘NRW: “Blood & Honour” - Konzert in Belgien mit “German Support,”’ Lotta Magazin, 14 July 2011, online at: <http://lotta-magazin.de/nrwrex/2011/07/nrw-blood-honour-konzert-belgien-mit-german-support>; Antifaschistisches Infoblatt, ‘Nazi-Gedenken ohne Ende – Tag(e) der Ehre in Budapest,’ Antifaschistisches Infoblatt, 26 May 2019, online at: <https://www.antifainfoblatt.de/artikel/nazi-gedenken-ohne-ende-%E2%80%93-tage-der-ehre-budapest>; Antifaschistisches Infoblatt, ‘Die Ermittlungen gegen “Blood & Honour” Nachfolger,’ Antifaschistisches Infoblatt, 21. September 2016, online at: <https://www.antifainfoblatt.de/artikel/die-ermittlungen-gegen-%E2%80%99blood-honour%E2%80%9C-nachfolger>.

²³ See Antifaschistisches Infoblatt, ‘Profis, Geld und Subkultur,’ Antifaschistisches Infoblatt, 17 December 2003, online at: <https://www.antifainfoblatt.de/artikel/profis-geld-und-subkultur>.

²⁴ See Michael Weiss, ‘Subkultur, Kommerz und Terrorismus. Die Netzwerke von Blood & Honour und Hammerskins in Brandenburg.’ In: Gideon Botsch, Jan Raabe & Christoph Schulze (eds.), Rechtsrock. Aufstieg und Wandel neonazistischer Jugendkultur am Beispiel Brandenburgs (Berlin: Bebra Verlag 2019), pp. 143-164, here: p. 149-162.

²⁵ See Bundesministerium des Innern, Verbotserfügung gegen die Gruppe Blood & Honour vom 12. September 2000 (Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern 2000), p. 2. Their stance against the constitutional order and some of their antisemitic and racist criminal offenses are documented in the transcript of the court proceedings of the NSU-trial and NSU-parliamentary enquiry reports (German Bundestag). See Annette Ramelsberger, Wiebke Ramm, Tanjev Schultz, Rainer Stadler, *Der NSU-Prozess. Das Protokoll* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2019), 2002; Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 3. Untersuchungsausschusses gemäß Artikel 44 des Grundgesetzes,’ Drucksache 18/12950, 23 June 2017, online at: <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/129/1812950.pdf>; Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 2. Untersuchungsausschusses gemäß Artikel 44 des Grundgesetzes,’ Drucksache 17/14600, August 2013, online at: <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/17/146/1714600.pdf>.

²⁶ See Heinz Schreckenberg, Erziehung, ‘Lebenswelt und Kriegseinsatz der deutschen Jugend unter Adolf Hitler,’ p. 213; Picture online at: <https://www.the-saleroom.com/en-gb/auction-catalogues/walldorf/catalogue-id-auktion10012/lot-a19643bf-8ac0-4194-b72a-a5c50098a150>.

NARRATIVE EXAMPLES (cont'd.)	
	<p>‘Revisionism:’ “We are the streets and we are the law, the 4th Reich is what we are fighting for.”</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>- B&H band ‘Race War’ from Germany with their Title ‘Hail Blood and Honour’ from their 2001 album ‘The White Race Will Prevail.’²⁷</i></p> <p>Ethno-Nationalism: “The purpose of the Blood & Honour movement must be to attract and activate young Whites through White Power music and other White Pride cultural activities.”</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>- Max Hammer (Erik Blücher), Blood & Honour Field Manual.²⁸</i></p>
BLOOD & HONOUR (B&H)	
IDEOLOGY (cont'd.)	
‘Revisionism’	
Ethno-Nationalism	

²⁷ Race War, ‘Hail Blood And Honour,’ The White Race Will Prevail, Micetrap Records 2001.

²⁸ See Max Hammer (Erik Blücher), *Blood & Honour Field Manual*, 2000.

	DESCRIPTION
	
COMBAT 18 (GERMANY) (COMBAT 18 DEUTSCHLAND, C 18 DEUTSCHLAND)	
LEADERS Torsten Heise Robin Schmiemann Marco Gottschalk Stanley Röske Marco Eckert Lars Bergeest	<p>C18 was founded in the UK in 1992 and, like its umbrella organisation B&H, quickly expanded to other countries, resulting in up to 25 official divisions worldwide. One of the most active and influential of these is located in Germany. This German division consists of three known and verifiable regional sections, all led by the confidant of the movement's current leader, Will Browning, Thorsten Heise, and his right-hand man Robin Schmiemann. The oldest section is led by Marco Gottschalk, singer of the C18 band 'Oidoxie' and leader of the 'Oidoxie Streetfighting Crew.' They are located around the city of Dortmund, one of the few local strongholds of the extreme radical right in West Germany. Stanley Röske is the leader of the second section (which includes the suspected murderer of CDU politician Walter Lübcke, who was closely linked to the Nordhessen Crew, a precursor of this section). This section is located around the city of Kassel. The third section builds on the remains of Combat-18 Pinnerberg, a paramilitary group which existed from 2001-2003. The leaders of this section are purported to be Marco Eckert and Lars Bergeest. C18 was involved in the reemerging concert business, band promotion (especially of C18 bands like 'Oidoxie,' 'TreueOrden,' and 'Erschießungskommando') as well as networking and combat training.³⁰ In January 2020 'Combat 18 Germany' was banned by the German Federal Minister of the Interior but — much like B&H — is has continued with a similar name. Called the 'Brothers of Honour,' the group now wears branded clothes of other divisions to conceal their identities (for example, that of Combat 18 Sweden).³¹ Beyond the combat training and the resulting verdicts, the homes of several members were searched in light of the C18 Germany ban. The headquarters of Thorsten Heise was raided several times in different contexts and he was found guilty of hate speech, the production and distribution of race-baiting CDs,³² and the illegal possession of firearms.³³</p>
MEMBERSHIP c. 20-60 (2019) ²⁹	
IDEOLOGY	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
Neo-Nazism	Neo-Nazism: "We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children." <i>-David E. Lane, member of 'The Order.'</i> ³⁴
Ethno-Nationalism	
Vigilantism	Ethno-Nationalism: "Fighting for better nations, we want our cities clean. This is the terrormachine, this is Combat 18." <i>- The band 'Oidoxie' from Dortmund with the title 'Terrormachine' from the 2006 album 'Terrormachine.'</i> ³⁵
	Vigilantism: 'Silent Brotherhood — whatever it takes — C18.' <i>- Combat 18 motto, Tattoo on the lower leg of Robin Schmiemann.</i> ³⁶

²⁹ See Exif-Recherche, '«Combat 18» Reunion', Exif-Recherche, 16 July 2018, online at: <https://exif-recherche.org/?p=4399>.

³⁰ See Maximilian Kreter, 'Die deutsche Rechtsrockszene. Integraler Bestandteil der rechtsextremen Bewegung oder isolierte, subkulturelle Szene', Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie 31, 2019, p. 159-173, here: p. 169-172.

³¹ See Sebastian Weiermann, 'Wirkungsloses Verbot', Neues Deutschland, 23 January 2020, online at: <https://www.neues-deutschland.de/artikel/1131902.combat-wirkungsloses-verbot.html>.


³² Referring to §130 German Criminal Code: "Incitement of masses."

³³ See Kai Budler, 'Zwischen Gewalt, RechtsRock und Kommerz. Der Multifunktionär Thorsten Heise' (Erfurt: Mobit 2020), p. 28-34.

³⁴ See George Michael, 'David Lane and the Fourteen Words,' Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions. 10 (1), 2009, p. 43-61.

³⁵ See Oidoxie, 'Terrormachine,' Terrormachine, WB-Versand 2006.

³⁶ See Antifa Recherche Dortmund, 'Aushängeschild für C18. Robin Schmiemann: Vom Handlanger zur Symbolfigur,' Lotta-Magazin, 29 June 2019, online at: <http://www.lotta-magazin.de/ausgabe/online/aushaengschild-f-c18-0>.

	DESCRIPTION
	
REVOLUTION CHEMNITZ (REVOLUTION CHEMNITZ, RC)	
LEADER Christian K.	<p>Revolution Chemnitz (RC) started as a Telegram chat group on 10 September 2018 in the aftermath of the radical right riots in Chemnitz in late August 2018.³⁸ Participants aimed to "change Germany's history [and claimed to] make the NSU look like kindergarten preschool group."³⁹ Members have their roots in the local and regional radical right skinhead, hooligan, and Neo-Nazi scene, especially in the surroundings of Sturm 34. Sturm 34 is a banned organisation whose members were found guilty of a long list of crimes ranging from hate speech to assaults. Only four days after foundation, RC started a 'test run' as a vigilante group. In Chemnitz, they attacked both Germans and foreigners ahead of a series of planned assaults on 03 October (German Unity Day, a public holiday). On 01 October the police arrested six out of eight members before they could carry out any assaults.⁴⁰ All 6 were found guilty of membership in a terrorist organisation (129a§ German Criminal Code). The leader, Christian K., was also found guilty of founding a terrorist organisation.⁴¹</p>
MEMBERSHIP 8 ³⁷	
IDEOLOGY	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
Neo-Nazism	Neo-Nazism: "Struggle against state and capital. Free, social national." ["Im Kampf gegen Staat und Kapital. Frei, sozial und national."] <i>- Self-description of RC on Facebook.</i> ⁴²
Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory	Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory: "Time does not stand still, 'Volkstod' ⁴³ is imminent. Time for Revolution, get active with us and take action. Revolution Chemnitz." ["Die Zeit bleibt nicht stehen, der Volkstod naht. Zeit zur Revolution, mit uns zur Tat. Revolution Chemnitz."] <i>- Screenshot of picture posted on Facebook.</i> ⁴⁴
Vigilantism	Vigilantism: "Assault on the media dictatorship and its slaves [...] and the NSU was intended to be made looking like a kindergarten preschool group in comparison to Revolution Chemnitz." ["Angriff auf die Mediendiktatur und ihre Sklaven [...] Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund sollte im Vergleich zu der Chemnitzer Gruppe aussehen wie eine 'Kindertagervorschulgruppe.'"] <i>- Facebook post and an excerpt of a Telegram chat of 'Revolution Chemnitz.'</i> ⁴⁵

³⁷ See ARD, 'Haftstrafen für "Revolution Chemnitz"', tagesschau.de, 24 March 2020, online at: <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/urteil-revolution-chemnitz-101.html>.

³⁸ See Matthias Bartsch, Maik Baumgärtner, Jörg Diehl, Jan Friedmann, Lothar Gornis, Nils Klawitter, Martin Knobbe, Beate Lakotta, Katharina Meyer zu Eppendorf, René Pfister, Christopher Piltz, Sven Röbel, Fidelius Schmid, Charlotte Schönberger, Andreas Ulrich, David Walden, Wolf Wiedmann-Schmidt, Steffen Winter, 'The Riots in Chemnitz and Their Aftermath', Spiegel Online, 31 August 2018, online at: <https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-riots-in-chemnitz-and-their-aftermath-the-return-of-the-ugly-german-a-1225897.html>.

³⁹ Julia Jüttner, 'Rechtsextremes Klassentreffen in Handschellen', Spiegel Online, 30 September 2019, online at: <https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/justiz/revolution-chemnitz-prozessauftakt-rechtsextremes-klassentreffen-a-1289362.html>.

⁴⁰ See Ibid.

⁴¹ See ARD, 'Haftstrafen für "Revolution Chemnitz"', tagesschau.de, 24 March 2020, online at: <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/urteil-revolution-chemnitz-101.html>.

⁴² See Revolution Chemnitz Facebook "Logo," online at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20181001164726/https://www.facebook.com/Revolution-Chemnitz-ANW-447800521999813/>.

⁴³ 'Volkstod' is a buzzword of the extreme radical right, which stands for the conviction that the German people will extinct by mixing with other ethnic groups. It is closely linked to the Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory. See, Gideon Botsch, Christoph Kopke, 'Umvolkung' und 'Volkstod': Zur Kontinuität einer extrem rechten Paranoia (Münster: Verlag Klemm+Oelschläger 2019).

⁴⁴ Revolution Chemnitz, Facebook site, online at: <https://image.stern.de/8385312/16x9-2048-1152/6d877c772c3b54a1fbd346fccc4db44/dq/chemnitz-screenshot-x4.jpg>.

⁴⁵ See <https://web.archive.org/web/20181001164726/https://www.facebook.com/Revolution-Chemnitz-ANW-447800521999813/>; Telegram chat cited in: Andrea Hentschel, 'In Sachsen stehen acht Männer der Gruppe "Revolution Chemnitz" vor Gericht,' General Anzeiger Bonn, 1 October 2018, online at: https://www.general-anzeiger-bonn.de/news/politik/deutschland/in-sachsen-stehen-acht-maenner-der-gruppe-revolution-chemnitz-vor-gericht_aid-46205445.

	<p style="text-align: center;">DESCRIPTION</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">OLDSCHOOL SOCIETY (OSS)</p>	<p>Oldschool Society (OSS) was the first terrorist group in Germany detected (with members later convicted) after the prosecution of the NSU in November 2011. OSS was initially launched as a chat group in autumn 2014, but it soon expanded its activities to a public Facebook account with approximately 3,000 followers. They then met for an act of foundation and to “make further plans” in the Saxon city of Frohburg (between Chemnitz and Leipzig). The core group consisted of three men (Andreas H.; Markus W.; Olaf O.) and one woman (Denise G.) alongside six more loosely connected members. Contrary to their online presence, however, the first four defined themselves as a “privy council” which would execute an “order of power and discipline” in order to “wage war against asylum seekers and their supporters.”⁴⁷ In early May 2015, two members illegally bought fireworks, firecrackers, and bangers ahead of a planned meeting on 8 May, again in Frohburg. On 6 May the police conducted a raid based on sufficient evidence that the group planned attacks on refugee hostels, mosques, churches, and sheltered housing schemes for disabled persons.⁴⁸ The four core members were sentenced to 3 to 5 years in prison. They were found guilty of membership in a terrorist organisation (129a§ German Criminal Code) in March 2017. Three other members were also sentenced to minor penalties.⁴⁹</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">LEADERS Andreas H. Markus W.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">NARRATIVE EXAMPLES</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">MEMBERSHIP c. 4-10⁴⁶</p>	<p>Anti-Immigration Sentiment: “Wage war against asylum seekers and their supporters.” [“Krieg gegen Asylanten und deren Unterstützer.”] <i>-OSS Facebook page screenshot.⁵⁰</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">IDEOLOGY Anti-Immigration Sentiment</p>	<p>Vigilantism: “Privy council [which would execute] order of power and discipline.” [“Geheimrat der Befehls- und Disziplinargewalt ausführt.”] (The core group on their style of leadership within the group and possible role model for ‘Old School Society.’) <i>- Verdict of OLG Munich.⁵¹</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Vigilantism</p>	<p>Chauvinism: “Beware, we do not call the police. We take care of unwanted guests by ourselves. One bullet is not enough. Oldschool Society.” [“Achtung wir rufen nicht die Polizei um ungebetene Gäste kümmern wir uns selbst. Eine Kugel reicht nicht. Oldschool Society.”] <i>- OSS Facebook page screenshot.⁵²</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Chauvinism</p>	

⁴⁶ See Sebastian Lipp, ‘Nach außen Terror, nach innen banal’, Zeit Online, 15 March 2017, online at: <https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2017-03/oldschool-society-terrorismus-rechtsextremismus-prozess-haftstrafen>.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ See Robert Andreasch, ‘Geheimrat vor Gericht’ Der rechte Rand, July 2016, online at: <https://www.der-rechte-rand.de/archive/1457/geheimrat-vor-gericht%E2%80%A8%E2%80%A8/>.

⁴⁹ See Spiegel Online, ‘Haft- und Bewährungsstrafen für Mitglieder von rechtsextremem Vereinigung’, Spiegel Online, 10 October 2019, online at: <https://www.spiegel.de/panorama/leute/dresden-oldschool-society-mitglieder-verurteilt-a-1290920.html>.

⁵⁰ See Sebastian Lipp, ‘Nach außen Terror, nach innen banal’, Zeit Online, 15 March 2017, online at: <https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2017-03/oldschool-society-terrorismus-rechtsextremismus-prozess-haftstrafen>.

⁵¹ Verdict of the OLG Munich cited in: Sebastian Lipp, ‘Nach außen Terror, nach innen banal’, Zeit Online, 15 March 2017, online at: <https://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2017-03/oldschool-society-terrorismus-rechtsextremismus-prozess-haftstrafen>.

⁵² Screenshot cited in: Tim Schulz, ‘Old School Society: Weiterer Prozess gegen rechte Terrorgruppe’, Endstation Rechts, 6 February 2019, online at: <https://www.endstation-rechts.de/news/old-school-society-weiterer-prozess-gegen-rechte-terrorgruppe.html>.

	<p style="text-align: center;">DESCRIPTION</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">GROUP FREITAL/CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS FREITAL (GRUPPE FREITAL/ BÜRGERWEHR FREITAL)</p>	<p>Group Freital started on Facebook as a vigilante group in March 2015. The foundation took place during the so-called refugee crisis. The group initially called itself ‘Civil Defence Corps FTL/360’ (Bürgerwehr FTL/360). The leader of the group was Timo Schulz, who was a member of the alleged terrorist group The White Wolves Terror Crew (Weisse Wölfe Terrorcrew, WWI). His co-leader was Patrick Festing, who had close ties to Dynamo Dresden’s radical right football firm, ‘Fist of the East’ (<i>Faust des Ostens</i>). Group Freital encompassed another five men and one woman. The group made its first major public appearance during the racist riots of Heidenau in August 2015.⁵⁴ Between July and November 2015 they launched several arson attacks against refugee accommodation, and also against cars and offices of politicians of The Left (<i>Die Linke</i>) party. One attack was also carried out alongside the Free Comradeship Dresden. All eight members were convicted of membership of a terrorist organisation (129a§ German Criminal Code), bomb attacks, and attempted murder.⁵⁵</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">LEADERS Timo Schulz Patrick Festing</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">NARRATIVE EXAMPLES</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">MEMBERSHIP 8⁵³</p>	<p>Neo-Nazism: “We’re Nazis until the bitter end.” [“Wir sind Nazis bis zum bitteren Ende.”] <i>- Facebook comment by PW, member of Group Freital on 23 September 2015.⁵⁶</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">IDEOLOGY Neo-Nazism</p>	<p>Anti-Immigration Sentiment: “Please keep on fleeing! No housing available!” [“Bitte flüchten Sie weiter! Es gibt hier nicht zu Wohnen.”] <i>- Sticker found at PW’s home.⁵⁷</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Anti-Immigration Sentiment</p>	<p>Ultra-Nationalism: “Germany awakes! Loving your country is not a crime.” [“DEUTSCHLAND ERWACHT! HEIMATLIEBE IST KEIN VERBRECHEN.”] <i>- Facebook comment by MS, member of Group Freital on 28 August 2015.⁵⁸</i></p>
<p style="text-align: center;">Ultra-Nationalism</p>	

⁵³ See Sebastian Gräfe, Sven Segelke, ‘Rechte Hassgewalt in Sachsen, 2011 bis 2016’ In: Uwe Backes, Sebastian Gräfe, Anna-Maria Haase, Maximilian Kreter, Michail Logvinov, Sven Segelke (eds.), Rechte Hassgewalt in Sachsen. Entwicklungstrends und Radikalisierung (Göttingen: V&R 2019), p. 53-136.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.




⁵⁶ See Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, Anklageschrift, Az 2 BJs 38/16-5, 2 StE 19/16-5, p. 43.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ See Der Generalbundesanwalt beim Bundesgerichtshof, Anklageschrift, Az 2 BJs 38/16-5, 2 StE 19/16-5, p. 47.

	DESCRIPTION
FREE COMRADESHIP DRESDEN [FREIE KAMERADSCHAFT DRESDEN (FKD)]	<p>Free Comradeship Dresden (<i>Freie Kameradschaft Dresden</i>, FKD) was founded in July 2015. The group's main goal was to carry out attacks against refugees (and their supporters), the political left, the police, and other (perceived) political enemies. In contrast to Group Freital, the FKD embraced direct physical confrontation with perceived political enemies. It often resulted in street riots, raids on alternative housing projects, or attacks on the police. Between July 2015 and January 2016, FKD members were involved in five attacks on (perceived) enemies or riots, before FKD officially dissolved in late February 2016.⁶⁰ The most notorious riot occurred in August 2015, when the FKD members took an active part in the racist riots of Heidenau. In January 2016, most members took part in the “Storm On Connewitz” (Connewitz is an alternative-leftist stronghold in the city of Leipzig), a raid on a neighbourhood with approximately 250 football hooligans and other violent perpetrators (215 were arrested).⁶¹ In August 2016 at least 3 former members were among 20 to 30 persons who took part in a “refugee hunt” during the Dresden City Festival. The final verdicts for the members ranged from 30 to 72 months, although they were not found guilty of foundation or membership of a terrorist organisation but rather that of a criminal organisation.⁶²</p>
LEADER Benjamin Z.	
MEMBERSHIP c. 6-30 ⁵⁹	
IDEOLOGY	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
Neo-Nazism	<p>Neo-Nazism/‘Revisionism’: “Their sacrifice, our mission, Free Comradeship Dresden.” [“Ihr Opfer, unser Auftrag, Freie Kameradschaft Dresden.”] <i>- Picture of the memorial wreath, which the FKD placed on WW II soldiers’ graves on Remembrance Sunday 2015.⁶³</i></p>
‘Revisionism’	
Vigilantism	<p>Vigilantism: “With 40 men we roughed up a bunch of wogs on the banks of the River Elbe.” (Context: The group members were looking for refugees and foreigners i.e. victims during the ‘Dresden City Fest’ to beat/rough them up [“Mit einem 40 Mann Haufen am Elbufer Kanackengruppen weggeklatscht.”]) <i>- One FKD member calling another FKD member on 21 August 2016.⁶⁴</i></p>

⁵⁹ See Sebastian Gräfe, Sven Segelke, ‘Rechte Hassgewalt in Sachsen, 2011 bis 2016’ In: Uwe Backes, Sebastian Gräfe, Anna-Maria Haase, Maximilian Kreter, Michail Logvinov, Sven Segelke (eds.), *Rechte Hassgewalt in Sachsen. Entwicklungstrends und Radikalisierung* (Göttingen: V&R 2019), p. 53-136, here: p. 111-113.
⁶⁰ Ibid.
⁶¹ See Landgericht Dresden, Urteil, Az. 3 KLs 373 Js 49/17, p. 53-56, 124-127.
⁶² See Sebastian Gräfe, Sven Segelke, ‘Rechte Hassgewalt in Sachsen, 2011 bis 2016’ In: Uwe Backes, Sebastian Gräfe, Anna-Maria Haase, Maximilian Kreter, Michail Logvinov, Sven Segelke (eds.), *Rechte Hassgewalt in Sachsen. Entwicklungstrends und Radikalisierung* (Göttingen: V&R 2019), p. 53-136, here: 111-113.
⁶³ See Landgericht Dresden, Urteil, Az. 3 KLs 373 Js 49/17, p. 152.
⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 159

MAINSTREAM RADICAL RIGHT IN GERMANY		
		
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GERMANY [NATIONALDEMOKRATISCHE PARTEI DEUTSCHLANDS (NPD)]	THE THIRD PATH [DER III. WEG/DER DRITTE WEG]	THE RIGHT [DIE RECHTE]
LEADER Frank Franz	LEADER Klaus Armstroff	LEADERS Sascha Krolzig Sven Skoda
MEMBERSHIP 4,000 (2018)	MEMBERSHIP 530 (2018)	MEMBERSHIP 600 (2018)
IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY	IDEOLOGY
Neo-Nazism	Neo-Nazism	Anti-Semitism
Ethno-Nationalism	‘Revisionism’	Ethno-Nationalism
Anti-Semitism	Anti-Globalism	Neo-Nazism/‘Revisionism’
Anti-Immigration Sentiment		
Victimhood		

MAINSTREAM RADICAL RIGHT IN GERMANY



PATRIOTIC EUROPEANS AGAINST THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE OCCIDENT
 [PATRIOTISCHE EUROPÄER GEGEN DIE ISLAMISIERUNG DES ABENDLANDES (PEGIDA)]

LEADER
 Lutz Bachmann

MEMBERSHIP
 Unknown (c. 750-1,000 demonstration participants each week in 2019; rising up to 25,000 in 2015.)

IDEOLOGY

- Anti-Muslim Populism
- Anti-Establishment
- Victimhood
- Ultra-Nationalism



IDENTITARIAN MOVEMENT GERMANY (ALSO KNOWN AS 'GENERATION IDENTITY')
 [IDENTITÄRE BEWEGUNG DEUTSCHLAND (IBD)]


LEADERS
 Daniel Fiß
 Nils Altmieks
 Philipp Stein
 Philip Thaler
 Alexander Kleine

MEMBERSHIP
 600 (2018)

IDEOLOGY

- Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory
- Ethno-Nationalism
- Anti-Globalism
- Identitarianism

MAINSTREAM RADICAL RIGHT IN GERMANY



ONE PERCENT FOR OUR COUNTRY/ONE PERCENT
 [EIN PROZENT FÜR UNSER LAND/EIN PROZENT]

LEADER
 Philipp Stein

MEMBERSHIP
 Unknown

IDEOLOGY

- Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory
- Ultra-Nationalism
- Victimhood



INSTITUTE FOR STATE POLICY
 [INSTITUT FÜR STAATSPOLITIK (IFS)]

LEADERS
 Götz Kubitschek
 Erik Lehnert (formally)

MEMBERSHIP
 Unknown

IDEOLOGY

- Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory
- Ultra-Nationalism

	DESCRIPTION
	<p>Founded in 1964 to unite the electoral radical right. After several victories in the late 1960s (represented in seven out of eleven state parliaments, and 4.3% in the 1969 German Federal election) the party sank into societal and electoral insignificance until the mid-1990s when Udo Voigt took the lead in 1996. While the party kept a distance from the radical right subcultural and skinhead scene, Voigt started to invite skinheads, members of the groupuscular right (especially free comradeships), and those from other formerly ‘unwanted’ groups to join the NPD in order to transform the party from an electoral formation into a movement party. He introduced a “four pillar strategy” which was about fighting for: 1. hearts and minds; 2. the streets; 3. parliament; and 4. the organised will.⁶⁶ This approach allowed the party to mobilise supporters for election campaigns. In (re)turn they supported Comradeships (by supplying them with a robust legal framework for demonstrations by the so-called ‘Parteienprivileg’ [lit. party privilege] guaranteed by article 21, German Basic Law) and the subcultural scene (such as providing a platform for concerts). The NPD twice entered the state parliaments of Saxony and Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania between 2004 and 2011. Since then, most political — meaning parliamentary and extra-parliamentary — strongholds were and still are located in East Germany. The NPD did not get more than 1.6% of the votes in a German Federal election after 1969.⁶⁷ During times of limited electoral success, nearly a quarter of high-ranking party officials had a criminal record, ranging from verbal abuse over holocaust denial and hate speech to aggravated assaults.⁶⁸ The drift towards political insignificance, alongside infiltration by confidential informants, were major reasons for the failure of the two attempts to ban the party in 2003 and 2017.⁶⁹ Today, the party still retains seats in some local parliaments despite being usurped electorally by the less extreme AfD. The party focuses on the role of a movement party again, i.e. the NPD will not only strive for power by winning seats in parliaments but preferentially seek alliances with street movements like PEGIDA as well as the groupuscular right.⁷⁰</p>
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GERMANY [NATIONALDEMOKRATISCHE PARTEI DEUTSCHLANDS (NPD)]	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
LEADER Frank Franz	<p>Neo-Nazism: “Without any doubt Hitler was a great German statesman.”[Zweifellos handelt es sich bei Hitler um einen großen deutschen Staatsmann].</p> <p style="text-align: right;">- Udo Voigt, former party chairman.⁷¹</p>
MEMBERSHIP 4,000 (2018) ⁶⁵	
IDEOLOGY	
Neo-Nazism	

⁶⁵ See Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat (eds.), ‘Verfassungsschutzbericht 2018,’ p.85.

⁶⁶ Christoph Schulze, ‘Das Viersäulenkonzept der NPD.’ In: Stephan Braun, Alexander Geisler, Martin Gerster (eds.), Strategien der extremen Rechten. Hintergründe – Analysen – Antworten (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2009), p. 92-108, here 93.


⁶⁷ See Marc Brandstetter, *Die NPD unter Udo Voigt. Organisation. Ideologie. Strategie.* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2013).

⁶⁸ See Frankfurter Rundschau, ‘Ein Viertel der NPD-Funktionäre vorbestraft’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 19 December 2013, online at: <https://www.fr.de/politik/viertel-npd-funktionaere-vorbestraft-11385622.html>.

⁶⁹ See Uwe Backes, ‘Banning political parties in a democratic constitutional state: the second NPD ban proceedings in a comparative perspective,’ *Patterns of Prejudice* 53 (2), 2019, p. 136-151.

⁷⁰ See Rainer Melcher, ‘I’m still here. Elektorale Erfolgsbedingungen der NPD in Gemeinden Sachsens. In: Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 41 (3), 2018, p. 365–397; Christoph Richter, Axel Salheiser, Matthias Quent, ‘Rechtsradikale Landnahme. Analyse des AfD-Wahlerfolgs zur Landtagswahl 2019 in den Thüringer Gemeinden’ (Jena: Institut für Demokratie und Zivilgesellschaft, 2019).

⁷¹ See Moritz Schwarz, ‘“Ziel ist es die BRD abzuwickeln”. Der NPD-Vorsitzende Udo Voigt über den Wahlerfolg seiner Partei und den Zusammenbruch des liberal-kapitalistischen Systems.’ *Junge Freiheit*, 24 September 2004.

	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES (cont'd.)
	<p>Ethno-Nationalism: “Germany for the Germans! What else?” [“Deutschland den Deutschen! Was denn sonst?”]</p> <p style="text-align: right;">- Ronny Zasonk, current party vice chairman.⁷²</p> <p>Anti-Semitism: “The entire financial edifice of this Jewish Republic will completely collapse within the next two years.” [“Das gesamte Finanzgebäude dieser Judenrepublik in den nächsten zwei Jahren zusammenbrechen wird.”]</p> <p style="text-align: right;">- Udo Pastörs, former party chairman at the 2009 Ash Wednesday NPD convention.⁷³</p> <p>Anti-Immigration Sentiment: “Travel home instead of entering [Germany].” [“Heimreise statt Einreise.”]</p> <p style="text-align: right;">- Frequently used campaign slogan of the NPD.⁷⁴</p> <p>Victimhood: “End German collective guilt! We defend ourselves against moral self-destruction of our nation through one sided historical recriminations to the account of Germany.” [“Schuld kult beenden. Wir wehren uns gegen die moralische Selbstvernichtung unserer Nation durch einseitige geschichtliche Schuldzuweisungen zu Lasten Deutschlands.”]</p> <p style="text-align: right;">- NPD party programme 2010.⁷⁵</p>
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF GERMANY [NATIONALDEMOKRATISCHE PARTEI DEUTSCHLANDS (NPD)]	
IDEOLOGY (cont'd.)	
Ethno-Nationalism	
Anti-Semitism	
Anti-Immigration Sentiment	
Victimhood	

⁷² See Ronny Zasonk, ‘Deutschland den Deutschen! Was denn sonst?’, NPD website, 26 June 2017, online at: <https://npd.de/2017/06/deutschland-den-deutschen-was-denn-sonst/>.

⁷³ Udo Pastörs, cited in: Patrick Gensing, *Terror von rechts: Die Nazi-Morde und das Versagen der Politik* (Berlin: Rotbuch 2012), p. 121.

⁷⁴ See NPD, ‘Heimreise statt Einreise,’ online at: http://www.npd-lahn-dill.de/inhalte/image/ferneinbindung/1_heimreise_750.jpg.

⁷⁵ See Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, ‘Arbeit. Familie. Vaterland. Das Parteiprogramm der Nationaldemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (NPD),’ (Bamberg, 2010), p. 14.

	DESCRIPTION
THE THIRD PATH [DER III. WEG/ DER DRITTE WEG]	<p>The Third Path is a minor Neo-Nazi party founded in 2013 as a camouflage organisation for the banned 'Free Network South' (<i>Freies Netz Süd</i>). The local strongholds are nearly congruent to the ones of the 'Free Network South' in North Eastern Bavaria/Franconia, South West Saxony, and Western Rhineland-Palatine. The Third Path participates in elections even though, according to the statements of their chairman, Klaus Armstroff, they are not interested in traditional party politics. Instead, they focus on movement and street politics such as martial arts training or rallies in their strongholds. For instance, the Third Path conducted a demonstration resembling the SA-tradition on 1 May 2019 in Plauen. They also built a transnational network which they maintain with regular visits in countries like Hungary (Day of Honour), Bulgaria (Lukov March), and Greece (Imia March). Their only programmatic document ever published was a ten-point manifesto, which bears compositional and terminological similarities to the 25-point manifesto of the 'National Socialist German Workers' Party' ('Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei,' NSDAP).⁷⁶ High ranking members of this group have long criminal records and are deeply rooted in the extreme radical right movement. For example, Martin Wiese is a member of the terrorist organization 'Schutzgruppe' from Munich, which planned a bomb attack on a Jewish Cultural Center in Munich, and Maik Eminger, a close supporter of the NSU (whose brother André was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison for direct support of the NSU) is also a former co-leader of the free comradeship 'White Brotherhood Erzgebirge' ['Weiße Bruderschaft Erzgebirge']. Matthias Fischer, a former leader of the 'Free Network South,' served at least two years in prison for several crimes.⁷⁸</p>
LEADER Klaus Armstroff	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
MEMBERSHIP 530 (2018) ⁷⁶	Neo-Nazism
IDEOLOGY	Neo-Nazism: "Creation of German Socialism [...] German children for the country." ["Schaffung eines deutschen Sozialismus [...] Deutsche Kinder braucht das Land."]
'Revisionism'	<i>- 10-point manifesto of The Third Path.⁷⁹</i>
Anti-Globalism	'Revisionism:' "Germany is larger than the FRG." ["Deutschland ist größer als die BRD."]
	<i>-10-point manifesto of The Third Path.⁸⁰</i>
	Anti-Globalism: "No German Blood for foreign interests." ["Kein deutsches Blut für fremde Interessen."]
	<i>-10-point manifesto of The Third Path.⁸¹</i>

⁷⁶ See Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat (eds.), 'Verfassungsschutzbericht 2018,' p. 80.

⁷⁷ See Marc Brandstetter, M., 'Partei Gründungen als Reaktionen auf staatliche Verbote,' Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie 28, 2016, 188-206; Maximilian Kreter, 'Die deutsche Rechtsrockszene. Integraler Bestandteil der rechtsextremen Bewegung oder isolierte, subkulturelle Szene,' Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie 31, 2019, p. 159-173, here: 166-167.

⁷⁸ See Marc Brandstetter, M., 'Partei Gründungen als Reaktionen auf staatliche Verbote,' Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie 28, 2016, 188-206; Jonas Miller, 'Die bayerische Neonaziszene verliert einen führenden Kopf,' Zeit Störungsmelder, 12 July 2014, online at: https://blog.zeit.de/stoerungsmelder/2014/07/12/die-bayerische-neonaziszene-verliert-einen-fuehrenden-kopf_16687; Tim Mönch, 'Weniger Neonazis in Plauen als erwartet', Belltower News, 2 May 2019, online at: <https://www.beltower.news/aufmarsch-am-1-mai-weniger-neonazis-in-plauen-als-erwartet-84665/>.

⁷⁹ See Der Dritte Weg, '10 Punkte Programm der Partei DER DRITTE WEG,' online at: <https://der-dritte-weg.info/zehn-punkte-programm/>.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

	DESCRIPTION
THE RIGHT [DIE RECHTE]	<p>The Right received its initial impulse from two major influences in 2012. On one hand, it was founded as a collective movement for former members of the NPD (see above) and the 'German Peoples' Union' (<i>Deutsche Volksumion</i>, DVU), who were dissatisfied with the politics of an NPD/DVU merger in 2011. On the other hand, it served as a camouflage organization, in this case for the banned free comradeship 'National Resistance Dortmund' ('National Widerstand Dortmund,' NWDO). The well-known Neo-Nazi and movement entrepreneur⁸² Christian Worch became the first chairman and remained in office from 2012 to 2017. The party was divided by a party conference resolution asserting the party's absolute and unconditional avowal to the German ethnic community. As a consequence of this showdown, Worch resigned. He was replaced by the former NWDO activist Sascha Krolzig and Sven Skoda, a former high-ranking member of the 'Action Committee Middle Rhein' ('Aktionsbüro Mittelrhein').⁸⁴ Both were (and still are) involved in street fights with perceived political enemies, propaganda, and other crimes (often in the wake of political demonstrations). Their penalties sum up to several years in prison.⁸⁵ To demonstrate a new political orientation towards Anti-Semitism and National Socialism the new chairmen nominated the 90-year old notorious Holocaust denier Ursula Haverbeck-Wetzel as their frontrunner for the 2019 European Parliament elections.⁸⁶ Despite this, The Right focuses more on street activism and demonstrations than on parliamentary politics.</p>
LEADERS Sascha Krolzig Sven Skoda	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES
MEMBERSHIP 600 (2018) ⁸²	Anti-Semitism
IDEOLOGY	Anti-Semitism: "After 75 years, we still have the same enemy. The enemy isn't called Müller or Meier — No! — The enemy is called Rothschild and Goldman & Sachs." ["Wir haben auch noch heute denselben Feind wie vor 75 Jahren. Der Feind heißt nicht Müller oder Meier — Nein! Er heißt Rothschild und Goldman und Sachs."]
	<i>- Matthias Deyda (of The Right) at the Day of Honour in Budapest/Hungary on 8 February 2020.⁸⁷</i>

⁸² See Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat (eds.), 'Verfassungsschutzbericht 2018,' p. 78.


⁸³ Relating to the typologies of John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald as well as of Suzanne Staggenborg Staggenborg. John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, 'Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,' American Journal of Sociology 82 (6), 1977, 1212-1241, here: 1227. Suzanne Staggenborg, 'The Consequences of Professionalization and Formalization in the Pro-Choice Movement,' American Sociological Review 53 (4), 1988, 585-605, here: 586-590. Precisely the type of movement entrepreneur who entirely lives politically, socially, and economically of, by and for the scene and the movement. They are often involved since years or even decades, thereby have a lot of (professional) knowledge and are often charismatic leaders with distinct organizational skills. Thomas Grumke, 'Die rechtsextremistische Bewegung,' In: Roland Roth, Dieter Rucht (eds.), Die sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland seit 1945. Ein Handbuch (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 2008), pp. 475-491, here: 482.

⁸⁴ See Marc Brandstetter, M., 'Partei Gründungen als Reaktionen auf staatliche Verbote,' Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie 28, 2016, 188-206; Kreter, M., 'Die deutsche Rechtsrockszene. Integraler Bestandteil der rechtsextremen Bewegung oder isolierte, subkulturelle Szene,' Jahrbuch Extremismus & Demokratie 31, 2019, p. 159-173, here: 166-167.

⁸⁵ See Uwe Buse, 'Wie Neonazis in Dortmund ungestört leben können,' Spiegel Online, 22 February 2019, online at: <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/wie-neonazis-in-dortmund-dorstfeld-ungestoert-leben-koennen-a-00000000-0002-0001-0000-000162534096>.


⁸⁶ See Reiner Burger, 'Maximale Provokation,' Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 November 2019, online at: <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/nazi-partei-die-rechte-maximale-provokation-16475729.html>.

⁸⁷ See Raimond Lippken, Dario Veréb, Jennifer Marken, "'Der Feind heißt nicht Müller oder Meier. Unser Feind heißt Rothschild und Goldman und Sachs,'" Hagalil – Jüdisches Leben online, 12 February 2020, online at: <https://www.hagalil.com/2020/02/ungarn-32/>.

NARRATIVE EXAMPLES (cont'd.)	
	<p>Ethno-Nationalism: “70 years FRG are an expression of lacking state sovereignty and anti-popular/anti-people politics: Against the Brussels EU-monster; standing in for a Europe of Fatherlands!” [“70 Jahre BRD sind aber nicht nur ein Ausdruck fehlender staatlicher Souveränität und einer volksfeindlichen Politik [...] Gegen das EU-Monster aus Brüssel, für ein Europa der Vaterländer!”]</p> <p style="text-align: right;">- <i>Call for demonstration of The Right.</i>⁸⁸</p> <p>‘Revisionism’/Neo-Nazism: “Freedom for Ursula Haverbeck! [...] Freedom for Horst Mahler.”</p> <p>- <i>Multiple political demonstrations for the two holocaust deniers and notorious Nazis Ursula Haverbeck-Wetzels and Horst Mahler, organised by The Right.</i>⁸⁹ Haverbeck-Wetzels is a former NSDAP member and campaigned for National Socialism and denied the holocaust her whole life. Horst Mahler is a former lawyer and member of the radical left terrorist organisation Red Army Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion) who turned to the radical right and became a notorious holocaust denier.</p>
THE RIGHT [DIE RECHTE]	
IDEOLOGY (cont'd.)	
Ethno-Nationalism	
‘Revisionism’/Neo-Nazism	

⁸⁸ See The Right, 70 Jahre BRD? Wir feiern nicht!“ – Demonstration am 25. Mai 2019 in Dortmund!, 25 February 2019, online at: <https://die-rechte.net/lv-nordrhein-westfalen/kv-dortmund-dortmundecho/70-jahre-brd-wir-feiern-nicht-demonstration-am-25-mai-2019-in-dortmund/>.

⁸⁹ See Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Umgang mit Rechtsextremisten im Strafvollzug,’ Drucksache 19/17626, 5 March 2020, online at: <https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/brd/19/172/1917267.pdf>, p. 6.

DESCRIPTION	
	<p>PEGIDA was founded by Lutz Bachmann in October 2014 as a Facebook group, and primarily consisted of “his wife and some of their closest friends.”⁹² Most had not been politically active before. Their core motivation was to mobilise street protests against the perceived ‘Islamification’ of Germany or even ‘the West.’ On 20 October 2014, they lead a rally with approximately 350 participants. One year later PEGIDA had mobilised 15,000 to 25,000 people in Dresden.⁹³ Despite a steep decline in the intervening years, PEGIDA still mobilises between 750 to 1,000 participants each Monday. In celebration of the 200th rally, approximately 4,000 people came to Dresden to listen to the AfD and The Wing politician Björn Höcke.⁹⁴ By that time, PEGIDA had changed from a broad-based street protest of politically (but not economically) marginalised middle-class support with some extremists among them, to a platform for radical right activism.⁹⁵</p>
PATRIOTIC EUROPEANS AGAINST THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE OCCIDENT [PATRIOTISCHE EUROPÄER GEGEN DIE ISLAMISIERUNG DES ABENDLANDES (PEGIDA)]	
LEADER Lutz Bachmann	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown (c. 750-1,000 demonstration participants each week in 2019; ⁹⁰ rising up to 25,000 in 2015. ⁹¹)	
IDEOLOGY	
Anti-Muslim Populism	<p>Anti-Muslim Populism: “Tolerance has nothing to do with Islam [...] But violence, robbery, war, killing, decapitation, crucifying, all that has to do with Islam” [“Toleranz hat nichts mit dem Islam zu tun [...] Denn Gewalt, Ausrauben, Krieg, Töten, Kopfab schneiden, Kreuzigen, alles hat mit dem Islam zu tun.”]</p> <p style="text-align: right;">- <i>Michael Stürzenberger, speaker at PEGIDA rally (formerly party chairman of ‘Die Freiheit’).</i>⁹⁶</p>
Anti-Establishment	<p>Anti-Establishment: “Get together, stand together like a wall, then we will reconquer this country; from the hands of those who betrayed and sold you.” [“Rauft euch zusammen, steht zusammen wie eine Wand, dann werden wir gemeinsam dieses Land zurückerobern von diesen miesen Gestalten, welche uns verraten und verkauft haben.”]</p> <p style="text-align: right;">- <i>Lutz Bachmann, co-founding member of PEGIDA.</i>⁹⁷</p>
Victimhood	<p>Victimhood: “From stock data storage to abolition of cash money, one can feel that total control of the people is their final goal.” [“Von Vorratsdatenspeicherung bis Abschaffung des Bargeldes, es ist immer mehr zu spüren, dass die totale Kontrolle der Menschen das Endziel ist.”]</p> <p style="text-align: right;">- <i>Lutz Bachmann, co-founding member of PEGIDA.</i>⁹⁸</p>
	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES

⁹⁰ See Michael Freitag, “5 Years of Hate: The Birthday of PEGIDA” [5 Jahre Hass: PEGIDA feiert Geburtstag], *Leipziger Internet Zeitung*, October 20, 2019, <https://www.l-iz.de/politik/sachsen/2019/10/5-Jahre-Hass-PEGIDA-feiert-Geburtstag-300854>.

⁹¹ See Thomas Geithner and Marko Laske, “Police Operation,” *Polizei Sachsen*, December 12, 2015, <https://www.webcitation.org/6VXHmpP7>.

⁹² See Kai Arzheimer, “Every Monday, Thousands of Germans Rally against Muslims. Here Are the 6 Things You Need to Know About the ‘Pegida’ Movement,” *The Washington Post*, November 4, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/11/04/every-monday-thousands-of-germans-rally-against-muslims-here-are-the-6-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-pegida-movement/>.

⁹³ See Hans Vorländer, Maik Herold, Steven Schäller, *PEGIDA and New Right-Wing Populism in Germany* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).


⁹⁴ See Doreen Reinhard, “Sturm um Höcke,” *Zeit Online*, 18 February 2020, online at: <https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2020-02/pegida-dresden-demonstration-bjoern-hoecke>.

⁹⁵ See Hans Vorländer, Maik Herold, Steven Schäller (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), Chapter 1 and 7.

⁹⁶ See Michael Stürzenberger at a PEGIDA rally, 15 June 2015, online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=70RSnVUCeCg>.

⁹⁷ Lutz Bachmann at a PEGIDA rally, 14 April 2017, online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xfj_HIJ0d9Y.

⁹⁸ Lutz Bachmann at a PEGIDA rally, 22 June 2015, online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=StDBemHINb8w>.

NARRATIVE EXAMPLES (cont'd.)	
 PEGIDA PATRIOTIC EUROPEANS AGAINST THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE OCCIDENT [PATRIOTISCHE EUROPÄER GEGEN DIE ISLAMISIERUNG DES ABENDLANDES (PEGIDA)]	<p>Ultra-Nationalism: “The love for our fatherland is our incurable ‘disease.’” [“Die Vaterlandsliebe ist unsere unheilbare ‘Krankheit.’”] <i>- AfD banner at a PEGIDA rally.⁹⁹</i></p> <p>“Those who do not love Germany should leave Germany.” [“Wer Deutschland nicht liebt, soll Deutschland verlassen.”] <i>- PEGIDA slogan at a rally on 16 March 2015.¹⁰⁰</i></p>
IDEOLOGY (cont'd.)	
Ultra-Nationalism	

⁹⁹ Online at: <https://i.pinimg.com/originals/80/5b/e9/805be962eabdf2cc165757fcb633337.jpg>.

¹⁰⁰ See PEGIDA rally, 16 March 2015, online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rt9LYeDrBCg>.

DESCRIPTION	
 IDENTITARIAN MOVEMENT GERMANY (ALSO KNOWN AS ‘GENERATION IDENTITY’) [IDENTITÄRE BEWEGUNG DEUTSCHLAND (IBD)]	<p>The Identitarian Movement Germany first appeared in 2012, initially inspired by the “Génération Identitaire”¹⁰² in France. The movement has gained some influence within both the French and later the Austrian radical right, partly due to the notoriety of its nominal leader, Martin Sellner who is a travelling activist, often present in France, Germany, and Austria to connect the activists in Europe and even beyond. The IBD remained a predominantly virtual phenomenon with approximately 600 members in 2018. The number of members and political influence has been diminishing since 2018, due to multiple reasons, but especially the lack of success and effect of their political action and campaigns, for example, the deplatforming of most of their channels proves.¹⁰³ In fact, even their ‘spiritus rector,’ Götz Kubitschek (founder of the Institute for State Policy; see below) declared that the movement has lost its power and function for the radical right in late 2019.¹⁰⁴ The ideological core of the IBD is the ‘Volkstod’ (or Great Replacement conspiracy theory), based on the concept of ethnopluralism. Their main forms of action have been inspired by the ‘Sponti Movement/Generation of ’68.’¹⁰⁵ They transferred the techniques to the digital age, for example using apps instead of handbills or producing short videos instead of local concerts. The IBD can be credited with contributing to the transformation of the German radical right by increasing its attractiveness to younger and better educated people.¹⁰⁶ This was achieved by replacing ethnocentrism with ethnopluralism, and by veiling blatant racism and Anti-Semitism with the Great Replacement narrative.¹⁰⁷</p>
LEADERS	
Daniel Fiß Nils Altmieks Philipp Stein Philip Thaler Alexander Kleine	
MEMBERSHIP	
600 (2018) ¹⁰¹	
IDEOLOGY	
Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory	<p>Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory: “Stop the Great Replacement!” [“Stoppt den großen Austausch!”] <i>- Central motto of the Identitarian Movement (Germany).¹⁰⁸</i></p>
Ethno-Nationalism	<p>Ethno-Nationalism: “Remigration — Integration failed.” [“Remigration — Die Integration ist gescheitert.”] <i>- Banner of the IBD at a ‘Kandel is everywhere’ [‘Kandel ist überall’] rally.¹⁰⁹</i></p>
NARRATIVE EXAMPLES	

¹⁰¹ See Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat (eds), ‘Verfassungsschutzbericht 2018,’ p. 82.

¹⁰² This movement is rooted in “Le Bloc identitaire – Le mouvement social européen,” an extreme radical right movement of French and Francophone (Wallonia and Romandy) activists founded in 2002/3. They promoted a so called bio-regionalism / European federalism, while the “Génération Identitaire” took a clear stance in favour of ethnopluralism. The “Génération Identitaire” evolved from the ashes of the Bloc Identitaire. See Bernhard Schmid, ‘Nationalistische “Identitäten,”’ Blick nach Rechts, 7 November 2012, online at: <https://www.bnr.de/artikel/hintergr-und/nationalistische-identitaeten>.

¹⁰³ See Simon Murdoch, ‘Following the Deplatformed: Where are they now?’ Hope Not Hate, 2 January 2019, online at: <https://www.hopenothate.org.uk/2019/02/01/following-deplatformed-now/>.

¹⁰⁴ See Simone Rafael, ‘Ende der IB? Götz Kubitschek erklärt die “Identitäre Bewegung” für “bis zur Unberührbarkeit kontaminiert,”’ Belltower News, 8 November 2019, online at: <https://www.belltower.news/ende-der-ib-goetz-kubitschek-erklart-die-identitaere-bewegung-fuer-bis-zur-unberuehrbarkeit-kontaminiert-92799/>.

¹⁰⁵ The Sponti Movement originated in the Generation of ’68. It was the result of a conflict of dogmatic and undogmatic wings of the extreme radical left. The Sponti movement was the undogmatic wing, comprising of the squatter scene among others. The name is derived from spontaneism. This term had negative connotations for the strictly communist and dogmatic left. See Wolfgang Kraushaar, ‘Die Frankfurter Sponti-Szene: Eine Subkultur als politische Versuchsanordnung,’ Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 44, pp. 105-121, here: 111-114.

¹⁰⁶ Beforehand the image of the radical right oscillated between an old-mans-party movement comprising of (former) Nazis and the extreme right bully boys i.e. boneheads; roughly sketched/oversubscribed. For a more detailed approach, see Armin Pfahl-Traughber, *Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS 2019).

¹⁰⁷ See Fabian Virchow, ‘The Identitarian Movement: What Kind of Identity? Is It Really a Movement?’ In: Patrice A. Simpson, Helga Druxes (eds), *Digital Media Strategies of the Far Right in Europe and the United States* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015), p. 177–190; Andreas Speit (eds), *Das Netzwerk der Identitären. Ideologie und Aktionen der Neuen Rechten* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2018).

¹⁰⁸ See Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Inneres und Sport, ‘Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland. Ideologie und Aktionsfelder’ (Hannover), p.14.

¹⁰⁹ Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland, ‘Remigration – Die Integration ist gescheitert,’ 3 March 2018, online at: <https://i.pinimg.com/236x/78/d1/3a/78d13ae0c3474452bd94d0b601f99bc3.jpg> (Kandel is a village in South West Germany. There, an Afghan refugee, aged 15, stabbed his ex-girlfriend in 2017).

	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES <i>(cont'd.)</i>
IDENTITARIAN MOVEMENT GERMANY (ALSO KNOWN AS 'GENERATION IDENTITY') <small>[[IDENTITÄRE BEWEGUNG DEUTSCHLAND (IBD)]]</small>	<p>Anti-Globalism: “Fortress Europe, close the borders.” [“Festung Europa, macht die Grenzen dicht.”] <i>-IBD activists during a failed occupation of the German Ministry of Justice in 2017.¹¹⁰</i></p> <p>Identitarianism: “Democracy requires a certain degree of homogeneity of the population in order to be able to form a common will. By fighting the multicultural project we fight for conditions that make true democracy (rule by the people) possible.” [“Demokratie [...] erfordert eine gewisse Homogenität in der Bevölkerung, damit sie einen gemeinsamen Willen bilden kann. Indem wir gegen das multikulturelle Projekt kämpfen [...], kämpfen wir auch für die Bedingung der Möglichkeit einer echten Demokratie (Volksherrschaft).”] <i>-One of the main goals of the Identitarian Movement (Germany).¹¹¹</i></p>
IDEOLOGY <i>(cont'd.)</i>	
Anti-Globalism	
Identitarianism	

¹¹⁰ Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland, “Remigration – Die Integration ist gescheitert,” 3 March 2018, online at: <https://i.pinimg.com/236x/78/d1/3a/78d13ae0c3474452bd94d0b601f99bc3.jpg> (Kandel is a village in South West Germany. There, an Afghan refugee, aged 15, stabbed his ex-girlfriend in 2017).

¹¹¹ See Sören Kittel, Christian Unger, “Wie gefährlich sind die ‘Identitären,’ Hamburger Abendblatt, 23 May 2017, online at: <https://www.abendblatt.de/politik/article210668511/Wie-gefaehrlich-sind-die-Identitaeren.html>.

	DESCRIPTION
ONE PERCENT FOR OUR COUNTRY/ONE PERCENT <small>[[EIN PROZENT FÜR UNSER LAND/EIN PROZENT]]</small>	<p>One Percent was founded as a campaign project in 2015 — initially advertising itself as “Greenpeace for Germany” — to connect various actors from across the German radical right movement. Among the founding members were politicians of the AfD (such as Hans-Thomas Tillschneider), “Compact” magazine, as well as the Institute for State Policy and the prominent legal scholar, Karl Albrecht Schachtschneider. The group’s core goals are the “representation of German interests”¹¹² and the “struggle against illegal mass immigration.”¹¹³ In reference to their name, One Percent aims to extend their political reach to just one percent of the German population. They are convinced that it only requires one percent of the population to change the system. The group’s main office is located in Oybin in Eastern Saxony. It serves as an interface between the New Right, the AfD, and radical right intellectuals. Yet One Percent also consorts with activists from the Neo-Nazi scene as well as offering refuge for members of the IBD, since One Percent has not been under state surveillance, unlike parts of the AfD and the IBD.¹¹⁴</p>
LEADER Philipp Stein	
MEMBERSHIP Unknown	
IDEOLOGY	
Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory	<p>Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory: “Storm of asylum seekers, mass immigration, birth rate deficit, senescence, that’s what we all know, it happens with the active support of the ruling class and the devoted media.” [“Asylansturm, Massenzuwanderung, Geburtendefizit, Vergreisung — all das kennen wir, all das läuft ab unter aktiver Teilnahme durch die herrschende Klasse und die ihr treu ergebene Medienwelt.”] <i>- Philipp Stein, in the IJS journal ‘Sezession.’¹¹⁵</i></p>
Ultra-Nationalism	<p>Ultra-Nationalism: “Platform of resistance for German interests.” [“Widerstandsplattform für deutsche Interessen.”] <i>-Self-description of One Percent.¹¹⁶</i></p>
Victimhood	<p>Victimhood: “Antifa and Media against freedom of speech.” [“Antifa und Medien: Vereint gegen Meinungsfreiheit.”] <i>- The headline of a One Percent blog post.¹¹⁷</i></p>
	NARRATIVE EXAMPLES

¹¹² Ein Prozent, “Über uns,” online at: <https://www.einprozent.de/ueber-uns>.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ See Andreas Speit, “Reaktionärer Klan. Die Entwicklung der Identitären Bewegung in Deutschland” In: Andreas Speit, (eds), ‘Das Netzwerk der Identitären. Ideologie und Aktionen der Neuen Rechten’ (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2018), p. 17-41, here: 32-35; Marcel Laskus, ‘Im Hinterland, rechts außen,’ MDR Sachsen, 9 August 2017, online at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20170809170909/http://www.mdr.de/sachsen/ein-prozent-in-oybin-100.html>.

¹¹⁵ Philipp Stein, ‘Ethnosuizid und der “Große Austausch,” 24 August 2015, online at: <https://sezession.de/51054/ethnosuizid-und-der-grosse-austausch>.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ein Prozent, ‘Antifa und Medien: Vereint gegen Meinungsfreiheit,’ Ein Prozent Blog, 25 April 2018, online at: <https://www.einprozent.de/blog/linksextremismus/antifa-und-medien-vereint-gegen-meinungsfreiheit/2284>.

	<p style="text-align: center;">DESCRIPTION</p>
<p>INSTITUTE FOR STATE POLICY [INSTITUT FÜR STAATSPOLITIK (IFS)]</p>	<p>The Institute for State Policy was launched by Götz Kubitschek, Karl-Heinz Weißmann, Stefan Hanz, and another four German New Right activists in 2000. From the beginning until 2014 the IfS had close links to the national-conservative/radical right newspaper <i>Junge Freiheit</i>, one of the leading and longest-running radical right newspapers in Germany. The IfS's main goal is the dissemination of extreme radical right ideology through publications and educational events — most prominently summer camps and winter academies — where radical right intellectuals, politicians, and activists gather to discuss strategies to obtain cultural and social hegemony. Although in the early days it was an elitist club since the early 2010s more allegedly moderate and more prominent speakers have been recruited to the IfS to address various audiences. Another pillar in the group's strategy is the affiliated publishing company (Anataios Verlag) and its main publication, the journal <i>Sezession: Printed Journal and Blog</i>.¹¹⁸</p>
<p>LEADERS Götz Kubitschek Erik Lehnert (formally)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">NARRATIVE EXAMPLES</p>
<p>MEMBERSHIP Unknown</p>	<p>Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory: “Our generation faces the historical challenge to stop the Great Replacement.” [“Den Großen Austausch zu stoppen ist die historische Herausforderung, vor die unsere Generation gestellt ist.”]</p> <p style="text-align: right;">- <i>Benedikt Kaiser, in the IfS journal 'Sezession.'</i>¹¹⁹</p>
<p>IDEOLOGY Great Replacement Conspiracy Theory</p>	<p>Ultra-Nationalism: “He has to fight, what destroys the state and castrates the nation. He has to save the state.” [“Er muß bekämpfen, was den Staat zerstört und die Nation kastriert. Er muß den Staat retten.”]</p> <p style="text-align: right;">- <i>Götz Kubitschek in 'Junge Freiheit,' a New Right newspaper.</i>¹²⁰</p>
<p>Ultra-Nationalism</p>	

¹¹⁸ See Helmut Kellershohn, H., 'Das Institut für Staatspolitik und das jungkonservative Hegemonieprojekt' In: Stephan Braun, Alexander Geisler, Martin Gerster (eds.), *Strategien der extremen Rechten – Hintergründe – Analysen – Antworten* (Wiesbaden: Springer, 2016), p. 439-467; See Andreas Speit, 'Reaktionärer Klan. Die Entwicklung der Identitären Bewegung in Deutschland' In: Andreas Speit, (eds), 'Das Netzwerk der Identitären. Ideologie und Aktionen der Neuen Rechten' (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2018), p. 17-41, here: 35-37.

¹¹⁹ Benedikt Kaiser, 'Halle ist identitär – Aktionen gegen den "Großen Austausch,"' 4 September 2015, online at: <https://sezession.de/51298/halle-ist-identitaer-aktionen-gegen-den-gro-sen-austausch>.

¹²⁰ Götz Kubitschek, 'Trotzdem: Preußen! Zehn Thesen zum Preußischen Typus, zum Wahlpreußen und zum Staat,' *Junge Freiheit*, 23 February 2007, p. 19.

MAINSTREAM RADICAL RIGHT GROUPS IN GERMANY

<p>ALTERNATIVE FOR GERMANY [ALTERNATIVE FÜR DEUTSCHLAND (AFD)]</p>
<p>LEADERS Jörg Meuthen Tino Chrupalla</p>
<p>MEMBERSHIP 34,023 (June 2020)</p>
<p>IDEOLOGY</p>
<p>Anti-Muslim Populism</p>
<p>Anti-Establishment Sentiment</p>
<p>Victimhood</p>
<p>Ethno-Nationalism</p>

DESCRIPTION	
	<p>The AfD was founded in February 2013, originally as an ‘Anti-Euro’ party. The membership was composed of predominantly well-educated and well-situated elder men with economically liberal and politically conservative political stances, including many CDU/CSU and FDP defectors. The first chairman was Bernd Lucke, an economics professor from Hamburg, who officiated from 2015 until 2017. Frauke Petry, an entrepreneur from Saxony, was the second leader who took over after the first split between the liberal-economic faction and national conservatives. The latter was led by the co-chairman, Jörg Meuthen, who is still in office. More than 2,000 members of the liberal-economic faction left the party as a direct consequence. This split caused a deep trench between those who are considered more moderate (Alternative Center (Alternative Mitte)) and those belonging to the more extreme, völkisch faction, (The Wing (<i>Der Flügel</i>)). The latter is led by Björn Höcke and Andreas Kalbitz, respectively the state chairmen in Thuringia and Brandenburg. These divides ultimately led to the resignation of Petry as party chair a day after the German Federal elections in 2017. Petry was followed by Alexander Gauland, the co-parliamentary party leader, alongside Alice Weidel.¹²² In 2019 Gauland became the first honorary chairman of the AfD. His successor was the Saxon MP Tino Chrupalla.¹²³ Since the end of 2017, The Wing has been the dominant faction within the AfD, meaning that all high-ranking officials only require the consent of this faction for their election. Politically and ideologically, therefore, the party has evolved from an anti-Euro to a populist radical right party into a much more extreme party, with undeniable affiliations to organised Neo-Nazism. Andreas Kalbitz’ links to ‘Heimatreue Deutsche Jugend’ (‘German Youth Faithful to the Homeland’)¹²⁴ can be cited as an example. A second example is Björn Höcke, the co-leader of The Wing, who wrote, “with a probability bordering on certainty,”¹²⁵ a few articles under his pseudonym ‘Landolf Ladig’ for journals published by NPD vice-chairman Thorsten Heise¹²⁶ The Wing and the Young Alternative for Germany (the youth wing of the AfD) are mentioned in a national intelligence report as a “Verdachtsfall” (“suspect case”). The party as a whole is currently a “Prüffall” (“inquiry case”).¹²⁷</p>
ALTERNATIVE FOR GERMANY [ALTERNATIVE FÜR DEUTSCHLAND (AFD)]	
LEADERS Jörg Meuthen Tino Chrupalla	
MEMBERSHIP 34,023 (June 2020) ¹²¹	
IDEOLOGY Anti-Muslim Populism	
NARRATIVE EXAMPLES	
	<p>Anti-Muslim Populism: “Burkas, headscarf girls, payed knifemen and other scapegraces will neither guarantee our wealth, nor our economic growth, nor our welfare state.” [“Burkas, Kopftuchmädchen, alimentierte Messermänner und sonstige Taugenichtse werden unseren Wohlstand, das Wirtschaftswachstum und vor allem den Sozialstaat nicht sichern.”] <i>-Alice Weidel, parliamentary party co-leader of the AfD.¹²⁸</i></p>

¹²¹ Presseportal.de, ‘AfD-Mitgliederparteiartag verfehlt das Quorum,’ Presseportal.de, 15 June 2020, online at: <https://www.presseportal.de/pm/110332/4623191>.

¹²² See Sebastian Friedrich, ‘Die AfD. Analysen – Hintergründe – Kontroversen’ (Berlin: Bertz + Fischer, 2019).

¹²³ See Severin Weiland, ‘Von rechts befügelt,’ Spiegel Online, 30 November 2019, online at: <https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/afd-parteiartag-tino-chrupalla-folgt-auf-alexander-gauland-von-rechts-beflugelt-a-1299112.html>.


¹²⁴ The HDJ is considered a successor organization of the Viking Youth (Wiking-Jugend). Both are deeply rooted in National Socialism, personally and ideologically and both were youth organisations where adult Nazis sent their children to be trained as the future National Socialist elite. The methods of education, the rituals and the daily routine were inspired by the Hitler Youth (Hitlerjugend) and the “Federation of German Girls” (Bund Deutscher Mädel). See Andrea Röpke, *Ferien im Führerbunker. Die neonazistische Kindererziehung der ‘Heimatreuen Deutschen Jugend (HDJ)’* (Braunschweig: Bildungsvereinigung Arbeit und Leben 2008).

¹²⁵ “Mit an Sicherheit grenzender Wahrscheinlichkeit” (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, ‘Gutachten zu tatsächlichen Anhaltspunkten für Bestrebungen gegen die freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung in der “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) und ihren Teilorganisationen, Köln 2019, p. 355.

¹²⁶ See Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, ‘Gutachten zu tatsächlichen Anhaltspunkten für Bestrebungen gegen die freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung in der “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) und ihren Teilorganisationen,’ Köln 2019, p. 354-356.

¹²⁷ See Hans Pfeifer, ‘AfD: Extrem rechts,’ Deutsche Welle, 25 March 2020, online at: <https://www.dw.com/de/afd-extrem-rechts/a-52914272>.

¹²⁸ Alice Weidel, in Deutscher Bundestag (eds.): Plenarprotokoll 16. Mai 2018, p. 2972, online at: <https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/htp/19/19032.pdf>.

NARRATIVE EXAMPLES (cont'd.)	
	<p>Anti-Establishment Sentiment: “Political correctness belongs to the ash heap of history.” [“Die politische Korrektheit gehört auf den Müllhaufen der Geschichte.”] <i>- Alice Weidel, Parliamentary party co-leader of the AfD.¹²⁹</i></p>
ALTERNATIVE FOR GERMANY [ALTERNATIVE FÜR DEUTSCHLAND (AFD)]	<p>Victimhood: “Formerly ideocracy — dictatorship of opinion today.” [“Früher Gesinnungsdiktatur — Heute Meinungsdiktatur.”] <i>- AfD campaign for (perceived) freedom of speech.¹³⁰</i></p>
IDEOLOGY (cont'd.)	<p>Ethno-Nationalism: “Besides the protection of our national and European borders, a large-scale re-migration project will be necessary.” [“Neben dem Schutz unserer nationalen und europäischen Außengrenzen, wird ein großangelegtes Remigrationsprojekt notwendig sein.”] <i>-Björn Höcke, leader of The Wing, an (inofficial) faction of the AfD, and Thuringian party chairman.¹³¹</i></p>
Anti-Establishment Sentiment	
Victimhood	
Ethno-Nationalism	

¹²⁹ Alice Weidel cited in: Willi Reiners, “Die AfD ist eine sehr tolerante Partei,” Stuttgarter Zeitung, 4 May 2017, online at: <https://www.stuttgarter-zeitung.de/inhalt.spitzenkandidatin-alice-weidel-die-afd-ist-eine-schr-tolerante-partei.628c903f-9645-4d3d-a7fa-b5e7babb8d6d.html>.

¹³⁰ See Kreistagsfraktion Erzgebirgskreis der Alternative für Deutschland, ‘Früher Gesinnungsdiktatur – Heute Meinungsdiktatur,’ 10 March 2016, online at: http://www.afd-erz.de/images/Kreis_uebergreifend/2016_10_03_Flyer_S_2.pdf.

¹³¹ Björn Höcke, *Nie zweimal in denselben Flug: Björn Höcke im Gespräch mit Sebastian Hennig* (Olfen: Manuscriptum, 2018), p. 254.

SUMMARY

The above overview reveals that most radical right groups identified here follow certain ideological patterns, with core features emerging in their overlapping narratives, while they adapted to current challenges (the ‘refugee crisis,’ digitization, climate change) which are not part of their core agenda. This adaptability suggests that a particular ideological shift has occurred within the radical right in Germany. Like in other countries, it is marked by a shift from biological racism, with a more explicitly fascist expression, to a more modern approach that features much greater compatibility with the mainstream right, building on broader Anti-Muslim Populism and Anti-Immigration Sentiments. According to this general development particular movements and parties adopting a more moderate tone, even if this is often far from their unconcealed ideological views. In contrast to this development, however, it is obvious that fascist ideological roots (above all Nazism), despite officially pursuing a form of “Us versus Them” populism, are still notable at the fringes, especially amongst vigilante groups and terrorist cells.

Summing up, these narratives can be simplified respectively to the following broadened positions:

1. Anti-Muslim Populist Narrative: Social, cultural, and religious identities are under threat due to the presence of

Muslims; elites are complicit and/or are engineering this development, leading to an inevitable “clash of civilizations: ‘The West’ versus Islam.”

2. Ethno-Nationalist Narrative: Ethnic and national identities are under threat by multiculturalism; elites are complicit and/or are engineering this development, including through a ‘Volkstod’ or Great Replacement of the white population.

3. Neo-Nazi and Nazi ‘Revisionist’ Narrative: Advocating extreme right ideological stances rooted in fascism and National Socialism, while simultaneously defending or minimising the crimes of historical National Socialism, above all the Holocaust.

4. Anti-Globalist Narrative: Multilateral organisations, multinational companies, and a corresponding global(ised) group of elites enforce their plans directly against the needs and the will of the ‘the people.’

5. Victimhood Narrative: Elites make politics for minorities rather than for the (ethnically, culturally or nationally defined) majority. Adverse opinions are silenced or suppressed at the expense of freedom of speech and the (perceived) suspension of basic rights.

PART TWO

RADICAL RIGHT COUNTER-NARRATIVES AND COUNTER-NARRATIVE CAMPAIGNS IN GERMANY

TAPPING INTO ANTI-MUSLIM, POPULISM, ETHNO-NATIONALIST, NEO-NAZI/‘REVISIONIST’ ANTI-GLOBALIST AND VICTIMHOOD POSITIONS

Counter-narratives are developed to delegitimize, disrupt, and appeal to the radical right. Therefore, it is useful to identify the ‘entry points’ for radical right narratives to undermine their power and their threats to community cohesion. Drawing upon the examples provided in the above summary, core narratives can be divided into their orientation (i.e. who, what, where, how, and when), action (i.e. evaluation of orientation), and resolution (i.e. prescribed course of action).¹³² Whilst it might be unprofitable to contest the factual veracity of an orientation statement,¹³³ both the action and resolution sections of the narrative have been more profitably contested. Accordingly, the five core counter-narratives proposed to be deployed against radical right narratives are as follows:¹³⁴

1. Anti-Muslim Populist Counter-Narrative: Acknowledge experiences that may have led to prejudices as starting points before highlighting the validity and value of German Basic Law. Stress the individual freedom and enshrined

rights for all law-abiding citizens, regardless of their religion, and stress the positive contributions, both individual and collective, that Muslims have made to German society. Take a clear stance against extremism, in keeping with the principles of militant democracy in Germany.

2. Ethno-Nationalist Counter-Narrative: Acknowledge fears and grievances (taking the Realistic Group Conflict Theory/Ethnic Competition Theory perspective¹³⁵). Deconstruct this perceptive frame by stressing a realistic perspective of a zero-sum game or even net gain for citizens. Culturally separate the individual from the perceived collective stereotype, draw upon successful experiences of the country’s past, such as Polish and Italian immigration or Russian-German late repatriates amid other positive examples in German immigration history.

3. Neo-Nazi/‘Revisionist’ Counter-Narrative: Refer to the successful re-education and accounting for the

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¹³² This is a simplified version of a similar schema, laid out in: William Labov & Joshua Waletzky, ‘Narrative analysis: Oral versions of personal experience,’ *Journal of Narrative & Life History*, 7(1-4), 1997, p. 3-38, online at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jnlh.7.02nar>.

¹³³ That means: If someone says something that is factually more or less correct, but then decontextualizes, reframes and possibly instrumentalises these facts, it will be much more profitable to deconstruct the framing, uncover the instrumental character by revealing the political goals of the actor and the give the correct context to the audience so that they can form an own opinion.

¹³⁴ In the German context the refugee crisis is a good example. The total numbers of refugees who came to Germany were quite high and the radical right was framing this process as an invasion. But in comparison to countries like Turkey or Jordan the numbers per capita were much lower. Also, due to the dispensation mechanism in Germany, the workload and financial efforts were well dispersed between the regions. Meaning it was a challenge for the country, but it was not the crisis that the radical right tried to invoke for their palingenesis/rise to power to restore ‘law and order.’

¹³⁵ In short, the RGCT/ECT describes a situation of competition between different (ethnic) groups to obtain limited goods for one’s own or the group, such as affordable housing, blue-collar jobs and social benefits. The detailed reaction schemes in different situations are best described by Leach et al. (2002). See Colin W. Leach, Nastia Snider, Avarti Iyer, ‘Poisoning the Conscience of the Fortunate: The Experience of Relative Advantage and Support for Social Equality. In: Iain Walker & Heather J. Smith (eds): *Relative Deprivation. Specification, Development and Integration*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 136-164.

past ('Vergangenheitsbewältigung') in postwar Germany by connecting (relative) economic success¹³⁶ and the establishment of a resilient democracy that offers more chances than any authoritarian form of ideocracy with different degrees of delimitation of freedom, i.e. "through governing," or "*Durchherrschung*."¹³⁷ Stress the illegitimacy of a prerogative state in contrast to a normative state and the rule of law in a liberal democracy. Illustrate the cultural dullness and the unsuccessful oligarchic structure of National Socialism. Emphasise that Neo-Nazism represents a selective nostalgia about historical fascism and the Third Reich, whereby single issues might not have been awful, though the overall picture makes clear that democracy offers more net gains for people legally, culturally, and economically.

4. Anti-Globalist Counter-Narrative: Stress the strength offered by multilateralism (such as NATO or the EU), as no one country is strong enough to openly compete with all others. Emphasise the limited but established democratic legitimacy of international organisations. Outline the economic, legal, and political benefits of cooperation, resulting, for example, from the impact of the Schengen Agreement.

5. Victimhood Counter-Narrative: Stress the advantages of checks and balances and democratic transparency in contrast to the tyranny of the majority. In Germany, it is still very important to discuss the role of accounting for the past ['Vergangenheitsbewältigung'] to stress the value of democracy as such, but also Germany's role today, i.e. a leading political and economic role that should not turn into domination. So, it is important to break the narrative of the radical right that Germany is still not a fully sovereign state that is suppressed by the former Allied Forces. This can be achieved by simultaneously discussing and stressing cases of (the protection of) minority rights and the rule of law that protects not only minorities from (possibly asserted) despotism or dictatorship. Emphasise the importance of independent voices and votes under proportional representation. Show them how their voice can be heard, for example, with petitions to the federal parliament or one of the

state parliaments. Citizens have the chance to participate in the political process. Thereby it is possible to overthrow the narrative of the powerless people and the power elite that controls the masses because people can practically experience their influence.

Radical Right Counter-Narrative Campaigns in Germany

Before turning from radical right narratives and (corresponding) counter-narratives to counter-narrative campaigns it is necessary to shed light on the background of Germany's history regarding P/CVE: "Germany is one of the few Western countries with a long and diverse history of countering violent extremism (CVE) and deradicalisation efforts. [...] Although Germany can rightly be called the world's most active country in CVE practices, theoretical and scientific accounts of these programs are scarce."¹³⁸ As a result, the international community remains largely "unaware of the varied CVE activities undertaken within Germany. To date, many countries treat CVE and deradicalisation programs as security-focused tools and thus are characterized by a strong involvement of police and intelligence services. By contrast, CVE operations in Germany very much belong within the realm of social work, education, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)."¹³⁹ This does not mean that intelligence services and police are not involved, but rather that they are two among the many players involved. Summing up, Germany has a national strategy called "Strategie der Bundesregierung zur Extremismusprävention und Demokratieförderung."¹⁴⁰ Due to the federal structure of the country with 16 states (Länder), the P/CVE landscape is highly fragmented but also offers a wide range of 1,642 different campaigns/programmes (1.051 i.e. 64% preventing/countering radical right extremism). The share of federal programmes amounts to 20%, whereas regional (state) and local programmes constitute 80% of the total number of campaigns/programmes. Evaluation of what works and what does not work is one of the most pressing issues in such a diverse, extensive, and competitive P/CVE landscape.¹⁴¹

The following selection¹⁴² of counter-narratives outlines how the attempts to foster best practice came to fruition when challenging radical right narratives by presenting counter-narrative campaigns that: 1) disrupt radical right ideology; 2) undermine the credibility of the narrative (and the radical right ideology) with humor; 3) promote positive alternatives to the narratives and the radical right ideology;¹⁴³ 4) can be used as examples or even blueprints for future campaigns, utilizing the underlying mechanisms and methodology.¹⁴⁴

The first example is one of EXIT-Germany's renowned campaigns "Operation Trojan T-Shirt" from 2011. Attending one of the largest 'White Power' music festivals in Germany at the time, "Rock for Germany" [*Rock für Deutschland*] — organised by the NPD and hosting both Brutal Attack and Radikahl on stage — EXIT-Germany pretended to act as a supporter of the event by providing radical right merchandise in the form of free t-shirts. The shirts initially carried the slogan "Hardcore Rebels: National and Free" [*Hardcore Rebellen: National und Frei*] but when washed this imagery was replaced by EXIT-Germany's intended message: "What your T-shirt can do, you also can do — We help you to free yourself from radical right extremism.

EXIT-Germany."¹⁴⁵ This innovative campaign quickly went viral and the initial article that covered this campaign¹⁴⁶ reached a combined 99,790 likes, shares, comments, and tweets across various social media platforms. It was the most successful Germanophone journalistic article on social media in 2011, according to the ZDF (Zweites Deutsche Fernsehen, Second German Television) Hyperland Charts.¹⁴⁷ As a result, the project's original goal succeeded: neo-Nazis became (and still are) much more aware of EXIT-Germany.¹⁴⁸ The campaign was designed to reach out to highly involved people in the radical right (subculture) using a mix of counter and alternative narratives, undermining the movement's credibility with humor and offering positive alternatives, by providing an exit strategy. But of course, this campaign had to face a lot of counter reactions, warnings via SMS within the scene, and more detailed raging online. The SMS comprised a short warning that it was a trap, while in online forums such as f.e. Thiazi (formerly one of the largest Germanophone extreme radical right platforms, 2007-2012), the scene reacted more drastically. Here they accused EXIT of wasting tax money and directly insulted EXIT staff, but surprisingly some compliments for the trojan mechanism could be found. The advantage of EXIT — not only with this campaign — is that it communi-



FIGURE 2 EXIT-Germans' Trojan T-Shirt before and after washing

¹³⁶ The myth of the 'Miracle on the Rhine' was a successful framing, but not miraculous economic growth and increase of wealth that is often talked and written about. The myth has (not only) been deconstructed. See Ulrike Herrmann, *Deutschland, ein Wirtschaftsmärchen. Warum es kein Wunder ist, dass wir reich geworden sind* (Frankfurt: Westend Verlag, 2019).

¹³⁷ The term was coined by the German historians Jürgen Kocka and Alf Lüdtke. See (f.e.) Jürgen Kocka, 'Ein deutscher Sonderweg: Überlegungen zur Sozialgeschichte der DDR', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 41 (40), p. 34-45.

¹³⁸ Two examples: Kurt Möller, Beate Küpper, Frank Buchheit, Florian Neuscheler, *Evaluation des Aussteigerprogramms für Rechtsextremisten des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (APR NRW)* (Esslingen, 2015); Lena Frischlich, Diana Rieger, Anna Morten, Gary Bente (eds.), *Videos gegen Extremismus? Counter-Narrative auf dem Prüfstand* (Wiesbaden: Bundeskriminalamt, 2017).

¹³⁹ Arie W. Kruglanski, David Webber, Daniel Koehler, *The Radical's Journey: How German Neo-Nazis Voyaged to the Edge and Back* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 39.

¹⁴⁰ Die Bundesregierung, 'Strategie der Bundesregierung zur Extremismusprävention und Demokratieförderung' (Berlin, 2016).

¹⁴¹ See Saskia Lützing, Florian Gruber, Ali Hedayat, 'Extremismuspräventionslandschaft — eine Bestandsaufnahme präventiver Angebote in Deutschland sowie ausgewählter Präventionsstrategien aus dem europäischen Ausland'. In: Brahim Ben Slama & Uwe Kemmesies (eds.) *Handbuch Extremismusprävention. Gesamtgesellschaftlich. Phänomenübergreifend.* (Wiesbaden: Bundeskriminalamt, 2020), pp. 597-627, here: 600-601. For a summary, see: Arie W. Kruglanski, David Webber, Daniel Koehler, *The Radical's Journey: How German Neo-Nazis Voyaged to the Edge and Back* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 39-58. For a detailed history of the framework programs, its history of ideas and legal foundations, see: Maximilian Fuhrmann, *Antirextrismus und wehrhafte Demokratie. Kritik am Selbstverständnis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2019) p. 264-292. For a detailed overview of the programs and single projects, see: Florian Gruber, Saskia Lützing, Uwe E. Kemmesies, 'Extremismusprävention in Deutschland — Erhebung und Darstellung der Präventionslandschaft Schwerpunktdarstellung', *Präventionsprojekte in staatlicher Trägerschaft (2014/2015)*, (Wiesbaden: Bundeskriminalamt, 2016).

¹⁴² This selection makes no claim to representativeness, it is an overview to provide information on how an effective counter-narrative campaign could be designed, using examples of campaigns already implemented.

¹⁴³ See Diana Rieger, Anna Morten & Lena Frischlich, 'Verbreitung und Inszenierung.' In: Lena Frischlich, Diana Rieger, Anna Morten, Gary Bente (eds.), 'Videos gegen Extremismus? Counter-Narrative auf dem Prüfstand' (Wiesbaden: Bundeskriminalamt, 2017), pp. 47-80, here 53.

¹⁴⁴ This criteria explicitly relates to the mechanisms and not to the campaigns as such.

¹⁴⁵ See Fabian Wichmann, 'Successfully Countering Hate and Far Right Propaganda: The Story of Exit Germany,' *Journal Exit-Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und demokratische Kultur* 7, 2018, p. 64-67, here: 66-67 (The proper translation would be "If your T-shirt can do it, you can do it too").

¹⁴⁶ See Marc Felix Serrao, 'Trojaner: "T-Hemd" legt Neonazis rein, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10 August 2011, online at: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/panorama/aktion-auf-rechtsrockfestival-trojaner-t-hemd-legt-neonazis-rein-1.1129735>.

¹⁴⁷ See: <http://www.popkulturjunkie.de/wp/?cat=15>; According to Exit Germany more than 100 articles/contributions were printed and aired in foreign media, The Guardian, BBC, Le Monde, The Local, Toronto Sun, Herald Sun and China Daily among them. See: Exit Deutschland, 'OPS // Trojan T-Shirt / EXIT-Deutschland,' 30 March 2012, online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSlBsHKEP-8&feature=youtu.be>. The campaign also serves as a paramount example how to counter the radical in the textbook for tenth grade in German language in the largest state, North Rhine-Westphalia. See: Fabian Dilks & Martina Feldhues, 'Klartext : Sprach-Lesebuch Deutsch' (Braunschweig: Westermann, 2014), p.68-70.

¹⁴⁸ See Exit Deutschland, 'OPS // Trojan T-Shirt / EXIT-Deutschland,' 30 March 2012, online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CSlBsHKEP-8&feature=youtu.be>.

¹⁴⁹ See Franziska Mozart, 'Trojaner Shirt für Nazi-Aussteiger, W&V, 9 August 2011, online at: https://www.wuv.de/marketing/trojaner_shirt_fuer_nazi_aussteiger.



FIGURE 3 Rudolf-Hess-Memorial March and EXIT-Germany campaign (The campaign banner with the slogan “If the Führer would know” (“Wenn das der Führer wüsste”))

cates as an organization and rarely as individuals (excepting one of the founders, Bernd Wagner), so that criticism and threats are addressed to the organization while for potential dropouts personal mentors are available, i.e. they use the advantage of asymmetric communication.¹⁴⁹

A second innovative example is the “Right Against Right” [*Rechts gegen Rechts*] campaign by EXIT-Germany. Since 2001, the commemorative march for Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Heß, has taken place in the Upper Franconian city of Wunsiedel where he was buried.¹⁵⁰ The city of Wunsiedel has thus become a site of pilgrimage for neo-Nazis, even though they often face massive counter-demonstrations. EXIT-Germany designed a campaign against these marches with the idea of adapting the ‘charity run’ model. With every step made by the radical right participants of this commemorative march, they raised funds for the benefit of anti-fascist organisations and their activities. Radical right extremists attending the march were faced with the dilemma of marching and raising money against their cause, or not demonstrating to avoid the donations. The campaign started on 15 November 2014, and every meter walked raised 10 Euros summing up to 10,000 Euros for EXIT’s deradicalisation programme.¹⁵¹

Counter-march protesters updated marchers of how much they had raised throughout the march, posted ‘motivational’ banners such as “Final Spurt instead of Final Victory” [Endspurt statt Endsieg] or “March and donate” [*Marschieren und spendieren*]. The participants of this commemorative march remained calm and conducted their march.¹⁵² The campaign was designed to disrupt the Neo-Nazism/‘Revisionism’ narrative by giving propaganda a price and mocking the participants of the march. This approach is (partly) controversial as it might foster radicalisation or at least stabilise political and social in-group bonds. The limitations of this approach have been outlined by Martin Becher, director of the “Bavarian Alliance for Tolerance” (“Bayrisches Bündnis für Toleranz”), who shows that this concept is hardly upscalable to rallies such as PEGIDA.¹⁵³ In sum, it is an effective method to raise awareness for the problem of this radical right march, but also more broadly for EXIT-Germany and their deradicalisation program (which has been positively evaluated several times, for example under the supervision of the “Living Democracy” programme or the Freudenberg foundation).¹⁵⁴

A final example from EXIT Germany follows the same pattern as the “Right against Right” campaign while transferring

¹⁵⁰ From 1988 until 1990 the commemorative events respectively demonstrations took place in front of the administrative court of Bayreuth. From 1991 to 2000 the event was banned by regional courts and the commemorative events took place somewhere else, f.e. in Thuringia, Luxemburg or Denmark. In 2011 the tomb was removed with (belated) consent of the relatives. See Thomas Dörfler, Andreas Klärner, ‘Der »Rudolf-Heß-Gedenkmarsch« in Wunsiedel. Rekonstruktion eines nationalistischen Phantasmas,’ *Mittelweg* 36 13 (4), 2004, p. 74-91; Hans Holzhaider, ‘Grab von Rudolf Heß existiert nicht mehr,’ *Süddeutsche Zeitung/SZ.de*, 21. July 2011, online at: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/wunsiedel-ende-einer-nazi-pilgerstaette-grab-von-rudolf-hess-existiert-nicht-mehr-1.1122689>.

¹⁵¹ The campaign was successfully transferred to other cities with the same problem of continuous Neo-Nazi demonstrations or commemorative events, as for example the city of Bad Nenndorf in Lower-Saxony where a commemorative march – announced annually until 2030 – for the “Victims of the Allied torture camp Wincklerbad” (Opfer des alliierten Folterlagers im Wincklerbad) takes place. See Angelika Henkel, Stefan Schölermann, ‘Bad Nenndorf wehrt sich gegen rechts,’ *Norddeutscher Rundfunk*, 22 July 2012, online at: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160119114435/https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/dossiers/der-norden-schaut-hin/badnenndorf265.html>.

¹⁵² See Fabian Wichmann, ‘Successfully Countering Hate and Far Right Propaganda: The Story of Exit Germany,’ *Journal Exit-Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und demokratische Kultur* 7, 2018, 64-67, here: 64-66; Fabian Wichmann, ‘4 Ways To Turn The Neo-Nazi Agenda On Its Head,’ *Journal Exit-Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und demokratische Kultur* 5, 2017, p. 93-98, here: 93-95.

¹⁵³ Martin Becher, “Wenn das der Führer wüsste!” 22 December 2014, online at: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/satirischer-umgang-mit-extremismus-wenn-das-der-fuehrer-wuesste-1.2276787>.

¹⁵⁴ See Radicalisation Awareness Network, *Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Approaches and Practices* (Brussels, 2019), p. 193.

¹⁵⁵ Among those described here, other campaigns of EXIT-Germany can be found here: <https://www.exit-deutschland.de/projekte/>.



FIGURE 4 Donate the Hate campaign

the charity run model online to counter hate speech.¹⁵⁵ For this campaign, titled “Donate the Hate” [“Hass hilft”], EXIT Germany designed an app connected to various social media sites dealing with the topic of migrants and refugees in Germany. Every hate speech comment detected resulted in a personal “Thank you for your donation” comment, and one Euro raised for charities. These donations were earmarked beforehand by media companies, a football club (second division), and many individual donors. Once again, the target group — in this case hate-speech purveyors — become trapped in a paradox: either cease engaging in hate speech or raise one Euro for each new comment. Additionally, the campaign site lists the top 10 donor purveyors, using the data generated by hate speech comments.¹⁵⁶ Criticism from scene and movement was very limited due to the mechanism of the campaign, other than the “Right against Right” campaign (see above). Even though it follows the same pattern, it is different in style and effect. Due to the broader approach of aiming at comments, it is designed to counter a variety of radical right narratives, not only the ones of a specific target group. Aside from that, it disrupts the radical right ideology but instead of mainly mocking the target group it primarily promotes positive alternatives by turning every hate speech comment into a donation to a refugee aid integration project as well as to its own deradicalisation programme.

The second organization is the Violence Prevention Network (VPN), founded in 2004.¹⁵⁷ The charity predominant-

ly addresses radical right and Islamist extremism in their projects and campaigns.¹⁵⁸ One campaign conducted by the VPN is “Online and Offline Deradicalisation Interventions through Social Media” (On/Off Derad), which addressed the two target groups (radical right and Islamist extremists mentioned above between 2016 and 2018. This project’s (“Youth Asks” [“Jugend fragt”]) target group were (not yet deeply engaged) radical right sympathizing youngsters, as well as teenagers and those younger. “Youth Asks” [“Jugend fragt”] consisted of a three pillar strategy: 1) identify vulnerable groups and individuals; 2) correspond with them online and promote critical debate about their ideology; and 3) encourage a distancing process by working with the individuals and, later, offering them offline support to keep the distance from these groups. In short, the aim is to disrupt radical right ideology and offer alternative narratives. The concept was based on the AKT-program designed for Facebook, helping to identify the appropriate target group, which means entering their on- and offline social environment instead of using/creating neutral spaces. VPN favoured an active rather than a passive approach. Given the rapidly changing communication patterns of online users, the project was decommissioned in early 2017 as it was no longer possible to pursue the charity’s goals without further fueling the hate. The main reason was that the algorithms of Facebook trigger and push controversial content, detached from social responsibility, clashing with the main goals of a CVE organization and programme.¹⁵⁹ The

¹⁵⁶ See Fabian Wichmann, ‘Successfully Countering Hate and Far Right Propaganda: The Story of EXIT- Germany,’ *Journal Exit-Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und demokratische Kultur* 7, 2018, 64-67, here: 66; Fabian Wichmann, ‘4 Ways To Turn The Neo-Nazi Agenda On Its Head,’ *Journal Exit-Deutschland. Zeitschrift für Deradikalisierung und demokratische Kultur* 5, 2017, p. 93-98, here: 96-97.

¹⁵⁷ VPN is rooted in anti-violence and social competence training (*Anti-Gewalt- und Kompetenztraining, or AKT*) and is mainly funded via European Union support, private donors as well as through varying programmes by German federal and state ministries. VPN is a founding member of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) and co-chair of the Exit-Working group.

¹⁵⁸ See, Judy Korn, Harald Weinhöck, ‘Der lange Abschied von Hass und Gewalt,’ Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 9 July 2013, online at: <https://www.bpb.de/apuz/164926/der-lange-abschied-von-hass-und-gewalt?p=all>; Violence Prevention Network, ‘Verantwortung übernehmen – Abschied von Hass und Gewalt. Violence Prevention Network’, online at: https://www.phineo.org/uploads/tx_phineoprojects/PHINEO_Engagement-gegen-Rechts_Violence-Prevention-Network.pdf.

¹⁵⁹ The detailed mechanisms are explained here: Maik Fielitz, Holger Mareks, ‘Digital Fascism: Challenges for the Open Society in Times of Social Media,’ online at: <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/87w5c5gp>.



FIGURE 5 Banner of Philip Schlaffer's Facebook page

programme operators were trapped: it was not possible to post sufficiently controversial statements reaching out to the target group without fueling hate; and posting less controversial statements to avoid the fueling hate would have meant losing a considerable share of range.¹⁶⁰

Another example concerns the role of formers in countering violent radical right extremism.¹⁶¹ The former Neo-Nazi and high-ranking member of the motorcycle gang 'Schwarze Schwar MC,' Philip Schlaffer, disengaged from the scene. After his deradicalisation he received training and support (a one-year anti-violence and competency training carried out by VPN), before ultimately gaining qualifications as an anti-violence and deradicalisation coach. Today he works freelance with potential target groups in schools and clubs, where he continues to be accompanied by journalists and researchers who evaluate his activities.¹⁶² Just as importantly, he launched a Youtube Channel "EX - Rechte Rotlicht Rocker - Philip Schlaffer" where he discusses his former life (on his own or with guests, who are also usually formers).¹⁶³ This is usually accompanied by an open live chat: Schlaffer deconstructs myths about the alleged glory of such a life and openly talks about how attractive this life might seem to be for people in search of belonging or a feeling of superiority. On one hand, this format is authentic and reveals the dangers of radical right extremism, on the other hand, one might criticize Schlaffer for his choice of interview partners and — not atypical for formers — too much self-promotion. His channel has 69,700 subscribers and can reach out to those who find glory in his former way of life, even though it is not a counter-narrative campaign as such, but it might serve as an entry point to disengagement. To state it clearly, projects like this will only have

short-term effects¹⁶⁴ in countering radical right extremism. Without subsequent caretakership the effect will most likely fall flat.

Another two campaigns are concerned with satire while addressing the radical right extremism from a practical point of view. The first is concerned with the NPD and radical right extremism in its entirety, especially that which links to free comradeships and the AfD, and the rising influence of the radical right in parliaments, street politics, and local societies. The weekly satirical magazine 'extra3,' produced by the public service broadcaster 'Norddeutscher Rundfunk' (NDR), addressed the NPD's changing role after the party entered the state parliaments of Saxony and the Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania.¹⁶⁵ The "extra3" production team established the sequel "Latest National News" [*Neueste Nationale Nachrichten*, or NNN], where activities — especially radical right interviews, pre-election parties, and contributions in parliamentary debates — were satirically recontextualized. The feature starts with alternatively dubbed footage of a Hitler speech, taken from Leni Riefenstahl's infamous propaganda film *Triumph of the Will*.¹⁶⁶ An alternative dubbing first praises attempts by the various politicians to bring radical right extremism back to power, but then quickly turns upon documenting the ludicrousness of these attempts. The edited video shows how these attempts are doomed to fail due to inherent ideological contradictions or blatant incompetence by radical right activists. The single, short episodes always end with the same footage of Hitler, now blaming the current radical right actors for the aforementioned contradictions, resulting in a despondent realisation that the radical right movement will never return to power, punctuated with

ridiculous insults.¹⁶⁶ To take one example: One of the key election campaign topics for the NPD in state and federal elections has been 'criminal foreigners.' This issue has remained at the top of the political agenda for the party and its voters. The production team of 'extra3' found Safet Babic among the ranks of the NPD, an ethnic Bosnian holding German citizenship and a considerable criminal record, while at the same time he held the role of deputy party chairman for Rhineland-Palatine. Similarly, and with a sardonic undertone, 'extra3' added that MP Birger Lüssow, transport expert of the NPD in Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania, had recently been caught drunk in charge of a vehicle.¹⁶⁷ Satirical clips by NNN like these then form part of a toolbox for teachers called "With satire against right-wing extremism" [*Mit Satire gegen Rechtsextremismus*], which is supported by the German Federal Agency for Civic Education [*Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*, BPP].¹⁶⁸ The toolbox and the campaign as such are designed to primarily counter the Neo-Nazism/Nazi Revisionism, Ethno-Nationalism, and the Victimhood narratives which the NPD tried to establish during their time in the state parliaments in Saxony and Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania. These counter-narratives mainly disrupt radical right ideology by mocking the party representatives and other actors in the clips, but always in order to encourage criti-

cal engagement with these politics, within the framework of the toolbox. Both the editors of the toolbox (German Federal Agency for Civic Education) and the filmmakers (public service broadcaster NDR) have a similar statutory mandate. It is their assignment "to contribute to the formation of individual and public opinion and thus contribute to a functioning democratic community" (NDR)¹⁶⁹ and "to promote understanding of political facts, to consolidate democratic awareness and to strengthen the readiness for political cooperation" (BPP).¹⁷⁰

The last campaign "Hooligans against syntax" [*Hooligans gegen Satzbau*, #HoGeSatzbau], was founded in October 2014 as a direct reaction to the 'Hooligans Against Salafists' [*Hooligans gegen Salafisten*, HoGeSa] movement, directly referring to both the ideological core as well as to the acronym. In the words of the steering committee, they represent "the final solution to the Duden [German dictionary] question"¹⁷¹ [*Finale Lösung der Dudenfrage*; a wordplay on the Nazis' 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question']. This means that members of #HoGeSatzbau pick up misanthropic (predominantly racist and nationalist) slogans, posted on various social media channels belonging to the AfD, PEGIDA, and other actors mentioned above, but invert the meaning of the message.¹⁷²



FIGURE 6 Screenshot of Neueste Nationale Nachrichten

¹⁶⁰ See Violence Prevention Network, 'OnOffDerad. Two-year report 2016 – 2018. Online and offline interventions for deradicalisation through social media.' (Berlin: Violence Prevention Network, 2018), p. 11-12, 19-21.

¹⁶¹ He took part in a one-year anti-violence and competency training carried out by VPN a while ago, but acts entirely independent and neither he nor his work/campaign has been endorsed by the organisation in any way.

¹⁶² See Carsten Janz, 'Philip Schlaffer: Vom Rockerboss zum Antigewaltstrainer', Norddeutscher Rundfunk, 13 August 2019, online at: <https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/schleswig-holstein/Philip-Schlaffer-Vom-Rockerboss-zum-Antigewaltstrainer-rechteraussteiger100.html>; Maria Walsh, Antje Gansewig, 'A former right-wing extremist in school-based prevention work: Research findings from Germany,' Journal for Deradicalization 21, 2019, p. 1-42.

¹⁶³ EX - Rechte Rotlicht Rocker - Philip Schlaffer, online at: <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCCcFnVUHZDKDUkghDspBKdQ>.

¹⁶⁴ Regarding the risks of former: "The role of formers is often highlighted in terms of how their experiences give them credibility when speaking out against violence or extremism, which may then increase the impact of the counter messaging. This credibility, which is often assumed to be inherent in formers is dependent on the target audience. For example, they are likely to be viewed as credible with those outside the movement that the former has left, since they are 'authentic' representations of the movement." "Formers have limited capacity to contribute to CVE beyond providing an important but short-term contribution to intelligence and counter-narratives." Marina Tapley, Gordon Clubb, 'The Role of Formers in Countering Violent Extremism,' ICCT Policy Brief April 2019, p. 5, 1, online at: <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ICCT-Tapley-Clubb-The-Role-of-Formers-in-CVE-April2019.pdf>.

¹⁶⁵ Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 'Mit Satire gegen Rechtsextremismus', Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 5 April 2016, online at: <https://www.bpb.de/lernen/themen-im-unterricht/mit-satire-gegen-rechtsextremismus/224196/extra-3-und-unn>.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ See Extra 3, 'NNN - Kriminelle Ausländer in der NPD,' Norddeutscher Rundfunk, 15 April 2014, online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cWhX1Nm2j38&feature=cmb_logo.

¹⁶⁸ See Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (eds.), *Mit Satire gegen Rechtsextremismus. Unterrichts-Kit zur Rechtsextremismus-Prävention* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2015). Some of the clips are also available here: https://www.ndr.de/fernsehen/sendungen/extra_3/rueckschau/NNN-Neueste-NationaleNachrichten,unn134.html.

¹⁶⁹ See ARD, 'Aufgabe und Funktion des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks/der ARD,' 15 October 2015, online at: <https://daserste.ndr.de/wahlarena/Aufgabe-und-Funktion-des-oeffentlich-rechtlichen-Rundfunks-der-ARD,antworten124.html>. (The assignments and tasks of the public service broadcaster are articulated in the Interstate Broadcasting Agreement, an agreement between the 16 states to organise public service broadcasting).

¹⁷⁰ See Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 'Was ist unser Auftrag?,' online at: <https://www.bpb.de/die-bpb/52218/was-ist-unser-auftrag>. (The BPP is a subordinate authority of the German Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community).

¹⁷¹ See Lilith Volkert, 'Auf die Fresse gegen Gewalt,' Süddeutsche Zeitung/SZ.de, 31 October 2014, online at: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/satire-gegen-hooligans-auf-die-fresse-gegen-walt-1.220072>.

¹⁷² See Hooligans gegen Satzbau, 'Über HoGeSatzbau,' online at: <https://www.hogesatzbau.de/ueber-hogesatzbau/>.



FIGURE 7 Grammar sets you free! Do you want total orthography? (A #HoGeSatzbau meme)

For example: 1. “Only because I’m a Nazi, I’m far from being a patriot” (Nur weil ich Nazi bin, bin ich noch lange kein Patriot). “In your face — against violence” 2. (Auf die Fresse — gegen Gewalt).¹⁷³ 3. “AfD: ‘Which gender you’re today?’ Striegel [Politician of the] (Greens): “The answer is 42” (AfD: ‘Welches Geschlecht tragen Sie heute?’ Striegel (Grüne): ‘Ich möchte Ihnen sagen, dass die Antwort auf all Ihre Fragen 42 ist’). In contrast to other organisations fighting against hate speech, #HoGeSatzbau is not funded by any governmental or close-to-the-state body, as the founders believe this would endanger their independence. As a consequence #HoGeSatzbau even terminated fruitful cooperation with the Amadeu Antonio Foundation. Now

funded by merchandise sales and crowdfunding campaigns, #HoGeSatzbau’s activities include poster guerilla actions with slogans like “All Saxons are racists...[] if you take the easy way out” [Alle Sachsen sind Rassisten... wenn man sich die Welt einfach macht].¹⁷⁴ The campaigns of #HoGeSatzbau are primarily designed to counter the Anti-Muslim Populism, Ethno-Nationalism, and Victimhood narratives, as these are the narratives that the HoGeSa movement tries to promote.¹⁷⁵ The counter-narratives try to undermine the credibility of the radical right narratives with humor in order to promote positive alternatives and food for thought about how to overcome thinking in stereotypes (see Saxon example) or group-focused enmity.

¹⁷³ See Lilith Volkert, ‘Auf die Fresse gegen Gewalt,’ Süddeutsche Zeitung/SZ.de, 31 October 2014, online at: <https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/satire-gegen-hooligans-auf-die-fresse-gegen-gewalt-1.2200072>.

¹⁷⁴ Hooligans gegen Satzbau, ‘Alle Sachsen sind Rassisten... wenn man sich die Welt einfach macht’, online at: <https://www.startnext.com/media/thumbnails/97a/e5b6aeeb78fef715979393e49cf6a097a/abcba2cd/3.jpg>; Hooligans gegen Satzbau, ‘Triumph des Wissens,’ (München: Verlag Antje Kunstmann 2018); See Hooligans gegen Satzbau, ‘HoGeSatzbau – Krautpfanding,’ 23 March 2016, online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nSXvcUmxizw>; Hooligans gegen Satzbau, ‘HoGeSatzbau – Krautpfanding, Initiative gegen Rechts-Schreibung™,’ 23 March 2016, online at: <https://www.startnext.com/hogesatzbau>.

¹⁷⁵ Nowadays they partially extended their focus to other narratives but they keep the focus on the above mentioned ones.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This report provides a brief overview of radical right extremist groups, narratives, counter-narratives, and the corresponding counter-narrative campaigns. The radical right in Germany has undergone multiple transformations since German Reunification but especially during the last 10 years. Moving from party politics and street-based activism to electoralism and vigilantism, it becomes clear that the radical right movement is much more united in its very diversity than in the past because the various groupings gather behind a common set of main narratives (see above). These are compatible with actors in the movement ranging from the AfD to PEGIDA and the IBD to C18. Even though these groups are not necessarily comparable regarding their approach, degree of violence, and mainstreamness, they can agree on the minimum common denominators. For example, the supporters of PEGIDA and the AfD in the wake of the ‘refugee crisis’ have used some of these narratives. In particular, the Anti-Muslim Populism and Victimhood narratives are accepted and partly adopted by wider parts of the population, evincing their support for the narrative and the groups/parties online and offline.

In response to such polarized societal situations and challenging circumstances, practitioners would be advised to develop creative and innovative methods, i.e. counter-narratives which serve the direct purpose of de-escalation by targeting the ideological specificities of single groups but that also unfold their effect in and to a wider public, online and offline. Counter-narratives work best when they disrupt and delegitimize the simplified views on which the radical right extremist narratives are often based upon. Re-

garding the choice of the type of counter-narrative, practitioners should make a careful choice regarding the counter-narrative itself and even especially consider the kind of counter-narrative. A recent study of the Federal Criminal Police Office¹⁷⁶ has shown that approaches and campaigns that are personalized and are precisely tailored to the target groups’ habits and offer alternative narratives to various grievances work best. But it is also important to use counter-narratives that address a broader public and raise attention and awareness in the public that certain narratives are opposed to the constitutionally and electorally confirmed democratic consensus, i.e. to show alternatives as well as ways out.

This report finds that informal campaigns using a mixture of humor, disruption of radical right ideology, and alternative narratives that focus online and offline equally but are also situation-dependent are the best ways to prevent and counter violent extremism on an argumentative basis. Moreover, it is desirable, if not an absolute necessity, to enable researchers to evaluate programmes on the basis of qualitative and quantitative data that have to be provided by the project coordinator/campaign managers. Another important point that should be considered for future projects is that programmes should not exclusively and separately target the radical right but might focus upon a wider public. For example, groups that offer and/or share platforms with the radical right. Proactive approaches in education targeting the mainstream and not only at-risk groups (ranging from primary to tertiary prevention), which is currently the case in the tripartite German Federal programme “Liv-

¹⁷⁶ See: Lena Frischlich, Diana Rieger, Anna Morten, Gary Bente (eds.), ‘Videos gegen Extremismus? Counter-Narrative auf dem Prüfstand’ (Wiesbaden: Bundeskriminalamt, 2017).

ing Democracy!” [Demokratie leben], with the pillars “Support Democracy” [Demokratie fördern], “Shape Diversity” [Vielfalt gestalten], and “Prevent Extremism” [Extremismusprävention]. It would be desirable to foster campaigns targeting the mainstream population so that narratives like Anti-Muslim Populism, Ethno-Nationalism, Anti-Globalism, and Victimhood are prevented from gaining traction in society.¹⁷⁷ In order to counter the radical right extremist narratives on a broader basis and to reach a larger target audience, the following points should be considered:

1. Expand and sustain long-term work in challenging non-constitutional and rigid conceptions of Islam; support liberal, secular communities; highlight positive contributions to society.
2. Strong emphasis upon the German Basic Law that stresses the universality of human rights in sharp contrast to particularistic citizenship based on ethnic-national criteria. Pointing at the German history of migra-

tion, especially after WWII, and how the refugees from Eastern Prussia became fellow citizens.

3. Stress the political and economic advantages of globalization; do not skip the disadvantages but address them in open dialogue.
4. Foster honest dialogue on grievances that are not given enough attention, but are of central importance to particular groups from the local to the federal level; draw red lines where democratic discourse and unjustified self-victimization grow out of proportion.

By expanding and sustaining radical right extremist counter-narratives — using best practice based on multiple forms of evaluation — Germany will be able to further sensitise its citizens (without overcharging them) and push back radical right ideology into the cordon sanitaire and contain not only radical right violent extremism, but hopefully other forms as well.

¹⁷⁷ The “Neo-Nazism respectively Nazi Revisionism” narrative is almost exclusively limited to the radical right and not very likely to become popular in the mainstream, even though exceptions confirm the rule.

